1 Cam Simpson, “ Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U. S. Widens Role in Palestinian Crisis; To
Undercut Hamas And Iran, Bush Pushes $ 86 Million Plan” Wall Street Journal, January 12,
2007.
2 For text, see [ http:// www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ prs/ ps/ 2003/ 20062. htm].
Order Code RS22768
December 7, 2007
Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process: The
Annapolis Conference
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international
conference in Annapolis, MD to officially revive the Israeli- Palestinian peace process.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority ( PA) President Mahmud
Abbas reached a “ Joint Understanding,” in which they agreed to launch continuous
bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to
simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance- Based Road Map to a
Permanent Two- State Solution to the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict. Both leaders are
operating under significant domestic political constraints and they continue to disagree
on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging. This report will not be
updated. For background and future developments, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-
Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U. S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz.
Background
In early 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was said to have promised
moderate Arab regimes that the United States would become more engaged in the Israeli-
Arab peace process in exchange for their support for countering increasing Iranian
influence in the Middle East. 1 The Secretary made eight trips to the region during the
year, initially to work with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority
( PA) President Mahmud Abbas on developing a “ political horizon” that would lead to a
resumption of the long- stalled Performance- Based Road Map to a Permanent Two- State
Solution to the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict, issued by the international Quartet ( the United
States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) on April 30, 2003.2 Each side
maintains that the other has not fulfilled its obligations under the three- phase Road Map;
independent observers agree that neither has done so. Phase I calls, inter alia, for Israel
CRS- 2
3 For President’s speech, see [ http:// www. whitehouse. gov/ news/ releases/ 2007/ 07
/ 20070716- 7. html].
to freeze all settlement activity ( including natural growth of settlements) and for the
Palestinians to confront terrorists and dismantle their infrastructures.
From February until June 2007, a Palestinian unity government included Hamas, a
U. S.- designated Foreign Terrorist Organization ( FTO), and Hamas’s participation
impeded Rice’s efforts. Olmert refused to negotiate with Abbas as long as Hamas failed
to recognize Israel, disavow violence, and accept prior Israeli- Palestinian agreements, i. e.,
met conditions that the Quartet laid down in January 2006 after Hamas won the
Palestinian parliamentary elections. In June 2007, however, Palestinian infighting ended
with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza Strip, and Abbas reacted by dissolving the
unity government. The Bush Administration and the Israeli government viewed the ouster
of Hamas as an opportunity to return to diplomacy.
On July 16, President Bush promised to support Abbas in order to lay the foundation
for serious negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The President called
for an international meeting “ of representatives from nations that support a two- state
solution, reject violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and commit to all previous
agreements between the parties.” When announced, the meeting was intended mainly to
review progress toward building Palestinian institutions and to look for ways to support
further reform, although participants also were to provide support for the parties in their
bilateral negotiations on a Palestinian state. 3
Olmert and Abbas, and later negotiating teams led by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Quray ( alternate spellings: Qurei,
Qureia), met over the next four months to work on a declaration of principles on final
status or core issues: Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, security, and water.
Olmert sought to keep the declaration vague in order to avoid concessions that would
prompt his domestic political opponents to bring down his government, while Abbas
wanted it to address core issues substantively in order to show his people that negotiations
could lead to an improvement in the quality of their lives, an end to the occupation, and
the establishment of a Palestinian state. They failed to produce a document.
Conference Attendees
The United States invited 49 countries and international organizations to send
representatives to a conference at the U. S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. Attendees
included members of the Arab League Follow- on Committee ( Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), the
G- 8 group of industrialized countries, permanent members of the U. N. Security Council,
fellow members of the international Quartet, members of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, and representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The size of the gathering signaled strong international support for a peace process. The
size of the Arabs’ turnout was attributed to their need for a strategic alliance with the
United States against Iran, but also may have indicated support for Abbas over Hamas.
CRS- 3
4 Interview, date not given, published by Al- Sharq al- Awsat, November 27, 2007.
5 Isabel Kershner and Taghreed el- Khodary, “ Hard- Liners in Gaza and Jerusalem Resist Peace
Talks,” New York Times, November 27, 2007.
6 For text, see [ http:// www. whitehouse. gov/ news/ releases/ 2007/ 11/ print/ 20071127. html].
The presence of Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal was
considered significant because the desert kingdom is a pro- Western Arab state that does
not have relations with Israel. The Foreign Minister clearly stated that normalization of
relations would come as a result of peace and not before it. 4 The attendance of Syria
suggested that the Bush Administration, which had been trying to isolate Damascus
because of its support for terrorist groups, its destabilization of Lebanon, and its alliance
with Iran, may now be willing to engage Syria and revive its dormant peace track with
Israel. Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments reportedly had demanded that Syria be
invited to Annapolis and that the conference call for a “ comprehensive peace” that would
include the return of the Golan Heights. Syria would only attend if the Golan were on the
agenda and sent Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al Miqdad, while almost all other
governments were represented by foreign ministers. Miqdad’s rank may have reflected
a belief that a renewed peace process would not address the Golan. However, Russia
reportedly wants a follow- up meeting in Moscow to address Syria’s concerns. Olmert
publicly has said that “ conditions have not yet matured” for the start of a dialogue with
Syria, but Israel and Syria have been talking via Turkish and Russian intermediaries.
