The Constitution in Crisis: The Downing Street Minutes and Deception,
Manipulation, Torture, Retribution, and Coverups in the Iraq War
Chapter 1. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 2. Chronology: Last Throes of Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 3. Detailed Factual Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Determination to go to War Before Congressional Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Avenging the Father and Working With the Neo- Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2. September 11 and its Aftermath: Beating the Drums for War . . . . . . . . 20
3. The Downing Street Minutes and Documentary Evidence of an Agreement
to go to War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
a. Description and Analysis of Various Downing Street Minutes
Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
b. Confirmation and Corroboration of Downing Street Minutes
Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. Manipulating Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5. Using the United Nations as a Pretext for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B. Misstating and Manipulating the Intelligence to Justify Pre- emptive War . . . . . 53
1. Links to September 11 and al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2. Resumed Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3. Aluminum Tubes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4. Acquisition of Uranium from Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5. Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
C. Encouraging and Countenancing Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1. Documented Instances of Torture and Other Legal Violations . . . . . . . . 97
2. Bush Administration Responsibility for Torture and Other Legal
Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
a. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
b. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency . . 107
D. Cover- ups and Retribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1. The Niger Forgeries and the “ Sliming” of Ambassador Wilson and his
Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
a. Disclosure and Panic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
b. Retribution and Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
c. Delays, Conflicts, and More Lies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2. Other Instances of Bush Administration Retribution Against its Critics
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
a. Former General Eric Shinseki and Others in the Military . . . . . 122
b. Former Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill and Economic Adviser
Lawrence Lindsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
c. Richard Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
d. Cindy Sheehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
e. Jeffrey Kofman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
f. International Organizations– the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons and the IAEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
g. Bunnatine Greenhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
h. The Central Intelligence Agency and its Employees . . . . . . . . . 131
3. Ongoing Lies, Deceptions and Manipulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
E. Thwarting Congress and the American Public: The Death of Accountability under
the Bush Administration and the Republican- Controlled Congress . . . . . . . . . 145
Chapter 4. Legal Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Chapter 5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Endnotes
Exhibits
A. Relevant Law and Standards
B. Analysis of Secretary Powell’s February 5, 2003 Statements Before the United Nations
C. House Government Reform Committee, Minority Report; “ Iraq on the Record”
D. List of Key Documents
Chapter I
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Executive Summary
3
The Constitution in Crisis
Executive Summary
This Minority Report has been produced at the request of Representative John
Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee. He made this
request in the wake of the President= s failure to respond to a letter submitted by 122
Members of Congress and more than 500,000 Americans in July of this year asking him
whether the assertions set forth in the Downing Street Minutes were accurate. Mr.
Conyers asked staff, by year end 2005, to review the available information concerning
possible misconduct by the Bush Administration in the run up to the Iraq War and
post- invasion statements and actions, and to develop legal conclusions and make
legislative and other recommendations to him.
In brief, we have found that there is substantial evidence the President, the
Vice President and other high ranking members of the Bush Administration misled
Congress and the American people regarding the decision to go to war with Iraq;
misstated and manipulated intelligence information regarding the justification for
such war; countenanced torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
other legal violations in Iraq; and permitted inappropriate retaliation against critics of
their Administration.
There is a prima facie case that these actions by the President, Vice- President
and other members of the Bush Administration violated a number of federal laws,
including ( 1) Committing a Fraud against the United States; ( 2) Making False
Statements to Congress; ( 3) The War Powers Resolution; ( 4) Misuse of Government
Funds; ( 5) federal laws and international treaties prohibiting torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment; ( 6) federal laws concerning retaliating against
witnesses and other individuals; and ( 7) federal laws and regulations concerning
leaking and other misuse of intelligence.
While these charges clearly rise to the level of impeachable misconduct,
because the Bush Administration and the Republican- controlled Congress have blocked
the ability of Members to obtain information directly from the Administration
concerning these matters, more investigatory authority is needed before
recommendations can be made regarding specific Articles of Impeachment. As a
result, we recommend that Congress establish a select committee with subpoena
authority to investigate the misconduct of the Bush Administration with regard to the
Iraq war detailed in this Report and report to the Committee on the Judiciary on
possible impeachable offenses.
