2002- 2003

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY

GRAND JURY

FINAL REPORT

June 2003

County Government Center

San Luis Obispo, California 93408

( 805) 781- 5188 [ voice]

( 805) 781- 1156 [ fax]

www. slocourts. net

GRAND JURY

COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA 93408

To the Citizens of San Luis Obispo County

We, members of the 2002- 2003 San Luis Obispo County Grand Jury, present our

Final Report to you. The most significant part of our report is a compilation of 11

individual reports on cases examining operations, conditions, management, and

procedures of several public agencies in the county. In accordance with California

Penal Code Section 940, at least 12 members of the grand jury approved this

report.

We present two types of reports:

♦ Investigation Reports ( 8) are those where we present findings and, in all but

one report, recommendations to which agencies must respond: “ do you agree

with what we found, and will you implement what we recommend?” We ask

you, as citizens, to watch for a report of the next grand jury in early 2004 on

those responses.

♦ Information Reports ( 3) are those where we want to increase your under-standing

about government programs that may affect your lives and how you

judge those in government who serve you. These reports do not include find-ings

or recommendations.

Other Parts of Our Final Report

♦ A description of how we went about our business as a grand jury from July

2002 to June 2003 to produce the investigation and information reports.

♦ A summary of the extent to which agencies are implementing recommenda-tions

of the 1998- 1999 Grand Jury ( continuing a tradition to tell the public how

well agencies have responded to prior grand jury recommendations).

Required Inquiries

California Penal Code Section 919( b) requires every county grand jury to inquire

into the condition and management of the public prisons within the county. In San

Luis Obispo County, those prisons include two state institutions, the California

Men’s Colony and the El Paso de Robles Youth Facility, and the County Jail. We

inspected all three facilities. We only report, however, on two: the El Paso de

Robles Youth Facility and the County Jail. We have nothing to add to what previ-ous

grand juries have reported on the California Men’s Colony.

Report Review

County counsel has reviewed this report. The presiding judge of the Superior

Court of California in San Luis Obispo County has certified that the report com-plies

with Title Four of the Penal Code and has directed the county clerk to accept

and file the report as a public document.

Kip Chase, Foreman, San Luis Obispo

Bill Baldridge, Atascadero

Barton Dennen, Pismo Beach

Kenneth Fowler, San Luis Obispo

Robert Gagnon, Paso Robles

Jeffry Green, San Luis Obispo

Gordon Herb, Los Osos

Norman Hulsey, Arroyo Grande

Cosmo Insalaco, Arroyo Grande

Bill Kerstan, Paso Robles

Gail Lafferty, San Luis Obispo

Ronald Magoffin, San Luis Obispo

Ben Pollard, San Luis Obispo

James Ragan, Cambria

Betty Scanlan, Atascadero

Ann Schlegel, Grover Beach

Harry Shlaudeman, San Luis Obispo

Harold Tune, Morro Bay

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INVESTIGATION REPORTS 3

RISK MANAGEMENT— SMALL OFFICE, BIG RESPONSIBILITIES 3

GROVER BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT MAKES MANAGEMENT

IMPROVEMENTS; MORE NEEDED 7

RALCCO RECYCLING SITE IN NIPOMO— CLEANUP DUE 12

IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN THE INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT

PROGRAM 14

CUESTA COLLEGE ASSOCIATE DEGREE NURSING PROGRAM ADJUSTS

WELL TO A CHANGE IN ADMISSION POLICY 16

NORTH COUNTY NEEDS NEW SYSTEM FOR BOOKING ACCUSED LAW

BREAKERS 19

JUVENILE COURT COURTROOM IN COUNTY NEEDS

BETTER SECURITY 20

FEW PROBLEMS EXIST IN SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY JAIL 21

INFORMATION REPORTS 22

SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS ACT IS EFFECTIVE— BUT WITH

RESERVATIONS 22

PASO ROBLES YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

DOWNSIZING— CHANGES AHEAD 26

PLANNING DEPARTMENT IS TRYING TO MAKE LIFE EASIER

FOR ITS CUSTOMERS 26

2002- 2003 GRAND JURY ACTIVITY 28

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 1998- 1999

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY GRAND JURY 29

RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS TO THIS REPORT’S FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 30

PHOTO OF 2002- 2003 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY GRAND JURY 31

GRAND JURY COMPLAINT FORM BACK COVER

3

RISK MANAGEMENT— SMALL OFFICE, BIG

RESPONSIBILITIES

Synopsis

R isk Management, an office with five employees, is responsible for the county

government’s insurance, liability, workers’ compensation, county employee

health benefits, unemployment insurance, and safety programs. The pro-jected

cost of servicing these programs in the 2002- 2003 fiscal year1 totals more

than $ 10 million. State legislation and the events of 9/ 11 have substantially in-creased

insurance premiums and administrative costs generally. Staffing turn-over

in recent months created problems for the office and made it necessary to

extend the contract of the outside company Risk Management uses to process

claims. This report discusses the functions Risk Management performs and makes

recommendations on staffing, processing of workers’ compensation claims, re-viewing

the work of the third- party administrator, and training of selected safety

officers.

Concept

In common with private- sector business— and, for that matter with every home-owner—

the county government must provide for and attempt to reduce the risks

to which it is exposed. The mission statement of the Risk Management Division

assigns it the responsibility “ to minimize the loss of county assets by ensuring a

safe, accessible environment, providing cost- effective employee benefit programs,

and insuring against risk.” Insurance is the first line of defense. The county in-sures

itself against liability and workers’ compensation claims up to $ 250,000 per

claim. It buys coverage above that amount and, for property damage and medical

malpractice, through a pooling arrangement with other California counties. Work-related

injury or illness leads to workers’ compensation claims. Risk Management’s

responsibility is ( 1) to coordinate and monitor countywide safety programs de-signed

to prevent the work- related accidents or illnesses that produce such claims;

and ( 2) once an employee makes a claim, to assure fair adjudication while holding

down processing costs. The affordable and effective healthcare coverage Risk

Management seeks to obtain as an employee benefit can also work to contain

costs in the form of fewer claims and a more productive work force.

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Does Risk Management have adequate staff?

Findings

( 1) Normal staffing consists of a risk manager, a workers’ compensation co-ordinator,

a safety officer, a benefits coordinator, and a confidential assis-tant.

2

( 2) Risk Management is responsible for the county’s insurance, workers’ com-pensation,

safety, and employee benefits programs.

( 3) The office was without a permanent workers’ compensation coordinator

and a full- time safety officer for approximately three months.

( 4) Risk Management’s budget for the current fiscal year, 2002- 2003, is $ 10.8

million. Its budget projection for 2003- 2004 is over $ 15 million.

1 July 2002 to June 2003.

2 A confidential assistant has access to highly sensitive legal and personal infor-mation.

INVESTIGATION

REPORTS

( 5) The risk manager states that her goal is a more proactive managerial role

for the office as a means to greater efficiency and cost containment. She

further states that one or two additional lower- level employees to assist

with the paperwork would help her achieve that goal.

Conclusions

With such a small staff and such heavy responsibilities, Risk Management needs

to have permanent qualified employees in these two positions as soon as pos-sible.

Recruitment of a full- time safety officer is particularly important in view of

the escalation in workers’ compensation costs.

We are in no position to measure the volume of paperwork the office must deal

with but can testify from frequent visits that there is a lot of it.

Extra support in processing paperwork should help free the risk manager and the

coordinators for more active roles in working with the county departments on such

problems as unnecessary delays in getting employees back on the job after ab-sences

as a result of work- related injury or illness.

Recommendations

( 1) The county should assign a high priority to recruiting and training qualified

individuals for the two positions.

( 2) The risk manager should prepare a detailed justification for adding one or

two clerical employees, including specifics on how she and her subordi-nates

would make use of the time saved from paperwork.

( 3) The county administrator should, if the justification makes sense, look at

the possibility of shifting one or two clerical employees to Risk Manage-ment

from other county departments. If that is not possible, he should

consider recruiting from outside the county government. Salaries for two

administrative assistant III positions would total $ 62,064 plus benefits at

step 5 of the wage scale. We estimate this expense at 0.5 percent of the

total annual 2003- 2004 budget.

Is the third- party administrator furnishing the best available level of service

in processing workers’ compensation claims?

Findings

( 6) Gallagher Bassett Services has been the third- party administrator since

1979.

( 7) Gallagher Bassett processes the claims and notifies employees of their

disposition.

( 8) Gallagher Bassett won the most recent five- year contract in 1998 with the

low bid for the first year’s annual fee. In light of the sudden departure of

the workers’ compensation coordinator, the risk manager extended the

contract for a year with the approval of the Board of Supervisors.

( 9) The most recent outside audit of the processing of these claims found

Gallagher Bassett performing effectively in the areas of investigation, de-cision

making on compensation, communicating with claimants, and clos-ing

out cases.

( 10) The audit found some areas for improvement. In the sample of cases

checked, Gallagher Bassett made some payments inaccurately or in an

untimely fashion. Reserves against projected future costs were not ad-equate

in all cases. Gallagher Bassett paid some medical bills against

the wrong files.

( 11) The audit sample identified five out of ten claims that had been paid late.

Of the claims paid late, the county averages 10 days to get the employer’s

report to Gallagher Bassett, which then averages another 9.8 days to is-sue

the first payment or notice.

( 12) California Labor Code Section 4652 requires issuing initial indemnity pay-ment

( or notice if there is no such payment) within 14 days of the first day

of disability.

( 13) The county paid $ 11,860 in penalties to workers between July 2002 and

March 2003.

4

( 14) Our examination of the records indicates some inconsistencies between

the loss data Gallagher Bassett reported to the California State Associa-tion

of Counties ( CSAC) and to Risk Management.

( 15) The county will seek proposals for the 2004- 2009 contract next year.

Conclusions

County officials told us that the county has had a long and apparently satisfactory

relationship with Gallagher Bassett.

Any long- term relationship of this kind merits a close look now and then.

A systematic review of Gallagher Bassett’s performance, with a focus on the

strengths and weaknesses the audit identified, could be useful in developing crite-ria

to be used in future Request for Proposals ( RFP) the county will issue in rela-tion

to contracts for third- party administrators.

In view of the legal requirements, both the county and Gallagher Bassett need to

speed up the processing of employer reports.

Recommendations

( 4) The county should make use of the months remaining before issuance of

a new RFP to review Gallagher Bassett’s performance in a systematic

fashion, using the results of the audit as a starting point in developing

criteria for the new RFP.

( 5) The county should, to the extent its regulations permit, give due weight to

other factors as well as cost in considering the proposals for the 2004-

2009 contract. Among those factors should be historical performance,

the ratio of projected claims to examiners, and the experience levels of

the examiners.

Would additional training strengthen the county’s safety program?

Findings

( 16) The county has an overall safety committee that includes representatives

of five key departments: General Services, Sheriff- Coroner, Medical Ser-vices,

Public Works, and Social Services.

( 17) Representatives of four of the five departments on the safety committee

told us that they made use of various training aids in preparing for their

responsibilities. 3 However, none had received formal training.

( 18) The California Office of Environmental Health and Safety ( CAL/ OSHA)

offers a wide variety of training classes in Sacramento and at other loca-tions.

Conclusion

More thorough training of its members should help the committee strengthen the

safety program throughout the county government.

Recommendation

( 6) Risk Management’s next full- time safety officer should look into the possi-bility

of formal training for the key members of the safety committee.

Comment Requirements

As provided in Section 933 of the California Penal Code, the risk manager and the

county administrative officer shall comment to the presiding judge of the Superior

Court of California in San Luis Obispo on the findings and recommendations in

this report within 60 days of its publication. The Board of Supervisors must com-ment

within 90 days.

3 A representative of the fifth department was not available.

The Setting: County Government Risk Management

Cost of Programs

The county’s current fiscal year budget allots about $ 10.8 million to the servicing

of the programs for which Risk Management has responsibility. Next year’s fiscal

year projections are for slightly over $ 15 million. Servicing includes insurance

premiums, claim payments, third- party administrator fees, legal and medical ex-penses,

and other operating expenditures. Escalating costs in the workers’ com-pensation

program contribute significantly to these numbers. That program’s pro-jected

operating costs in 2003- 2004 alone come to just over $ 8 million, a 68-

percent increase in one year. The table on below displays the budget for the

current fiscal year and the projected operating costs for 2003- 2004.4

General Budget Overview

Risk Management & Property Budget

------------ 2002- 2003------------- ----- 2003- 2004 ( requested)-----

Salaries & Benefits $ 455,829 $ 497,465

Property & Misc. Insurance Premiums 522,885 608,345

Services & Supplies 396,997 412,523

Risk Mgt. & Property Totals $ 1,375,711 $ 1,518,333

Internal Service Fund Budget, Self- Insured Programs ( Operating Expenses)

Services & Supplies $ 1,056,596 $ 931,609

Overhead 380,186 303,360

Gallagher Bassett Contracts

Workers' Compensation $ 182,972 $ 230,725

Liability 102,970 285,942 108,833 339,558

Insurance Premiums

Workers' Compensation 510,3279 28,036

Liability 121,5075 05,916

Medical Malpractice 270,904 902,738 311,540 1,745,492

Claims

Workers' Compensation 3,376,000 6,000,000

Liability 1,300,000 1,300,000

Medical Malpractice 25,000 20,000

Unemployment Insurance 232,000 714,000

Dental Plan 1,173,000 6,106,000 1,528,500 9,562,500

Outside Legal

Workers' Compensation 150,000 160,000

Liability 540,000 690,000 500,000 660,000

ISF Totals $ 9,421,442 $ 13,542,519

Totals, Both Budgets $ 10,797,153 $ 15,060,852

4 The county divides Risk Management costs between two budgets. The budget

for expenses, about $ 1.3 million, includes salaries and other office costs, as

well as those associated with the property insurance programs. The Internal

Service Fund ( ISF) budget with expenses about $ 9.5 million, covers programs

with a self- insured retention component including workers’ compensation, li-ability,

medical malpractice, unemployment, and a dental program.

