Order Code RL32048
Iran: U. S. Concerns and
Policy Responses
Updated December 5, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Iran: U. S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Summary
According to the Administration’s “ National Security Strategy” document
released on March 16, 2006, the United States “ may face no greater challenge from
a single country than Iran.” That Administration perception continues, generated
primarily by Iran’s nuclear program but intensified by Iran’s military assistance to
armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.
However, the threat perception of other governments might change following the
December 3, 2007 release of key judgements from a new National Intelligence
Estimate ( NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual
nuclear weapon.
The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its
approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran – strengthening
international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with
international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran
has complied with U. N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment.
Two U. N. resolutions ( 1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction ( WMD)-
related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran’s nuclear and related entities and
personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting
on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on
enrichment but apparently mostly cooperating with an August 2007 offer to reveal
to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its past nuclear
program, further sanctions, possibly including on civilian trade or financing, have
been under discussion at the U. N. Security Council. Separate U. S. efforts, showing
some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade,
investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with
Iran. A further step in this effort was taken on October 21, 2007, when the
Administration named several Revolutionary Guard entities and personalities as
proliferators and supporters of terrorism.
To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial
naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has been strongly denying
widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to
rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment program succeed.
Some in Congress seek to limit the President’s authority to take unilateral military
action against Iran. Some legislation passed in the 110th Congress, including H. R.
1400 and H. R. 957, would increase U. S. sanctions on Iran — both the U. S. trade ban
and the Iran Sanctions Act that seeks to prevent foreign investment in Iran’s energy
sector. Other legislation, such as H. R. 1357, H. R. 2347 ( passed by the House), and
S. 1430, promote divestment of companies that do business with Iran. Some in the
Administration believe that only a change of Iran’s regime would end the threat
posed by Iran.
For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act
( ISA), and CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, both by Kenneth Katzman,
and CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments. This
report is updated regularly.
Contents
Political History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Regime Stability, Human Rights, and Recent Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Rebound of the Conservatives and the 2005 Election of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ahmadinejad Election, Government, and Popularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Human Rights Practices and the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Prominent Internal Dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Exile Groups: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran ( PMOI) . . . . 11
The Son of the Former Shah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Other Exiled Activists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs . . . . . 13
Conventional Military/ Revolutionary Guard/ Qods Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U. S. Support for Diplomacy/ Establishment of “ P5+ 1” Contact
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Resolution 1696 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Resolution 1737 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Resolution 1747 and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Ballistic Missiles/ Warheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Relations with the Persian Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Iranian Policy in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Lebanese Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Central Asia and the Caspian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
U. S. Policy Responses, Options, and Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Overview of Bush Administration Iran Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Containment and Possible Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Iranian Retaliatory Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Presidential Authorities and Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Congress and Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Further International and Multilateral Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
European/ Japanese/ Other Foreign Country Policy on Sanctions and
Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Foreign Banking and Financing Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
World Bank Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
U. S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
H. R. 1400/ S. 970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Terrorism/ Foreign Aid Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Proliferation Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Counter- Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
U. S. Trade Ban/ Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Iran Sanctions Act ( ISA)/ H. R. 1400/ S. 970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Travel- Related Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Status of Some U. S.- Iran Assets Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
List of Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 2. Map of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Selected Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Human Rights Practices and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 5. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 6. Entities Sanctioned by U. N. Resolutions and Executive Order 13382 . 57
Iran: U. S. Concerns and
Policy Responses
Much of the debate over U. S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of
the current regime; some believe that Iran, a country of almost 70 million people, is
a threat to U. S. interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy
direction intended to challenge U. S. influence and allies in the region. President
Bush, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an
“ axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea.
Political History
The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
(“ the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah
assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi
( Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World
War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only
military force, the Cossack Brigade ( reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early
20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza
Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had
been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s
perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906
constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles
( parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution ( December 1906). Prior
to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and
dynasties. Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty ( 1500- 1722), which
brought Iran out from a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
The Shah was anti- Communist, and the United States viewed his government
as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. In 1951,
under pressure from nationalists in the Majles ( parliament) who gained strength in
the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr.
Mohammad Mossadeq, as Prime Minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning,
and the United States was wary of his policies, which included his drive for
nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers began an uprising in August
1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled. The Shah was
restored in a successful CIA- supported uprising against Mossadeq.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing
he also tried to limit the influence of Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition to the Shah,
opposition based on the Shah’s anti- clerical policies and what Khomeini alleged was
CRS- 2
1 The Assembly also has the power to amend Iran’s constitution.
2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six
Islamic jurists are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are
selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles ( parliament).
the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to his patron, the United States. Khomeini
fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the
Shrine of Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi
Shiite clerics and, with them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat- e- faqih ( rule
by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975,
Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders, which settled
territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each others’
oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic
revolution. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro- Khomeini forces, allied
with a broad array of anti- Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse
in February 1979. Khomeini returned from France and, on February 11, 1979,
declared an Islamic Republic of Iran, as enshrined in the constitution that was
adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 ( and amended in 1989). Khomeini
was strongly anti- West and particularly anti- U. S., and relations between the United
States and the Islamic Republic turned hostile even before the November 4, 1979,
seizure of the U. S. Embassy by pro- Khomeini radicals.
Regime Stability, Human Rights,
and Recent Elections
About a decade after founding the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini died on June 3, 1989. The regime he established appears relatively stable,
despite internal schisms, occasional unrest in areas inhabited by minorities, and
substantial unpopularity among intellectuals, students, educated elites, and many
women. Upon his death, one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, a two term
president ( 1981- 1989), was selected Supreme Leader by an “ Assembly of Experts”
( an elected body). 1 The fourth election for the Assembly of Experts, which is
empowered to oversee the work of the Supreme Leader and replace him if necessary,
as well as to amend the constitution, was held on December 15, 2006 After that
election, Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as
president himself ( 1989- 1997), was elected deputy chief of the Assembly of Experts,
positioning him for elevation to leader following the August 2007 death of the
existing chief, Ayatollah Ali Meshkini. Rafsanjani was voted head of the Assembly
of Experts on September 4, 2007, defeating the harder line Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.
Khamene’i has vast formal powers as Supreme Leader – he appoint heads of key
institutions, such as the armed forces ( the Supreme Leader is Commander in Chief
of the armed forces); half of the twelve- member Council of Guardians; 2 and the
members of Iran’s Supreme Judicial Council. Headed by Ayatollah Jannati ( see
above), this conservative- controlled Council of Guardians reviews legislation to
ensure it conforms to Islamic law, and it screens election candidates. Khamene’i also
has the power, under the constitution, to remove the elected President if either the
CRS- 3
Supreme Judicial Council or the elected Majles ( parliament) say the President should
be removed, with cause. Another body is the 42- member Expediency Council, set up
in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles ( parliament) and the
Council of Guardians. Expediency Council members are appointed by the Supreme
Leader for five- year terms. The Council, appointed most recently in February 2007,
is still headed by Rafsanjani; its executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard
commander- in- chief Mohsen Reza’i.
Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities
Conservatives
Supreme
Leader Ali
Khamene’i
Has all the formal powers but none of the undisputed authority of his
predecessor, founder of the revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Considered moderate conservative, seeks to challenge U. S. hegemony
but avoid isolating Iran or provoking military confrontation. Generally
supportive of the business community ( bazaaris), and opposes major
state intervention in the economy.
Akbar
Hashemi-
Rafsanjani
Key strategist of the regime, longtime advocate of “ grand bargain” to
resolve all outstanding issues with United States. Leads both
Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts. Was Majles
( parliament) speaker during 1981- 89 and President 1989- 1997.
President
Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad
Leads faction of younger, harder line conservatives associated with
Revolutionary Guard, revolutionary institutions, and provincial
governments, who comprise much of his cabinet. Generally support
state control of the economy, subsidies, and social welfare programs
for lower classes. In keeping with a practice begun by Khatemi,
Ahmadinejad has a woman as one of his nine vice presidents.
Majles Speaker
Gholem Ali
Haddad- Adel
Relative by marriage of Khamene’i, controls largest conservative
faction in the Majles. Possibly at Khamene’i’s behest, has
sometimes challenged Ahmadinejad’s nominees and budget
proposals. Associated with faction known as “ Builders of Islamic
Iran” which supports Ahmadinejad.
Ali Larijani Former state broadcasting head, was head of Supreme National
Security Council and is chief nuclear negotiator until October 2007
resignation. Considered hardline but politically close to Khamene’i,
Larijani sought to avoid U. N. Security Council isolation.
Mohammad
Baqer Qalibaf
Former Revolutionary Guard Air Force commander and police
chief, but perceived as a moderate conservative and rival of
Ahmadinejad. Supporters won nine out of 15 seats on Tehran city
council in December 2006 elections, defeating Ahmadinejad
supporters, propelling him to mayor of Tehran. Probable challenger
to Ahmadinejad in 2009.
Ayatollah
Mohammad
Taqi Mesbah-
Yazdi
Founder of the hardline Haqqani school, and spiritual mentor of
Ahmadinejad. Fared poorly in December 2006 elections for 86- seat
“ Assembly of Experts” that can amend the constitution, oversee
Khamene’i’s performance, and determine his successor, but did win
a seat. An assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader
and a proponent of an “ Islamic state” rather than the current
“ Islamic republic,” and advocates isolation from the West. Some
believe Mesbah- Yazdi harbors ambition to replace Khamene’i.
CRS- 4
Mahmud
Hashemi
Shahrudi
An Ayatollah, has headed the Supreme Judicial Council since 1999.
Ally of Khamene’i and Rafsanjani, has supported repeated
crackdowns on independent media critical of the regime. But, has
cracked down on judicial corruption and on mistreatment of
prisoners. Politically close to Shiite Islamist parties in Iraq.
Militant
Clerics
Association
Longtime organization of hardline clerics. Not to be confused with
Society of Militant Clerics, an organization with almost the same
name but which is composed of reformists and moderate clerics.
Reformists
Mohammad
Khatemi/
Reformists
Reformist president during 1997- 2005. Elected May 1997, with
69% of the vote; re- elected June 2001with 77%. Rode wave of
sentiment for easing social and political restrictions among students,
intellectuals, youths, and women that seeks reform but not outright
replacement of the Islamic republican regime. Khatemi supporters
held about 70% of the 290 seats in the 2000- 2004 Majles. Now
heads International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations and
remains a public figure in Iran. Visited U. S. in September 2006 to
speak at Harvard and the Washington National Cathedral on
“ dialogue of civilizations.” Reformist Mostafa Moin finished fifth
in the first round of presidential elections on June 17, 2005.
Reformists regrouped and won four of fifteen Tehran city council
seats in December 2006 local elections.
Office of
Consolidation
Unity ( Daftar
Tahkim- e-
Vahdat)
Hardline reformists. Originally strong Khatemi supporters, but
turned against him for failing to challenge hardliners, particularly
after July 1999 violent crackdown on student riots, in which four
students were killed. Generally dispersed and repressed under
conservative presidency of Ahmadinejad.
The Islamic
Iran
Participation
Front ( IIPF).
The most prominent and best organized pro- reform grouping. Its
leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi ( a
deputy speaker in the 2000- 2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi.
Mojahedin of
the Islamic
Revolution
Organization
( MIR).
Composed mainly of left- leaning Iranian figures who support state
control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and
relaxation of rules on social behavior. Its leader is former Heavy
Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi.
The Rebound of the Conservatives and the 2005 Election of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After suffering several major election defeats at the
hands of Mohammad Khatemi and the reformists during 1997- 2000 — and losing the
grip on power they held while Khomeini was alive — the conservative camp gained
strength after the February 28, 2003, municipal elections, when reformists largely
boycotted. The conservatives gained additional strength from the February 20, 2004,
Majles elections, in which the Council of Guardians disqualified about 3,600 mostly
reformist candidates, including 87 members of the incumbent Majles, enabling the
conservatives to win a majority ( about 155 out of the 290 seats) on turnout of about
51%. The Administration and the Senate ( S. Res. 304, adopted by unanimous consent
on February 12, 2004) criticized the elections as unfair, because of candidate
screening.
