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Order Code 98- 505 GOV
CRS Report for Congress
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National Emergency Powers
Updated September 15, 2005
Harold C. Relyea
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
National Emergency Powers
Summary
The President of the United States has available certain powers that may
be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or
emergency circumstances ( other than natural disasters, war, or near- war
situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution,
assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred
from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great
many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 200 years.
There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise
of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the
Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions
during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the
exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Indeed, both the
judiciary and Congress, as co- equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding
emergency powers. So can public opinion. Furthermore, since 1976, the
President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some
statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act ( 50
U. S. C. 1601- 1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency
authority, required the President to declare formally the existence of a national
emergency and to specify what statutory authority, activated by the declaration,
would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President’s
declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this
regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are
reviewed in this report, which is updated as events require.
Contents
Background and History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Emergency Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Law and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The National Emergencies Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
National Emergency Powers:
A Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Declared National Emergencies, 1976- 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1 Thomas I. Cook, ed., Two Treatises of Government, by John Locke ( New York: Hafner,
1947), pp. 203- 207; Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787- 1957,
( continued...)
National Emergency Powers
Federal law provides a variety of powers for the President to use in
response to crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation.
Moreover, they are not limited to military or war situations. Some of these
authorities, deriving from the Constitution or statutory law, are continuously
available to the President with little or no qualification. Others — statutory
delegations from Congress — exist on a stand- by basis and remain dormant until
the President formally declares a national emergency. These delegations or grants
of power authorize the President to meet the problems of governing effectively in
times of crisis. Under the powers delegated by such statutes, the President may
seize property, organize and control the means of production, seize commodities,
assign military forces abroad, institute martial law, seize and control all
transportation and communication, regulate the operation of private enterprise,
restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the lives of United States citizens.
Furthermore, Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated
emergency authority.
Until the crisis of World War I, Presidents utilized emergency powers at
their own discretion. Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency
authority. However, during World War I and thereafter, Chief Executives had
available to them a growing body of standby emergency authority which became
operative upon the issuance of a proclamation declaring a condition of national
emergency. Sometimes such proclamations confined the matter of crisis to a
specific policy sphere, and sometimes they placed no limitation whatsoever on the
pronouncement. These activations of stand- by emergency authority remained
acceptable practice until the era of the Vietnam war. In 1976, Congress curtailed
this practice with the passage of the National Emergencies Act.
Background and History
The exercise of emergency powers had long been a concern of the
classical political theorists, including the eighteenth- century English philosopher
John Locke, who had a strong influence upon the Founding Fathers in the United
States. A preeminent exponent of a government of laws and not of men, Locke
argued that occasions may arise when the executive must exert a broad discretion
in meeting special exigencies or “ emergencies” for which the legislative power
provided no relief or existing law granted no necessary remedy. He did not
regard this prerogative as limited to wartime, or even to situations of great
urgency. It was sufficient if the “ public good” might be advanced by its exercise. 1
CRS- 2
1 (... continued)
fourth revised edition ( New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 147- 148.
2 See J. Reuben Clark, Jr., comp., Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December 1917
Dealing with the Control and Taking of Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or
Welfare, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders Thereunder, to and Including
January 31, 1918, to Which Is Added a Reprint of Analogous Legislation Since 1775
( Washington: GPO, 1918), pp. 201- 228.
3 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography ( New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 388- 389.
Emergency powers were first expressed prior to the actual founding of the
Republic. Between 1775 and 1781, the Continental Congress passed a series of
acts and resolves which count as the first expressions of emergency authority. 2
These instruments dealt almost exclusively with the prosecution of the
Revolutionary War.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, emergency powers, as such,
failed to attract much attention during the course of debate over the charter for the
new government. It may be argued, however, that the granting of emergency
powers by Congress is implicit in its Article I, section 8 authority to “ provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare,” the commerce clause, its war, armed
forces, and militia powers, and the “ necessary and proper” clause empowering it
to make such laws as are required to fulfill the executions of “ the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
There is a tradition of constitutional interpretation that has resulted in so-called
implied powers, which may be invoked in order to respond to an
emergency situation. Locke seems to have anticipated this practice. Furthermore,
Presidents have occasionally taken an emergency action which they assumed to
be constitutionally permissible. Thus, in the American governmental experience,
the exercise of emergency powers has been somewhat dependent upon the Chief
Executive’s view of the presidential office.
Perhaps the President who most clearly articulated a view of his office in
conformity with the Lockean position was Theodore Roosevelt. Describing what
came to be called the “ stewardship” theory of the presidency, Roosevelt wrote of
his “ insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by
the Congress under its constitutional powers.” It was his view “ that every
executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a
steward of the people,” and he “ declined to adopt the view that what was
imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless
he could find some specific authorization to do it.” Indeed, it was Roosevelt’s
belief that, for the President, “ it was not only his right but his duty to do anything
that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the
Constitution or by the laws.” 3
Opposed to this view of the presidency was Roosevelt’s former Secretary
of War, personal choice for, and actual successor as Chief Executive, William
CRS- 3
4 William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers ( New York: Columbia
University Press, 1916), pp. 139- 140; for a direct response to Theodore Roosevelt’s
expression of presidential power, see William Howard Taft, The Presidency ( New York,
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), pp. 125- 130.
5 Albert L. Sturm, “ Emergencies and the Presidency,” Journal of Politics, vol. 11, Feb.
1949, pp. 125- 126.