5 We understand that the county is in the process of shifting Risk Management

from the Office of County Administrator to the Department of Personnel.

Staff and Supervision

Only five employees make up Risk Management’s regular staffing: the risk man-ager

( classified in the personnel system as a principal administrative analyst), a

personnel analyst to handle the workers’ compensation program, the safety of-ficer,

a coordinator of the benefits program, and a confidential assistant. 5 The

Board of Supervisors expects Risk Management to hold down the costs of these

expensive programs, to manage them efficiently with due regard for employee

welfare, and to guard the county against catastrophic loss. Following are brief

discussions of each of the programs.

5

Insurance

To reduce its costs, the county participates in the insurance programs available to

members of the CSAC Excess Insurance Authority ( EIA). The EIA, established in

1979, pools substantial buying power in a tight insurance market. Today, 53 of

California’s 58 counties participate in one or more of the EIA programs. The ar-rangement

has benefited San Luis Obispo County considerably. As an example,

fiscal year 2001- 2002 dividends6 to the county from the pool in the liability pro-gram

exceeded the gross premium of $ 380,429, making that year’s liability insur-ance

cost free. According to CSAC, liability insurance purchased that year in the

open market would have cost $ 711,673, or close to double the gross premium.

But even with the pooling advantages, the premiums the county must pay in this

difficult insurance market are rising rapidly, as the budget presented above illus-trates.

Workers’ Compensation. The county self- insures against workers’ compensa-tion

claims of up to $ 250,000 per claim and buys coverage to $ 50 million through

the EIA. The EIA premium was up 257 percent this fiscal year and will increase

another 82 percent next year, according to the county’s projection.

Liability. Payment of liability claims up to the $ 250,000 per claim self- insured

level comes out of a budget unit in the county’s Internal Service Fund ( ISF). Insur-ance

purchased through the EIA provides coverage over the risk the county re-tains

( the $ 250,000 per claim) up to $ 25 million.

Medical Malpractice . Despite the closing or sale of General Hospital, the county

will still need medical malpractice insurance to cover the doctors and other health

personnel working in its clinics and jails. The malpractice insurance the county

buys from the CSAC- EIA pool and from a private carrier through CSAC covers

claims up to $ 11.5- million with a $ 10,000 deductible. A third- party administrator,

Risk Management Services, processes the malpractice claims and engages out-side

legal counsel when needed to handle malpractice litigation.

Property. There is no self- insurance in the property program, 7 only a $ 10,000

deductible. The program includes a number of separate policies in addition to

straight property coverage. Liability exposure at the airport is among the risks

included in a separate policy. The premium for the county’s property insurance

nearly tripled from 2001- 2002 to 2003- 2004, in part as a result of the events of 9/

11.8 For insurance purposes, the county values its property at about $ 250 million.

It insures property valued at approximately $ 112 million against earthquake risk.

Workers’ Compensation

In common with every employer in the state, the county must compensate em-ployees

in accordance with the California Labor Code for disability leave and

medical expenses associated with work- related injuries or illness. Risk

Management’s policy statement assigns it the responsibility for investigating and

processing workers’ compensation claims. In practice, the third- party administra-tor,

Gallagher Bassett, processes the claims and arranges for investigation. Risk

Management oversees this function.

The budget for next fiscal year, taking into account changes in the system by the

state legislature, projects $ 6 million in payments for claims, up from an initially

estimated $ 3.4 million this fiscal year. The number of claims has averaged around

300, or roughly 10 percent of the work force for the past 12 years. According to

the county’s actuarial firm, the amount of the average claim is $ 8,640, which—

while above the CSAC average of $ 7,600— is well within CSAC’s acceptable range

of $ 6,500-$ 10,000. In fiscal year 2000- 2001, employees lost 1,541 days due to

workplace injury. In 2001- 2002, the count improved to 1,078 days lost.

6 A dividend is a share of surplus allocated to a policyholder in a participating

insurance policy. For CSAC members participating in the pool, the low claims

experience of the pool members generated dividends for all members in the

pool.

7 That fact accounts for the separate budgetary treatment of the property insur-ance

programs mentioned previously.

8 In the absence of the EIA, a stand- alone premium for property insurance pur-chased

individually by the county might well run one million dollars or, more, if

available at all.

Claims Process. The workers’ compensation process in the county requires the

affected employee’s department to fax to Risk Management an “ Employee Report

of Occupational Injury or Illness” within 24 hours of the occurrence of injury or

illness. After reviewing it, that office in turn faxes the form to Gallagher Bassett,

which has the contractual authority to settle claims up to $ 10,000. The risk man-ager

must approve claims above that figure to $ 20,000.

Third- Party Administrator. The county has utilized the services of Gallagher

Bassett since 1979 when the EIA first offered excess workers’ compensation in-surance.

The relationship presently rests on a five- year contract awarded July 1,

1998. This contract directly results from an internal audit conducted by the county

auditor- controller. A significant finding in the audit was that the county sent out an

RFP to elicit competitive bids only once in a 20- year period, in 1987. The auditor-controller

recommended that the county issue an RFP on a predetermined cycle

of not more than every five years to ensure that the county gets the most efficient

and cost- effective service available. Gallagher Bassett’s bid for the initial year’s

fee came in approximately $ 45,000 below the next lowest bid.

Due to the unexpected departure of two of Risk Management’s five permanent

employees, the Board of Supervisors approved Risk Management’s request to

extend the contract one year to June 30, 2004. Among the services the company

provides is a computerized claims- tracking system to which Risk Management

has access. Gallagher Bassett notifies employees in writing of the disposition of

their claims. It calculates and sends the temporary and permanent disability checks

and other related payments, as required. In handling the more difficult claims,

Gallagher Bassett may engage the services of outside investigators or attorneys.

Over the life of the contract to last December, the county paid Gallagher Bassett

$ 613,579 for outside legal counsel.

Risk Management’s Role. In addition to its role as overseer, Risk Management

acts as a liaison on workers’ compensation matters between the county depart-ments

and the third- party administrator. The risk manager would like a broader

role to include, among other responsibilities, providing training so that the depart-ments

can contribute more actively and directly to the workers’ compensation pro-gram.

She would like more control over the initial 30- day period in workers’ com-pensation

cases, particularly in the management of the medical aspect in order to

hold down costs and ensure that prescribed treatment is appropriate. Ideally, in

her view, the county would contract with a medical office to diagnose and treat all

claimants in a timely fashion during that initial period.

The risk manager describes her approach to workers’ compensation cases as

“ aggressive but fair”— aggressive in terms of preventing misuse of the program

but fair in treatment of legitimate claims.

The chronic shortage of physicians in this county and the consequent difficulty in

getting appointments can delay the processing of cases. That may mean a delay

in returning employees to work adding to the county’s cost.

Cost. Workers’ compensation payments from July 1, 1998, to December 2, 2002,

totaled more than $ 17 million. During that period the county paid more than

$ 930,0009 in premiums for coverage against claims exceeding the self- insured

limit. As a result of state legislation signed into law in February 2002, benefits

under workers’ compensation will increase over a four- year transitional period.

Beginning in January of this year, the maximum total disability payment went up

from $ 409 to $ 602 per week. It will continue to rise on a yearly basis, reaching

$ 840 per week in January 2006. Thereafter the rate will track average salaries in

the state.

Liability

Liability claims against the county typically result from automobile accidents and

other mishaps involving county vehicles, equipment, and property, as well as al-leged

misconduct on the part of county employees. A recent settlement to the

victim of an automobile accident involving a county employee and county vehicle

was $ 1.7 million. The County paid the first $ 250,000 and the CSAC- EIA policy will

cover the rest. Gallagher Bassett can settle claims up to $ 10,000; the risk man-ager

can settle claims up to $ 20,000; and claims above that figure require Board

of Supervisors’ approval.

9 Next year’s premium alone promises to equal that amount.

6

According to Risk Management’s annual budget presentation in June 2002, the

county on the average resolves 45 percent of its liability cases with no payment.

The average liability claim, in which there is payment, settles for approximately

$ 6,500. Nevertheless, the county projects $ 1.3 million in payments next fiscal

year for claims under the $ 250,000 limit and $ 500,000 in legal fees. Records

indicate that the county paid $ 3.3 million in claims and $ 2.3 million in legal fees

between July 1, 1998 and February 2003. The budget presentation also states

that the number of claims where the county made payment compares favorably

with the results reported by other CSAC members: 1.15 claims per one million

dollars of payroll as against an average of 1.22.

Benefits

Risk Management is responsible for negotiating and administrating county em-ployee

benefit programs, including health, dental, vision, life, and long- term dis-ability

insurance. The county contributes a “ cafeteria benefit” toward each

employee’s cost of such insurance. Collective bargaining determines the amount

for most employees. The monthly amounts currently range from $ 290 to $ 652.

Health, Vision, and Dental. Risk Management presently offers through the Cali-fornia

Public Employees Retirement System ( CALPERS) two Blue Cross plans

and a Blue Shield HMO plan. The Lifeguard Company previously offered a fourth

health plan. However, the plan failed financially and went into receivership on

January 1, 2003. Lifeguard was a popular option with 668 active and 82 retired

employees enrolled as of the end of 2002 out of an employee base of approxi-mately

2,700. Payment of still open claims against Lifeguard should be com-pleted

shortly.

Currently, the monthly cost of health coverage for an employee with two depen-dents

ranges from $ 694.86 to $ 1,425.00, minus the cafeteria benefit. These costs

are up about 18- 19 percent over 2001- 2002. If the employee does not take one of

the health, dental, and vision coverage options, he or she cannot collect the caf-eteria

benefit unless able to offer proof of adequate coverage through a policy

outside the system. Risk Management is currently evaluating alternatives to the

health insurance provided through CALPERS. Cost for an employee with two

dependents is $ 55.15 per month for the Delta HMO, or $ 96.00 for the Delta Pre-ferred

Option. The comparable rate for the Vision Service Plan is $ 19.76.

Life and Long- Term Disability. The county provides and pays for term life insur-ance

for management and confidential employees, 10 all attorneys, and the inves-tigators

in the district attorney’s office. Employees at the lower levels of these

categories receive $ 30,000 of such insurance at a cost to the county of $ 8.10 a

month. Department heads and general managers benefit from $ 50,000 of cover-age

at a cost of $ 13.50 a month.

The employees in these categories also receive long- term disability coverage at a

premium rate of 0.53 percent of gross salary to a monthly gross of $ 9,000. Life

and long- term disability insurance are benefits negotiated through collective bar-gaining.

About 550 employees are eligible to receive these benefits.

Safety

The California Occupational Safety and Health Act obligates every employer to

maintain an effective Illness and Injury Prevention Program ( IIPP) in writing. Risk

Management has prepared an IIPP Policy and Procedures Manual as guidance

for management and staff in implementing the program. The safety officer is re-sponsible

for coordinating the program with all county departments. In examining

the manual, we found that it addresses all of the requirements listed in act, includ-ing

assignment of responsibilities, inspections, training, accident investigations,

and record keeping.

Investigation Details

Origin of the Investigation

We encountered the Risk Management Division in the course of inquiring into a

citizen complaint. The members of the grand jury were, for the most part, un-aware

of the existence of such an office. To inform ourselves, we undertook the

investigation that led to this report. The objective of the report, in turn, is to inform

the public about the important responsibilities and functions of an entity of the

county government we assume is as little known to other citizens as it was to us.

Authority/ Jurisdiction for the Investigation

Section 925 of the California Penal Code provides that the “ grand jury shall inves-tigate

and report on the operations, accounts, and records of the officers, depart-ments,

or functions of the county. . . .” This report comes within that authority.