CRS- 5
3 “ Bush Criticizes Iran Election Process as Unfair.” Reuters, June 16, 2005.
On the tide of these conservative victories, Rafsanjani regained prominence and
ran in the June 2005 presidential elections. ( He was constitutionally permitted to run
because a third term would not have been consecutive with his previous two terms.)
Rafsanjani had several more conservative opponents, three of whom had ties to the
Revolutionary Guard: Ali Larijani ( see Table 1); Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf ( see
Table 1); and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
In the election, the Council of Guardians narrowed the field of candidates to 8
out of the 1,014 persons who filed. ( In the 2001 presidential election, the Council
permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.) On the eve of the first round,
President Bush criticized the elections as unfair because of the denial of so many
candidacies. 3 In the June 17, 2005 first round, turnout was about 63% ( 29.4 million
votes out of 46.7 million eligible voters). With 21% and 19.5%, respectively,
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad moved to a run- off. Ahmadinejad won a landslide
victory in the June 24 runoff, receiving 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%. Turnout was
47%, less than the first round, suggesting that reformists did not turn out in large
numbers to prevent Ahmadinejad’s election. He took office on August 6, 2005.
Ahmadinejad Election, Government, and Popularity. Since taking
office, Ahmadinejad has inflamed world opinion with several anti- Israel statements,
the first of which was stated at an October 26, 2005, Tehran conference entitled “ A
World Without Zionism” that “ Israel should be wiped off the map” and that
“ anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nations’ fury.” A
similar point of contention was his insistence on the holding of a December 2006
conference in Tehran questioning the Holocaust. A U. N. Security Council statement
and Senate and House resolutions ( H. Res. 523 and S. Res. 292), passed in their
respective chambers, condemned the statement. On June 3, 2007, Ahmadinejad said
that Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories had pressed “ the
countdown button for the destruction of the Zionist regime....” On June 21, 2007, the
House passed H. Con. Res. 21, calling on the United Nations Security Council to
charge Ahmadinejad with violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention includes “ direct and public
incitement” to commit genocide as a punishable offense. His visit to the U. N.
General Assembly meetings in September 2007 was controversial, including a
September 24 speech at Columbia University in which he said the Holocaust needed
further study, and denied that Iran had any homosexuals. The New York City police
department denied his request for a special, escorted visit to World Trade Center site
(“ Ground Zero”). His General Assembly speech on September 25 was defiant on the
nuclear issue, saying Iran considered it a “ closed issue.”
Some Iranian leaders, both conservative and reformist, and portions of the
population, appear to be concerned that Ahmadinejad’s defiance of the international
community on the nuclear issue are isolating Iran. The results of the December 15,
2006, municipal council and Assembly of Experts elections showed setbacks for
Ahmadinejad supporters. His supporters won only 3 out of the 15 seats on the Tehran
city council, with similar results in other major cities. Just before the elections,
students protested Ahmadinejad during a speech at Tehran’s Amir Kabir University,
CRS- 6
a possible preview of his waning popularity. Another student protest against him took
place on October 8, 2007.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
First non- cleric to be president of the Islamic republic since the assassination of then
president Mohammad Ali Rajai in August 1981. About 50, he campaigned as a “ man of
the people,” the son of a blacksmith who lives in modest circumstances, who would
promote the interests of the poor and return government to the principles of the Islamic
revolution during the time of Ayatollah Khomeini. His official biography says he served
with the “ special forces” of the Revolutionary Guard, and he served subsequently ( late
1980s) as a deputy provincial governor. A part of the “ Isargaran” faction composed of
former Guard and Basij ( volunteer popular forces) leaders and other hardliners. U. S.
intelligence reportedly determined he was not, as was thought by some, one of the holders
of the 52 American hostages during November 1979- January 1981. Other accounts say
Ahmadinejad believes his mission is to prepare for the return of the 12th “ Hidden” Imam,
whose return from occultation would, according to Twelver Shiite doctrine, be
accompanied by the establishment of Islam as the global religion. In an October 2006
address, Ahmadinejad said, “ I have a connection with God.” For more information, see
CRS Report RS22569, Iran: Profile and Statements of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
by Hussein Hassan.
Several experts believe that Supreme Leader Khamene’i and Rafsanjani want
to curb Ahmadinejad’s authority in order to limit confrontation with the international
community. The first decision that strengthened the view that Khamene’i seeks to
constrain Ahmadinejad was the October 2005 grant of new governmental supervisory
powers to the Expediency Council. The second was the July 2006 creation of a ten-person
advisory “ Foreign Policy Committee” consisting of former defense and
foreign ministers. In January 2007, an Iranian newspaper owned by Khamene’i
admonished Ahmadinejad to remove himself from the nuclear issue. A shakeup in
the nuclear negotiating team in October 2007, discussed below, could be further
indications of splits in the leadership on that issue. A further rebuke to Ahmadinejad
by the hardline news daily Jomhuri Elsami in November 2007 – ostensibly over the
issue of Ahmadinejad’s allegations against a Rafsanjani protege – was interpreted as
Rafsanjani’s maneuvering against Ahmadinejad in advance of March 2008 Majles
elections and presidential elections in March 2009, in which Ahmadinejad is
expected to run for a second term. However, Ahmadinejad’s ties to the Revolutionary
Guard and other revolutionary institutions, likely positions him to weather criticism
from senior leaders and others, at least for now.
Ahmadinejad also has tried to protect his position by appealing to the lower
classes. He has directed the raising of some wages and the lowering of interest rates
for poorer borrowers, cancelled some debts of farmers, and increased social welfare
payments and subsidies. Some analysts believe these moves have backfired, to some
extent, by causing increased inflation. His distributive policies have been supported,
in part, by relatively high oil prices, and the budget he submitted in January 2007
assumes an oil price of only $ 33 per barrel. The relative health of Iran’s budget is
expected to help Iran minimize the effects of international sanctions resulting from
Iran’s nuclear defiance. Still, Ahmadinejad has not moved to correct economic
CRS- 7
structural imbalances, such as the dependence on oil revenues, which account for
about 20% of Iran’s gross domestic product ( GDP), and its extensive imports of
refined gasoline. Major economic sectors or markets are controlled by the quasi- statal
“ foundations” ( bonyads), run by powerful former officials, and there are special
trading privileges for them and the bazaar merchants, a key constituency for some
conservatives. Ahmadinejad’s political standing was further undermined by the June
27, 2007 rationing of gasoline — a moves intended to curb consumption that forces
Iran to import refined gasoline. The rationing harms poorer Iranians —
Ahmadinejad’s key political base — who sometimes use their cars as unofficial taxis.
Some protests took place, including attacks on gas stations, after the rationing went
into effect, a although the unrest eased when the government offered to hand out six
months worth of gas rations in advance. The Oil Minister resigned in August 2007,
probably because of the unpopularity of the rationing program.
Table 2. Selected Economic Indicators
Economic Growth 4.3% ( 2006 est.)
Per Capita Income $ 8,100/ yr purchasing power parity
Proven Oil Reserves 100 billion barrels ( fifth in world)
Refined Gasoline
Imports
$ 5 billion value per year ( 60% from European oil trader Vitol)
Oil
Production/ Exports
4 million barrels per day ( mbd)/ 2.4 mbd exports
Major Oil/ Gas
Customers
China — 300,00 barrels per day ( bpd); about 4% of China’s oil imports;
Japan — 600,000 bpd, about 12% of oil imports; other Asia ( mainly
South Korea) — 450,000 bpd; Italy — 300,000 bpd; France — 210,000
bpd; Netherlands 40,000 bpd; other Europe — 200,000 bpd; India —
150,000 bpd ( 10% of its oil imports; Africa — 200,000 bpd. Turkey —
gas: 8.6 billion cubic meters/ yr
Refined Gasoline
Suppliers
India, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey, Venezuela, Singapore, Netherlands, China
Major Export
Markets ( 2004)
China ($ 6 billion); Italy ($ 2.5 billion); South Korea ($ 3 billion);
Netherlands ($ 3 billion); France ($ 2.5 billion); Turkey ($ 2.5 billion);
Spain ($ 2 billion); Japan ($ 1.5 billion); Germany ($ 1 billion); UAE ($ 1
billion)
Major Imports From
( 2004)
Germany ($ 5.1 billion); China ($ 4.1 billion); Italy ($ 3.9 billion); S. Korea
($ 3 billion); France ($ 2.7 billion); UAE ($ 2.9 billion); Turkey ($ 1.3
billion); Japan ($. 9 billion); Netherlands ($. 7 billion); Spain ($. 4 billion)
Export Credit
Guarantees ( 2006)
Germany $ 715 million, down from $ 2 billion in 2005; France — $ 3.8
billion, down from $ 5.7 billion in 2005.
Major Non- Oil
Investments
Renault ( France) and Mercedes ( Germany)- automobile production in
Karaj, Iran — valued at $ 370 million; Renault ( France), Peugeot ( France)
and Volkswagen ( Germany) — auto parts production; Turkey — Tehran
airport, hotels; China — shipbuilding on Qeshm Island, aluminum factory
in Shirvan, cement plant in Hamadan; UAE financing Esfahan Steel
Company; India — steel plant, petrochemical plant; S. Korea — steel
plant in Kerman Province; S. Korea and Germany — $ 1.7 billion to
expand Esfahan refinery.
Trade With U. S.
( 2006)
$ 242 million ( trade is severely restricted by U. S. sanctions). Exports to
U. S. — $ 157 million ( large categories: pomegranate juice, caviar,
pistachio nuts, carpets, medicines, artwork). Imports from U. S. — $ 85
million ( food, medicines, tobacco products).
CRS- 8
4 Wright, Robin. “ Iran Curtails Freedom in Throwback to 1979.” Washington Post, June 16,
2007.
Foreign Exchange $ 40 billion+
External Debt $ 19 billion ( 2005 est.)
Development
Assistance Received
2003 ( latest available): $ 136 million grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany
($ 38 million); Japan ($ 17 million); France ($ 9 million).
Unemployment Rate 11%+
Source: CIA World Factbook, various press, IMF, Iran Trade Planning Division ( 2006), press
Human Rights Practices and the Opposition
The regime appears to have a relatively firm grip on power, in part because
Iran’s leaders have taken numerous steps to suppress dissent. The State Department’s
human rights report for 2006, released March 6, 2007, said Iran’s already poor human
rights record “ worsened” during the year. That report, and the 2007 State Department
“ religious freedom” report ( released September 14, 2007), cite Iran for widespread
human rights abuses including summary executions, disappearances, torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, and discrimination against women. Other accounts say that,
during 2007, the regime has cracked down on dissent and personal freedoms. 4
Successive administrations have not generally considered Iran’s human rights
practices as a strategic threat to U. S. interests, but the Bush Administration has
highlighted Iran’s human rights record in order to build international consensus to
pressure Iran. The Administration has established with European allies and Canada
a “ Human Rights Working Group” that coordinates a response to Iran’s human rights
abuses. A special U. N. Human Rights Commission monitoring mission for Iran,
consisting of reports by a “ Special Representative” on Iran’s human rights record,
was conducted during 1984- 2002. Iran has since agreed to “ thematic” monitoring
consisting of periodic U. N. investigations of specific aspects of Iran’s human rights
record. Iran is a party to the two international human rights covenants.
CRS- 9
5 Sources: State Department reports on human rights and on religious freedom.
[ http:// www. state. gov/ g/ drl/ rls/ hrrpt/ 2006/ 78852. htm]; [ http:// www. state. gov/ g/ drl/ rls
/ irf/ 2005/ 51599. htm].
Table 3. Human Rights Practices and Dissent5
Group/
Issue
Regime Practice/ Recent Developments
Ethnic and
Religious
Breakdown
Persians are about 51% of the population, and Azeris ( a Turkic people) are
about 24%. Kurds are about 7% of the population, and about 3% are Arab. Of
religions, Shiite Muslims are about 90% of the Muslim population and Sunnis
are about 10%. About 2% of the population is non- Muslim, including
Christians, Zoroastrians ( an ancient religion in what is now Iran), Jewish, and
Baha’i.