6 See 84 Stat. 799- 800, 1468; 85 Stat. 13, 38, 743- 755; and 87 Stat. 27- 29.
7 See 64 Stat. 798; 50 U. S. C. App. 2061 et seq. ( 1994).
Howard Taft. He viewed the presidential office in more limited terms, writing
“ that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably
traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such
express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.” In his view, such a
“ specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. There is,” Taft concluded, “ no undefined residuum
of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public
interest....” 4
Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations of
opinion, resulting in perhaps as many conceptions of the office as there have been
holders. One authority has summed up the situation in the following words:
Emergency powers are not solely derived from legal sources. The extent
of their invocation and use is also contingent upon the personal
conception which the incumbent of the Presidential office has of the
Presidency and the premises upon which he interprets his legal powers.
In the last analysis, the authority of a President is largely determined by
the President himself. 5
Finally, apart from the Constitution, but resulting from its prescribed
procedures, there are statutory grants of power for emergency conditions. The
President is authorized by Congress to take some special or extraordinary action,
ostensibly to meet the problems of governing effectively in times of exigency.
Sometimes these laws are only of temporary duration. The Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, for example, allowed the President to impose certain
wage and price controls for about three years before it expired automatically in
1974.6 The statute gave the President emergency authority to address a crisis in
the nation’s economy.
Of course, many of these laws are continuously maintained or
permanently available for the President’s ready use in responding to an
emergency. The Defense Production Act, originally adopted in 1950 to prioritize
and regulate the manufacture of military material, is exemplary of this type of
statute. 7
Finally, there are various stand- by laws that convey special emergency
powers once the President formally declares a national emergency activating
them. In 1973, a Senate special committee studying emergency powers published
a compilation identifying some 470 provisions of federal law delegating to the
CRS- 4
8 U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,
Emergency Powers Statutes, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 93- 549 ( Washington: GPO, 1973).
9 90 Stat. 1255; 50 U. S. C. 1601- 1651.
10 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary ( Springfield, MA: G & C Merriam, 1974), p. 372.
11 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 440 ( 1934).
12 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787- 1957, p. 3.
13 U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,
National Emergency, hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 11- 12, 1973 ( Washington: GPO,
1973), p. 277.
14 Ibid., p. 279.
executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency. 8 The vast
majority of them are of the stand- by kind — dormant until activated by the
President. However, formal procedures for invoking these authorities, accounting
for their use, and regulating their activation and application were established a
while ago by the National Emergencies Act of 1976.9
The Emergency Concept
Relying upon constitutional authority or congressional delegations made
at various times over the past 200 years, the President of the United States may
exercise certain powers in the event that the continued existence of the nation is
threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances. What is a national
emergency?
In the simplest understanding of the term, the dictionary defines an
emergency as “ an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state
that calls for immediate action.” 10 In the midst of the crisis of the Great
Depression, a 1934 Supreme Court majority opinion characterized an emergency
in terms of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence
to a public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably
subject to anticipation. 11 An eminent constitutional scholar, the late Edward S.
Corwin, explained emergency conditions as being those “ which have not attained
enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to
rule.” 12 During congressional committee hearings on emergency powers in 1973,
a political scientist described an emergency in the following terms: “ It denotes
the existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity and duration, which are
perceived to threaten life or well- being beyond tolerable limits.” 13 Corwin also
indicated it “ connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree
of existing danger to life or well- being beyond that which is accepted as
normal.” 14
There are perhaps at least four aspects of an emergency condition. The
first is its temporal character: an emergency is sudden, unforeseen, and of
unknown duration. The second is its potential gravity: an emergency is
dangerous and threatening to life and well- being. The third, in terms of
governmental role and authority, is the matter of perception: who discerns this
CRS- 5
15 While some might argue that the concept of emergency powers can be extended to
embrace authority exercised in response to circumstances of natural disaster, this dimension
is not within the scope of this report. Various federal response arrangements and programs
for dealing with natural disasters have been established and administered with no potential
or actual disruption of constitutional arrangements. With regard to Corwin’s characterization
of emergency conditions, these long- standing arrangements and programs suggest that
natural disasters do “ admit of their being dealt with according to rule.”
16 1 Stat. 264- 265.
17 This authority may presently be found at 10 U. S. C. 334.
18 See James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, vol. 1 ( New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), pp. 149- 154.
phenomenon? The Constitution may be guiding on this question, but not always
conclusive. Fourth, there is the element of response: by definition, an emergency
requires immediate action, but is, as well, unanticipated and, therefore, as Corwin
notes, cannot always be “ dealt with according to rule.” From these simple factors
arise the dynamics of national emergency powers. 15 These dynamics can be seen
in the history of the exercise of emergency powers.
Law and Practice
During the summer of 1792, residents of western Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and the Carolinas began forcefully opposing the collection of a federal excise tax
on whiskey. Anticipating rebellious activity, Congress enacted legislation
providing for the calling forth of the militia to suppress insurrections and repel
invasions. 16 Section 3 of this statute required that a presidential proclamation be
issued to warn insurgents to cease their activity. 17 If hostilities persisted, the
militia could be dispatched. On August 17, 1794, President Washington issued
such a proclamation. The insurgency continued. The President then took
command of the forces organized to put down the rebellion. 18
Here was the beginning of a pattern of policy expression and
implementation regarding emergency powers. Congress legislated extraordinary
or special authority for discretionary use by the President in a time of emergency.
In issuing a proclamation, the Chief Executive notified Congress that he was
making use of this power and also apprised other affected parties of his
emergency action.
Over the next 100 years, Congress enacted various permanent and standby
laws for responding largely to military, economic, and labor emergencies. During
this span of years, however, the exercise of emergency powers by President
Abraham Lincoln brought the first great dispute over the authority and discretion
of the Chief Executive to engage in emergency actions.