Other Issues

The critical issues we encountered in preparing this report transcend both the

authority and analytical capabilities of any grand jury. Those issues relate to the

exorbitant costs of the programs for which Risk Management is responsible. Ab-sent

a more favorable insurance market and reforms in the statewide workers’

compensation system, that office can do little to reduce the burden on the county

and its taxpayers.

Lesser issues included, in addition to those we have addressed in this report, the

question of where to place Risk Management in the county’s administrative struc-ture.

As noted, there is a proposal to switch it from the County Administrator’s

Office to the Department of Personnel. We are unable to judge the pros and cons

of such a move. We discussed the question of whether the safety and benefit

programs belong in Risk Management. Some counties limit risk management to

administering only the insurance functions. This comes down to a matter of ad-ministrative

convenience. We see nothing intrinsically wrong in the current ar-rangement,

always assuming staffing is adequate. In part because of the turn-over

in personnel, we did not assess the overall management of the division. We

did find the risk manager to be both dedicated to her job and highly industrious.

Methods and Validity

In gathering information for this report, we interviewed a number of county em-ployees—

active and retired— as well as sources outside the county government.

We met numerous times with the current risk manager, at some trial to her pa-tience.

Her retired predecessor gave us information, as did the employee ben-efits

coordinator, the former safety officer, and the former workers’ compensation

coordinator. We also discussed risk management operations with the county

administrator, assistant county administrator, assistant county counsel, the audi-tor-

controller, assistant auditor- controller, and the county personnel director. Four

of the five key members of the safety committee provided their views. At least two

jurors participated in every interview.

We obtained information from state offices in Sacramento, including those deal-ing

with self- insurance plans, workers’ compensation, and managed health care.

Two senior analysts at CSAC helped us with information. We also consulted two

partners and an analyst at a private company in the field of risk services. And we

consulted the company that did the outside audit on Gallagher Bassett.

In order to obtain and confirm the data we presented, we reviewed division bud-gets

provided by the risk manager, overall county budgets, and the comprehen-sive

annual financial reports provided by the auditor- controller. We also reviewed

the most recent annual CSAC/ EIA reports on this county, the CSAC risk- loss data

reports, as well as overall CSAC annual reports for the past five years. And we

examined Gallagher Bassett claims reports and all related vendor payments the

county made for the past five years, matching vendor payments to premium his-tory

provided by CSAC. We checked and rechecked all the numbers in this re-port.

The risk manager reviewed our findings and provided comment.

10 Confidential employees are those with access to highly sensitive information.

7

GROVER BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT MAKES

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS; MORE NEEDED

Synopsis

T he past few years have been somewhat turbulent for the Grover Beach

Police Department. This is due, at least in part, to internal differences in

law enforcement and public allegations of mismanagement against the de-partment

by an employee it terminated. We examined those differences and alle-gations

in several management areas. While the department had a problem in

2000 and 2001 with respect to a police officer maintaining firearms proficiency, it

corrected the problem— albeit slowly. While there were inconsistencies in the

department’s conduct of arrests of persons for driving under the influence ( DUI) of

alcohol or drugs, there is no longer a problem because of personnel changes.

The department could, however, endanger public safety and expose the city to

financial risk in how it continues to deal with the vehicles driven by DUI arrestees.

We recommend a way for the department to reduce this risk.

We commend the department for the positive changes it has made. Neverthe-less,

we found a lack of strong management, accountability, and sense of urgency

in resolving issues such as firearms qualification, DUI enforcement, vehicle tow-ing,

concerns about liability, and gender bias. Moreover, it has taken the depart-ment

two years to comprehensively update its outdated Policy and Procedures

Manual. We recommend that the department seek accreditation from the Com-mission

on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. Achieving accreditation,

which involves setting police department standards, is a way to control liability

costs, contribute to administrative improvements, achieve greater accountability

from supervisors, and increase governmental and community support.

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

In 2000 and 2001, did the Grover Beach Police Department potentially

endanger public safety or expose the city to financial risk in its policies and

conduct of its requalification of peace officers in firearms proficiency?

Findings

( 1) The department’s current Policy and Procedures Manual contains no policy

with respect to officers achieving and maintaining firearms proficiency on

the range.

( 2) A revision to the Policy and Procedures Manual, in draft but not yet adopted,

does contain a policy with respect to officers achieving and maintaining

firearms proficiency on the range.

( 3) In 2000 and 2001, the practice ( unwritten) with respect to officers achiev-ing

and maintaining firearms proficiency on the range was that officers

went to a range to requalify on firearms once or twice a year.

( 4) Beginning in 2002, the practice ( unwritten) with respect to officers achiev-ing

and maintaining firearms proficiency on the range is that officers go to

the range monthly: every three months to requalify and the other months

to practice and train.

( 5) Between June 2000 and July 2001, one officer failed to requalify on fire-arms

proficiency four times: June 2000, July 2000, November 2000, and

January 2001.

( 6) That officer had previously requalified in September 1999, October 1999,

and January 2000.

( 7) That officer requalified in July 2001. Department management asked the

Arroyo Grande Police Department rangemaster to conduct the requali-fication

test to dispel any allegations of impartiality or impropriety. The

officer has subsequently requalified at every range since then.

( 8) In 2000 and 2001, the department had no policy, written or unwritten, with

respect to how to deal with an officer who repeatedly fails to requalify on

firearms proficiency.

( 9) The current draft revision to the department’s Policies and Procedures

Manual contains the policy: “ All qualified personnel are required to qualify

quarterly with their duty weapons on an approved course and that sworn

members who repeatedly fail to qualify will be relieved from field assign-ment

and appropriate disciplinary action may follow.”

( 10) In January 2001, department management stated that the range program

had lost direction.

( 11) During the period of the officer’s failure to requalify, a department supervi-sor

directed a sergeant to draft a policy on range and qualification stan-dards.

The sergeant submitted the draft on February 9, 2001.

( 12) Department management rejected the draft on the basis that parts of it ( 1)

were too punitive against officers or ( 2) conflicted with the Fair Standards

Labor Act and worker’s compensation regulations.

( 13) During the period that the officer failed to requalify, the department gave

the officer remedial training.

( 14) The officer is a female.

( 15) During the period that the officer failed to requalify, she carried on her

normal duties that required her to carry and potentially use firearms. She

was also a member of the department’s Special Problems Team ( SPT), a

special unit directed to area- containment activities in crisis situations.

( 16) Three department supervisors involved in officer range qualification made

statements about her performance as a female officer. Two of the three

told her that she was in danger of being fired. They expressed concern to

management about her qualifications, given her nonqualification on the

firing range, to serve on the SPT.

( 17) In a May 2001 memo to the chief, two sergeants expressed disagreement

on department procedures with respect to the repeated failure of an of-ficer

to qualify on firearms. The two officers also delivered the memo to

the city manager and discussed it with him. One of the officers is a friend

of a city councilmember, who had access to the memo. The two officers

also made information contained in the memo available to the media.

( 18) The chief responded in a June 2001 memo criticizing the sergeants for

not sending the memo up through the department’s established chain of

command.

( 19) The chief told the sergeants that he had received the memo but disagreed

with their findings and conclusions.

( 20) The chief removed one of the sergeants as rangemaster, saying that he

had “ lost faith in his ability to oversee our range program.”

( 21) The female officer orally alleged gender bias incidents to department per-sonnel

in command positions.

( 22) The officer did not file a formal sexual harassment complaint, saying that

she just wanted to get on with her job.

( 23) In late 2001, the department decided to use the Arroyo Grande Police

Department range to requalify all department officers in firearms profi-ciency.

( 24) There were discussions among employees of the department and offi-cials

of the City of Grover Beach with respect to what might be the finan-cial

liability implications of an officer failing to pass firearms proficiency

tests and subsequently firing his or her weapon inadvertently causing in-jury.

( 25) During the time that the officer failed to requalify, there was no incident in

which she fired her firearm in an unsatisfactory manner.

( 26) The officer has received satisfactory performance evaluations.

( 27) Except for this one officer during 2000 and 2001, no witness could recall

when an officer ever failed to requalify after more than two requalification

ranges.

8

Conclusions

The department did not endanger public safety and expose the city to financial

risk in its policies and conduct of its requalification of peace officers in firearms

proficiency. The issue did, however, expose deficiencies in policies and opera-tions

in the requalification process.

In 2000 and 2001, the department dealt with a problem that it had never faced

before: the failure of a sworn police officer to qualify in firearms proficiency four

consecutive times over a 13- month period, June 2000 to July 2001. The officer

had qualified three times prior to June 2000 and has subsequently qualified every

time since July 2001.

Until now, the department had no policy on how to deal with an officer who repeat-edly

failed firearms qualifications’ tests. The department is about to adopt a policy

that addresses the issue: “ All qualified personnel are required to qualify quarterly

with their duty weapons on an approved course and that sworn members who

repeatedly fail to qualify will be relieved from field assignment and appropriate

disciplinary action may follow.” This new policy is a direct result of one officer’s

failure to qualify over the 13- month period.

In May 2001, two department sergeants sent a memo to their department com-manders

expressing their concern about the risk to other officers and the public

from allowing an officer to continue to carry firearms when she consistently failed

to qualify on firearms proficiency. The memo also addressed potential financial

liability to the city if she caused injury to other officers or the public by firing a

weapon during her period of non- qualification. The sergeants writing the memo

inappropriately provided copies to the then city manager and to at least one city

councilmember.

By this time, department managers were concerned about the validity of the fire-arms

qualification tests that the officer failed. They therefore discounted some of

the allegations. Rather than directly addressing the substance of the May 2001

memo, they objected to its distribution directly to the chief of police, thus outside

the chain of command.

Although the officer did not file a formal complaint, there is evidence suggesting

that gender bias was a consideration in how the supervisors dealt with the fire-arms

qualification of that officer.

Given the problem, department managers took control of firearms proficiency quali-fication.

In that officer’s case, they ( 1) removed certain officers from supervising

firearms qualification and ( 2) selected a neutral agency, the Arroyo Grande Police

Department to test her. As indicated before, the officer qualified on that test and

has qualified on every field test since then. During the period of the officer’s non-qualification

on firearms proficiency, there was no incident that might have re-sulted

in safety or liability issues.

Since the summer of 2001, the department has done all of its firearms qualifica-tion

and testing at the Arroyo Grande Police Department range in cooperation with

that department’s rangemaster.

We commend the department for adopting a new policy covering firearms qualifi-cation

certification. However, we express our concern that department managers

allowed this specific issue to get out of control. They could have resolved the

issue by taking control much earlier rather than relying on the reports of their

rangemasters in whom they had lost confidence.

From 1999 to 2001, were there inconsistencies or deficiencies in the

department’s policies for and conduct of arrests of persons for driving under

the influence ( DUI) of alcohol or drugs?

Findings

( 28) The department has no current or proposed policies specifically address-ing

how an officer should handle DUI arrests.

( 29) The department follows appropriate sections of the California Penal Code

and California Vehicle Code in handling DUI arrests.

( 30) Department records state the following with respect to DUI adult arrests:

40 in 1997, 65 in 1998, 136 in 1999, 123 in 2000, 66 in 2001, and 56 in

2002.

( 31) There were 259 DUI arrests in 1999 and 2000. Two officers ( of 17) made

168 of them ( 65%).

( 32) The department sent those two and other officers to special DUI training

between 1998 and 2000.

( 33) In 1999 and 2000, one of those two and other officers received Mothers

Against Drunk Driving ( MADD) and California Office of Traffic Safety ( OTS)

awards for their positive efforts in DUI enforcement, based on recommen-dations

by department management.

( 34) In applying for a grant from the OTS in 2000, the department stated that

one of its objectives was to increase DUI arrests by 15 percent from the

calendar 1998 base year from 83 to 95 by June 2001 and an additional 15

percent from 95 to 110 by June 2002. From July 2001 to June 2002, there

were 80 DUI arrests.

( 35) Also in applying for the OTS grant, the department stated that one of its

objective was to decrease alcohol- related fatal and injury collisions by 50

percent from the calendar 1998 base year of 8 to 4 by June 2002.

( 36) Department records state the following with respect to DUI injury traffic

collisions: 4 in 1997, 6 in 1998, 2 in 1999, 5 in 2000, 6 in 2001, and 6 in

2002. There were no DUI fatal traffic collisions.

( 37) Department records state the following with respect to all DUI traffic colli-sions

( injury and non- injury): 9 in 1997, 12 in 1998, 10 in 1999, 9 in 2000,

18 in 2001, and 14 in 2002.

( 38) One of the officers came under department scrutiny because the quantity

of his DUI arrests were interfering with his performance of other patrol

officer duties.

( 39) Department supervisors discussed their concerns with him.

( 40) Later, department management expressed to him their concern about the

quality of his DUI arrests. One instance involved the arrest of a person

who passed the officer’s Field Sobriety Test and whose field Preliminary

Alcohol Screening ( PAS) test indicated a blood alcohol content ( BAC)

below the 0.08 threshold. The arrestee challenged the arrest. The officer’s

supervisor nullified the arrest because the BAC was below the threshold.