Private
Media
Since 2000, judicial hardliners have closed hundreds of reformist newspapers,
although many have tended to reopen under new names, and authorities have
imprisoned or questioned several editors and even some members of the Majles.
Iran also has blocked hundreds of pro- reform websites. On December 19, 2005,
Ahmadinejad banned Western music from state media, reviving a cultural
decree from Ayatollah Khomeini’s rule. During 2006, regime increased controls
over use of the internet because citizens have increasingly turned to that
medium as a source for news and political debate. In one specific major
development, in September 2006, the government closed a major reformist daily
newspaper, Shargh, citing its publishing of a satirical cartoon with political
overtones.
Labor
Unions/
Students
In 2006, regime forcibly repressed strikes by the 17,000- member Tehran bus
drivers union, including arresting its leaders then and again in July 2007.
Regime reportedly also dissolved student unions and replaced them with regime
loyalists following student criticism of Ahmadinejad. Unions are technically not
independent, but under a state- controlled “ Workers’ House” umbrella.
H. Con. Res. 203 condemns Iran’s July 2007 arrests of several union officers.
Women Regime strictly enforcing requirement that women fully cover themselves in
public, generally with a garment called a chador, including through detentions.
In March 2007, the regime arrested 31 women activists who were protesting the
arrest in 2006 of several other women’s rights activists; all but 3 of the 31 were
released by March 9. In May 2006, the Majles passed a bill calling for increased
public awareness of Islamic dress, an apparent attempt to persuade women not
to violate the dress code or wear Western fashion. The bill did not, as some
outside Iran intimated, contain any requirement or suggestion that members of
Iran’s minority groups wear badges or distinctive clothing. In April 2006,
Ahmadinejad directed that women be allowed to attend soccer matches, but the
Supreme Leader reversed that move. Women can vote and run in parliamentary
elections, but their candidacies for president have routinely been barred by the
Council of Guardians. Iranian women can drive, and many work outside the
home, including owning and running their own businesses. There are thirteen
women in the 290- seat Majles.
Religious
Freedom
Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named
Iran as a “ Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious
Freedom Act, and continued deterioration in Iran’s practices on this issue was
noted in the International Religious Freedom report for 2007. ( No sanctions
have been added because of this designation, on the grounds that Iran is already
subject to extensive U. S. sanctions.)
CRS- 10
Group/
Issue
Regime Practice/ Recent Developments
Baha’is Iran repeatedly cited for repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s
Shiite Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect. In March 2006, U. N. Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief revealed the existence of an
Iranian letter directing greater domestic surveillance of the Baha’is. In the
1990s, several Baha’is were executed for apostasy ( Bahman Samandari in 1992;
Musa Talibi in 1996; and Ruhollah Ruhani in 1998). Another, Dhabihullah
Mahrami, was in custody since 1995 and died of unknown causes in prison in
December 2005. In February 2000, Iran’s Supreme Court set aside the death
sentences against three other Baha’is. Several congressional resolutions have
condemned Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is, including S. Con. Res. 57 ( 106th
Congress), which passed the Senate July 19, 2000, and H. Con. Res. 257, which
passed the House on September 19, 2000. In the 109th Congress, partly in
response to a May 2006 wave of arrests of Baha’is in Shiraz, H. Con. Res. 415,
requests the Administration emphasize that it regards Iran’s treatment of the
Baha’is as a significant factor in U. S. Iran policy.
Jews Along with Christians, a “ recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the
30,000- member Jewish community ( the largest in the Middle East aside from
Israel) enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish communities in several
other Muslim states. However, in practice the freedom of Iranian Jews to
practice their religion is limited, and Iranian Jews remain reluctant to speak out
for fear of reprisals. During 1993- 1998, Iran executed five Jews allegedly
spying for Israel. In June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews ( mostly teachers,
shopkeepers, and butchers) from the Shiraz area that it said were part of an
“ espionage ring” for Israel. After an April- June 2000 trial, ten of the Jews and
two Muslims accomplices were convicted ( July 1, 2000), receiving sentences
ranging from 4 to 13 years. An appeals panel reduced the sentences, and all
were released by April 2003.
Sunnis The State Department reports note other discrimination against Sufis and Sunni
Muslims, although abuses against Sunnis could reflect that minority ethnicities,
including Kurds, are mostly Sunnis. In addition, the regime repressed 2006
unrest among the minority Azeri population, as well as Arabs in the southern
province of Khuzestan.
Human
Trafficking
The June 12, 2007 ( latest annual), State Department “ Trafficking in Persons”
report continues to place Iran in Tier 3 ( worst level) for failing to take action to
prevent trafficking in persons. Girls purportedly are trafficked for sexual
exploitation within Iran and from Iran to Turkey, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf
states.
Prominent Internal Dissidents. The regime is highly concerned about those
dissidents who previously held senior regime positions. These dissidents are popular
inside Iran, but their ascendancy, were it to occur, might not fundamentally alter
Iran’s relations with the United States. One such figure, Ayatollah Hossein Ali
Montazeri, was released in January 2003 from several years of house arrest, but he
remains under virtual house arrest. He had been Khomeini’s designated successor
until 1989, when Khomeini dismissed him for allegedly protecting intellectuals and
other opponents of clerical rule. Another senior cleric who takes similar positions,
Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi, was arrested on October 8, 2006.
Dissidents with similar views include theoretician Abd al- Karim Soroush, former
Interior Minister Abdollah Nuri, and former hostage- holder Abbas Abdi, who had
CRS- 11
6 Other names by which this group is known is the Mojahedin- e- Khalq Organization ( MEK
or MKO) and the National Council of Resistance ( NCR).
7 The designation was made under the authority of the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ( P. L. 104- 132).
been arrested in 2002 for publishing an opinion poll purporting to show that the
Iranian public favors restoring relations with the United States.
Some dissidents were not high level regime figures, but have sought to
challenge or expose the regime’s practices from inside Iran. One example is
journalist Akbar Ganji, who conducted hunger strikes to protest regime oppression.
He was released on schedule on March 18, 2006 after sentencing in 2001 to six years
in prison for alleging high- level involvement in a series of murders of Iranian
dissident intellectuals that the regime had blamed on “ rogue agents” in the security
apparatus. The Bush Administration issued a statement calling for his release on July
12, 2005. In the 109th Congress, H. Res. 414 expressed the sense of Congress that the
United States and United Nations should condemn Iran’s imprisonment of him.
Another example was a Canadian journalist of Iranian origin, Zahra Kazemi, who
died in 2003, allegedly of beating, while in Iranian detention. She had been detained
in July 2003 for filming outside Tehran’s Evin prison. An intelligence agent who
allegedly conducted the beating was acquitted on July 25, 2004, prompting
accusations that the investigation and trial were unfair. The prosecutor in her case,
Saeed Mortazavi, allegedly responsible for numerous human rights abuses, was Iran’s
representative to the inaugural meeting of the U. N. Human Rights Council.
Exile Groups: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran ( PMOI). Of
the groups seeking to replace the regime outright, one of the best known is the
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran ( PMOI). 6 Secular and left- leaning, it was
formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the Shah of Iran and advocated a form of
Marxism blended with Islamic tenets. It allied with pro- Khomeini forces during the
Islamic revolution and supported the November 1979 takeover of the U. S. Embassy
in Tehran but was later purged and driven into exile. In June 2003, France arrested
about 170 PMOI members, including its co- leader Maryam Rajavi ( wife of PMOI
founder Masoud Rajavi, whereabouts unknown); she was released and remains based
in France, and is occasionally received by European parliamentarians and other
politicians. In December 2006, a European Union ( EU) court struck down EU’s
freezing of the PMOI’s assets in Europe.
Even though it is an opponent of Tehran, since the late 1980s the State
Department has refused contact with the PMOI and its umbrella organization, the
National Council of Resistance ( NCR). The State Department designated the PMOI
as a foreign terrorist organization ( FTO) in October 19977 and the NCR was named
as an alias of the PMOI in the October 1999 re- designation. The FTO designation
was prompted by PMOI attacks in Iran that sometimes killed or injured civilians —
although the group does not appear to purposely target civilians. In August 14, 2003,
the State Department designated the NCR offices in the United States an alias of the
PMOI, and NCR and Justice Department authorities closed down those offices. In
CRS- 12
8 “ Removal of Iran Group From Terror List Sought.” Washington Post, November 23, 2002.
9 Cloud, David. “ U. S., Iran Hit Bumpy Terrain on Road to Rapprochement.” Wall Street
Journal, May 12, 2003.
10 Kampeas, Ron. “ Iran’s Crown Prince Plots Nonviolent Insurrection from Suburban
Washington.” Associated Press, August 26, 2002.
November 2002, a letter signed by about 150 House Members was released, asking
the President to remove the PMOI from the FTO list. 8
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2006 asserts that the
organization — and not just a radical element of the organization as the group asserts
— was responsible for the alleged killing of seven American defense advisers to the
former Shah in 1975- 1976. The State Department report has, in the past, noted the
group’s promotion of women in its ranks, but the report for 2006 emphasizes the
group’s “ cult- like” character, including indoctrination of its members and separation
of family members from its activists.
The group’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s
contributed to the U. S. shunning of the organization. U. S. forces attacked PMOI
military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and negotiated a
ceasefire with PMOI military elements in Iraq, requiring the approximately 3,350
PMOI fighters to remain confined to their Ashraf camp near the border with Iran. Its
weaponry is in storage, guarded by U. S. and now Bulgarian military personnel.
Another 350 PMOI fighters have taken advantage of an arrangement between Iran
and the ICRC for them to return home if they disavow further PMOI activities.
Another 200 are in the process of leaving Ashraf if a host country could be found.
Press reports say that some Administration officials want the group removed
from the FTO list and want a U. S. alliance with it against the Tehran regime. 9 Those
advocating that policy took heart from the U. S. decision in July 2004 to grant the
Ashraf detainees “ protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva Convention,
meaning they will not be extradited to Tehran or forcibly expelled as long as U. S.
forces remain in Iraq. At the same time, some Iraqi leaders from pro- Iranian factions,
including Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki, have said that the group would be expelled.
The Son of the Former Shah. Some Iranian exiles, as well as some elites
still in Iran, want to replace the regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza
Pahlavi, the U. S.- based son of the late former Shah and a U. S.- trained combat pilot.
However, he does not appear to have large- scale support inside Iran. In January 2001,
the Shah’s son, who is about 50 years old, ended a long period of inactivity by giving
a speech in Washington, DC, calling for unity in the opposition and the institution
of a constitutional monarchy and democracy in Iran. He has since broadcast messages
into Iran from Iranian exile- run stations in California. 10 His political adviser is MIT-educated
Shariar Ahy.
Other Exiled Activists. Numerous other Iranians in exile want to see a
change of regime in Tehran. Many of them are based in California, where there is a
large Iranian- American community, and there are about 25 small- scale radio or
CRS- 13
11 See [ http:// www. whitehouse. gov/ nsc/ nss/ 2006/].
television stations that broadcast into Iran. Some organizations, such as The National
Iranian American Council ( NIAC), are not necessarily seeking to be active inside Iran
but generally seek to promote discussion of U. S. policy toward Iran. Some U. S.-
based activists are as follows:
! The Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation. This foundation, led by
two Boroumand sisters, is trying to document human rights abuses
in Iran.
! The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center ( IHDC). The center
is run by persons mostly of Iranian origin and affiliated with Yale
University’s Griffin Center for Health and Human Rights. It is
documenting abuses in Iran, using contacts with Iranians in Iran.
! Amir Abbas Fakravar. A leader of the student dissidents who
emerged in the July 1999 anti- regime student riots. A former
medical student, he served time in Iranian prisons.
! Channel One TV/ Radio Pedar. Run by Mr. Shahram Homayoun, a
Los Angeles- based exile, it broadcasts to Iran one hour per day.
No U. S. assistance has been provided to exile- run stations. The conference
report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P. L. 109- 102, stated the
sense of Congress that the Administration consider such financial support.