In addition, we believe the failure of the President, Vice President and others
in the Bush Administration to respond to myriad requests for information concerning
these charges, or to otherwise account for explain a number of specific misstatements
they have made in the run up to War and other actions warrants, at minimum, the
introduction and Congress= approval of Resolutions of Censure against Mr. Bush and
Chapter 1
4
House Democratic Committee Staff
Mr. Cheney. Further, we recommend that Ranking Member Conyers and others
consider referring the potential violations of federal criminal law detailed in this
Report to the Department of Justice for investigation; Congress should pass legislation
to limit government secrecy, enhance oversight of the Executive Branch, request
notification and justification of presidential pardons of Administration officials, ban
abusive treatment of detainees, ban the use of chemical weapons, and ban the
practice of paying foreign media outlets to publish news stories prepared by or for the
Pentagon; and the House should amend its Rules to permit Ranking Members of
Committees to schedule official Committee hearings and call witnesses to investigate
Executive Branch misconduct.
The Report rejects the frequent contention by the Bush Administration that
there pre- war conduct has been reviewed and they have been exonerated. No entity
has ever considered whether the Administration misled Americans about the decision
to go to war. The Senate Intelligence Committee has not yet conducted a review of
pre- war intelligence distortion and manipulation, while the Silberman- Robb report
specifically cautioned that intelligence manipulation Awas not part of our inquiry.@
There has also not been any independent inquiry concerning torture and other legal
violations in Iraq; nor has there been an independent review of the pattern of cover-ups
and political retribution by the Bush Administration against its critics, other than
the very narrow and still ongoing inquiry of Special Counsel Fitzgerald.
While the scope of this Report is largely limited to Iraq, it also holds lessons for
our Nation at a time of entrenched one- party rule and abuse of power in Washington.
If the present Administration is willing to misstate the facts in order to achieve its
political objectives in Iraq, and Congress is unwilling to confront or challenge their
hegemony, many of our cherished democratic principles are in jeopardy. This is true
not only with respect to the Iraq War, but also in regard to other areas of foreign
policy, privacy and civil liberties, and matters of economic and social justice. Indeed
as this Report is being finalized, we have just learned of another potential significant
abuse of executive power by the President, ordering the National Security Agency to
engage in domestic spying and wiretapping without obtaining court approval in
possible violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
It is tragic that our Nation has invaded another sovereign nation because Athe
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy,@ as stated in the Downing
Street Minutes. It is equally tragic that the Bush Administration and the Republican
Congress have been unwilling to examine these facts or take action to prevent this
scenario from occurring again. Since they appear unwilling to act, it is incumbent on
individual Members of Congress as well as the American public to act to protect our
constitutional form of government.