( 41) Department management did verbally counsel the officer regarding his

using probable cause in making DUI arrests. Management did not initiate

any proceedings against the officer for his conduct of DUI arrests.

( 42) Based on a concern about the quality of the officer’s DUI arrests, depart-ment

management asked the County District Attorney’s office if it had

received any negative reports about the officer. The response was that

there were none. Prior to initiating a field test to determine whether the

officer was using probable cause in making DUI arrests, the department

placed him on administrative leave for other actions that led to his termi-nation.

( 43) The department received verbal complaints from tavern owners in the city

that officers were “ sitting on bars,” defined as staking out bars, waiting for

a patron to get behind the wheel and drive away, and then stop him as a

suspected DUI.

( 44) Department management told officers that “ sitting on bars” is “ against all

department protocols.”

Conclusions

There were inconsistencies in the department’s conduct of arrests of persons for

DUI.

The department’s Policy and Procedures Manual does not specifically address

DUI arrests. We have no evidence to suggest that the manual should include

them, since state laws provide the necessary direction.

In 1999 and 2000, the number of annual DUI arrests by department officers more

than doubled the number of arrests in earlier or later years. This two- year “ bubble”

seems consistent with the department’s objective ( stated to the OTS) to increase

DUI arrests by 15 percent annually. The department did not, however, sustain the

increase; the DUI arrests fell back to former levels in 2001. This was due to the

9

facts that, in 2001, one of the two officers responsible for the majority of arrests

was no longer with the department, and the other officer had assumed different

duties that did not give him the opportunity to make as many DUI arrests. The two

officers gave DUIs a higher priority in relation to their other patrol duties than did

most other officers. In 1999 and 2000, there was an inconsistency in carrying out

the department’s law enforcement priorities.

While we do not know whether there is a relationship between the number of DUI

arrests and the number of DUI traffic collisions ( injury and non- injury), one might

expect more arrests to result in fewer collisions and fewer arrests to result in more

collisions. The following table compares the two, 1997 to 2002.

states that it is the general policy of the department to store [ impound]

vehicles driven by persons who are arrested but that officers retain the

discretion to not store the vehicle at the request of the arrestee and when

there is no obvious need to store the car for the continued investigation or

prosecution of the case. Reasons cited for not towing are a traffic- related

warrant arrest; situations where the vehicle was not used to further the

offense for which the driver was arrested; and a situation where a vehicle

can be safely parked, locked, and no obvious valuables are involved. The

policy is not yet in force.

( 55) The department does not keep statistics on the number of towed vehicles

of DUI arrestees. Department records state the following with respect to

the number of vehicles towed for whatever reason: 263 in 1997, 254 in

1998, 296 in 1999, 311 in 2000, 356 in 2001, and 376 in 2002.

Conclusions

The department could endanger public safety and expose the city to financial risk

in its policies and conduct in dealing with the vehicles of DUI arrestees.

The hypothesis proposed was that if:

♦ an officer arrested a person for DUI and simply parked the car nearby,

♦ the officer released the person while still intoxicated to an adult acquaintance,

and

♦ the arrested person drove his vehicle and crashed it resulting in injury or death

to someone,

then the department might be criminally liable and the city financially liable to the

victims.

In August 2001, a new law took effect in the State of New Jersey addressing just

such a situation. The DWI ( driving while intoxicated) Vehicle Impoundment Law

( known as “ John’s Law” after the victim) authorizes, but does not require, law

enforcement agencies in the state to ( 1) impound the vehicle operated by the DUI

arrestee for up to 12 hours and ( 2) issue written warnings of responsibility regard-ing

potential criminal and civil liability to persons assuming custody of the arrestees.

U. S. Senate Bill 192, introduced in January 2003, would amend the U. S. Code by

making impoundment of vehicles driven by DUI arrestees mandatory nationwide.

Current California law authorizes, but does not require, the impoundment of ve-hicles

arrested for DUI. Accordingly, the Grover Beach Police Department’s cur-rent

unwritten policy gives each officer discretion as to when to impound.

The number of all vehicles towed by the department has increased every year

since 1998 ( 48% more in 2002 than in 1998).

The department’s proposed policy ( to be part of its updated Policy and Proce-dures

Manual) states that officers should generally impound vehicles, but gives

them the discretion not to impound for several listed reasons. This policy is pro-impoundment,

allowing for specific exceptions. The chief of police’s direction is

inconsistent with this policy, since he says that “ you have to have a reason to tow

every car.” His direction is anti- impoundment.

To date, the issues resulting in John’s Law and the current U. S. Senate bill have

not affected Grover Beach. No released DUI arrestee has ever returned to his car,

driven away while still intoxicated, and caused a traffic collision. Department man-agement

has avoided the issue.

This avoidance is shortsighted. The events leading to John’s Law might never

happen in the small community of Grover Beach. Then again, it would take only

one serious incident to reflect adversely on the department. It took only one inci-dent

in New Jersey to produce John’s Law.

The department does not need to impound all vehicles driven by DUI arrestees.

But it should take additional steps to protect itself, the city, and the public.

Does the department need to improve its management and accountability?

Findings

Findings 1- 55 above that apply to specific procedures and actions are appropriate

in answering this question. In addition, we have the following findings:

All DUI traffic collisions did increase substantially after 1999 and 2000, but injury

traffic collisions remained relatively stable over the six- year period. We do not

know whether this is statistically significant.

Despite management’s concern about the quantity and quality of one officer’s DUI

arrests and alleged practices such as “ sitting on bars,” the department’s only ac-tion

was to counsel him. Management did not initiate any disciplinary action. This

suggests that the officer did not violate any law, policy, or procedure with respect

to his DUI activities.

Does the department potentially endanger public safety and expose the city

to financial risk in its policies and conduct in dealing with the vehicles of

DUI arrestees?

Findings

( 45) From at least 1999 to the present, the department’s Policy and Proce-dures

Manual has contained no policy with respect to the impoundment

and towing of vehicles driven by DUI arrestees. The department’s draft

revision to its Policy and Procedures Manual includes a vehicle towing

policy ( August 2002). The policy is not yet in force.

( 46) The general department policy ( unwritten) from 1999 to 2001 with respect

to vehicle impoundment and towing is that the officer should not impound

and tow a vehicle in situations where a vehicle can be safely parked and

locked and where no obvious valuables are involved. But overall, the

decision to impound and tow is at the officer’s discretion.

( 47) In 1999, department supervisors told two officers that they were impound-ing

and towing too many vehicles and directed them to comply with the

unwritten policy.

( 48) Those two officers decreased towing vehicles of DUI arrestees.

( 49) The department received oral inquiries from towing companies under con-tract

to the city about the reduction in their business due to fewer towings.

( 50) The chief of police’s direction to his officers is that they must have a rea-son

to tow a car: “ there is no reason to tow every car.”

( 51) Those two officers raised with department supervisors an issue regarding

the potential safety of the public or liability to the department or the City of

Grover Beach from a released DUI arrestee causing an accident or injury

from driving himself home immediately following the release.

( 52) The department supervisors responded that that was a “ what if” situation:

“ It has never happened; we don’t deal with hypotheticals.”

( 53) The general department procedure from 1999 to 2001 with respect to the

release of a DUI arrestee from the department’s holding facility was to

release him to a responsible adult, give the arrestee all his belongings

( including his car keys), and tell the responsible adult to drive him home.

There is no follow- up to ensure that the arrestee himself doesn’t drive the

car ( when he might still be intoxicated).

( 54) The revised draft department Policy and Procedures Manual has a sec-tion

on “ storage at arrest scenes” as part of the “ vehicle towing policy.” It

DUI Arrests and Traffic Collisions, 1997- 2002

19971998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Adult DUI Arrests 40 65 136 123 66 56

DUI Traffic Collisions ( Injury & Non- Injury) 9 12 10 9 18 14

DUI Injury Traf fic Collisions 4 6 2 5 6 6

10

( 56) The department’s Policy and Procedures Manual establishes rules under

which the department operates.

( 57) The department last comprehensively updated its manual in 1999, but

updated portions of the manual “ as needed.”

( 58) In 2001, the department began a comprehensive update of the manual.

( 59) On the department’s recommendation, the city contracted with a law firm

to draft the manual and subsequently update it annually.

( 60) Final approval of the updated manual is pending ( as of the date of this

report).

( 61) In between updates of the manual, written orders from the chief of police

override the manual to the extent that the orders bring department poli-cies

and procedures in compliance with new laws.

( 62) The chief of police also issues written and verbal orders to ensure compli-ance

with his management philosophy and priorities.

( 63) Department supervisors guide and counsel officers on their actions to

ensure that they are consistent with the chief’s management direction and

priorities.

( 64) Failure to follow policies, procedures, and orders is subject to counseling

and, if necessary, discipline ( from written reprimand to days off without

pay to termination, depending on the severity of the failure).

( 65) The current Policy and Procedures Manual prohibits probationary officers

from serving as watch commanders ( shift supervisors).

( 66) Probationary officers have served as watch commanders.

( 67) The revised Policy and Procedures Manual permits probationary officers

with at least six months of prior police officer experience to serve as watch

commanders.

( 68) In defending one officer- dismissal case, the city has spent $ 400,000 in

legal expenses since the firing in June 2001.

( 69) Police department and city officials stated that their focus on that officer-dismissal

case affected how they addressed other department issues, in-cluding

firearms qualification, DUI, and internal investigations.

( 70) In June 2002, the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Department submit-ted

a preliminary proposal to the City of Grover Beach in response to the

city’s request for proposal about the Sheriff’s Department assuming re-sponsibilities

for police services in Grover Beach. The Sheriff’s Depart-ment

presented three alternatives. In the one it favored, the sheriff esti-mated

that its department would save Grover Beach $ 462,000 per year,

mostly through economy of scale by using a centralized communications

center, central records system, and centralized property control.

( 71) To date, the city has made no response to the Sheriff’s Department pro-posal.

( 72) The City of Grover Beach is now exploring with the cities of Arroyo Grande

and Pismo Beach with respect to consolidating their police dispatch func-tions

into a single operation.

Conclusions

The department has taken positive steps to improve its management by updating

the department’s Policy and Procedures Manual that contains, for the first time,

policies on firearms qualification and vehicle towing. The updated manual also

allows probationary officers with six months law enforcement experience to serve

as watch commanders. Moreover, the departure of three officers from the depart-ment

has eased internal discord. Nevertheless, the department still needs to im-prove

its management and accountability.

The department is still operating under a manual that it last comprehensively up-dated

in 1996. The department began its current comprehensive update in 2001.

At the writing of this report, the chief of police has yet to approve the update. Until

that approval, the current policies and procedures ( without polices on firearms

qualification and vehicle towing) direct operations. It should not take almost two

years to update such a manual.

A city councilmember allowing himself to be approached in the firearms qualifica-tion

issue was inappropriate for two reasons. First, it complicated department

management’s resolution of the issue. Second, it was inconsistent with the Grover

Beach city- manager form of government, which gives ( 1) the city manager control

over management and operations and ( 2) the city council control over policy.

Participation in the officer- termination case distracted management in carrying out

other responsibilities. Management relied too much on sergeants to resolve inter-nal

disputes such as those involving firearms qualification, DUI enforcement, ve-hicle

towing, concerns about liability, and gender bias.

Public exposure of discord on many of the issues addressed in this report has not

contributed to public confidence in the department, city government, and the city

council.

The Sheriff Department’s proposal to provide contracted police services to the city

focuses mainly on cost savings. We received the report too late in our investiga-tion

to evaluate it.

The Grover Beach Police Department should take additional steps to control liabil-ity

costs, contribute to administrative improvements, achieve greater accountabil-ity

from supervisors, and increase governmental and community support. Obtain-ing

national accreditation can be an effective way to do this.

Overall Recommendations

( 1) Require— as part of the release of every DUI arrestee— that the person

assuming custody of the arrestee sign a statement acknowledging his or

her potential criminal and civil liability for permitting or facilitating the

arrestee’s operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. This should be-come

part of the department’s Policy and Procedures Manual.

( 2) Seek police department accreditation from the Commission on Accredita-tion

for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. ( CALEA).

We make this recommendation because this accreditation would address

many of management issues we have addressed in this report. The ben-efits

include:

• Reduced Exposure to Liability. Accreditation status can decrease li-ability

costs.

• Stronger Defense against Lawsuits and Citizen Complaints. Accred-ited

agencies are better able to defend themselves against lawsuits

and citizen complaints. Many agencies report a decline in legal ac-tions

against them, once they become accredited.

• Greater Accountability within the Agency. Accreditation standards give

the chief executive officer a proven management system of written

directives, sound training, clearly defined lines of authority, and rou-tine

reports that support decision- making and resource allocation.