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
The Administration’s “ National Security Strategy” document released March
16, 2006 — which continues to represent a prevailing Administration view — says
the United States “ may face no greater challenge from a single country than from
Iran,” an assessment based largely on Iran’s growing weapons of mass destruction
( WMD) programs and its ability to exert influence in the region. 11 Iran’s advanced
and other conventional weaponry is deemed to pose a less significant threat than its
WMD, but Iran’s forces could still, in some cases, threaten U. S. forces and allies in
the Gulf region, as discussed later in this paper.
Conventional Military/ Revolutionary Guard/ Qods Force
Iran’s armed forces are extensive but widely considered relatively combat
ineffective against a well- trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United
States. Iran’s forces are believed to be sufficiently effective to deter or fend off
conventional threats from Iran’s relatively weak neighbors such as post- war Iraq,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan but are largely lacking in logistical
ability to project power much beyond Iran’s borders. Iran’s armed forces have few
CRS- 14
formal relationships with foreign militaries, but Iran and India have a “ strategic
dialogue” and some Iranian naval officers reportedly are being trained in India. Most
other military relationships between Iran and other countries generally center on
Iranian arms purchases or upgrade contracts.
Lacking confidence in its combat capability, Iran has avoided cause for conflict
with its more militarily capable neighbors such as Turkey and Pakistan. Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC), which also controls the Basij volunteer militia
that enforces adherence to Islamic customs, is generally loyal to the hardliners
politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular military, a
holdover from the Shah’s era. The two forces, the Guard and the regular military,
technically report to a Joint Headquarters. As further evidence of the Guard’s pre-eminence,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said on
November 29, 2007 that the IRGC Navy now has responsibility to patrol the entire
Persian Gulf, and that the regular Navy is patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf
of Oman. On September 2, 2007, Khamene’i replaced Rahim Safavi with
Mohammad Ali Jafari as Commander In Chief of the Guard; Jafari is considered a
hardliner against political dissent, but he is believed politically aligned with
Rafsanjani and former Guard chief Mohsen Reza’i, rather than with Ahmadinejad.
More information on Iran’s military and how it might perform in combat against the
United States is discussed under “ military options” later in this paper. The Guard also
has a unit, the Qods ( Jerusalem) Force, that operates outside Iran to assist pro- Iranian
movements with weapons, training, and finances. The Guard is also increasingly
involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting businesses it has
set up, most notably Ghorb ( also called Khatem ol- Anbiya, Persian for “ Seal of the
Prophet”). Active duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board
of directors. For the role of the Guard/ Qods Force in external activities, see below
under “ Foreign Policy and Terrorism.”
In the 110th Congress, a provision of H. R. 1400 ( passed by the House on
September 25), S. 970, and a Senate amendment to H. R. 1585 ( FY2008 defense
authorization bill; amendment adopted September 6 by vote of 76- 22) calls for the
Revolutionary Guard to be designated a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. On
October 25, 2007, the Administration took a somewhat lesser step by naming the
Guard, the Ministry of Defense, and several of the Guard’s commanders and
construction firms, as well as several Iranian banks, as proliferation entities under
Executive Order 13382. The Qods Force of the Guard, along with Bank Saderat, was
named as a “ specially designated global terrorist entity” under Executive Order
13224. Both orders freeze the U. S.- based assets and prevent U. S. transactions with
the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U. S.- based
assets that could be frozen - the main penalties of Executive Order 13382 and 13324.
The U. S. action might have more substantial material affect on the Guard and its
subordinate business entities if U. S. partner countries and others adopt similar
sanctions.
CRS- 15
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Military
Personnel Tanks
Surfac
e- Air
Missiles
Combat
Aircraft Ships
Defense
Budget
( billions
U. S. $)
545,000
( regular military
and
Revolutionary
Guard Corps
( IRGC)). IRGC
is about one-third
of total
force.
1,693
( incl. 480
T- 72)
150
I- Hawk
plus
some
Stinger
280
( incl. 25 MiG- 29
and 30 Su- 24)
200
( incl. 10 Chinese-made
Hudong, 40
Boghammer, 3
frigates) Also has 3
Kilo subs
6.6
“ Qods Forces” of IRGC . Approximately 3,500 - 5,000 total in the Qods Force, which
promotes Iran’s regional and global objectives through advisory support to pro- Iranian
factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Also operates
worldwide intelligence network to give Iran possible terrorist option and to assist in
procurement of WMD- related technology.
Ship- launched cruise missiles. Iran is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese- made
C- 802 cruise missiles. Iran also has Chinese- supplied HY- 2 Seerseekers emplaced along
Iran’s coast.
Midget Subs. Iran is said to possess several, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form
from North Korea. Iran claimed on Nov. 29, 2007 to have produced a new small sub
equipped with sonar- evading technology.
Anti- aircraft missile systems. Russia has sold and now delivered to Iran ( January 2007)
30 anti- aircraft missile systems ( Tor M1), worth over $ 1 billion. In September 2006,
Ukraine agreed to sell Iran the Kolchuga radar system that can improve Iran’s detection of
combat aircraft.
Nuclear Program
Some observers believe that, during 2007, Iran and the international community
have been approaching a crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. Many outside experts
and governments believe that Iran is attempting to achieve a nuclear weapons
capability. U. S. policy, as stated repeatedly by President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, and other senior officials is that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that U. S.
policy is to prevent that outcome. The International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA),
despite intensified inspections and other means of investigation since late 2002, says
it cannot verify that Iran’s current program is purely peaceful, and several of its
reports ( January 31, 2006, and February 27, 2006) say it found documents that show
a possible “ military nuclear dimension” to Iran’s program. However, the National
CRS- 16
12 Text at [ http:// www. dni. gov/ press_ releases/ 20071203_ release. pdf]
13 For Iran’s arguments about its program, see Iranian paid advertisement “ An Unnecessary
Crisis — Setting the Record Straight About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in the New York
Times, November 18, 2005. P. A11.
14 Stern, Roger. “ The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
December 26, 2006.
Intelligence Estimate ( unclassified key judgments), released December 3, 2007,12 cast
doubt on the Administration view ( as well as on that of a previous NIE issued in May
2005), saying Iran had but then ( in late 2003) halted a covert nuclear weapons
program as a result of increased international scrutiny and pressure. In a press
conference on December 4, President Bush, in arguing against a change in U. S.
policy, said that a key concern is that Iran could, at any time, decide to revive those
covert activities.
Iranian leaders welcomed the NIE, saying it validates Iran’s position that its
Iran’s nuclear program is for electricity generation. Iran says its oil resources are
finite and that enriching uranium to make nuclear fuel is allowed under the 1968
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, 13 to which Iran is a party. Ahmadinejad, on the eve
of a visit to the U. N. General Assembly meetings in New York on September 24,
2007, said that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon because doing so would not
ensure Iran’s security. An analysis was published by the National Academy of
Sciences challenging the U. S. view that Iran is petroleum rich and therefore has no
need for a nuclear power program. According to the analysis, the relative lack of
investment is causing a rapid decline in Iranian oil exports to the point where Iran
might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.14 U. S. officials say that Iran’s vast gas
resources make a nuclear energy program unnecessary.
Despite Iran’s professions that WMD is inconsistent with its ideology, the NIE
says it is likely that Iran will eventually try to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s
factions appear to agree on the utility of a nuclear weapons capability as a means of
ending its perceived historic vulnerability to U. S. domination and a symbol of Iran
as a major nation. Others believe Iran sees nuclear weapons as instruments to
dominate the Persian Gulf, and these experts believe an Iranian nuclear weapon
would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Gulf/ Middle East in Iran’s favor.
There are also fears Iran might transfer WMD to extremist groups or countries.
Even before the release of the NIE, there had been disagreement over the
urgency of the issue. The NIE said that Iran is enriching uranium – the key
Administration concern – and that Iran will likely be technically capable of producing
enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon some time during 2010- 2015.
An IAEA report of November 15, 2007, based on actual observations of Iran’s
facilities by IAEA inspectors, said that Iran is now running about 3,000 centrifuges
( 18 cascades of 164 centrifuges each), considered a threshold number that could
allow Iran to enrich enough uranium for a nuclear weapon. However, the IAEA
report also said Iran had enriched uranium to only about 4%, and not to 4.8% as Iran
has claimed ( 90% is needed for a weapon), and the NIE says that Iran still faces
significant bottlenecks in enrichment. The IAEA report added that Iran has admitted
CRS- 17
15 Lancaster, John and Kamran Khan. “ Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran.”
Washington Post, January 24, 2004.
16 For text of the agreement, see [ http:// www. iaea. org/ NewsCenter/ Focus/ IaeaIran/ eu_ iran
14112004. shtml].
to testing a new generation of centrifuge design. Other experts focus on a so- called
“ point of no return,” a point at which Iran has the expertise and proficiency to enrich
uranium to weapons grade levels.
European Diplomatic Efforts/ Paris Agreement. International attention
to Iran’s nuclear program increased in 2002 after Iran confirmed PMOI allegations
that it was building two facilities that could be used to produce fissile material useful
for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water
production plant at Arak, considered ideal for the production of plutonium. ( In
November 2006, the IAEA, at U. S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance
to the Arak facility on the grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.) It was
also revealed in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul
Qadeer ( A. Q.) Khan, sold Iran nuclear technology and designs. 15 At the same time,
concerns continued over Russia’s work, under a January 1995 contract, on an $ 800
million nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Russia insisted that Iran sign an agreement
under which Russia would provide reprocess the plant’s spent nuclear material; that
agreement was signed on February 28, 2005. The plant was expected to become
operational in 2007, but Russia had insisted ( including during President Putin’s visit
to Iran in October 2007) that Iran first comply with the U. N. resolutions discussed
below. In November 2007, perhaps to signal disagreement with further pressure on
Iran, Russia began taking steps to fuel the reactor. As part of the contract, Russia has
trained about 700 Iranian nuclear engineers.
In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany ( the “ EU- 3”) opened a separate
diplomatic track to curb Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return
for peaceful nuclear technology, to ( 1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, ( 2) to
sign and ratify the “ Additional Protocol” to the NPT ( allowing for enhanced
inspections), and ( 3) to suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran signed the
Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not yet ratified
it. Iran abrogated the agreement after the IAEA reports of November 10, 2003, and
February 24, 2004, stated that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over
an 18- year period. ( The NIE released on December 3, 2007 appears to indicate that
it was in conjunction with this October 2003 agreement with the EU- 3 that Iran might
have halted its covert nuclear weapons work.)
In the face of the U. S. threat to push for Security Council action, the EU- 3 and
Iran reached a more specific November 14, 2004, “ Paris Agreement,” committing
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment ( as of November 22, 2004) in exchange for
renewed trade talks and other aid. 16 EU- 3 — Iran negotiations on a permanent nuclear
pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation
accord ( TCA) began in January 2005. On March 11, 2005, the Bush Administration
announced it would support, but not join, the EU- 3 talks by offering to drop U. S.
objections to Iran’s application to the World Trade Organization ( which it did in May
2005) and to consider sales of U. S. civilian aircraft parts to Iran.
CRS- 18
17 Voting in favor: United States, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina,
Belgium, Ghana, Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia,
Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India. Against: Venezuela. Abstaining: Pakistan,
Algeria, Yemen, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia,
and Vietnam.
18 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South
Africa.
19 See [ http:// daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 290/ 88/ PDF/ N0629088. pdf? Open
Element].