Chapter 4
2
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff
Chapter II
Chronology:
Last Throes of Credibility
Executive Summary
3
The Constitution in Crisis
Chapter 2: Chronology
7
The Constitution in Crisis
Chronology: Last Throes of Credibility
The 2000 Presidential election focused on many issues relating to domestic and
foreign policy. 2 However, the topic of Iraq was virtually unmentioned in the
campaign. In a presidential debate with then- Vice President Al Gore, then-presidential
candidate George W. Bush
emphasized that he would be careful about
using troops for Anation building@ purposes and
that he would not launch a pre- emptive war
because he believed the role of the military
was to Aprevent war from happening in the first
place.@ 3 At the same time, some future
members of the Bush Administration, dubbed
the neoconservatives, were waiting for war
with Iraq. High- ranking officials such as Dick
Cheney, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were
part of this group. 4
In the aftermath of the September 11
attacks, the Bush Administration began to hint
at the coming attack on Iraq. In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address, the
President remarked that countries like Iraq, Iran and North Korea Aconstitute an axis
of evil. . . . These regimes pose a grave and growing danger. . . . I will not wait on
events, while dangers gather.@ 5 On June 1, 2002, during a speech at West Point,
President Bush formally enunciated his doctrine of preemption that would be used
against Iraq. 6 It was also around this time that Vice President Cheney and his Chief of
Staff, Scooter Libby, began making a series of unusual trips to the Central Intelligence
Agency ( CIA) to discuss Iraq intelligence. 7
At the same time, the President= s public statements indicated a reluctance to
use military force in Iraq. He assured the public that he had not made up his mind to
go to war with Iraq and that war was a last resort. 8 However, contrary to these
public statements, the Bush Administration formed the White House Iraq Group
( WHIG) in August 2002 in an apparent effort to bolster public support for war with
Iraq. 9
Shortly thereafter, the Administration began making more alarming and
sensational claims about the danger posed to the United States by Iraq including in a
September 12, 2002 address to the United Nations, and began to press forward
publicly with preparations for war. 10 In the days following the President= s speech to
the United Nations, Iraq delivered a letter to UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan stating
that it would allow the return of UN weapons inspectors Awithout conditions.@ 11 But
ABut I think the level of
activity that we see today,
from a military standpoint, I
think will clearly decline. I
think they're in the last
throes, if you will, of the
insurgency.@
----- May 30, 2005, Vice
President Dick Cheney= s
Remarks on the Iraqi
insurgency, Larry King Live1
Chapter 2
8
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff
on September 18, President Bush discredited Hussein= s offer to let UN inspectors back
into Iraq as Ahis latest ploy.@ 12
As the Congressional vote to authorize force against Iraq approached, the
President and Administration officials raised the specter of a nuclear attack by Iraq. 13
The President subsequently received from Congress on October 11, 2002, a joint
resolution for the use of force in Iraq. 14 Based on the intelligence findings in the
National Intelligence Estimate provided to Congress by the Administration, the
resolution stated that Iraq posed a Acontinuing threat@ to the United States by, among
other things, Aactively seeking a nuclear weapons capability.@ 15
The President= s focus then moved on to the United Nations in an effort to
persuade the UN to approve renewed weapons inspections in Iraq and sanctions for
noncompliance. Once again, the President asserted his
reluctance to take military action. Upon signing the
resolution, the President stated: AI have not ordered the use
of force. I hope the use of force will not become
necessary.@ 16 On November 8, 2002, the United Nations
Security Council adopted UN Resolution 1441, which
stipulated that Iraq was required to readmit UN weapons
inspectors under more stringent terms than required by
previous UN Resolutions. 17
On January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy
Agency ( IAEA) indicated that the Bush Administration= s claim
that aluminum tubes being delivered to Iraq were part of an
Iraqi nuclear weapons program likely was false. 18 In the wake
of this claim being discredited President Bush introduced a
new piece of evidence to the public in his State of the Union
address on January 28, 2003, to demonstrate that Iraq was
developing a nuclear arms program: AThe British government
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa.@ 19
On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell took the Bush
Administration= s case to the United Nations Security Council. In a presentation to the
United Nations, Secretary Powell charged, among other things, that Iraq had Amobile
production facilities@ for biological weapons. 20 With its case to the United Nations
delivered, for the first time and contrary to earlier claims that the Administration was
reluctant to use force, the Administration publicly indicated its readiness and
enthusiasm for going to war. The question was no longer whether force would be
used, but what - if any - difficulties would accompany the use of force. Vice
Pres. Bush, State of the Union,
January 28, 2003: AThe British
government has learned that
Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium
from Africa.”
Chronology
9
The Constitution in Crisis
President Dick Cheney made an appearance on Meet the Press and stated that the war
was not going to be long, costly or bloody because Awe will, in fact, be greeted as
liberators.@ 21
On March 18, 2003, the President submitted a letter to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate informing the
Congress of his determination that diplomatic and peaceful means alone would not
protect the Nation or lead to Iraqi compliance
with United Nations demands22 and on March 20,
the President launched the preemptive invasion.