Iran and Hamas, which have the potential to act as spoilers of the peace process,
were conspicuously missing from Annapolis. Iran denounced the conference before,
during, and after it took place. Its influence may have been felt in the absence of the
Shiite- led Maliki government of Iraq, an invitee which declined to send a representative
but which said that it would welcome peace. Yet, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was
unable to dissuade Syrian President Bashar al Asad, his presumed ally, from sending a
representative. For their part, Hamas officials described the meeting as “ useless” and
stridently escalated their rhetoric, vowing not to abandon their goal of a Palestinian state
“ from the river to the sea,” i. e., destroying Israel. 5
Agenda
The conference began on November 26, when President Bush held separate meetings
with Abbas and Olmert at the White House and Secretary Rice hosted a dinner for
attendees at the State Department. A plenary session convened in Annapolis on
November 27. After remarks by Bush, Abbas, and Olmert, the agenda included
international support for the peace process, institutional reform, and capacity building; a
comprehensive peace to include Israel- Syria and Israel- Lebanon; and advancing normal
relations and security between Israel and the Arab states. On November 28, President
Bush briefly met jointly with Abbas and Olmert.
Joint Understanding
Instead of a declaration of principles, President Bush read a “ Joint Understanding”
at the conference that dealt with the process or structure of negotiations. 6 In it, Prime
Minister Olmert and President Abbas express their determination to “ immediately launch
CRS- 4
bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty to resolve all core issues without
exception, as specified in previous agreements.” They agree to engage in continuous
negotiations in an effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this
purpose, a steering committee to oversee negotiating teams will meet continuously
beginning on December 12. Abbas and Olmert will meet biweekly to follow and assist
the negotiations. Negotiations will be bilateral. The Joint Understanding does not specify
a role for the United States in the negotiations, although one may emerge with time.
President Bush will not be playing a role similar to that of Presidents Carter and Clinton
in the past, and the United States will not necessarily make proposals in the event of a
deadlock. This is in line with a long- standing Administration view that it is the parties
themselves who must make peace. However, it is anticipated that Secretary of State Rice
will travel to the region frequently to provide encouragement and assistance. The
resumption of negotiations after a seven- year hiatus is viewed as the main achievement
of the conference, although the process may be said to have resumed with the Olmert-
Abbas talks in mid- 2007.
In the Joint Understanding, the parties also commit to immediately implement their
respective obligations under the Road Map. The United States will lead a tripartite U. S.-
Israeli- Palestinian mechanism to follow up on implementation. The parties further
commit to continue implementing the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject
to the implementation of the road map, as judged by the United States. The United States
will monitor and judge fulfillment of their Road Map commitments, a task that may prove
to be extremely difficult.
The President named General James L. Jones ( Ret.), former Commander of U. S.
European Command, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, as special envoy for Middle East security. The general will report to Secretary
Rice, who said that Jones will oversee “ the full range of security issues for the Israelis and
Palestinians as well as security cooperation with neighboring countries, and American
efforts to provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority.” He will not monitor
compliance with the Road Map nor replace Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, the U. S. Middle East
security coordinator, who has been assisting the Palestinians with improving their security
forces.
Domestic Constraints
The domestic political weaknesses of Olmert and Abbas may create challenges to or
constraints on progress on the Road Map and a peace treaty and have prompted much
skepticism about the prospects for the renewed peace process.
Palestinian Politics. Since 1996, the Palestinian Authority ( PA) has administered
both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, albeit amidst the presence of Israeli Defense Forces
and settlements. Factional fighting between Fatah and Hamas in May/ June 2007 resulted
in Hamas seizing total control of the Gaza Strip. PA President Mahmoud Abbas then
declared a state of emergency, dissolved the Hamas- led government, and replaced it with
one led by independent, technocrat Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. In practice, the
Abbas/ Fayyad government now administers only the West Bank while Hamas dominates
the Gaza Strip. Abbas has been unable to prevent Hamas from permitting its allies to
launch rockets into southern Israel.
CRS- 5
Israelis opposed to negotiations argue that talks are futile because Abbas is weak and
unable to implement the Road Map and/ or a peace treaty. Others contend that progress
in the peace process would strengthen Abbas by showing him able to deliver benefits for
the Palestinian people. Saudi Arabia and others are urging Abbas to reconcile with
Hamas in order to present a unified Palestinian front in negotiations and to increase the
legitimacy of any accord. However, as with the prior unity government, it is unlikely that
Israel would agree to negotiate with it unless Hamas meets conditions set out in 2006 that
it recognize Israel, disavow violence, and accept all prior Israeli- Palestinian agreements.
Hamas officials show no inclination to meet these conditions. Instead, they organized
protests against the Annapolis conference, rejected its results, hardened their rhetoric, and
continued to argue that Abbas lacks a legitimate mandate to conduct negotiations because
they won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Moreover, Hamas retains the capability to
sabotage the peace process by escalating terror attacks.