By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration ( March 4, 1861), seven states of the
lower South had announced their secession from the Union; the Confederate
provisional government had been established ( February 4, 1861); Jefferson Davis
had been elected ( February 9, 1861) and installed as president of the confederacy
CRS- 6
19 Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 3215- 3216.
20 Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship ( New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1963), p. 225.
21 Ibid.
22 See James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, vol. 7, p. 3216.
23 Ibid., pp. 3216- 3217.
24 Ibid., p. 3225.
25 James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln ( Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1951); also see Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress ( New York:
( continued...)
( February 18, 1861); and an army was being mobilized by the secessionists.
Lincoln had a little over two months to consider his course of action.
When the new President assumed office, Congress was not in session. For
reasons of his own, Lincoln delayed calling a special meeting of the legislature,
but soon ventured into its constitutionally designated policy sphere. On April 19,
he issued a proclamation establishing a blockade on the ports of the secessionist
states, 19 “ a measure hitherto regarded as contrary to both the Constitution and the
law of nations except when the government was embroiled in a declared, foreign
war.” 20 Congress, of course, had not been given an opportunity to consider a
declaration of war.
The next day, the President ordered the addition of 19 vessels to the navy
“ for purposes of public defense.” 21 A short time later, the blockade was extended
to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. 22
By a proclamation of May 3, Lincoln ordered that the regular army be
enlarged by 22,714 men, that navy personnel be increased by 18,000, and that
42,032 volunteers be accommodated for three- year terms of service. 23 Such a
directive, of course, antagonized many Representatives and Senators, because
Congress is specifically authorized by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution “ to
raise and support armies.”
In his July message to the newly assembled Congress, Lincoln suggested
that, while his actions with regard to the expansion of the armed forces might be
legally suspect, “[ t] hese measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured
upon under what appeared to be a popular and a public necessity, trusting then, as
now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed,” he wrote, “ that
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.” 24
Indeed, Congress subsequently did legislatively authorize, and thereby
approve, the President’s actions regarding his increasing armed forces personnel,
and would do the same later concerning some other questionable emergency
actions. In the case of Lincoln, the opinion of scholars and experts is “ that neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court exercised any effective restraint upon the
President.” 25 The emergency actions of the Chief Executive were either
CRS- 7
25 (... continued)
Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 124- 127; Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp.
233- 234; and Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States ( New York:
Columbia University Press, 1907), p. 58.
26 39 Stat. 1814.
27 39 Stat. 728.
28 41 Stat. 1359.
29 48 Stat. 1689.
30 40 Stat. 411.
31 48 Stat. 1.
32 48 Stat. 1691.
unchallenged or approved by Congress, and were either accepted or, because of
almost no opportunity to render judgment, went largely without notice by the
Supreme Court. The President made a quick response to the emergency at hand, a
response which Congress or the courts might have rejected in law, but which,
nonetheless, had been made in fact and with some degree of popular approval.
Similar controversy would arise concerning the emergency actions of Presidents
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both men exercised extensive
emergency powers with regard to world hostilities, and Roosevelt also used
emergency authority to deal with the Great Depression. Their emergency actions,
however, were largely supported by statutory delegations and a high degree of
approval on the part of both Congress and the public.
Furthermore, during the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies, a major
procedural development occurred in the exercise of emergency powers — use of a
proclamation to declare a national emergency and thereby activate all stand- by
statutory provisions delegating authority to the President during a national
emergency. The first such national emergency proclamation was issued by
President Wilson on February 5, 1917.26 Promulgated on the authority of a statute
establishing the United States Shipping Board, the proclamation concerned water
transportation policy. 27 It was statutorily terminated, along with a variety of other
wartime measures, on March 3, 1921.28
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the next national emergency
proclamation some 48 hours after assuming office. 29 Proclaimed March 6, 1933,
on the somewhat questionable authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917,30 the proclamation declared a so- called “ bank holiday” and halted a major
class of financial transactions by closing the banks. Congress subsequently gave
specific statutory support for the Chief Executive’s action with the passage of the
Emergency Banking Act on March 9.31 Upon signing this legislation into law, the
President issued a second banking proclamation, based upon the authority of the
new law, continuing the bank holiday until it was determined that banking
institutions were capable of conducting business in accordance with new banking
policy. 32
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33 54 Stat. 2643.
34 55 Stat. 1647.
35 61 Stat. 449.
36 65 Stat. 451.
37 66 Stat. 54; extended at 66 Stat. 96, 137, and 296.
38 66 Stat. 330; extended at 67 Stat. 18 and 131.
39 66 Stat. c31.
40 64 Stat. A454.
41 84 Stat. 2222.
42 See 10 U. S. C. 673 ( 1970).
Next, on September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt promulgated a
proclamation of “ limited” national emergency, though the qualifying term had no
meaningful legal significance. 33 Almost two years later, on May 27, 1941, he
issued a proclamation of “ unlimited” national emergency. 34 This action, however,
actually did not make any important new powers available to the Chief Executive
in addition to those activated by the 1939 proclamation. The President’s purpose
in making the second proclamation was largely to apprise the American people of
the worsening conflict in Europe and growing tensions in Asia.