A little more than a month into the
invasion, President Bush landed aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln and, standing beneath a massive
banner reading " Mission Accomplished,@ he stated,
AMajor combat operations in Iraq have ended.@ 23
Immediately thereafter, it was self- evident that -
despite the premature declaration of victory -
numerous problems persisted with regard to the
occupation. This was not the only post- war
mischaracterization of the truth by the Bush
Administration. Since then, they have been
dogged by misstatements concerning the size and
strength of the insurgency; the preparedness of Iraqi troops; the cost of the war; the
existence of weapons of mass destruction ( WMD); and the war= s impact on terrorism,
among other things. 24
Another significant problem for the Bush Administration was its failure to find
any of the WMD that it had used to justify the invasion. On July 6, 2003, Ambassador
Joseph Wilson, who was sent to Niger at the behest of the CIA to investigate the
uranium claim, wrote in an op- ed piece that the intelligence concerning Niger= s
alleged sale of uranium to Iraq was Atwisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.@ 25 The
following day, the White House issued a rare retraction of the uranium allegations
from the President= s State of the Union Address. 26 Shortly thereafter, the identity of
Wilson= s wife, a covert CIA agent, was revealed in the press through a Robert Novak
column sourced to two officials in the Administration. 27 Later in the year, Colin
Powell also conceded that the information given in his February 5, 2003 speech before
the UN Aappear[ ed] not to be . . . that solid.@ 28 Capping these retractions were the
findings of David Kay, the U. S. official responsible for the WMD search as the head of
Iraq Survey Group, who concluded that Athere were not large stockpiles of newly
produced weapons of mass destruction. We don't find the people, the documents or
the physical plants that you would expect to find if the production was going on.@ 29
AMajor combat operations in Iraq have ended.”
---- President Bush, May 1, 2003
Chapter 2
10
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff
Amid these admissions that the case for war was, generously speaking, faulty,
the Administration and Congressional Republicans sought to pre- empt inquiries into
the White House use or manipulation of intelligence by launching more limited
investigations. On February 6, 2004, President Bush created the Robb- Silberman
Commission, which later found that the intelligence community was Adead wrong in
almost all of its pre- war judgments about Iraq= s weapons of mass destruction.@ 30
However, this Commission was specifically prohibited from examining the use or
manipulation of intelligence by policymakers. 31
On March 16, 2004, the Democratic staff of the U. S. House Committee on Government
Reform submitted a report to Ranking Member Henry A. Waxman. 32 This report,
entitled AIraq on the Record: the Bush Administration= s Public Statements on Iraq,@
details public statements made by senior Bush Administration officials regarding
policy toward Iraq. The report, which is attached as Exhibit C, indicates that Afive
officials made misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public
appearances. The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific
misleading statements by the five officials.” 33
On July 7, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence reported that it had found numerous failures
in the intelligence- gathering and analysis process. 34
However, that review also was explicitly not intended to
look into the Administration= s use of that wrong
intelligence in selling the war. 35 To date, there has never
been a truly independent, comprehensive non- partisan or
bipartisan review of the Administration= s false claims
regarding WMD or any other aspect of the war. 36
On April 28, 2004, 60 Minutes II made public a series
of photos taken at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq
documenting apparent torture and other cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment by U. S. military and other
personnel. 37 Since then, reports of other alleged
violations of international law involving Iraqi prisoners
have been reported by the media and human rights
organizations. 38
As the war continued into 2005, with U. S. casualties approaching 1,500, Iraq
held elections on January 30. The Administration heralded the elections as a symbol
of freedom and as an event which validated the initial invasion. By that point,
however, the reason for attacking Iraq had shifted from an imminent threat of
weapons of mass destruction; to combating terrorism after the September 11,
Abu Ghraib prison detainee abuses.