Reference to the Security Council. The Paris Agreement broke down just
after Ahmadinejad’s election, when Iran rejected as insufficient an EU- 3 “ final
settlement” plan that offered to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy
( medicine, agriculture, and other uses) and provide limited security guarantees in
exchange for Iran’s ( 1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; ( 2) dismantling the
Arak reactor; ( 3) agreement to no- notice nuclear inspections; and ( 4) pledge not to
leave the NPT ( which has a legal exit clause). On August 8, 2005, Iran broke the
IAEA seals on its uranium “ conversion” ( one step before enrichment) facility at
Esfahan and began conversion. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board voted to
declare Iran in non- compliance with the NPT and to refer the issue to the Security
Council, 17 but no time frame was set for the referral. Iran did not cease uranium
conversion ( and now has about 200 tons of converted uranium, enough for 20 nuclear
weapons if enriched). The Administration supported a November 2005 Russian
proposal to Iran to establish a facility in Russia at which Iranian uranium would be
enriched, thereby enabling Iran to claim it had retained its right to enrich. Iran did not
accept the proposal. ( Putin reportedly discussed with Khamene’i “ new” Russian ideas
to resolve the nuclear issue during his October 2007 visit to Iran, but without
reaching any firm agreement. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia appeared to back the
Russian suggestion by offering to join a consortium that would enrich uranium for
Iran.)
In January 2006, Iran resumed enrichment activities, and on February 4, 2006,
the IAEA board voted 27- 318 for a resolution to report Iran to the U. N. Security
Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council agreed on a Council presidency
“ statement” setting a 30- day time limit ( April 28, 2006) for Iran to cease
enrichment. 19
U. S. Support for Diplomacy/ Establishment of “ P5+ 1” Contact
Group. Because of opposition from Russia and China to immediately punishing
Iran, as well as to build support for possible international or multilateral sanctions,
the Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks with Iran if Iran
first suspends its uranium enrichment. Such talks would center on a package of
incentives and possible sanctions that were agreed to on June 1, 2006, by a newly-formed
group of negotiating nations, the so- called “ Permanent Five Plus 1” ( P5+ 1:
United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). EU representative
Javier Solana formally presented the offer to Iran on June 6; U. S. and EU officials
say that this offer remains open. Iran- Solana negotiations have continued on the
package in 2007, without result to date.
CRS- 19
20 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News:
[ http:// www. basicint. org/ pubs/ Notes/ BN060609. htm]
Reported Incentives20
! Negotiations on an EU- Iran trade agreements and acceptance of Iran
into the World Trade Organization.
! Easing of U. S. sanctions to permit sales to Iran of commercial
aircraft or aircraft parts.
! Sale to Iran of a light- water nuclear reactor and guarantees of nuclear
fuel, and possible sales of light- water research reactors for medicine
and agriculture applications.
! An “ energy partnership” between Iran and the EU, including help for
Iran to modernize its oil and gas sector and to build export pipelines.
! Support for a regional security forum for the Persian Gulf, and
support for the objective of a WMD free zone for the Middle East.
! The possibility of eventually allowing Iran to resume uranium
enrichment if it complies with all outstanding IAEA requirements
and can prove that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful
purposes.
Reported Sanctions
! Denial of visas for Iranians involved in Iran’s nuclear program and
for high- ranking Iranian officials.
! A freeze of assets of Iranian officials or institutions and freeze of
Iran’s assets abroad and a ban on some financial transactions with
Iran.
! A ban on sales of advanced technology and of arms to Iran; and a
ban on sales to Iran of gasoline and other refined oil products.
! An end to support for Iran’s application to the WTO.
Resolution 1696. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14- 1 ( Qatar
voting no) for U. N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31,
2006, to fulfill the longstanding IAEA nuclear demands ( enrichment suspension, etc).
Purportedly in deference to Russia and China, it was passed under Article 40 of the
U. N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory, but not under Article 41, which
refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which would authorize military action.
It called on U. N. member states not to sell Iran WMD- useful technology.
CRS- 20
21 Weisman, Steven. Lack of ID Data Impedes U. N. Sanctions Against Iran. New York
Times, September 17, 2007.
On August 22, 2006, Iran submitted a formal response to the June 6 offer by the
six powers. The text of Iran’s response was not disclosed, but it reportedly did not
offer to suspend uranium enrichment, instead proposing negotiations on a broader
roadmap of engagement with the West — and sought provision of guarantees that the
United States would not seek to change Iran’s regime.
Resolution 1737. With the backing of the P5+ 1, chief EU negotiator Javier
Solana negotiated with Iran to try arrange a temporary enrichment suspension. A
round of talks, in Berlin, concluded on September 28, 2006, without agreement. After
almost four months of negotiations during which Russia and, to a lesser extent,
China, argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would
sanctions, the Security Council agreed to U. N. Security Council Resolution 1737. It
was passed unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the
U. N. Charter. It prohibits sale to Iran — or financing of such sale — of technology
that could contribute to Iran’s uranium enrichment or heavy- water reprocessing
activities. It also required U. N. member states to freeze the financial assets of 10
named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and 12 persons related to those programs.
See Table 6.
The Resolution did not mandate the banning of travel by these personalities, but
called on member states not to admit them. It also provided an exemption for the
Bushehr reactor, which Russia had sought. The EU foreign ministers agreed on
February 12, 2007, to freeze the assets of the named entities and to impose broader
restrictions on entities that might later be identified as assisting Iran’s WMD program
and to prevent the training of Iranians in Europe that might contribute to Iran’s
programs. U. S. implementation of the existing Resolutions has reportedly run into
some difficulty because the United States lacks passport numbers and other data to
track the assets or movements of the named Iranian personages. 21
Resolution 1747 and Results. Resolution 1737 demanded enrichment
suspension by February 21, 2007. An IAEA report sent to Board member countries
that day said Iran continued its enrichment activities. In London on March 8, 2007,
the P5+ 1 began formal discussions on a new Chapter 7 Security Council resolution
that would presumably impose additional sanctions on Iran, quickly reaching
agreement. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously:
! It added 10 military/ WMD- related entities; 3 Revolutionary Guard
entities; 8 persons, and 7 Revolutionary Guard commanders listed
in Table 6.
! It bans arms transfers by Iran, a provision targeted at Iran’s alleged
arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq.
! It requires all countries to report to the United Nations when the
sanctioned Iranian persons travel to their territories.
CRS- 21
! It calls for ( but does not require) countries to refrain from selling
arms or dual use items to Iran and to avoid any new lending or grants
to Iran.
Resolution 1747 demanded Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The
IAEA report of May 23, 2007 indicated that Iran did not comply, but, suggesting that
the pressure might be starting to yield results on Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking, in
August 2007, Iran and the IAEA signed an agreement to clear up these outstanding
uncertainties by the end of 2007, an agreement criticized by the United States as not
central to preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear capability. On that basis, the P5+ 1
grouping — along with the EU itself — agreed to a joint statement on September 28,
2007 ( reiterated in November 2007), in which all the undersigned, including Russia
and China, said they would negotiate another sanctions resolution if there is no
progress reported by the IAEA in implementing the August 2007 agreement or in
separate continued negotiations with EU representative Javier Solana. The IAEA
report was circulated on November 15, 2007, saying that Iran has provided additional
information on its past programs, but the report indicated that Iran had, in many
ways, become less transparent on its current enrichment programs – the key concern
to the United States. Solana’s report is due later in 2007, but Solana a characterized
a meeting with new Iranian negotiator Sayid Jallili as “ disappointing,” suggesting no
progress whatsoever. On December 1, 2007, the P5+ 1 states said after a London
meeting they would return to work on a new resolution increasing sanctions on Iran.
However, the December 3, 2007 NIE is predicted by many to further complicate
agreement among the P5+ 1 states and to harden the views of China and Russia that
additional diplomacy with Iran, not sanctions, is what is needed.
If a new resolution is agreed, it might be based on November 12 comments by
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown who said that, if the IAEA and Solana reports
do not satisfy the Security Council, Britain would propose that a new resolution ban
financing in Iran’s energy sector and restrict other banking activity with Iran. Other
ideas mentioned by observers include making mandatory those provisions that are
only voluntary in 1737 and 1747, including an arms sale ban and travel ban on named
Iranian officials. Some have suggested requiring inspections of Iranian cargo flights
and shipping. The potential for additional sanctions is further discussed in the section
on multilateral and international sanctions later in this paper.
However, the NIE suggests that Iranian leaders differ on how high a price to
pay, in international sanctions and isolation, to achieve that capability. As discussed
above, one overt sign that the pressure is causing rifts was the October 2007
resignation of Larijani as chief negotiator, and his replacement by deputy foreign
minister Sayid Jallili, a close Ahmadinejad confident. The move might have reflected
an effort by Ahmadinejad to ensure that the nuclear issue is handled by hardliners.
At the same time, IAEA Director Baradei has incurred some criticism in 2007
for reportedly telling the Security Council countries that it is no longer realistic to
demand uranium enrichment suspension, but instead to focus on preventing
industrial- scale production of enriched uranium and allowing robust inspections to
ensure the uranium is not enriched to bomb- grade levels. Others have criticized him
for comments taking issue with U. S. officials who advocate military action as a
means of curbing Iran’s nuclear program.
CRS- 22
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles
Official U. S. reports and testimony continue to state that Iran is seeking a self-sufficient
chemical weapons ( CW) infrastructure, and that it “ may have already”
stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and nerve agents — and the bombs and shells to
deliver them. This raises questions about Iran’s compliance with its obligations under
the Chemical Weapons Convention ( CWC), which Iran signed on January 13, 1993,
and ratified on June 8, 1997. These officials and reports also say that Iran “ probably
maintain[ s] an offensive [ biological weapons] BW program ... and probably has the
capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents.”
Ballistic Missiles/ Warheads. Largely with foreign help, Iran is becoming
self sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles and, by U. S. accounts, already
has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Tehran appears to
view its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter or retaliate against
forces in the region, including U. S. forces. However, Iran’s technical capabilities are
a matter of some debate among experts. The Bush Administration is seeking to
establish sites in Europe, including Poland and the Czech Republic, to counter
Iranian ballistic missiles, although Russia has opposed these locations as indications
that the missile defense plans are a cover for systems directed against Russia. At the
G- 8 summit in June 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin presented an alternative
proposal to cooperate with the missile defense against Iran by allowing use of a radar
facility in Azerbaijan that Russia leases. In October 2007, U. S. officials suggested the
missile defense plan might be slowed or ended if the nuclear threat from Iran were
alleviated.
CRS- 23
22 “ Greater U. S. Concern About Iran Missile Capability.” Reuters, March 11, 2002.
23 “ Iran: New Missile on the Assembly Line.” New York Times, September 26, 2002.
24 Broad, William and David Sanger. “ Relying On Computer, U. S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s
Nuclear Aims.” New York Times, November 13, 2005.
Table 5. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal
Shahab - 3 800 mile range. Two of first three tests ( July 1998, July 2000, and
September 2000) reportedly inconclusive or unsuccessful. Apparently
successful tests in June 2003; Iran subsequently called missile
operational ( capable of hitting Israel). Despite claims, some U. S.
experts say the missile not completely reliable, and Iran tested a
purportedly more accurate version on August 12, 2004. Iran called the
test successful, although some observers said Iran detonated it in mid-flight.
On May 31, 2005, Iran announced it had successfully tested a
solid- fuel version.
“ Shahab - 4” 1,200 mile range. In October 2004, Iran announced it had extended range
of the Shahab- 3 to 1,200 miles, and it added in early November 2004
that it is capable of “ mass producing” this “ Shahab- 4.” Agence France
Presse report ( February 6, 2006) said test in January 2006 was
successful. Related missiles claimed produced by Iran - both of about
1,200 mile range, include the “ Ashoura” ( claimed in November 2007)
and the “ Ghadr” ( displayed at military parade in September 2007. If
Iran’s claims are accurate, large portions of the Near East and
Southeastern Europe would be in range, including U. S. bases in Turkey.
On March 31, 2006, Iran claimed to have tested a missile, possibly a
Shahab- 4, with separately targeted warheads.
BM- 25 1,500 mile range. On April 27, 2006, Israel’s military intelligence
chief said that Iran had received a shipment of North Korean- supplied
BM- 25 missiles. Missile said to be capable of carrying nuclear
warheads. The Washington Times appeared to corroborate this
reporting in a July 6, 2006, story, which asserted that the North
Korean- supplied missile is based on a Soviet- era “ SS- N- 6” missile.