• Staunch Support from Government Officials. Accreditation provides

objective evidence of an agency’s commitment to excellence in lead-ership,

resource management, and service- delivery. Thus, govern-ment

officials are more confident in the agency’s ability to operate

efficiently and meet community needs.

• Increased Community Advocacy. Accreditation embodies the precepts

of community- oriented policing. It creates a forum in which police and

citizens work together to prevent and control challenges confronting

law enforcement and provides clear direction about community ex-pectations.

CALEA is an independent accrediting authority established by the four

major law enforcement membership associations: International Associa-tion

of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement

Executives, National Sheriffs’ Association, and Police Executive Research

Forum. Their members represent about 80 percent of the law enforce-ment

profession in the nation.

Through a voluntary process, CALEA accredits law enforcement agen-cies.

The purpose of the accreditation program is to improve delivery of

law enforcement service by offering a body of standards, developed by

law enforcement practitioners, that cover a wide range of up- to- date law

enforcement topics.

11

According to CALEA, the accreditation process serves as an “ audit” to

determine whether or not the police department’s operational policies,

written and unwritten, comply with the standards to which the courts and

the public hold city managers, police chiefs, supervisors, and patrol offic-ers

accountable in the everyday conduct of their business. By having an

accredited police department, a city can be reasonably confident that the

agency is doing things right.

The accreditation process may take over two years, but it may take the

Grover Beach Police Department less time because it has just updated

its Policy and Procedures Manual.

The cost of accreditation for an agency of the police department’s size is

$ 7,650.

An alternative is for the department to participate in the CALEA Recogni-tion

Program, which can serve as a stepping stone for smaller law en-forcement

agencies that wish to participate in a professional credentialing

program before seeking accreditation. The CALEA Recognition Program

is intended for smaller agencies that may not have the resources for the

full accreditation program. The award of CALEA Recognition is for three

years. The estimated cost is $ 2,500.

Comment Requirements

Section 933 on the California Penal Code requires comments on the findings and

recommendations to the presiding judge of the Superior Court of California in San

Luis Obispo County by ( 1) the chief of police of the Grover Beach Police Depart-ment

within 60 days and ( 2) the Grover Beach City Council within 90 days.

Investigation Setting: the Grover Beach Police

Department

The Grover Beach Police Department provides law enforcement and related pub-lic

safety services to the residents of Grover Beach ( 2000 population: 13,067), in

the southern portion of the county. The city encompasses 2.25 square miles.

The department’s services include responding to emergency and non- emergency

incidents related to crimes, nuisances, traffic, municipal code violations, animal

complaints, and various other activities. The department operates under the di-rection

of a chief of police, who reports to the city manager. Under the chief, an

operations lieutenant is responsible for all patrol, traffic, community activities, de-tectives,

property, emergency planning, and related administrative functions. A

support services lieutenant is responsible for dispatch, records, property, internal

affairs, and primary department/ administrative functions. In 2002, the depart-ment

underwent a reorganization. Previously, a commander ( same rank as lieu-tenant)

oversaw the operations functions; a sergeant, the support services.

The department has an authorized strength of 21 full- time sworn ( peace officer)

personnel and 10 non- sworn support personnel. The current staff is 20 full- time

sworn personnel and 10 non- sworn personnel. Testimony during the course of

our investigation indicated that, over the years, it was difficult to hire and retain

peace officers because the department salaries were lower than other law en-forcement

agencies in the county. Recent salary increases ordered by the city

manager and approved by the city council have made the department more com-petitive

in hiring officers.

The department’s budget for fiscal year 2003 ( July 2002 to June 2003) is $ 2.3

million. The City of Grover Beach’s total budget is about $ 11 million, $ 4.9 million

of which comes from the city’s general fund ( tax revenues and license fees). Most

of the funding for the police department comes from the general fund.

Investigation Details

Origin of the Investigation

The investigation resulted from a complaint from a citizen, who made several

allegations about management and operations of the Grover Beach Police De-partment

generally during the period 1999 to 2001. We used the complaint as a

starting point for our investigation but did not investigate all allegations. We did

not, for example, examine anything with respect to an employee termination ac-tion

that is currently open between an employee and the department. As a matter

of policy, the grand jury conducts no investigations on matters where legal pro-ceedings

are ongoing. Since it is public record, we can state ( without violating our

oath of confidentiality) that the complainant, Todd Miller, is the former employee

engaged in the currently unresolved termination action.

Over the course of our investigation, the complainant submitted several letters

either elaborating on or introducing new issues. We carefully considered each

submittal.

Authority/ Jurisdiction for the Investigation

We undertook this investigation under Section 925a of the California Penal Code:

“ Authority to Examine Records of City or Joint Powers Agency. The grand

jury may at any time examine the books and records of any incorporated

city or joint powers agency located in the county. In addition to any other

investigative powers granted by this chapter, the grand jury may investi-gate

and report upon the operations, accounts, and records of the offic-ers,

departments, functions, and the method or system of performing the

duties of any such city or joint powers agency and make such recommen-dations

as it may deem proper and fit.”

The Grover Beach Police Department is a department of the City of Grover Beach,

an incorporated city.

Main Issues

As stated before, we did not address any allegation related to the ongoing officer-termination

case. Our investigation encompassed the following issues, some of

which the complainant proposed and others that we identified during the course of

our work:

( 1) In 2000 to 2001, did the department potentially endanger public safety

and expose the city to financial risk in its policies and conduct of its

requalification of peace officers of firearms proficiency? See our

findings and conclusions above for our answer ( beginning on page 7).

( 2) From 1999 to 2001, were there inconsistencies or deficiencies in the

department’s policies for and conduct of arrests of persons for driv-ing

under the influence ( DUI) of alcohol or drugs? See our findings

and conclusions above for our answer ( beginning on page 9).

( 3) Does the department potentially endanger public safety and expose

the city to financial risk in its policies for and conduct in dealing with

the vehicles of DUI arrestees? See our findings and conclusions above

for our answer ( beginning on page10).

( 4) In 2001, did department supervisorial personnel establish quotas for

traffic citations in violation of state law? We found no evidence to

support this allegation.

( 5) Were selected officers treated unfairly, and did some officers receive

more favorable treatment that others? We found no evidence to sup-port

this allegation.

( 6) Does the department need to improve its management and account-ability?

See our findings, conclusions, and overall recommendations

above for our answer ( beginning on page 11).

Methods and Validity

Principal Methods

( 1) Initial Document Review. We reviewed the documentation provided with

the complaint. We developed a list of initial records needed from the

department.

( 2) Investigative Plan. We developed an initial plan for the investigation that

included the issues to be investigated, the documents needed, and the

witnesses to be called. We updated the plan, as appropriate, over the

course of the investigation.

12

( 3) Witness Interviews. We interviewed, under oath, 24 witnesses: current

and former police department personnel ( Grover Beach and other), cur-rent

and former city elected and appointed officials, and state and county

government officials. We interviewed four people more than once. Prior

to each interview, we developed questions to ask. During each interview,

we asked follow- up questions, as appropriate. Collectively, we asked 1,200

questions. We also gave witnesses the opportunity to say anything else

they considered important to our understanding of department operations.

( 4) Document Review. We reviewed over 1,000 pages of documents: cur-rent

and proposed department policies and procedures, statistical records,

range qualification records and reports, arrest records and reports, inter-nal

investigation files, meeting summaries, email messages and direc-tives,

and internal memos. The department complied with all of our re-quests

for information.

Validity. We took the following steps to verify the accuracy of this report’s find-ings:

1) Grand Jury Validation of Testimony. At least five grand jurors inter-viewed

each witness except for one interview conducted outside the county.

( 2) Verification of Facts. We based all findings on official records and/ or the

testimony by at least two independent sources.

( 3) Elimination of Hearsay Testimony. We rejected every hearsay state-ment

( in person or in writing) unless we could validate it through official

records or the testimony ( in person or in writing) by at least two indepen-dent

sources who were present or directly involved in the incident de-scribed

in the hearsay statement.

( 4) Consultation with Legal Advisors. We consulted with a representative

of the county counsel’s office on legal issues concerning the investiga-tion.

Review

( 1) Throughout the course of the investigation, the grand jury— at its weekly

meetings— received reports on the investigation’s progress and issues.

( 2) The chief of police reviewed our findings and provided comment.

RALCCO RECYCLING SITE IN NIPOMO— CLEANUP DUE

Synopsis

R ALCCO, a company engaged in recycling household and construction

material, operated a plant and storage yard at 801 Ralcoa Way in Nipomo.

The company stopped recycling at that facility in October 2001 and has

since ceased to function as a business. Sixteen months later, the site remained

littered with unprocessed material. The county’s Division of Environmental Health

Services issued a series of notices and orders requiring the company and the

owner of the land to clean up the site, but to no effect. On March 10, 2003, the

agency issued a new notice and order complete with prospective fines for failure

to comply. Representatives of the California Integrated Waste Management Board

( CIWMB) inspected the site and indicated that state funds might be available for

the cleanup. We recommend that Environmental Health take whatever action

necessary to assure a prompt cleanup, regardless of whether state funds become

available. We further recommend that the agency again explore the possibility of

excavations at the site to determine if buried drums are present, as was once

alleged.

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Condition of the Site

Findings

( 1) There has been no recycling at the site since early October 2001, accord-ing

to RALCCO’s owner and as he notified the California Department of

Conservation on October 15, 2001.

( 2) In a letter to the CIWMB dated March 17, 2003, Environmental Health

stated that “ large volumes of solid waste, construction/ demolition debris,

cardboard, paper, and plastic” are present on the site.

( 3) Visual evidence confirmed that statement. We took the photos below on

February 8, 2003.

( 4) The director of Environmental Health stated in September 2002 that the

RALCCO problem fell into the third and lowest priority of nuisance com-plaints

and did not represent a threat to public health.

( 5) In its March 17 letter to CIWMB, the agency characterizes the site as a

“ threat to public health and safety” because of fire hazard and the danger

to trespassers.

Conclusions

As of March 17, 2003, some 16 months after RALCCO ceased operations, the site

resembled a junkyard.

Renewed inspections of the site ( see below) evidently persuaded Environmental

Health that a cleanup deserved a higher priority.

Responsibilities

Findings

( 6) The Stipulated Order dated November 4, 1999, to which the owner of the

business agreed, requires the processing of recyclable material at the

site within five days of receipt and prohibits storing such material for more

than 60 days.

( 7) The Order applies “ in perpetuity” and commits Environmental Health to

“ immediately proceed with regulatory actions” in the event of non- compli-ance.

( 8) Environmental Health notified RALCCO on November 17, 2000, that it

was in compliance, but in July 2001 found the company out of compli-ance.

( 9) Subsequent to the stipulated order, Environmental Health issued five sepa-rate

additional notices of violations and/ or orders beginning in January

2000 and ending with the Notice and Order of March 10, 2003. The latter

order carries with it prospective fines for failure to comply.

( 10) More than a year passed between the July 2001 Notice of Violation and

the Notice to Remove of November 12, 2002.

( 11) The director of Environmental Health stated in September 2002 that a

staffing problem and the low priority his office assigned to the RALCCO

problem accounted for delays in addressing that problem.

13

( 12) The law provides that the Department of Health is responsible for the

removal of solid waste from private property.

( 13) The owner of RALCCO has informed the grand jury and Environmental

Health that financial difficulties made it impossible to comply with the or-ders

issued prior to the March 10 order. He has filed a plan for compli-ance

with the latter order.

Conclusions

Environmental Health failed to enforce the stipulated order after the initial period

of compliance.

The record indicates that the agency did not turn its attention again to the site after

the July 2001 notice until the fall of 2002.

Although a low priority and staffing problems could reasonably delay action some-what,

at least 18 months passed between the time the agency became aware that

the RALCCO problem had reoccurred and its issuance of the March 10, 2003,

notice and order.

It remains to be seen if the owner of RALCCO will be able to carry out his plan to

comply.

Environmental Health has the responsibility under the stipulated order and the law

to assure a cleanup of the site.

Hazardous Waste

Findings

( 14) The California Department of Toxic Substances Control ( DTSC), in re-sponse

to an anonymous allegation that two drums of toxic waste had

been buried at the site, conducted a magnetometer survey and took soil

samples on October 28, 1998.

( 15) According to the director of Environmental Health, the samples indicated

levels of lead and zinc above regulatory limits, but not to a degree danger-ous

to public health as long as the site remained in its current use. He

understood the magnetometer survey to have been inconclusive.

( 16) Environmental Health requested permission on August 3, 1999, to exca-vate

portions of the site as a follow- up to the DTSC investigation. RALCCO

did not grant permission, asserting that the disruption and digging involved

would seriously damage its ongoing business.

( 17) In August 2002, the director of Environmental Health consulted the county

counsel on that refusal and determined that there was insufficient evi-dence

to seek an administrative search warrant in order to enter the prop-erty.

( 18) The manager of the Integrated Waste Management Authority ( IWMA),

who received and reported the allegation of buried drums, continues to

believe it should be investigated.