These two war- related proclamations of a general condition of national
emergency remained operative until 1947, when certain of the provisions of law
they had activated were statutorily rescinded. 35 Then, in 1951, Congress
terminated the declaration of war against Germany. 36 In the spring of the
following year, the Senate ratified the treaty of peace with Japan. Because these
actions marked the end of World War II for the United States, legislation was
required to keep certain emergency provisions in effect. Initially, the Emergency
Powers Interim Continuation Act temporarily maintained this emergency
authority. 37 It was subsequently supplanted by the Emergency Powers
Continuation Act, which kept selected emergency delegations in force until
August 1953.38 By proclamation in April 1952, President Harry S. Truman
terminated the 1939 and 1941 national emergency declarations, leaving operative
only those emergency authorities continued by statutory specification. 39
President Truman’s 1952 termination, however, specifically exempted a
December 1950 proclamation of national emergency he had issued in response to
hostilities in Korea. 40 Furthermore, this condition of national emergency would
remain in force and unimpaired well into the era of the Vietnam war.
Two other proclamations of national emergency also would be
promulgated before Congress once again turned its attention to these matters.
Faced with a postal strike, President Richard M. Nixon declared a national
emergency in March 1970,41 thereby gaining permission to use units of the Ready
Reserve to assist in moving the mail. 42 A second national emergency was
proclaimed by President Nixon in August 1971 to control the balance of payments
CRS- 9
43 85 Stat. 926.
44 The historical record suggests that, prior to 1973, when congressional research revealed
their existence, other outstanding proclaimed national emergencies were not apparent to, or
much discussed by, Members of Congress.
45 U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies Act, hearings,
94th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 6, 13, 19, and Apr. 9, 1975 ( Washington: GPO, 1975), p. 20.
flow by terminating temporarily certain trade agreement provisos and imposing
supplemental duties on some imported goods. 43
Congressional Concerns
In the years following the conclusion of U. S. armed forces involvement in
active military conflict in Korea, occasional expressions of concern were heard in
Congress regarding the continued existence of President Truman’s 1950 national
emergency proclamation long after the conditions prompting its issuance had
disappeared. There was some annoyance that the President was retaining
extraordinary powers intended only for a time of genuine emergency, and a
feeling that the Chief Executive was thwarting the legislative intent of Congress
by continuously failing to terminate the declared national emergency. 44
Growing public and congressional displeasure with the President’s
exercise of his war powers and deepening U. S. involvement in hostilities in
Vietnam prompted interest in a variety of related matters. For Senator Charles
Mathias, interest in the question of emergency powers developed out of U. S.
involvement in Vietnam and the incursion into Cambodia. Together with Senator
Frank Church, he sought to establish a Senate special committee to study the
implications of terminating the 1950 proclamation of national emergency that was
being used to prosecute the Vietnam war, “ to consider problems which might
arise as the result of the termination and to consider what administrative or
legislative actions might be necessary.” Such a panel was initially chartered by
S. Res. 304 as the Special Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency in June of 1972, but did not begin operations before the end of the
year. 45
With the convening of the 93rd Congress in 1973, the special committee
was approved again with S. Res. 9. Upon exploring the subject matter of national
emergency powers, however, the mission of the special committee became more
burdensome. There was not just one proclamation of national emergency in
effect, but four such instruments, issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971. The
United States was in a condition of national emergency four times over, and with
each proclamation, the whole collection of statutorily delegated emergency
powers was activated. Consequently, in 1974, with S. Res. 242, the study panel
was rechartered as the Special Committee on National Emergencies and
Delegated Emergency Powers to reflect its focus upon matters larger than the
1950 emergency proclamation. Its final mandate was provided by S. Res. 10 in
the 94th Congress, although its termination date was necessarily extended briefly
CRS- 10
46 Other members of the Special Committee included Senators Clifford P. Case, Clifford P.
Hansen, Philip A. Hart, James B. Pearson, Claiborne Pell, and Adlai E. Stevenson III.
47 See U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, committee
print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. ( Washington: GPO, 1974); U. S. Congress, Senate Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Recommended
National Emergencies Act, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 93- 1170 ( Washington: GPO, 1974);
U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency, committee
print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. ( Washington: GPO, 1974); U. S. Congress, Senate Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Replies,
3 parts, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. ( Washington: GPO, 1974); U. S. Congress,
Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers,
National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 94-
922 ( Washington: GPO, 1976); U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the
Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.,
S. Rept. 93- 549 ( Washington: GPO, 1973); U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the
Termination of the National Emergency, National Emergency, 3 parts, hearings, 93rd Cong.,
1st sess., Apr. 11- 12, July 24, and Nov. 28, 1973 ( Washington: GPO, 1973).
in 1976 by S. Res. 370. Senator Church and Senator Mathias co- chaired the
panel. 46
The Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers produced various studies during its existence. 47 After
scrutinizing the United States Code and uncodified statutory emergency powers,
the panel identified 470 provisions of federal law which delegated extraordinary
authority to the executive in time of national emergency. Not all of them required
a declaration of national emergency to be operative, but they were, nevertheless,
extraordinary grants. The special committee also found that no process existed
for automatically terminating the four outstanding national emergency
proclamations. Thus, the panel began developing legislation containing a formula
for regulating emergency declarations in the future and otherwise adjusting the
body of statutorily delegated emergency powers by abolishing some provisions,
relegating others to permanent status, and continuing others in a standby capacity.
In addition, the panel also began preparing a report offering its findings and
recommendations regarding the state of national emergency powers in the nation.
The National Emergencies Act
The special committee, in July 1974, unanimously recommended
legislation establishing a procedure for the presidential declaration and
congressional regulation of a national emergency. The proposal also modified
various statutorily delegated emergency powers. In arriving at this reform
measure, the panel consulted with various executive branch agencies regarding
the significance of existing emergency statutes, recommendations for legislative
action, and views as to the repeal of some provisions of emergency law.