ICBM U. S. officials believe Iran might be capable of developing an
intercontinental ballistic missile ( 3,000 mile range) by 2015.22
Other
Missiles
On September 6, 2002, Iran said it successfully tested a 200 mile
range “ Fateh 110” missile ( solid propellent), and Iran said in late
September 2002 that it had begun production. 23 Iran also possesses a
few hundred short- range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab- 1
( Scud- b), the Shahab- 2 ( Scud- C), and the Tondar- 69 ( CSS- 8).
Warheads Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U. S.
intelligence believes Iran is working to adapt the Shahab- 3 to deliver a
nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say that U. S. intelligence
captured an Iranian computer in mid- 2004 showing plans to construct
a nuclear warhead for the Shahab. 24 Iran denied work on such a
warhead, but the IAEA is seeking additional information from Iran on
the material.
CRS- 24
25 U. S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. Released April 2006.
[ http:// www. state. gov/ documents/ organization/ 65462. pdf].
26 See CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U. S. Policy, 2006, by
Kenneth Katzman.
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist
Organizations
Iran’s foreign policy is a product of the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution,
blended with long- standing national interests. The State Department report on
international terrorism for 2006, released April 30, 2007, again stated ( as it has for
more than a decade) that Iran “ remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism”
in 2005, and it again attributed the terrorist activity to the Revolutionary Guard
[ presumably the Qods Force] and the Intelligence Ministry ( Ministry of Information
and Security, MOIS). 25
Relations with the Persian Gulf States. 26 During the 1980s and early
1990s, Iran, through the Qods Force and the MOIS, sponsored Shiite Muslim
extremist groups opposed to the Sunni Muslim- led monarchy states of the 6- member
Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and
the United Arab Emirates). However, Iran’s efforts to “ export” its Islamic revolution
were unsuccessful and caused the Gulf states to ally closely with the United States.
During Khatemi’s presidency, Iran reduced support for Gulf Shiite dissident
movements there. In part to counter Iran’s perceived growing influence in the Gulf,
in December 2006 the summit of the GCC leaders announced that the GCC states
might jointly study their own development of “ peaceful nuclear technology.” On the
other hand, seeking to avoid further tensions with Iran, the GCC leaders invited
Ahmadinejad to observe and speak at the December 2- 3, 2007 summit of the GCC
leaders in Doha, Qatar - the first time an Iranian president has been invited to the
meeting since the GCC was formed in 1981.
! Saudi Arabia. Many observers closely watch the relationship
between Iran and Saudi Arabia because of Saudi alarm over the
emergence of a pro- Iranian government in Iraq and Iran’s
ascendancy in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia sees itself as leader of the
Sunni Muslim world and views Shiite Muslims as heretical and
threatening internally. Saudi leaders are concerned that Iran’s
nuclear program will further strengthen Iran strategically but the
Saudis also worry about the potential for Iranian reaction against the
Kingdom should the United States take military action to stop Iran’s
program. The Saudis, who do not want a repeat of Iran’s sponsorship
of disruptive and sometimes violent demonstrations at annual Hajj
pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s – or an increase in
Iranian support for Saudi Shiite dissidents – are receptive to easing
tensions with Iran, particularly, and they hosted Ahmadinejad in the
Kingdom in March 2007. The Saudis blame a pro- Iranian movement
in the Kingdom, Saudi Hezbollah, for the June 25, 1996, Khobar
CRS- 25
27 Walsh, Elsa. “ Annals of Politics: Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” The New Yorker, May 14,
2001. The June 21, 2001, federal grand jury indictments of 14 suspects ( 13 Saudis and a
Lebanese citizen) in the Khobar bombing indicate that Iranian agents may have been
involved, but no indictments of any Iranians were announced. In June 2002, Saudi Arabia
reportedly sentenced some of the eleven Saudi suspects held there. The 9/ 11 Commission
final report asserts that Al Qaeda might have had some as yet undetermined involvement in
the Khobar Towers attacks.
Towers housing complex bombing, which killed 19 U. S. airmen. 27
After restoring relations in December 1991 ( after a four- year break),
Saudi- Iran ties progressed to high- level contacts during Khatemi’s
presidency, including Khatemi visits in 1999 and 2002.
! United Arab Emirates ( UAE) concerns about Iran’s intentions have
not completely recovered from the April 1992 Iranian expulsion of
UAE security forces from the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa,
which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. ( In
1971, Iran, then ruled by the U. S.- backed Shah, seized two other
islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras
al- Khaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of
Sharjah.) The UAE ( particularly the federation capital, Abu Dhabi,
which takes a harder line than Dubai, which has a large Persian-speaking
community and business ties to Iran) wants to refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice ( ICJ), but Iran insists on
resolving the issue bilaterally. The UAE has not pressed the issue
vigorously in recent years, although it insists the islands dispute be
kept on the agenda of the U. N. Security Council ( which it has been
since December 1971). The United States, which is concerned about
Iran’s military control over the islands, supports UAE proposals but
takes no formal position on sovereignty. As an indicator of the
degree to which the issue is fading, the UAE received Ahmadinejad
in May 2007, the highest level Iranian visit to UAE since the 1979
revolution in Iran; during the visit, Ahmadinejad led an anti- U. S.
rally of a reported several hundred Iranian- origin residents of Dubai
at a soccer stadium there.
! Qatar is wary that Iran might seek to encroach on its large North
Field ( natural gas), which it shares with Iran ( called South Pars on
Iran’s side) and through which Qatar earns large revenues for natural
gas exports. Qatar’s fears were heightened on April 26, 2004, when
Iran’s deputy Oil Minister said that Qatar is probably producing
more gas than “ her right share” from the field and that Iran “ will not
allow” its wealth to be used by others. These concerns might have
prompted Qatar to request to the other GCC leaders that
Ahmadinejad be invited to the December 2007 GCC summit in
Qatar.
! In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of
supporting Bahraini Shiite dissidents ( the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, Bahrain- Hezbollah, and other Bahraini
CRS- 26
28 This issue is covered in greater depth in CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman.
dissident groups) in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa
family. Bahrain is about 60% Shiite, but its government is
dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. Some Bahraini
leaders feared Iran might try to interfere in Bahrain’s November 25,
2006, parliamentary election campaign by providing support to
Shiite candidates, but this did not appear to be an issue in the
elections or their aftermath, even though the main Shiite opposition
coalition won 18 out of the 40 seats of the elected body. Tensions
flared in July 2007 when an Iranian newspaper claimed Bahrain is
part of Iran – that question was the subject of the 1970 U. N.- run
referendum in which Bahrainis opted for independence.
Iranian Policy in Iraq. The U. S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein has
benefitted Iran strategically, 28 but U. S.- Iran differences in Iraq widened as Iran has
sought to assist its Shiite proteges that now dominate Iraq. U. S. officials assert that,
as part of that effort to build influence in Iraq, Iran is providing arms ( including
highly lethal “ explosively forced projectiles,” EFPs, that have killed about nearly 200
U. S. soldiers in Iraq) and financing to Shiite militias involved in sectarian violence.
In his September 10- 11, 2007 testimony, U. S. commander in Iraq General David
Petraeus reiterated U. S. military assessments that Iran is providing aid to these
militias, and he assessed it as causing harm to the U. S. effort to stabilize Iraq.
General Petraeus particularly focused on what he called Iranian attempts to set up
“ Hezbollah- like” structures in southern Iraq to serve as an Iranian proxy. In early
October 2007, Gen. Petraeus told journalists that Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan
Kazemi- Qomi, is a member of the Qods Force. Since early November 2007,
however, some U. S. commanders in Iraq said they were seeing signs of a diminished
arms flow from Iran, in line with Iran’s October 2007 pledge to Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al- Maliki to stop arming Shiite militias in Iraq. Iran also has signed a number
of agreements with Iraq on transportation, energy cooperation, free flow of Shiite
pilgrims, border security, intelligence sharing, and other cooperation.
The Administration has not taken, although some advocate, military action
against Iranian factories or other facilities that support its weapons shipments into
Iraq. A Senate amendment to the FY2008 defense authorization bill ( H. R. 1585)
requires a report to Congress on Iran’s interference in Iraq and accuses Iran of
destabilizing Iraq and contributing to the deaths of American soldiers there. The
amendment does not authorize or recommend use of U. S. force to stop these actions.
The “ Iraq Study Group” ( Recommendations 9, 10, and 11) in its December
2006 report, recommended U. S. dialogue with Iran but President Bush initially
appeared to reject that idea in his January 10, 2007, speech on Iraq in which he stated
instead that the United States “... will interrupt the flow of support [ to armed groups]
from Iran and Syria.” As part of that stance, U. S. forces in Iraq arrested a total of 20
alleged Qods Force members involved in Iraq during December 2006 - September
2007, releasing nine of them in November 2007 but holding those of “ highest value.”
CRS- 27
The Administration might have judged that the military moves in Iraq and the Gulf
strengthened the U. S. position, and the Administration supported a March 10, 2007,
regional conference in Iraq attended by Iran and Syria. Both Iranian and U. S. officials
called the conference constructive, but both denied that substantive bilateral talks
took place at the margins of the conference. Further regional talks on Iraq
(“ Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” process) were held in Egypt during May 3- 4, 2007,
but Secretary of State Rice did not hold substantive bilateral discussions with her
counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. Nor did they directly talk
at the November 2, 2007 ministerial on Iraq held in Istanbul.
The Administration also began potentially more significant bilateral talks with
Iran on the Iraq issue. The first such meeting, in Baghdad, was on May 28, 2007; the
two sides met at the home of Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki, who opened the
meeting. According to Ambassador Crocker ( the Iranian side was represented by the
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq), the two sides agreed on broad principles for Iraq’s
political evolution and stability, but the United States would judge the dialogue by
Iranian cooperation “ on the ground” by stopping military supply of Shiite militias.
Another round of talks was held on July 24; it reportedly included mutual accusations
but resulted in an agreement to establish a working group to discuss ways to stabilize
Iraq. This working group met for the first time on August 6, 2007. In his September
2007 testimony before Congress, Ambassador Crocker said that the dialogue had not
yielded results on Iran’s activity in Iraq but should be nonetheless continued because
Iran might at some point see it in its interests to adjust its stance. U. S. officials said
in early November 2007 that, in light of signs of a diminished Iranian arms flow into
Iraq, another round would be held. The two sides have agreed in principle to further
talks but no date is set.
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups. Iran’s support for Palestinian
militant groups has long concerned U. S. Administrations, particularly since doing so
gives Tehran an opportunity to try to obstruct Israeli- Palestinian peace prospects.
Ahmadinejad’s various statements on Israel were discussed above, although other
Iranian leaders have made similar statements in the past. In the 1990s, Khamene’i
called Israel a “ cancerous tumor” and made other statements suggesting that he seeks
Israel’s destruction. In December 2001, Rafsanjani said that it would take only one
Iranian nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, whereas a similar strike against Iran by Israel
would have far less impact because Iran’s population is large. Iran has sometimes
openly incited anti- Israel violence, including hosting conferences of anti- peace
process organizations ( April 24, 2001, and June 2- 3, 2002). During his presidency,
Khatemi generally refrained from inflammatory statements against Israel, and he
conversed with Israel’s president at the 2005 funeral of Pope John Paul II. The
Iranian Foreign Ministry, considered a bastion of moderates, has repeatedly stated
that Iran’s official position is that it would not seek to block any final Israeli-
Palestinian settlement but that the peace process is too weighted toward Israel to
result in a fair settlement for Palestinians. Ahmadinejad again articulated a hardline
position when he openly criticized the participation of Iran’s ally, Syria, at the major
U. S.- sponsored Middle East peace meeting in Annapolis, Maryland on November 27,
2007. The meeting, in part, represented a U. S. attempt to isolate Iran and other
hardline opponents of an Israeli- Palestinian peace agreement.
CRS- 28
29 CNN “ Late Edition” interview with Hamas co- founder Mahmoud Zahar, January 29,
2006.