Conclusions

The delay of more than three years in seeking the advice of the county counsel

indicates that Environmental Health did not consider credible the report of buried

drums, or at least relegated it to a lower priority.

Excavations as originally planned would clear up any disagreement between IWMA

and Environmental Health on that score.

RALCCO’s no longer operating the site disposes of the problems digging there

would have caused its business.

State Action

Findings

( 19) Representatives of the CIWMB inspected the site on March 11, 2003, in

connection with a review of landfills and other waste sites that might rep-resent

a fire hazard.

( 20) As a result of the inspection, Environmental Health requested that the

board provide funds from the Solid Waste Disposal and Co- disposal Site

Cleanup Program ( Assembly Bill 2136) for the removal of the material

stored at the RALCCO site.

Conclusion

State funds and the involvement of the CIWMB ( if that comes to pass) should

resolve this long- standing problem.

Overall Recommendations

( 1) Environmental Health should take whatever measures necessary to as-sure

a prompt cleanup of the site, regardless of how the CIWMB decides

on its request for funds.

( 2) If RALCCO is unable to comply fully with the Order of March 10, 2003, the

agency should consult with the County Counsel on what further legal ac-tion

may be feasible.

( 3) Environmental Health should make another effort to investigate on site

the allegation of buried drums. Now that RALCCO is no longer operating

the facility, excavation can take place without damage to an ongoing busi-ness.

The agency should request permission for excavation on that ba-sis.

( 4) The Integrated Waste Management Authority should respond to these

recommendations if, as has been proposed, it takes over Environmental

Health’s responsibilities for the regulation of solid waste,

Comment Requirements

Section 933 on the California Penal Code requires comments on the findings and

recommendations to the presiding judge of the Superior Court of California in San

Luis Obispo County by ( 1) the director of Environmental Health Services, the county

counsel, and the manager of the Integrated Waste Management Authority within

60 days; and ( 2) the Board of Supervisors within 90 days.

Investigation Setting: Waste Management in the

County and RALCCO

The Division of Environmental Health is the Local Enforcement Agency ( LEA) of

the California Integrated Waste Management Board. The LEA is responsible for

enforcing state laws and regulations pertaining to landfills, composting facilities,

and transfer stations. Recyclers are exempt from state laws and regulations ap-plied

to solid waste facilities as long as the residual waste after processing is less

than 10 percent of the material received. The agency found in 1999 that RALCCO

was taking in significant amounts of material and then transferring it to a landfill

rather than processing it. That qualified the site as a transfer station subject to the

LEA’s regulation. The result was the stipulated order. In July 2001, the agency

found RALCCO out of compliance. The series of notice and orders followed. The

agency refers to RALCCO as an “ unpermitted transfer station” in its March 21,

2003, request to the CIWMB for funds.

In December 2002, the owner of the land on which the site is located sold the

parcel across the road at 734 Ralcoa Way. RALCCO used that parcel in part to

store hazardous waste. Subsequent to the sale, Environmental Health issued an

order enforcing a cleanup based on hazardous waste violations. The order listed

nine violations determined in the course of five site inspections beginning in Octo-ber

27, 1998. The new owner of the property and the owner of RALCCO arranged

a cleanup and reached an agreement on paying the fines involved.

Environmental Health’s role as a LEA may be coming to an end. The Board of

Supervisors has voted to request the CIWMB to designate the local Integrated

Waste Management Authority as the LEA in its place. The CIWMB itself, with no

intermediary, acts as the LEA in the case of solid waste disposal at the city of Paso

Robles. The city prefers this arrangement to participation in the countywide pro-gram

that Environmental Health oversees.

14

Investigation Details

Origin of the Investigation

We encountered the problem of the RALCCO site during the course of an inquiry

into the regulation and permitting of solid waste operations in this county. A mem-ber

of the Board of Supervisors suggested that inquiry. Complaints addressed to

us of a failure to enforce applicable regulations in the RALCCO case persuaded

us to undertake a separate investigation.

Authority/ Jurisdiction for the Investigation

Section 925 of the California Penal Code provides that the “ grand jury shall inves-tigate

and report on the operations, accounts, and records of the officers, depart-ments,

or functions of the county.”

Main Issues

The investigation began with a complaint from a landfill operator that Environmen-tal

Health was not enforcing its rules and regulations in the case of RALCCO. We

first checked the site itself to confirm its condition. We then conducted interviews

and analyzed documents in an effort to determine the reasons for the delay in

enforcement. This report lays out the results of those inquiries.

The alleged buried drums posed a second issue. In this instance, we found no

evidence either to confirm or deny what remains an anonymous story.

A third main issue was how to gauge the importance of cleaning up the site. We

believe the CIWMB’s inspection of the site and the resulting letter of March 21,

2003, settles the issue as a practical matter. The cleanup will proceed on the

basis that the site is a “ threat to public health and safety.”

Methods and Validity

We interviewed the director of Environmental Health ( twice), his deputy, two land-fill

operators, the manager of the Integrated Waste Management Authority, the

former general manager and owner of RALCCO, the landowner of the site, two

neighboring property owners, and the attorney in the County Counsel’s office who

deals with waste issues. We checked the site from outside the fence on four

occasions, and once on the site itself with permission from RALCCO’s owner.

Documentary sources included tax records, the 1998 Inspection Report of the

California Department of Toxic Substance Control, minutes of meetings of the

Integrated Waste Management Authority Board, the Stipulated Order of Novem-ber

4, 1999, and the Notice and Order of March 10, 2003. We reviewed letters

written over more than three years by the director of Environmental Health and his

subordinates, as well as letters and written messages from the other parties con-cerned

with the problem. Documentary evidence supports all the findings in this

report.

IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN THE INTEGRATED WASTE

MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Synopsis

T he San Luis Obispo County Division of Environmental Health Services

( agency) is the designated local enforcement agency responsible for over-seeing

the collection and disposal of household solid waste. That respon-sibility

includes permitting, inspection, and enforcing state and county laws. Envi-ronmental

Health enforces and regulates solid waste laws in all parts of the county

except the City of Paso Robles.

The agency has had problems maintaining trained staff in the solid waste pro-gram.

The staffing problems have contributed to difficulties in issuing permits,

conducting inspections, and enforcing orders to correct violations. The disposal

site operators have had problems obtaining permits and complying with permit

conditions. The extra costs of compliance result in higher disposal fees for con-sumers.

We recommend that the agency either fill the solid waste position with one full-time

person or, if two part- time staff members are necessary, give one of these

persons the lead role for making program decisions. We also recommend that the

county work with the State Integrated Waste Management Board to allow minor

changes to a permit without requiring major revisions to the entire permit.

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Agency Staffing

Findings

( 1) During the past five years, there have been six separate inspectors in the

solid waste program.

( 2) According to the director of Environmental Health, it takes from four to six

months to train a registered environmental health specialist for the solid

waste position.

( 3) When a program member resigns, inspections have occasionally been

made by staff not fully trained in the solid waste program.

( 4) The solid waste program does not have a dedicated full- time person. The

director is currently staffing the program with two people working 86 per-cent

of their time in solid waste. The purpose of this arrangement is to

provide backup in case one of the staff leaves the program.

( 5) As a result of staffing problems, Environmental Health did not complete

all of the required inspections of closed sites in the year 2000.

( 6) The Board of Supervisors has held hearings regarding changing the local

enforcement agency from the Environmental Health Division of the Public

Health Department to the county’s Integrated Waste Management Au-thority.

Conclusions

The frequent turnover of staff is making it difficult for the agency to remain focused

on the details of the program. Training replacement staff further reduces the man-power

available. In order to function effectively, the program must find qualified

staff and find ways to keep the staff in the program. Staff in charge of the solid

waste program receive specialized training beyond the training required to be a

registered environmental health specialist. When an inspector in the solid waste

program leaves the position, there are usually no qualified replacements on the

staff to immediately fill the position. On some occasions, the department had to

use untrained or partially trained individuals to conduct the required site inspec-tions.

Employees of the State Integrated Waste Management Board confirmed that staffing

in the program was a problem in other counties, as well.

Recommendation

( 1) The agency needs a qualified lead staff person to coordinate the solid

waste program. Alternatively, the agency should assign more responsibil-ity

for the solid waste program to the supervisor and fully train him in the

program so that he can fill any temporary vacancy.

Permitting

Findings

( 6) The director of Environmental Health maintains that there is no such a

thing as a minor change to a permit. Any modification opens the entire

permit to review.

( 7) The director said that, perhaps in issuing a specific permit, the agency

overlooked factors that came up for review when the permit was later

modified.

15

( 8) The agency must review every landfill permit every five years unless modi-fied

earlier by the permit holder.

( 9) According to the director, permit reviews normally take four months from

the time the agency deems the application complete.

( 10) Waste site operators must file a report called Disposal Site Information as

part of their permit application. This document fills a four- inch binder and

costs $ 50,000 to $ 100,000, according to the operator of a major waste

site.

( 11) In addition to the county review, all permits must be reviewed and ap-proved

by the State Integrated Waste Management Board.

Conclusions

The permit process is overly complicated. Due to the costly and time consuming

process involved in modifying a permit, it is essential that the agency assure care-ful

review of permits prior to issuance. Simple modifications to the permit should

be possible without opening the entire permit to review. An unnecessarily detailed

review only adds to the cost of permitting and makes waste disposal more expen-sive

for the community. The automatic five- year review of the permit should pro-vide

sufficient environmental protection.

Recommendations

( 2) Environmental Health should work with the State Integrated Waste Man-agement

Board to establish procedures for allowing minor permit modifi-cations

without requiring complete permit reviews.

( 3) If the local Integrated Waste Management Authority becomes the local

enforcement agency, as proposed, it should take this recommendation

into account.

Comment Requirements

As provided in Section 933( c) of the California Penal Code, the director of Envi-ronmental

Health Services shall comment to the presiding judge of the Superior

Court of California in San Luis Obispo County on the findings and recommenda-tions

in this report within 60 days of its publication. The Board of Supervisors must

comment within 90 days.

Investigation Setting: Integrated Waste Management

Originally, Environmental Health had authorization to enforce the solid waste pro-gram

in seven cities and in the county. Several years ago, the City of Paso Robles

requested that the State Integrated Waste Management Board become the en-forcement

agency for its operation.

The Environmental Health Division has traditionally had the charge of protecting

the public health in such settings as drinking water supply, waste water disposal,

sanitary food handling, public swimming pool safety and sanitation, and sanitary

housing. Employees of the Environmental Health Division must have bachelors’

degrees in science. After completing several months of on- the- job training, new

employees become eligible to take a comprehensive test covering all aspects of

environmental health. On successful completion of the test, they earn the title of

Registered Environmental Health Specialist.

Since 1989, a local enforcement agency must carry out solid waste laws. The

State Integrated Waste Management Board must approve the cities and the county

law enforcement agencies. By state law, each agency must have on its staff a

registered environmental health specialist.

Funding of the local enforcement agency comes from permit fees, a grant from the

Integrated Waste Management Board, and some general fund money.

The California Integrated Waste Management Board has the lead role in the solid

waste management program. The board reviews all aspects of the local enforce-ment

agency’s program and has the power to withdraw the authorization of the

local agency for cause. The local agency has little room to negotiate its enforce-ment

program.

Investigation Details

Origin of the Investigation

A member of the Board of Supervisors suggested there might be a problem with

the solid waste program. The concern came from reports to the board of difficul-ties

in obtaining solid waste permits in a timely manner. There were also concerns

that Environmental Health was requiring renewal of operating permits on a more

frequent schedule than the five years stipulated in the regulations. In addition, the

operators expressed frustration with the frequent turnover of inspectors and the

different interpretation of the law that each inspector made during inspections.

Authority/ Jurisdiction for the Investigation

Section 925 of the California Penal Code provides that the Grand Jury shall inves-tigate

and report on the operations, accounts and records of the officers, depart-ments

or functions of the county. The Division of Environmental Health Services

is a county agency.

Main Issues

For almost a decade, the Environmental Health Division has been acting as the

local enforcement agency in San Luis Obispo County. During this time, the agency

has done a relatively good job of managing the program according to the State

Integrated Waste Management Board staff. One problem that the agency has not

been able to deal with effectively is staffing. There is a relatively high turnover of

staff in the division. The lack of experienced staff has resulted in problems con-ducting

required inspections, issuing permits in a timely manner, and maintaining

consistency in conducting inspections. As a result of the staffing problems, the

regulated community has experienced additional costs to comply with the solid

waste regulations. In addition, the regulated community has experienced disrup-tions

in its business by not being able to obtain permits in a timely manner.

Methods and Validity

Principal Methods. We interviewed operators of two of the largest disposal sites

in San Luis Obispo County, the director of Environmental Health and his supervi-sor

of solid waste, the manager of the Integrated Waste Management Authority,

and staff of the State Integrated Waste Management Board. We also reviewed

copies of permits issued to one site operator, inspection reports conducted by the

agency at a disposal site, correspondence between a site operator and the county

regarding permitting issues, and the county’s enforcement program plan.