This recommended legislation was introduced by Senator Church for
himself and others on August 22, 1974, and became S. 3957. It was reported
from the Senate Committee on Government Operations on September 30 without
CRS- 11
48 See U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies
Act, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 93- 1193 ( Washington: GPO, 1974).
49 See Congressional Record, vol. 120, Oct. 7, 1974, pp. 34011- 34022.
50 See U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies Act,
hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 6, 13, 19, and Apr. 9, 1975 ( Washington: GPO, 1975).
51 U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies, 94th Cong.,
1st sess., H. Rept. 94- 238 ( Washington: GPO, 1975).
52 Congressional Record, vol. 121, Sept. 4, 1975, pp. 27631- 27647; Ibid., Sept. 5, 1975, p.
27745.
53 See U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies
Act, hearing, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 25, 1976 ( Washington: GPO, 1976).
54 See U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies
Act, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 94- 1168 ( Washington: GPO, 1976).
55 See Congressional Record, vol. 122, Aug. 27, 1976, pp. 28224- 28228.
public hearings or amendment. 48 The bill was subsequently discussed on the
Senate floor on October 7, when it was amended and passed. 49
Although a version of the reform legislation had been introduced in the
House on September 16, becoming H. R. 16668, the Committee on the Judiciary,
to which the measure was referred, did not have an opportunity to consider either
that bill or the Senate adopted version due to the press of other business —
chiefly the impeachment of President Nixon and the nomination of Nelson A.
Rockefeller to be Vice President of the United States. Thus, the National
Emergencies Act failed to be considered on the House floor before the final
adjournment of the 93rd Congress.
With the convening of the next Congress, the proposal was introduced in
the House on February 27, 1975, becoming H. R. 3884, and in the Senate on
March 6, becoming S. 977. House hearings occurred in March and April before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
Committee on the Judiciary. 50 The bill was subsequently marked- up and, on
April 15, was reported in amended form to the full committee on a 4- 0 vote. On
May 21, the Committee on the Judiciary, on a voice vote, reported the bill with
technical amendments. 51 During the course of House debate on September 4,
there was agreement to both the committee amendments and a floor amendment
providing that national emergencies end automatically one year after their
declaration unless the President informs Congress and the public of a
continuation. The bill was then passed on a 388- 5 yea and nay vote and sent to
the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Government Operations. 52
The Senate Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on H. R.
3884 on February 25, 1976,53 The bill was subsequently reported on August 26
with one substantive and several technical amendments. 54 The following day, the
amended bill was passed and returned to the House. 55 On August 31, the House
CRS- 12
56 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1976, p. 28466.
57 90 Stat. 1255; 50 U. S. C. 1601- 1651 ( 1988); see U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Government Operations and Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, The National Emergencies Act ( Public Law 94- 412). Source Book:
Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.
( Washington: GPO, 1976).
58 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 ( 1983).
59 See 99 Stat. 405, 448.
agreed to the Senate amendments, 56 clearing the proposal for President Gerald
Ford’s signature on September 14.57
As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles. The
first of these generally returned all standby statutory delegations of emergency
power, activated by an outstanding declaration of national emergency, to a
dormant state two years after the statute’s approval. However, the act did not
cancel the 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971 national emergency proclamations because
these were issued by the President pursuant to his Article II constitutional
authority. Nevertheless, it did render them ineffective by returning to dormancy
the statutory authorities they had activated, thereby necessitating a new
declaration to activate standby statutory emergency authorities.
Title II provided a procedure for future declarations of national emergency
by the President and prescribed arrangements for their congressional regulation.
The statute established an exclusive means for declaring a national emergency.
Furthermore, emergency declarations were to terminate automatically after one
year unless formally continued for another year by the President, but could be
terminated earlier by either the President or Congress. Originally, the prescribed
method for congressional termination of a declared national emergency was a
concurrent resolution adopted by both houses of Congress. This type of so- called
“ legislative veto” was effectively invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983.58
The National Emergencies Act was amended in 1985 to substitute a joint
resolution as the vehicle for rescinding a national emergency declaration. 59
When declaring a national emergency, the President must indicate,
according to Title III, the powers and authorities being activated to respond to the
exigency at hand. Certain presidential accountability and reporting requirements
regarding national emergency declarations were specified in Title IV, and the
repeal and continuation of various statutory provisions delegating emergency
powers was accomplished in Title V.
Since the 1976 enactment of the National Emergencies Act, various
national emergencies, identified in Table 1, have been declared pursuant to its
provisions. Some were subsequently revoked, while others remain operative. All
original declarations made pursuant to the National Emergencies Act are
identified in Table 1. Unless otherwise indicated ( in italic), their status is
operational. A Code of Federal Regulations or Federal Register citation is
provided to enable examination of their full text.
CRS- 13
Table 1. Declared National Emergencies, 1976- 2005
Declaration Date Title Citation/ Status
E. O. 12170 11/ 14/ 79 Blocking Iranian
Government Property
3 C. F. R., 1979 Comp.,
pp. 457- 458.
E. O. 12211 04/ 17/ 80 Further Prohibitions on
Transactions with Iran
3 C. F. R., 1980 Comp.,
pp. 253- 255.
E. O. 12444 10/ 14/ 83 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R., 1983 Comp.,
pp. 214- 215; revoked
by E. O. 12451 of
12/ 20/ 83.
E. O. 12470 03/ 30/ 84 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R., 1984 Comp.,
pp. 168- 169; revoked
by E. O. 12525 of
07/ 12/ 85.
E. O. 12513 05/ 01/ 85 Prohibiting Trade and Certain
Other Transactions Involving
Nicaragua
3 C. F. R., 1985 Comp.,
p. 342; revoked by
E. O. 12707 of
03/ 13/ 90.