30 Hezbollah is believed responsible for the October 1983 bombing of the U. S. Marine
barracks in Beirut, as well as attacks on U. S. Embassy Beirut facilities in April 1983 and
September 1984, and for the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985 in which Navy diver
Robert Stetham was killed. Hezbollah is also believed to have committed the March 17,
1992, bombing of Israel’s embassy in that city, which killed 29 people. Its last known
terrorist attack outside Lebanon was the July 18, 1994, bombing of a Jewish community
center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85. On October 31, 2006, Argentine prosecutors asked
a federal judge to seek the arrest of Rafsanjani, former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian,
former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and four other Iranian officials for this attack.
The State Department report on terrorism for 2006 ( mentioned above) again
accuses Iran of providing “ extensive” funding, weapons, and training to Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad ( PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command ( PFLP- GC). All are named as
foreign terrorist organizations ( FTO) by the State Department for their use of
violence to undermine the Arab- Israeli peace process. Some saw Iran’s regional
policy further strengthened by Hamas’ victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian
legislative elections, and even more so by Hamas’ June 2007 armed takeover of the
Gaza Strip. The Hamas gains position Hamas to block any moves toward peace, and
Hamas continues to oppose a two- state solution with Israel. However, Hamas
activists downplay Iranian influence, asserting that Iran is mostly Shiite, while Hamas
members are Sunni Muslims. 29 In one manifestation of that identity, Hamas protested
the execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006, in part blaming pro- Iranian
Shiite factions that dominate Iraq for “ victors’ justice.” Hamas was reputed to receive
about 10% of its budget in the early 1990s from Iran, although since then Hamas has
cultivated funding from wealthy Persian Gulf donors and supporters in Europe and
elsewhere. On April 16, 2006, at a conference in Tehran of Palestinian militant
leaders, Iran pledged $ 50 million to the Hamas- led government to help it weather aid
reductions from the United States and Europe. In December 2006, Iran reportedly
pledged an additional $ 250 million for 2007. Some pro- U. S. Arab states ( Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait) have pledged comparable amounts since Hamas
took over governance.
Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran has maintained a close relationship with
Hezbollah since the group was formed in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics who were
sympathetic to Iran’s Islamic revolution and belonged to the Lebanese Da’wa Party.
Hezbollah was responsible for several acts of anti- U. S. and anti- Israel terrorism in
the 1980s and 1990s. 30 Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon
contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, but, despite United Nations
certification of Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah maintained military forces along the
border. Hezbollah continued to remain armed and outside Lebanese government
control, despite U. N. Security Council Resolution 1559 ( September 2, 2004) that
required its dismantlement. In refusing to disarm, Hezbollah says it was resisting
Israeli occupation of small tracts of Lebanese territory ( Shib’a Farms).
Neither Israel nor the United States opposed Hezbollah’s progressively
increased participation in peaceful Lebanese politics. In March 2005, President Bush
CRS- 29
31 “ Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
32 Shadid, Anthony. “ Armed With Iran’s Millions, Fighters Turn to Rebuilding.”
Washington Post, August 16, 2006.
33 See CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The Israel- Hamas- Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated
( continued...)
indicated that the United States might accept Hezbollah as a legitimate political force
in Lebanon if it disarms. In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of May — June
2005, Hezbollah expanded its presence in the parliament to 14 out of the 128- seat
body. On the strength of this showing, two Hezbollah members were given cabinet
seats. As a matter of policy, the United States does not meet with any Hezbollah
members, even those in the parliament or cabinet. Hezbollah is a designated FTO, but
that designation bars financial transactions by the group and does not specifically ban
meeting with members of the group.
Whether or not Iran instigated Lebanese Hezbollah to provoke the July- August
2006 crisis, Iran has long been its major arms supplier. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied
rockets on Israel’s northern towns during the fighting. As part of a package
of aid to Hezbollah said to exceed $ 100 million per year, reported Iranian shipments
to Hezbollah over the past five years have included the “ Fajr” ( dawn) and Khaybar
series of rockets that were fired at the Israeli city of Haifa ( 30 miles from the border),
and over 10,000 Katyusha rockets that were fired at cities within 20 miles of the
Lebanese border. 31 Iran also supplied Hezbollah with an unmanned aerial vehicle
( UAV), the Mirsad, that Hezbollah briefly flew over the Israel- Lebanon border on
November 7, 2004, and April 11, 2005; at least three were shot down by Israel during
the conflict. On July 14, 2006, Hezbollah apparently hit an Israeli warship with a C-
802 sea- skimming missile probably provided by Iran. ( See above for information on
Iran’s acquisition of that weapon from China.) Iran also purportedly provided advice
during the conflict; about 50 Revolutionary Guards Qods Force personnel were in
Lebanon ( down from about 2,000 when Hezbollah was formed, according to a
Washington Post report of April 13, 2005) when the conflict began; that number
might have increased during the conflict to help Hezbollah operate the Iranian-supplied
weaponry.
Iran has supported Hezbollah after the conflict as Hezbollah has increasingly
( but thus far peacefully, including a withdrawal from the cabinet) challenged the pro-
U. S. government in Beirut. Other Lebanese factions have sought Hezbollah’s
concurrence on a consensus candidate as new president of Lebanon – which appears
to have been achieved in November 2007 around military leader Michel Suleiman
– but Hezbollah insists it be allowed to remain armed. To bolster its protege’s
challenge, one press report said Iran made $ 150 million available for Hezbollah to
distribute to Lebanese citizens ( mostly Shiite supporters of Hezbollah) whose homes
were damaged in the Israeli military campaign. 32 Other reports say Iran is replacing
the 4,000 rockets Hezbollah fired during that war. A State Department counter-terrorism
official testified before the House International Relations Committee on
September 28, 2006, that Iranian military support to Hezbollah continued after the
August 14 ceasefire, which took place in accordance with U. N. Security Council
Resolution 1701 ( July 31, 2006). 33
CRS- 30
33 (... continued)
by Jeremy Sharp.
34 See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post- War Governance, Security, and U. S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
Prior to the conflict, in the 109th Congress, two resolutions ( H. Res. 101 and
S. Res. 82) passed their respective chambers. They urged the EU to classify Hezbollah
as a terrorist organization; S. Res. 82 called on Hezbollah to disband its militia as
called for in U. N. Security Council Resolution 1559 ( September 2, 2004).
Central Asia and the Caspian. Iran’s policy in Central Asia has thus far
emphasized Iran’s rights to Caspian Sea resources, particularly against Azerbaijan.
That country’s population, like Iran’s, is mostly Shiite Muslim, but its leadership is
secular. In addition, Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic, and Iran fears that Azerbaijan
nationalists might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population,
which demonstrated some unrest in 2006. In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat
aircraft threatened a British Petroleum ( BP) ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an
area of the Caspian that Iran considers its own. The United States called that action
provocative, and it is engaged in border security and defense cooperation with
Azerbaijan directed against Iran ( and Russia). The United States successfully backed
construction of the Baku- Tblisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in part to provide
alternatives to Iranian oil. Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given
observer status at the Central Asian security grouping called the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization ( SCO), which contains Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Iran is hoping to formally join the
organization, which generally opposes a long term U. S. presence in Central Asia.
Afghanistan. 34 Since the fall of the Taliban, Iran, through aid and
reconstruction projects with Afghanistan that total at least $ 200 million since 2001
( out of a pledged $ 500 million), is trying to restore some of its Iran’s traditional sway
in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan where Persian- speaking Afghans
predominate. It aided Northern Alliance figures that were prominent in the post-
Taliban governing coalition, although, since 2004, Iran’s influence has waned
somewhat as its allies, mostly Persian- speaking Afghan minority factions still
referred to as the “ Northern Alliance,” have been marginalized in Afghan politics.
However, Iranian- funded Shiite theological seminaries are being built in Kabul and
elsewhere, perhaps an indication of Iran’s continuing efforts to support Afghanistan’s
Shiite minority. Iran is said to fear the continuing presence of the about 27,000 U. S.
troops in Afghanistan, and Iran has objected to the U. S. use of Shindand air base in
western Afghanistan, asserting that it is being used to conduct surveillance on Iran.
U. S. aircraft began using the base in September 2004 after the downfall of the pro-
Iranian governor of Herat Province, Ismail Khan.
On April 17, 2007, U. S. military personnel in Afghanistan captured a shipment
of Iranian weapons that purportedly was bound for Taliban fighters. Because such a
shipment would appear to conflict with Iran’s policy in Afghanistan, Secretary of
Defense Gates, in a statement on the matter on June 4, 2007, said it was unclear
whether or not the shipments resulted from a deliberate Iranian government decision
to arm the Taliban. However, on June 6, 2007 and again on September 6, 2007,
CRS- 31
35 Gertz, Bill. “ Al Qaeda Terrorists Being Held by Iran.” Washington Times, July 24, 2003.
36 Keto, Alex. “ White House Reiterates Iran Is Harboring Al Qaeda.” Dow Jones Newswires,
May 19, 2003.
37 Gertz, Bill. “ CIA Points to Continuing Iran Tie to Al Qaeda.” Washington Times, July 23,
2004.
NATO officers said they directly intercepted Iranian shipments of heavy arms, C4
explosives, and advanced roadside bombs (“ explosively- forced projectiles, EFPs,
such as those found in Iraq) to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. U. S. commander of
international forces in Afghanistan Gen. Dan McNeil says the intercepted shipments
are large enough that the Iranian government would have to have known about them.
Responding to a statement on CNN by Afghan President Karzai that Afghanistan
views Iran as helpful in stabilizing Afghanistan, Secretary Gates said later that same
day ( August 5, 2007) on that network that Iran is “ playing both sides” in Afghanistan
– an apparent reference to possible Iranian attempts to gain leverage against the
United States in Afghanistan ( and on other issues) by causing U. S. combat deaths.
Iran long opposed the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan on the grounds that
it oppressed Shiite Muslim and other Persian- speaking minorities. Iran nearly
launched a military attack against the Taliban in September 1998 after Taliban
fighters captured and killed nine Iranian diplomats based in northern Afghanistan,
and Iran provided military aid to the Northern Alliance factions. Iran, along with the
United States, Russia, and the countries bordering Afghanistan, attended U. N.-
sponsored meetings in New York ( the Six Plus Two group) to try to end the conflict
in Afghanistan. During the major combat phase of the post- September 11 U. S.- led
war in Afghanistan, Iran offered search and rescue of any downed service- persons
and the trans- shipment to Afghanistan of humanitarian assistance. In March 2002,
Iran expelled Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a pro- Taliban Afghan faction leader. Iran froze
Hikmatyar’s assets in Iran ( January 2005).
Al Qaeda. Iran is not a natural ally of Al Qaeda, largely because Al Qaeda is
an orthodox Sunni Muslim organization. However, Iran might see possibilities for
tactical alliance with Al Qaeda, and U. S. officials have said since January 2002 that
Iran has not brought to justice senior Al Qaeda operatives ( spokesman Sulayman Abu
Ghaith, top operative Sayf Al Adl, and Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad35) who are
believed to be in Iran, 36 meaning they might be at relative liberty within Iran. U. S.
officials blamed these figures for the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia against four expatriate housing complexes on these operatives, saying they
have been able to contact associates outside Iran. 37 In testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 29, 2007, Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns accused Iran of violating U. N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373,
which require sharing information on Al Qaeda, as part of the emerging broader U. S.
strategy of pressuring Iran militarily, politically, and economically.
Iran asserted on July 23, 2003, that it had “ in custody” senior Al Qaeda figures.
However, if that is not their status, the explanation could be that hardliners in Iran
might want to use Al Qaeda activists as leverage against the United States and its
allies. Some say Iran might want to exchange them for a U. S. hand- over of People’s
CRS- 32
38 “ Tehran Pledges to Crack Down on Militants.” Associated Press, July 18, 2005.
39 Arostegui, Martin. “ Uruguay Caught Buying Iran Arms.” Washington Times, October 12,
2007.
40 An exception was the abortive 1985- 1986 clandestine arms supply relationship with Iran
in exchange for some American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon ( the so- called
“ Iran- Contra Affair”).