Validity. Operators of the county’s two largest disposal sites first provided the

information regarding the performance of the Environmental Health Division. We

verified the information by reviewing letters between the site operators and Envi-ronmental

Health. We also interviewed both the director of Environmental Health

and his supervisor separately. We asked each one specific questions regarding

the deficiencies alleged by the operators. We also conducted a telephone inter-view

with staff members of the Integrated Waste Management Board regarding

their reviews of the Environmental Health Division.

16

CUESTA COLLEGE ASSOCIATE DEGREE NURSING

PROGRAM ADJUSTS WELL TO A CHANGE IN

ADMISSION POLICY

Synopsis

T here is a shortage of nurses in California. Cuesta College operates the

only Associate Degree Nursing ( ADN) Program in San Luis Obispo County.

In 1997, the California Chancellor’s Office of Community Colleges directed

all community colleges to change their ADN admission policy from selecting stu-dents

through traditional competition to selecting students randomly from a “ quali-fied

pool” consisting of all applicants with a grade average of “ C” or better.

How did this policy change affect the number of Cuesta students who became

nurses? The percentage of program graduates declined for the first two years

under the new policy, but returned to previous levels during the last two years.

The percentage of graduates who passed their licensing exams to become regis-tered

nurses held steady for students admitted during the first two years of the

new policy, declined significantly for the next two years, and then increased again.

Cuesta College is bettering statewide statistics.

Cuesta’s ADN Program hopes to change its admissions policy soon. It needs

Board of Trustees’ approval to admit applicants from the random drawing pool in

an order based on their GPA performance in their prerequisite courses.

Since there are more applicants than spaces at Cuesta College’s ADN Program,

adding spaces is more important than changing policies to increase the number of

nurses in California.

Findings and Conclusions

Findings

( 1) There are more applicants than there are spaces for students in the Asso-ciate

Degree Nursing ( ADN) Program at Cuesta College ( See Appendix

A, page 18).

( 2) Before 1997, Cuesta College evaluated each applicant individually and

gave points for academic achievement, performance at an interview, ref-erences

and a few other factors. Cuesta College then admitted applicants

with the highest point totals.

( 3) The School of Nursing at Cuesta College was not alone in using grades

and other criteria for selecting their nursing students. The community

college system in California is decentralized, and nursing programs at

these colleges were allowed to make their own decisions on how to de-cide

who to admit.

( 4) After the Chancellor’s Office of the California Community Colleges lost a

series of lawsuits against it in the 1980s and early 1990s, it decided in

1993 to make changes to Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations

that eliminated grade- related prerequisite and co- requisite requirements.

( 5) Cuesta College decided to comply with the Chancellor’s Office’s policy

and eliminated all admission criteria that it could not validate as predic-tors

to students’ success in the field of nursing. Beginning in 1997, Cuesta

College placed all applicants who maintain a “ C” average in math and

science prerequisite courses into a pool from which it randomly selected

a set number of them to be admitted into the next class.

( 6) The number of student spaces in the program dropped from 45 in 1996 to

35 in 1997 through 1999 due mainly to the lack of clinical space for train-ing.

( 7) In 2000 and 2001, the number of spaces increased to 46.

( 8) In 2000, the program had fewer enrolled students ( 37) than spaces ( 46).

( 9) Cuesta officials stated that standards for evaluating students did not change

following implementation of the Qualified Applicant Pool system. We were

not able to verify the statement because of time and resource constraints.

They stated also they believed that students admitted under the new pro-gram

were less prepared for the rigors of the ADN program than those

admitted under the point system.

( 10) Since Cuesta and other community colleges implemented this change in

admissions policy, there has been a decrease statewide in the number of

admitted students who complete the course of study through to gradua-tion

( success rate): statewide, the success rates of ADN students have

declined from about 82 percent in 1994- 95 to about 73 percent in 1998-

99.

( 11) At Cuesta College’s ADN Program, students admitted during the last five

years of the point system have had about an 82 percent success rate,

which was the same as the statewide success rate.

( 12) During the first two years following inauguration of the Qualified Applicant

Pool system for selecting students for admission, nursing students at

Cuesta have had a success rate of about 63 percent.

( 13) During the last two years of measurement, 1999- 2000 and 2000- 2001,

the success rate at Cuesta College averaged about 86 percent.

( 14) In 2002, the Research and Planning Group’s Center for Student Success

( CSS) engaged in a study designed to improve the prediction of success-ful

student completion in ADN programs: The Associate Degree Nursing:

Model Prerequisites Validation Study.

( 15) This study acknowledged that there were other factors over which the

community colleges had no control that were contributing to the shortage

of nurses in California. These factors included more attractive jobs in

other professions, low wages, poor working conditions, and high training

costs to nurses. However, the assumption of the study was that attrition in

nursing programs is an important contributing factor.

( 16) The study found that there were four factors that rose to the top in the

prediction model: overall college grade point average ( GPA), English GPA,

Core Biology GPA ( anatomy, physiology and microbiology), and Core Bi-ology

repetitions ( the number of times a student repeats any of the core

biology courses). The study found also that the application of these fac-tors

significantly improved the chance for success for completing the ADN

program.

( 17) In 2002, CSS sent this study to the chancellor and the Academic Senate

of the California Community Colleges.

( 18) The president of the Academic Senate wrote in his update in June 2002

that the Academic Senate is “ adamantly opposed” to any measures that

would limit access, and believes that community colleges should find al-ternative

means of ensuring the success of nursing students other than

imposing entrance requirements that “ would screen out ’ less- prepared’

candidates.” The President also stated that “ if the state is serious about

wanting us to crank out more nurses, it can give us more resources with

which to get our students through our programs.”

( 19) The chancellor wrote in opposition to implementing any change in en-trance

requirements as recommended by the CSS study. In his Weekly

Email Update, the Chancellor wrote on June 7, 2002:

“ At this point it’s appropriate that we put a big, red ‘ stop’ sign in front of us.

It would be dangerous to consider and implement this research in isola-tion.

The discussion we’re undertaking is one of rationing access— look-ing

at who gets in to limited spaces. This discussion is in direct conflict to

the open access mission of the California Community Colleges. And, if

we’re not extremely careful, this discussion will be in direct conflict to our

core beliefs of student equity and equal opportunity. Let’s back up and

look at the big picture before we proceed. If we keep our eye on the big

picture it means we must pursue a multi- part strategy: 1) Aggressively

increasing the number of nursing slots available in our colleges, 2) doing

more outreach in terms of recruiting students to our programs, 3) having

counseling, advice, and other intervention strategies in place to help stu-dents

understand their options and overcome obstacles to success, and

4) carefully implementing methods to help determine the order in which

we serve students.”

17

( 20) In June 2002, the Chancellor’s Office wrote that it would provide the com-munity

colleges its recommendations on the findings of the CSS Study.

The Chancellor’s Office stated recently that these recommendations would

be ready by the end of April, but officials at Cuesta College say that they

are not optimistic that this date will be met.

( 21) Although they have not received the Chancellor Office’s recommenda-tions,

officials at Cuesta College say that they plan to implement some

recommendations of the CSS study related to admissions policy. Ap-proval

by the Board of Trustees is necessary. Cuesta’s plan is to main-tain

the qualified pool of applicants, but end the random drawing from the

pool. Instead, Cuesta will admit applicants in an order determined by

their GPA in prerequisite courses. Applicants not admitted will go on a

waitlist and offered study skills courses. Cuesta would place waitlisted

applicants, if still interested, on next year’s qualified pool and admitted

first.

( 22) The nursing authority in the state where a nurse intends to practice must

license the person as a registered nurse. To obtain this license, the nurse

must pass the National Council Licensure Examination for Registered

Nurses, commonly called NCLEX- RN.

( 23) For those students admitted during the last two years of the point system,

Cuesta College had the second highest NCLEX- RN pass rate ( 97%) of all

California community colleges that graduated ADN students who took the

NCLEX- RN examination for the first time. The overall statewide pass rate

among ADN programs was 85 percent ( see Appendix B, page 18).

( 24) Of the Cuesta College ADN graduates admitted during the first three years

of the qualified applicant pool system and who took the NCLEX- RN ex-amination

for the first time, 84.4 percent passed the exam. The pass rate

for those three years in all ADN programs in California was 83.5 percent.

While Cuesta exceeded that pass rate, 33 of the reported 71 ADN pro-grams

had higher pass rates ( see Appendix B).

( 25) For July 1 to September 30, 2002, 16 Cuesta College nursing graduates

( all admitted under the qualified applicant pool system) took and passed

the NCLEX- RN examination.

( 26) In February 1999, the Board of Registered Nursing expressed concern

about declining pass rates statewide on the NCLEX- RN examination. In

December 2000, the board’s NCLEX- RN Task Force issued a report rec-ommending

ways to ameliorate the effects of the decline. Cuesta College

has adopted some recommendations from the report. These include:

• Incorporate an assessment of language proficiency, reading level, and

reading comprehension as part of pre- nursing assessment for poten-tial

nursing students or for counseling newly admitted students to the

nursing major. Cuesta currently uses the Test of Essential Academic

Skills, designed to assess student competencies in the areas of math-ematics,

science, English, reading and comprehension. These re-sults

give both students and instructors information about areas of

student weakness.

• Develop techniques to identify at- risk students early and implement

remediation plans. Cuesta College has recently recommended giv-ing

nursing majors a higher registration priority. This will allow the

college to identify potential applicants very early in the process. In

addition, Cuesta College is forming learning communities for this fall.

These communities will join science courses with study skills courses

to assist all students, but particularly those students at risk.

Conclusions

During the first two years of the new “ qualified pool” admission policy, a higher

percentage of the students admitted to the ADN Program at Cuesta College did

not finish the program than had the students admitted during the previous “ point

system” admission policy. Evidence suggests that there was a correlation be-tween

these events.

The proposed new admissions policy based on the factors raised in the CSS study

would probably improve the prediction of ADN program completion. However,

Cuesta College is already doing better than the state averages, and some of the

problems reported statewide may not necessarily apply to the program at Cuesta.

In the last two years, the percentage of students who failed to complete the Cuesta

College nursing program has decreased significantly. The percentage of students

who pass the NCLEX- RN test after completing the Cuesta College nursing pro-gram

has started to rise again. The ADN program at Cuesta College is being

courageous in not waiting for recommendations from the Chancellor’s Office be-fore

acting on the findings of the CSS Study. Given the pressure from both the

chancellor and the president of the Academic Senate, Cuesta is doing the best it

can to deal with the situation.

Since there are more applicants for spaces at the Nursing Program at Cuesta

College than there are spaces, increasing the number of spaces available, as the

chancellor suggests, would have a greater effect on increasing the number of

nurses in California than would making changes to admission policies. Unfortu-nately,

budget cuts for community colleges and reductions in medical facilities in

the county ( where students must do their clinical training) make increasing the

number of spaces at Cuesta unlikely.

We commend Cuesta for adopting some of the recommendations from the Board

of Nursing report to help increase its success rate.

Comment Requirements

Section 933 of the California Penal Code requires comments of the findings to the

presiding judge of the Superior Court of California in San Luis Obispo County by

( 1) the president of Cuesta College within 60 days and ( 2) the college Board of

Trustees within 90 days.

The Setting: Cuesta College Nursing Program

Reports of impending and actual shortages of registered nurses ( RNs) as well as

other nursing personnel appear frequently in the California and national press.

Factors contributing to California’s nursing shortage include changes in the

healthcare environment that downsized the nursing work force due to managed

care, the aging nursing work force, and public policy regarding nursing education.

As a result, California ranks 50th in the nation in number of RNs per 100,000

population. The current shortage is a “ public health crisis” because of a projected

shortfall of 25,000 nurses within the next five years. Seventy percent of registered

nurses in California are graduates of community colleges with ADN programs.

About one percent of these California community college ADN graduates are from

Cuesta College.

Currently, Cuesta admits 46 students each fall to its ADN program. Applicants

must complete the following Cuesta College courses and assessment test or equiva-lent

courses with a “ C” or better by the end of the fall semester prior to the year for

which they are applying: anatomy, physiology, bacteriology, and English 1A. Ap-plicants

must also take the Test of Essential Academic Skills. Applicants follow the

testing directions published in the Cuesta nursing application form for the year for

which they are applying. This is a standardized test for pre- nursing candidates in

the following areas: reading, basic mathematics, basic science, English, and lan-guage

usage. Applications are available from July through mid- December. A

random computerized drawing from completed applications makes the student

selection. Cuesta places students not selected in that drawing on a wait list. Cuesta

encourages students to continue their education after graduation. After students

complete their prerequisites, they enter the four- semester ADN program, exclud-ing

summers. Cuesta schedules clinical rotations during day and evening shifts

throughout the county.