E. O. 12532 09/ 09/ 85 Prohibiting Trade and Certain
Other Transactions Involving
South Africa
3 C. F. R., 1985 Comp.,
pp. 387- 391; revoked
by E. O. 12769 of
07/ 10/ 91.
E. O. 12543 01/ 07/ 86 Prohibiting Trade and Certain
Transactions Involving Libya
3 C. F. R., 1986 Comp.,
pp. 181- 182; revoked
by E. O. 13357 of
09/ 20/ 04.
E. O. 12635 04/ 08/ 88 Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to
Panama
3 C. F. R., 1988 Comp.,
pp. 563- 564; revoked
by E. O. 12710 of
04/ 05/ 90.
E. O. 12722 08/ 02/ 90 Blocking Iraqi Government
Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Iraq
3 C. F. R., 1990 Comp.,
pp. 294- 295; revoked
by E. O. 13350 of
07/ 29/ 04.
E. O. 12730 09/ 30/ 90 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R., 1990 Comp.,
pp. 305- 306; revoked
by E. O. 12867 of
09/ 30/ 93.
E. O. 12735 11/ 16/ 90 Chemical and Biological
Weapons Proliferation
3 C. F. R., 1990 Comp.,
pp. 313- 316; revoked
by E. O. 12938 of
11/ 11/ 94.
CRS- 14
Declaration Date Title Citation/ Status
E. O. 12775 10/ 04/ 91 Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to
Haiti
3 C. F. R., 1991 Comp.,
pp. 349- 350; revoked
by E. O. 12932 of
10/ 14/ 94.
E. O. 12808 05/ 30/ 92 Blocking “ Yugoslav
Government” Property and
Property of the Governments
of Serbia and Montenegro
3 C. F. R., 1992 Comp.,
pp. 305- 306; revoked
by E. O. 13304 of
05/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 12865 09/ 26/ 93 Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Involving
UNITA
3 C. F. R., 1993 Comp.,
pp. 636- 638; revoked
by E. O. 13298 of
05/ 06/ 03.
E. O. 12868 09/ 30/ 93 Restricting the Participation
by United States Persons in
Weapons Proliferation
Activities
3 C. F. R., 1993 Comp.,
pp. 650- 651; revoked
by E. O. 12930 of
09/ 29/ 94.
E. O. 12923 06/ 30/ 94 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R., 1994 Comp.,
pp. 916- 917; revoked
by E. O. 12924 of
08/ 19/ 94.
E. O. 12924 08/ 19/ 94 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R., 1994 Comp.,
pp. 917- 919; revoked
by E. O. 13206 of
04/ 04/ 01.
E. O. 12930 09/ 29/ 94 Measures to Restrict the
Participation by United States
Persons in Weapons
Proliferation Activities
3 C. F. R., 1994 Comp.,
pp. 924- 925; revoked
by E. O. 12938 of
11/ 14/ 94.
E. O. 12934 10/ 25/ 94 Blocking Property and
Additional Measures With
Respect to the Bosnian Serb-
Controlled Areas of the
Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
3 C. F. R., 1994 Comp.,
pp. 930- 932; revoked
by E. O. 13304 of
05/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 12938 11/ 14/ 94 Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction
3 C. F. R., 1994 Comp.,
pp. 950- 954.
E. O. 12947 01/ 23/ 95 Prohibiting Transactions with
Terrorists Who Threaten to
Disrupt the Middle East
Peace Process
3 C. F. R., 1995 Comp.,
pp. 319- 320.
E. O. 12957 03/ 15/ 95 Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to
the Development of Iranian
Petroleum Resources
3 C. F. R., 1995 Comp.,
pp. 332- 333; revoked
in part by E. O. 12959
of 05/ 06/ 95.
CRS- 15
Declaration Date Title Citation/ Status
E. O. 12978 10/ 21/ 95 Blocking Assets and
Prohibiting Transactions with
Significant Narcotics
Traffickers
3 C. F. R., 1995 Comp.,
pp. 415- 417.
Proc. 6867 03/ 01/ 96 Regulation of the Anchorage
and Movement of Vessels
with Respect to Cuba
3 C. F. R., 1996 Comp.,
pp. 8- 9.
E. O. 13047 05/ 22/ 97 Prohibiting New Investment
in Burma
3 C. F. R., 1997 Comp.,
pp. 202- 204; revoked
in part by E. O. 13310
of 07/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 13067 11/ 03/ 97 Blocking Sudanese
Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with
Sudan
3 C. F. R., 1997 Comp.,
pp. 230- 231.
E. O. 13088 06/ 09/ 98 Blocking Property of the
Governments of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
( Serbia and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, and the
Republic of Montenegro, and
Prohibiting New Investment
in the Republic of Serbia in
Response to the Situation in
Kosovo
3 C. F. R., 1998 Comp.,
pp. 191- 193; revoked
by E. O. 13304 of
05/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 13129 07/ 04/ 99 Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with
the Taliban
3 C. F. R. 1999 Comp.,
pp. 200- 203; revoked
by E. O. 13268 of
07/ 02/ 02.
E. O. 13159 06/ 21/ 00 Blocking Property of the
Government of the Russian
Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly
Enriched Uranium Extracted
from Nuclear Weapons
3 C. F. R. 2000 Comp.,
pp. 277- 278.
E. O. 13194 01/ 18/ 01 Prohibiting the Importation
of Rough Diamonds from
Sierra Leone
3 C. F. R. 2001 Comp.,
pp. 741- 743; revoked
by E. O. 13224 of
01/ 15/ 04.