41 Sciolino, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf
Crisis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991. p. 168.
Mojahedin activists under U. S. control in Iraq. Possibly attempting to show that it is
an adversary and not an ally of Al Qaeda, on July 16, 2005, Iran’s Intelligence
Minister said that 200 Al Qaeda members are in Iranian jails and that Iran had broken
up an Al Qaeda cell planning attacks on Iranian students. 38
The 9/ 11 Commission report said several of the September 11 hijackers and
other plotters, possibly with official help, might have transited Iran, but the report
does not assert that the Iranian government cooperated with or knew about the plot.
Another bin Laden ally, Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, killed by U. S. forces in Iraq on June
7, 2006, reportedly transited Iran after the September 11 attacks and took root in Iraq,
becoming a major insurgent leader there.
Latin America. A growing concern has been Iran's developing relations with
countries and leaders in Latin America considered adversaries of the United States,
particularly Cuba and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Chavez has visited Iran on several
occasions, offering Iran additional gasoline during Iran’s fuel shortages in 2007 as
well as joint oil and gas projects. The two countries have established direct air links.
In February 2006, Secretary Rice referred to Venezuela and Cuba as “ sidekicks” of
Iran because of their votes in the IAEA against referring Iran to the Security Council.
On October 30, 2007, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said that
Iran’s relationship with Venezuela is an emerging threat because it represents a
“ marriage” of Iran’s extremist ideology with “ those who have anti- American views.”
The State Department terrorism report for 2006 said that Cuba maintains “ close
relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.” In October 2007,
Uruguayan parliamentary investigators said they blocked an attempt by the
government to buy arms from Iran, using a diversion through Venezuela. 39
U. S. Policy Responses, Options, and Legislation
The February 11, 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U. S. ally, opened a long
rift in U. S.- Iranian relations. On November 4, 1979, radical “ students” seized the
U. S. Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage until minutes after President
Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. The United States broke relations with
Iran on April 7, 1980 and the two countries have had only limited official contact
since. 40 The United States tilted toward Iraq in the 1980- 1988 Iran- Iraq war,
including U. S. diplomatic attempts to block conventional arms sales to Iran,
providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq41 and, during 1987- 1988, direct skirmishes
with Iranian naval elements in the course of U. S. efforts to protect international oil
CRS- 33
shipments in the Gulf from Iranian attacks. In one battle on April 18, 1988, Iran lost
about a quarter of its larger naval ships in a one- day engagement with the U. S. Navy,
including one frigate sunk and another badly damaged. Iran strongly disputed the
U. S. assertion that the July 3, 1988, U. S. shoot- down of Iran Air Flight 655 by the
U. S. S. Vincennes over the Persian Gulf ( bound for Dubai, UAE) was an accident.
In his January 1989 inaugural speech, President George H. W. Bush laid the
groundwork for a rapprochement, saying that, in relations with Iran, “ goodwill begets
goodwill,” implying better relations if Iran helped obtain the release of U. S. hostages
held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran reportedly did assist in obtaining their releases,
which was completed in December 1991, but no thaw followed, possibly because
Iran continued to back groups opposed to the U. S.- sponsored Middle East peace
process, a major U. S. priority.
Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration moved to further isolate
Iran as part of a strategy of “ dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. In 1995 and 1996,
the Clinton Administration and Congress added sanctions on Iran in response to
growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction, its support for terrorist
groups, and its efforts to subvert the Arab- Israeli peace process. The election of
Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U. S. shift toward engagement; the Clinton
Administration offered Iran official dialogue, with no substantive preconditions. In
January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to “ people- to- people” U. S.- Iran exchanges
as part of his push for “ dialogue of civilizations, but he ruled out direct talks. In a
June 1998 speech, then Secretary of State Albright stepped up the U. S. outreach
effort by calling for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a “ road
map” for normalization of relations. Encouraged by the reformist victory in Iran’s
March 2000 parliamentary elections, Secretary Albright, in a March 17, 2000,
speech, acknowledged past U. S. meddling in Iran, announcing some minor easing of
the U. S. trade ban with Iran, and promised to try to resolve outstanding claims
disputes. In September 2000 U. N. “ Millennium Summit” meetings, Albright and
President Clinton sent a positive signal to Iran by attending Khatemi’s speeches.
Overview of Bush Administration Iran Policy
Although some U. S. commentators, including former CENTCOM Commander
John Abizaid, believe that the United States “ can live with” a nuclear Iran, it is U. S.
policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. The Bush
Administration has continued multi- faceted efforts to try to implement that policy,
as well as to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities more generally, through international
diplomacy and sanctions — both international sanctions as well as sanctions enforced
outside Security Council mandate. At the same time, the Administration has engaged
in selected bilateral diplomacy with Iran on specific priority issues, such as
stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. These efforts are mostly led by Department of State
officials, who believe that this policy course is the only U. S. option that would garner
broad international support and affect Iran’s behavior. The policy framework is
supported by U. S. conventional military capabilities in the Persian Gulf and alliances
with Iran’s Gulf and Central Asian neighbors.
At times, the Administration has considered or, to some extent, pursued harder
line options. Some Administration officials, reportedly led by Vice President Cheney,
CRS- 34
42 Cooper, Helene and David Sanger. “ Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House.”
New York Times, June 16, 2007.
43 Fletcher, Michael and Keith Richburg. “ Bush Tries to Allay E. U. Worry Over Iran.”
Washington Post, February 23, 2005.
44 For an extended discussion of U. S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul. Iran:
Consequences Of a War. Oxford Research Group, February 2006.
believe that existing measures will not curb the threat posed by Iran and that policy
should focus on possible military confrontation with Iran or on U. S. efforts to change
Iran’s regime. 42 Legislation pending in the 110th Congress, discussed below, indicates
congressional support for increasing U. S. sanctions and for steps to compel other
countries to adopt stricter sanctions against Iran or to curb their companies’ business
dealings with Iran. The FY2007 defense authorization law ( P. L. 109- 364) calls for
a report by the Administration on all aspects of U. S. policy and objectives on Iran
( and required the DNI to prepare a national intelligence estimate on Iran, which was
released on December 3, 2007 as discussed above).
Containment and Possible Military Action
A major question asked in Congress and among U. S. allies and other countries
has been whether President Bush might use military action to delay or halt Iran’s
nuclear program. Although some Members publicly oppose such action, others fear
that containment might not succeed and that Iran’s nuclear program should be
stopped before Iran possesses a working nuclear device. In discussing possible
military options against Iran’s nuclear facilities, President Bush has repeatedly
maintained that “ all options are on the table” 43 – a position he reiterated after the
release of the NIE, which most observers saw as lessening the chance of U. S. conflict
with Iran. A U. S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime does not appear to be
under serious consideration; most experts believe U. S. forces are spread too thin to
undertake such action, including about 160,000 deployed in Iraq, and that U. S. forces
would be greeted with hostility.
Some experts believe that limited military action, such as air or missile strikes
against suspected nuclear sites should be considered. Proponents of the option argue
that military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program because there are only a
limited number of key targets, and these targets are known to U. S. planners and could
be struck, even those that are hardened or buried. 44 It could also be argued that the
United States could reduce Iran’s potential for military or unconventional retaliation
by striking not only nuclear facilities but also Iran’s conventional military
infrastructure, particularly its small ships and coastal missiles.
Still others argue that there are military options available that do not involve air
or missile strikes. Some say that a naval embargo is possible that could pressure Iran
into reconsidering its stand on the nuclear issue. Others say that the imposition of a
“ no- fly zone” over Iran might also serve that purpose. Either action could still be
considered acts of war that Iran might challenge, and which could escalate into
military hostilities.
CRS- 35
Most U. S. allies in Europe, not to mention Russia, China, and some U. S.
experts, have expressed opposition to any military action. Opponents believe any
benefits would be minor, or only temporary, and that the costs of a strike are too
high. On the other hand, in August 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated
that such a strike might be undertaken by the United States if Iran does not curb its
nuclear program, although he said the effects of such a strike would be a “ disaster.”
Other members of his government made similar comments in September 2007,
possibly in an effort to provoke accelerated action on stricter international sanctions
against Iran.
Some question whether the United States is aware of or militarily able to reach
all relevant sites; one former Air Force planner estimates that up to 400 targets would
need to be struck, including at least 75 that would require penetrating munitions.
Some published estimates discuss a few thousand sites, including conventional
military targets, if such action were expanded to include not only WMD sites but also
to try to prevent any Iranian retaliation. Some believe that a U. S. strike would cause
the Iranian public to rally around Iran’s regime, setting back U. S. efforts to promote
change within Iran.
Expressing particular fear that Iran might achieve a nuclear weapons capability,
Israeli officials have repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility that Israel might
strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. However, several experts doubt that Israel has the
capabilities, such as sufficient aerial refueling capacity, that could make such action
effective. Most experts believe that Israel’s strategy is to persuade the United States
to undertake such a strike, and Israeli leaders sought to engage visiting Secretary of
Defense Gates in such a discussion in April 2007, although he reportedly declined
to discuss with the Israelis any strike planning during the visit.
Iranian Retaliatory Scenarios. Some officials and experts warn that a U. S.
military strike on Iran could provoke unconventional retaliation, using the equipment
discussed in the section on “ conventional military capabilities,” that could be difficult
to counter. At the very least, such conflict is likely to raise world oil prices
significantly out of fear of an extended supply disruption. Others say such action
would cause Iran to withdraw from the NPT and refuse any IAEA inspections. Other
possibilities include firing missiles at Israel, or directing Lebanese Hezbollah or
Hamas to fire rockets at Israel.
Iran has acquired a structure and doctrine for unconventional warfare that partly
compensates for its conventional weakness. Former CENTCOM commander Gen.
John Abizaid said in March 2006 that the Revolutionary Guard Navy, through its
basing and force structure, is designed to give Iran a capability to “ internationalize”
a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. In his confirmation hearings on January 30, 2007,
Abizaid’s replacement, Admiral William Fallon, said that “ Based on my read of their
military hardware acquisitions and development of tactics ... [ the Iranians] are
posturing themselves with the capability to attempt to deny us the ability to operate
in [ the Strait of Hormuz].” During a visit to the Gulf, Vice President Cheney warned
Iran on May 11, 2007, not to try to restrict sea traffic, saying “[ The United States]
will keep the sea lanes open.”
CRS- 36
45 Shanker, Thom. “ U. S. and Britain to Add Ships to Persian Gulf in Signal to Iran,” New
York Times, December 21, 2006.
46 “ State Department Promotes New Persian Gulf Security Architecture.” Inside the Navy,
( continued...)
Although many experts believe that U. S. forces could quickly reopen the Strait
if Iran closed it, Iran has tried to demonstrate that it is a capable force in the Gulf. It
has conducted at least five major military exercises since August 2006, including
exercises simultaneous with U. S. exercises in the Gulf in March 2007; there were no
reported incidents. CNN reported on February 21, 2007, that Iranian ships have been
widening their patrols, coming ever closer to key Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.
Several weeks after that report, Iran seized 15 British sailors that Iran said were
patrolling in Iran’s waters, although Britain says they were in Iraqi waters performing
coalition- related searches. The 15 were held until April 5, 2007.
If there were a conflict in the Gulf, some fear that Iran might try to use suicide
boat attacks or to lay mines in the Strait. In April 2006, Iran conducted naval
maneuvers, including test firings of what Iran claims are underwater torpedos that
can avoid detection, presumably for use against U. S. ships in the Gulf, and a surface-to-
sea radar- evading missile launched from helicopters or combat aircraft. U. S.
military officials said the claims might be an exaggeration. The Gulf states fear that
Iran will fire coastal- based cruise missiles at their oil loading or other installations
across the Gulf, as happened during the later stages of the Iran- Iraq war.
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue. Whether or not a strike
on Iran is planned, the Administration believes that U. S. conventional military
capabilities and regional alliances strengthen overall efforts to contain Iran
strategically. An assertive military containment component of policy was signaled in
the January 10, 2007, Iraq “ troop surge” statement by President Bush, in which he
confirmed in that speech t