Investigation Details

Origin of the Investigation

We initiated this investigation because some of us expressed concern that no one

had followed up on measuring whether there were any effects resulting from Cuesta

College’s change of admissions policy in 1997.

18

Authority/ Jurisdiction for the Investigation

We undertook this investigation under Section 933.5 of the California Penal Code:

“ Examination of Books of Special District or Commission. The grand jury

may at any time examine the books and records of any special- purpose

assessing or taxing district located wholly or partly in the county or the

local agency formation commission in the county, and, in addition to any

other investigatory powers granted by this chapter, may investigate and

report upon the method or system of performing the duties of such district

or commission.”

Methods and Validity

Principal Methods. We interviewed many representatives of Cuesta College

administration in academic and business areas. We also spoke with officials in-volved

at the State of California level when the change to the statewide admission

policy occurred. We researched and analyzed relevant studies. We also read

and analyzed writings of state officials responsible for reacting to these studies

and for making recommendations based on them.

Validity. We verified information from Cuesta College officials by checking it against

information from the State Board of Registered Nursing and other sources. The

vice president of Student Services at Cuesta College and staff of the ADN pro-gram

reviewed our findings and provided comments.

Appendix A

Cuesta College Nursing Program Statistics

Appendix B

California Board of Registered Nursing ( BRN)

NCLEX Pass Rates for BRN- Accredited

Associate Degree Registered Nursing Programs

The table to the right, based on information from the Board of Registered Nursing’s

web site ( April 7, 2003), reflects the results of all Associate Degree ( AD) gradu-ates

( including students who graduated prior to July 1997) who have taken the

NCLEX examination for the first time within the last five years. The data are by

academic year ( for example, July 2001- June 2002). The first two years were

under the earlier point system; the last three years were under the new qualified

pool system. We present the data in order of pass rates for the last three years.

Santa Ana College 62 87.10 59 84.75 52 73.08 72 79.17 62 82.26 78.5

Los Angeles County College of

Nursing & Al lied Health

53 86.78 37 70.27 85 81.18 72 66.67 68 79.41 76.0

Los Angeles Valley College 76 84.21 90 73.33 87 77.01 89 68.54 89 75.28 73.3

Merritt College 39 71.79 28 60.71 17 88.24 29 62.07 9 77.78 72.7

Los Angeles Trade- Tech.

College

45 82.22 46 78.26 40 75.00 33 66.67 25 76.00 72.4

Hartnell College 24 87.50 29 68.97 23 82.61 34 70.59 40 65.00 71.1

Merced College 25 92.00 20 75.00 12 66.67 19 73.68 14 71.43 71.1

Los Angeles Pierce College 67 85.07 47 91.49 56 71.43 60 61.67 60 80.00 71.0

Southwestern Community

College

39 92.31 40 62.50 36 75.00 34 58.82 30 80.00 71.0

East Los Angel es College 70 70.00 66 63.64 102 58.82 58 77.59 37 86.49 69.5

Maric College 135 65.19 122 80.33 159 65.41 121 71.07 94 74.47 69.5

Mount Saint Mary's College 53 60.38 77 62.34 67 47.76 71 83.10 71 76.06 69.4

Napa Valley College 43 79.07 40 75.00 39 79.49 41 60.98 45 75.56 64.0

Compton Community College 25 80.00 16 75.00 28 71.43 7 28.57 20 25.00 49.1

Los Angeles Southwest College 37 72.97 25 68.00 36 61.11 49 46.94 58 36.21 46.2

TOTALS 3,708 87.08 3,520 82.27 3,561 82.81 3,652 81.47 3,656 83.86 83.5

Earlier Point System New Qualified Pool System

1997/ 1998 1998/ 1999 1999/ 2000 2000/ 2001 2001/ 2002 % Pass

Program #

Taken

%

Pass

#

Taken

%

Pass

#

Taken

%

Pass

#

Taken

%

Pass

#

Taken

%

Pass

Last 3

Yrs.

Moorpark College 61 93.44 46 89.13 42 97.62 49 95.92 62 93.55 95.4

Santa Rosa Junior College 38 89.47 47 93.62 48 93.75 50 92.00 47 95.74 93.8

Sierra College 41 95.12 27 88.89 29 89.66 33 93.94 47 95.74 93.6

Los Angeles Harbor College 53 90.57 46 91.30 38 92.11 48 91.67 45 95.56 93.1

Palomar College 74 94.59 47 95.74 60 91.67 41 92.68 57 94.74 93.0

Butte Communi ty College 28 78.57 23 91.30 22 86.36 21 95.24 21 95.24 92.2

Sacramento City College 48 85.42 56 89.29 51 88.24 38 92.11 36 97.22 92.0

Cypress College 70 95.71 72 88.89 76 92.11 60 95.00 54 87.04 91.6

College of the Desert 50 96.00 55 92.73 44 95.45 53 88.68 41 90.24 91.3

Chaffey College 46 97.83 61 95.08 33 90.91 46 89.13 48 91.67 90.6

Mount San Antonio College 54 79.63 30 76.67 39 94.87 50 82.00 39 97.44 90.6

San Bernardino Valley College 71 88.73 65 92.31 58 86.21 76 85.53 75 96.00 89.5

Bakersfield College 55 89.09 50 94.00 53 92.45 47 87.23 77 88.31 89.3

Santa Barbara City College 30 93.33 30 100.00 26 80.77 35 91.43 36 91.67 88.7

Ventura College 70 77.14 68 85.29 59 88.14 66 87.88 59 89.83 88.6

Modesto Junior College 69 94.20 55 81.82 65 81.54 79 89.87 86 91.86 88.2

Antelope Valley College 81 90.12 66 89.39 50 84.00 52 94.23 41 85.37 88.1

El Camino College 61 95.08 74 89.19 68 92.65 65 84.62 72 86.11 87.8

Saddleback College 102 91.18 89 93.26 82 92.68 74 89.19 89 89.89 87.8

Long Beach City College 89 88.76 84 94.05 78 91.03 86 87.21 83 84.34 87.4

Riverside Communi ty College 98 89.80 101 88.12 97 85.57 99 83.84 101 92.08 87.2

American River College 55 87.27 51 82.35 65 84.62 59 89.83 51 86.27 86.9

Shasta College 41 97.56 47 85.11 41 90.24 47 82.98 57 87.72 86.9

Gavilan College 16 87.50 15 80.00 13 76.92 10 80.00 15 100.00 86.8

Cabri llo College 37 97.30 34 94.12 38 84.21 29 89.66 40 87.50 86.6

Mount San Jacinto College 17 100.00 14 85.71 12 100.00 17 64.71 29 93.10 86.2

Yuba College 23 100.00 24 91.67 25 80.00 22 86.36 45 88.89 85.9

Grossmont College 71 97.18 67 86.57 71 91.55 74 82.43 81 83.95 85.8

Ohlone College 32 90.63 50 92.00 25 88.00 36 86.11 35 82.86 85.4

Los Medanos College 40 92.50 33 78.79 35 94.29 48 85.42 46 78.26 85.2

College of the Sequoias 58 93.10 33 90.91 61 88.52 52 80.77 48 85.42 85.1

Monterey Peninsula College 43 93.02 39 97.44 46 89.13 36 80.56 39 84.62 85.1

Victor Valley College 67 85.07 66 90.91 61 83.61 24 58.33 59 96.61 84.7

CUESTA COLLEGE 52 100.00 19 89.47 24 91.67 34 79.41 40 85.00 84.4

Evergreen Valley College 56 89.29 41 85.37 38 84.21 31 77.42 40 90.00 84.4

Cerritos College 62 80.65 69 76.81 78 80,77 91 87.91 99 81.82 84.3

College of San Mateo 26 92.31 34 76.47 36 86.11 28 71.43 39 89.74 83.5

Golden West College 79 89.87 67 97.01 54 92.59 75 89.33 72 81.94 83.4

College of Marin 47 87.23 43 81.40 31 87.10 36 80.56 34 82.35 83.2

Glendale Community College 42 83.33 34 85.29 31 80.65 40 90.00 54 79.63 83.2

Rio Hondo College 46 89.13 51 82.35 53 84.91 45 82.22 38 81.58 83.1

De Anza Community College 50 88.00 47 87.23 63 85.71 50 80.00 52 84.62 83.0

City College of San Francisco 50 88.00 64 90.63 54 81.48 46 86.96 62 80.65 82.7

Santa Monica College 52 88.46 56 92.86 50 84.00 48 89.58 51 74.51 82.6

Pasadena City College 75 90.67 68 86.76 67 77.61 80 82.50 82 86.59 82.5

College of the Canyons 56 85.71 65 89.23 62 77.42 43 86.05 54 85.19 82.4

College of the Redwoods 41 100.00 39 64.10 36 77.78 39 94.87 24 66.67 81.8

Fresno City College 59 91.53 73 86.30 102 81.37 125 80.00 120 83.33 81.6

Pacific Union College 51 88.24 76 84.21 54 83.33 82 82.93 46 76.09 81.3

Solano Community College 44 88.64 38 86.84 26 88.46 34 88.24 31 67.74 81.3

San Joaquin Delta College 84 82.14 45 82.22 88 87.50 70 75.71 88 79.55 80.6

Contra Costa College 34 85.29 40 72.50 49 79.59 29 65.52 38 92.11 80.2

Imperial Valley College 30 73.33 40 70.00 28 92.86 34 82.35 34 67.65 80.2

Chabot College 40 90.00 32 84.38 37 81.08 21 66.67 26 88.46 79.8

San Diego City College 50 68.00 51 76.47 47 87.23 48 70.83 46 76.09 79.1

Al lan Hancock College N/ A N/ A 21 71.43 3 100.00 22 72.73 3 100.00 78.6

19

NORTH COUNTY NEEDS NEW SYSTEM FOR

BOOKING ACCUSED LAW BREAKERS

Synopsis

L aw enforcement agencies in San Luis Obispo County use holding

facilities to confine arrestees for a short period of time before law

enforcement officers must either release the arrestees or book them in the

county jail in San Luis Obispo for later court trial. This creates a particular burden

for the law enforcement agencies in the north county. An officer in that area must

leave his or her normal duties ( downtime) and transport the arrested person to the

county jail and await that person’s booking. Over the past two or three years, the

four law enforcement agencies of north county have collectively averaged 2,502

hours per year transporting arrestees to the county jail. When officers are trans-porting

and booking arrestees, they are unable to perform regular patrol and other

duties. We recommend that the county establish a new booking office in Templeton.

This would cut downtime by at least half.

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Can law enforcement agencies be more efficient by booking arrestees in

north county for later trial?

Findings

( 1) Holding facilities exist at law enforcement agencies in the county to detain

arrestees for up to six hours prior to their release, booking at the county

jail on Kansas Avenue on the western end of San Luis Obispo, or appear-ance

in court.

( 2) In north county, the police departments of Paso Robles and Atascadero

have holding facilities.

( 3) The four law enforcement agencies in north county report the following

statistics over the past two or three years:

• The Paso Robles Police Department ( 36 full- time officers) has aver-aged

24 bookings per month over the last three years at an annual

cost of 720 hours. Average time spent per booking has been 2.5

hours. The roundtrip between Paso Robles and the county jail is 66

miles; between Paso Robles and Templeton, the roundtrip is 14 miles.

• The Atascadero Police Department ( 29 full- time officers) has averaged

31 bookings per month over the last three years at an annual cost of

558 hours. Average time spent booking has been 1.5 hours. The

roundtrip between Atascadero and the county jail is 42 miles; between

Atascadero and Templeton, the roundtrip is 10 miles.

• The sheriff’s sub- station at Temple- ton ( 28 full- time officers) has

averaged 38 bookings per month over the last two years at an annual

cost of 684 hours. Average time spent booking has been 1.5 hours.

The roundtrip between Templeton and the county jail is 52 miles.

• The Templeton office of the California Highway Patrol ( CHP) also books

arrestees at the county jail. The CHP ( 22 full- time officers) has

averaged 30 bookings per month over the last three years at an annual

cost of 540 hours. The average booking time and distance to the

county jail are the same as those for the sheriff’s sub- station.

( 4) The chief of police of the Paso Robles Police Department and the ser-geant

in charge of Atascadero Police Depart- ment’s holding facility said

they favor changes to reduce the time lost in booking arrestees.

( 5) The Board of Supervisors has authorized the construction of a new sheriff’s

sub- station for north county in Templeton. As of the writing of this report,

construction has not yet started.

Conclusions

Annually, the officers of the four agencies spend about 2,502 hours transporting

arrestees to the county jail for booking. These hours are the equivalent of over

1.25 person- years. This time- consuming booking system takes officers in north

county away from their regular assigned duties to an inordinate degree and to the

detriment of law enforcement in the area. We calculate that the establishment of

a booking facility associated with the new sheriff’s sub- station in Templeton would

cut the time required to book by least one- half because of the substantially re-duced

driving distan