E. O. 13219 06/ 26/ 01 Blocking Property of Persons
Who Threaten International
Stabilization Efforts in the
Western Balkans
3 C. F. R. 2001 Comp.,
pp. 778- 782; revised
by E. O. 13304 of
05/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 13222 08/ 17/ 01 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
3 C. F. R. 2001 Comp.,
pp. 783- 784.
CRS- 16
Declaration Date Title Citation/ Status
60 U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, p. 19.
61 Ibid., p. 10.
Proc. 7463 09/ 14/ 01 Declaration of National
Emergency by Reason of
Certain Terrorist Attacks
3 C. F. R. 2001 Comp.,
p. 263.
E. O. 13224 09/ 23/ 01 Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with
Persons who Commit,
Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism
3 C. F. R. 2001 Comp.,
pp. 786- 789
E. O. 13288 03/ 06/ 03 Blocking Property of Persons
Undermining Democratic
Processes or Institutions in
Zimbabwe
68 Fed. Reg. 11457-
11458.
E. O. 13303 5/ 22/ 03 Protecting the Development
Fund for Iraq and Certain
Other Property in Which Iraq
has an Interest
68 Fed. Reg. 31931-
31932; scope
expanded by E. O.
13315 of 08/ 28/ 03.
E. O. 13338 05/ 11/ 04 Blocking Property of Certain
Persons and Prohibiting the
Export of Certain Goods to
Syria
69 Fed. Reg. 26751-
26754.
E. O. 13348 07/ 22/ 04 Blocking Property of Certain
Persons and Prohibiting the
Importation of Certain Goods
from Liberia
69 Fed. Reg. 44885-
44887.
In its final report, issued in late May 1976, the special committee
concluded “ by reemphasizing that emergency laws and procedures in the United
States have been neglected for too long, and that Congress must pass the National
Emergencies Act to end a potentially dangerous situation.” 60 The panel’s
recommended legislation, of course, was enacted into law before the end of the
year.
Other issues identified by the special committee as deserving attention in
the future, however, did not fare so well. The panel, for example, was hopeful
that standing committees of both houses of Congress would review statutory
emergency power provisions within their respective jurisdictions with a view to
the continued need for, and possible adjustment of, such authority. 61 Actions in
this regard probably were not as ambitious as the special committee expected. A
title of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, granting the President or Congress
power to declare a civil defense emergency in the event an attack on the United
CRS- 17
62 See 50 U. S. C. App. 2297 ( 1970); U. S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Extending Civil Defense Emergency Authorities, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., H. Rept. 93- 1243
( Washington: GPO, 1974); Associated Press, “ Rules Panel Halts Bill on War Powers,”
Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1974, p. A5.
63 90 Stat. 517; 10 U. S. C. 12302
64 10 U. S. C. 673 ( 1970).
65 50 U. S. C. 1701- 1706.
66 91 Stat. 1625.
67 12 U. S. C. 95a and 50 U. S. C. App. 5( b) ( 1976).
68 Of related interest to these statutory developments, President Ford, by a proclamation of
February 19, 1976, gave notice that E. O. 9066, providing for the internment of Japanese-
Americans in certain military areas during World War II, was canceled as of the issuance of
the proclamation formally establishing the cessation of World War II on December 31, 1946.
See 3 C. F. R., 1976 Comp., pp. 8- 9. Certain statutory authority relevant to this executive
order, concerning the creation of military areas and zones, was canceled by the National
Emergencies Act. See 18 U. S. C. 1383 ( 1976).
States occurred or was anticipated, expired in June 1974 after the House
Committee on Rules failed to report a measure continuing the statute. 62
A provision of emergency law was refined in May 1976. Legislation was
enacted granting the President the authority to order certain selected members of
an armed services reserve component to active duty without a declaration of war
or national emergency. 63 Previously, such an activation of military reserve
personnel had been limited to a “ time of national emergency declared by the
President” or “ when otherwise authorized by law.” 64
Another refinement of emergency law occurred in 1977 when action was
completed on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( IEEPA). 65
Reform legislation containing this statute66 modified a provision of the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917, authorizing the President to regulate the nation’s
international and domestic finance during periods of declared war or national
emergency. 67 The enacted bill limited the President’s Trading with the Enemy
Act power to regulate the country’s finances to times of declared war. In IEEPA,
a provision conferred authority on the Chief Executive to exercise controls over
international economic transactions in the future during a declared national
emergency and established procedures governing the use of this power, including
close consultation with Congress when declaring a national emergency to activate
IEEPA. Such a declaration would be subject to congressional regulation under
the procedures of the National Emergencies Act. 68
Other matters identified in the final report of the special committee for
congressional scrutiny included:
! investigation of emergency preparedness efforts conducted by the
executive branch;
CRS- 18
69 See U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, pp. 11- 18.
70 See, for example, U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations,
Presidential Directives and Records Accountability Act, hearing, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., Aug.
3, 1988 ( Washington: GPO, 1989; U. S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Emergency Preparedness and the Licensing Process for Commercial Nuclear Power
Reactors, 2 parts, hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 18 and July 8, 1983 ( Washington:
GPO, 1985).