Israeli Politics. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert heads a fractious, multiparty
coalition whose majority in the Knesset ( parliament) is deceptively large. Many in his
own Kadima party oppose what they view as “ concessions” to the Palestinians and could
defect to the opposition Likud. Two parties in the coalition preemptively voiced
objections to possible compromises on Jerusalem and territory that would be required to
conclude a peace treaty. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual leader of the ultraorthodox Shas
Party, declared that he will order Shas to leave the coalition if Jerusalem is raised in
negotiations. The Russian- language based Yisrael Beytenu ( Israel Our Home) party, also
in the coalition, is willing to cede parts of Jerusalem, but not settlements. Meanwhile,
opposition Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu continues to lead all public opinion
polls, snipes at both Shas and Yisrael Beytenu for not bolting the coalition, voices
skepticism about Abbas’s ability to fulfill commitments, and charges that territorial
concessions will lead to a “ Hamastan.”
The Joint Understanding conditions implementation of a treaty on implementation
of the Road Map. This provision is intended to reassure the Israeli people that their
government continues to give priority to security and preventing terror. Nonetheless, the
Prime Minister’s ability to compromise in negotiations and stay in office at the same time
is severely constrained. Olmert’s unease about his coalition’s durability may partly
account for the complete failure of the Joint Understanding to mention core issues by
name -- Jerusalem is one of them. Should the two rightwing parties depart, Olmert could
rely on the leftwing Meretz and three small Israeli Arab parties to remain in power and
get a peace accord ratified, but any agreement that depends on Arab support would not
be viewed by many Israelis as legitimate.
Olmert’s tenure as prime minister also may be in jeopardy for other reasons. He is
the subject of several investigations into alleged corruption and a report by a commission
investigating Israel’s conduct of its 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon is due to be
submitted shortly. A criminal indictment or a scathing report could produce increased
calls for Olmert’s resignation. Israeli governments are notoriously short- lived and Olmert
has already been in power for almost two years, which is the average length of a
government’s tenure. Finally, Olmert soon will undergo treatment for prostate cancer,
which may remove him from the negotiating process for at least a limited time.
CRS- 6
7 For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [ http:// www. mfa. gov. il/
MFA/ Peace+ Process/ Reference+ Documents/ Exchange+ of+ letters+ Sharon- Bush+ 14-
Apr- 2004. htm].
8 U. N. General Assembly Resolution 194, paragraph 11. For text of resolution see
[ http:// www. state. gov/ p/ nea/ rls/ 22566. htm].
Prospects
The two sides are no more able to fulfill their obligations under Phase I of the Road
Map now than they have been for the past four and a half years and still disagree about
implementation. Phase I calls on Israel to cease settlement activity. Israel has more than
275,000 settlers in the West Bank ( not including East Jerusalem) and, at Annapolis,
Olmert referred to a letter that President Bush gave to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon in April 2004. In it, the President noted the need to take into account changed
“ realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,” ( i. e.,
settlements), asserting “ it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” 7 At the time,
the Palestinians denounced the President’s “ legitimization” of settlements and
prejudgment of final status. On November 19, 2007, Olmert stated that he does not view
a freeze on building beyond the 1967 border as part of the Road Map’s requirements. He
also said that Israel would not build new settlements or outposts or appropriate more land
for settlement use. In addition, Israel does not believe that construction in East Jerusalem
is required in a freeze. Palestinians argue that a freeze means a complete cessation of all
settlement construction, including in existing settlements. Phase I also requires the
Palestinians to confront terrorists and dismantle terrorist infrastructures. Palestinian
officials claim that their limited actions against Hamas- supporting charities and
deployment of police in Nablus and Tulkarm prove that they are fulfilling their
obligations under Phase I. Yet, they lack the capability to truly confront Hamas and other
terror groups, even with the assistance provided thus far by the United States and Israel.
Final status issues also remain intractable. For example, on the issue of refugees,
Abbas referred at Annapolis to U. N. General Assembly Resolution 194, which the
Palestinians believe grants refugees the “ right to return” to their homes ( now in Israel).
( The Resolution also provides for an alternative right to compensation. 8) However, he also
had joined the Arab Initiative which calls for an agreed upon solution to the issue. Israel
maintains its right to remain a Jewish state, the identity of which would be lost if the
Palestinian refugees were allowed to return. It says that the refugees should resettle only
in Palestine and in Arab lands and be compensated. For support, Israelis cite another part
of President Bush’s 2004 letter to Sharon, which stated that a solution to the refugee issue
will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “ rather than in Israel,”
and thereby rejected a “ right of return.”
The 2000 Camp David talks failed largely because of the issue of Jerusalem. Olmert
has expressed willingness to cede the Arab neighborhoods and refugee camps in the city
( the boundaries of which the Israeli Knesset had enlarged after the 1967 war). It may be
more difficult for him to compromise on the control/ sovereignty over holy sites. As noted
above, rightwing Israeli parties could bring down the government over any steps they
consider threatening to “ divide” the city. In Annapolis, Abbas spoke of a Palestinian
capital in East Jerusalem and of guaranteed access for all religions to holy sites.