71 See Federal Register, vol. 70, Sept. 13, 2005, pp. 54227- 54228.
72 Currently found at 40 U. S. C. § 3147; formerly codified at 40 U. S. C. § 276a- 5.
! attention to congressional preparations for an emergency and
continual review of emergency law;
! ending open- ended grants of authority to the executive;
! investigation and institution of stricter controls over delegated
powers; and
! improving the accountability of executive decisionmaking. 69
There is some public record indication that certain of these points,
particularly the first and the last, have been addressed in the past two decades by
congressional overseers. 70
Overview
The development, exercise, and regulation of emergency powers, from the
days of the Continental Congress to the present, reflect at least one highly
discernable trend: those authorities available to the executive in time of national
crisis or exigency have, since the time of the Lincoln Administration, come to be
increasingly rooted in statutory law. The discretion available to a Civil War
President in his exercise of emergency power has been harnessed, to a
considerable extent, in the contemporary period. Furthermore, due to greater
reliance upon statutory expression, the range of this authority has come to be
more circumscribed, and the options for its use have come to be regulated
procedurally through the National Emergencies Act. Since its enactment,
however, the National Emergencies Act has not been revisited by congressional
overseers. Nonetheless, as the final report of the Senate Special Committee on
National Emergencies suggests, the prospect remains that further improvements
and reforms in this policy area might be pursued and perfected.
An anomaly in the activation of emergency powers appears to have
occurred on September 8, 2005, when President George W. Bush issued a
proclamation suspending certain wage requirements of the Davis- Bacon Act in
the course of the federal response to the Gulf coast disaster resulting from
Hurricane Katrina. 71 Instead of following the historical pattern of declaring a
national emergency to activate the suspension authority, 72 the President set out the
following rationale in the proclamation: “ I find that the conditions caused by
CRS- 19
73 Federal Register, vol. 70, Sept. 13, 2005, p. 54227.
Hurricane Katrina constitute a ‘ national emergency’ within the meaning of
section 3147 of title 40, United States Code.” 73 A more likely course of action
seemingly would have been for the President to declare a national emergency
pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and to specify that he was, accordingly,
activating the suspension authority. The propriety of the President’s action in this
case may be ultimately determined in the courts.
CRS- 20
National Emergency Powers:
A Selected Bibliography
Articles
Bowman, Mary M. C., “ Presidential Emergency Powers Related to International
Economic Transactions.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transactional Law, vol.
11, Summer 1978: 515- 534.
Culp, Maurice S., “ Executive Power in Emergencies. Michigan Law Review, vol.
31, June 1933: 1066- 1096.
Fuller, Glenn E., “ The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive’s
Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability.” Southern California
Law Review, vol. 52, July 1979: 1453- 1511.
Genovese, Michael A., “ Democratic Theory and the Emergency Powers of the
President.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, Summer 1979: 283-
289.
Klieman, Aaron S., “ Preparing for the Hour of Need: Emergency Powers in the
United States.” Review of Politics, vol. 41, April 1979: 235- 255.
——“ Preparing for the Hour of Need: The National Emergencies Act.”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, Winter 1979: 47- 64.
Miller, Arthur S., “ Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm.”
Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 39, 1978: 736- 751.
Relyea, Harold C., “ Emergency Powers,” in Katy J. Harriger, ed., Separation of
Powers: Documents and Commentary. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003,
pp. 80- 97.
——“ Stretch Points of the Constitution: National Emergency Powers,” in Ralph
S. Pollock, ed., Renewing the Dream: National Archives Bicentennial ‘ 87
Lectures on Contemporary Constitutional Issues. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1986, pp. 75- 91.
Robinson, Donald L., “ The Routinization of Crisis Government.” Yale Review,
vol. 63, Winter 1974: 161- 174.
Roche, John P., “ Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for
Prerogative.” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 5, December 1952: 592-
618.
Rossiter, Clinton L., “ Constitutional Dictatorship in the Atomic Age.” Review of
Politics, vol. 11, October 1949: 395- 418.
Sturm, Albert L., “ Emergencies and the Presidency.” Journal of Politics, vol. 11,
February 1949: 121- 144.
CRS- 21
Books
Corwin, Edward S., Total War and the Constitution. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1947. 162 p.
Janeway, Eliot, The Economics of Crisis: War, Politics, and the Dollar. New
York: Weybright and Talley, 1968. 317 p.
Koenig, Louis W., The Presidency and the Crisis: Powers of the Office from the
Invasion of Poland to Pearl Harbor. New York: King’s Crown Press,
1944. 166 p.
Murphy, Paul L., The Constitution in Crisis Times 1918- 1969. New York: Harper
and Row, 1972. 541 p.
Randall, James G., Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1951. 596 p.
Rankin, Robert S. and Winfred Dallmayr, Freedom and Emergency Powers in the
Cold War. New York: Appleton- Century- Crofts, 1964. 277 p.
Rich, Bennett Milton, The Presidents and Civil Disorder. Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1941. 235 p.
Rockoff, Hugh, Drastic Measures. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1984. 285 p.
Rossiter, Clinton L., Constitutional Dictatorship. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and World, 1963. 322 p.
Smith, J. Malcolm, and Cornelius P. Cotter, Powers of the President During
Crisis. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 175 p.
Documents
U. S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Trading with the
Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of
International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency.
Committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1976. 684 p.
U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations and Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers,
The National Emergencies Act: ( Public Law 94- 412). Source Book:
Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents. Committee print, 94th
Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1976. 360 p.
—— Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United
States, by Harold C. Relyea. Committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.
Washington: GPO, 1974. 140 p.
CRS- 22
—— Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency. Committee
print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1974. 283 p.
—— National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. S. Rept. 94- 922,
94th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1976. 38 p.
—— Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,
Emergency Powers Statutes. S. Rept. 93- 549, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.
Washington: GPO, 1973. 607 p.
—— National Emergency. Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 11, 12, July 24,
and Nov. 28, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. 917 p.
U. S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Executive Authorities.
Washington: Sept. 30, 1992. 131 p.