Chronology
11
The Constitution in Crisis
attacks; to regime change; and eventually to promoting democracy, and to ensure
that those lives lost were not lost in vain. 39
While evidence and accounts of Administration insiders strongly suggested a
predetermination to go to war and a manipulation of intelligence to justify it, that
evidence and those accounts were attacked by Administration officials as inaccurate
or biased. Then, on May 1,
2005, the Sunday London
Times published the first of a
series of important
documents known as the
ADowning Street Minutes.@ 40
The Downing Street Minutes
( DSM) are a collection of
classified documents, written
by senior British officials
during the spring and
summer of 2002, which
recounted meetings and
discussions of such officials
with their American
counterparts. The focus of
these meetings and
discussions was the U. S. plan
to invade Iraq. The DSM
appear to document a pre-determination
to go war with
Iraq on the part of U. S.
officials, and a manipulation of intelligence by such officials in order to justify the
war.
The DSM generated significant media coverage in Great Britain in the lead up to
the British elections, but initially received very little initial media attention in the
United States. However, a concerted effort to call attention to them by Congressman
John Conyers, Jr., and a number of Members of Congress, grassroots groups, and
Internet activists was ultimately successful. On May 5, 2005, Congressman Conyers,
the Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee, along with 87 other Members
of Congress ( eventually 121), wrote to the President demanding answers to the
allegations presented in the Minutes. 41 In his letter, Representative Conyers
questioned the President on whether there Awas there a coordinated effort with the
U. S. intelligence community and/ or British officials to > fix= the intelligence and facts
around the policy.@ 42
Congressman John Conyers leads Members of Congress bringing over 500,000
letters to the White House from citizens demanding the President answer
questions raised by the Downing Street Minutes.
Chapter 2
12
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff
On June 16, 2005, Congressman Conyers and 32 Members of Congress convened
an historic hearing on the Downing Street Minutes, covered by numerous press outlets.
The hearing was forced to a cramped room in the basement of the Capitol since
Democrats were denied ordinary hearing room space by the Republican leadership.
The Republicans tried to disrupt the hearings further by holding 12 consecutive floor
votes during the hearing, an unprecedented number. 43 After the hearing,
Congressman Conyers led a congressional delegation to the White House to personally
deliver a letter signed by over 500,000 citizens, demanding answers from the
President. 44 To date, the White House has declined to respond to these questions that
were posed by these citizens and their elected representatives in Congress.
In the meantime, after some initial false starts, delays, and denials concerning
possible misconduct in the Bush Administration= s Aouting@ of Valerie Plame Wilson, 45
then- Attorney General John Ashcroft recused himself from the investigation due to
conflicts of interest and, on December 30, 2003, U. S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald
was appointed to conduct the investigation of the Plame leak. 46 By July 2005, it
became apparent that Karl Rove, a senior aide to the President, was involved in the
leak; a Time reporter= s notes revealed that he had spoken to Karl Rove about the
case. 47 Then, on July 18, 2005, President Bush conspicuously changed the standard
for White House ethics from stating that he would fire
anyone who leaked the information to only firing someone
if he or she Acommitted a crime.@ 48 With a lack of response
from the Administration or from congressional Republicans,
on July 22, 2005, Congressman Henry Waxman and Senator
Byron Dorgan conducted a joint Democratic hearing on the
ANational Security Consequences of Disclosing the Identity
of a Covert Intelligence Officer.@ 49
Ambassador Wilson was not the only individual facing
apparent retribution from the Bush Administration for
criticizing its conduct. For example, on August 27, 2005,
Bunnatine Greenhouse, the Chief Contracting officer at the
Army Corps of Engineers, was demoted in apparent
retaliation for exposing Pentagon favoritism toward a
Halliburton subsidiary in awarding no- bid contracts in Iraq. 50 As discussed later in this
Report, a long line of individuals were subject to other forms of sanctions and
retribution by the Administration for exposing Administration wrongdoing concerning
Iraq.
On October 28, 2005, Vice Presidential Chief of Staff Scooter Libby resigned
after a federal grand jury indicted him on five charges, totaling a maximum 30- year
sentence, related to the leak probe. 51 Patrick Fitzgerald has yet to indict other
After indicting Scooter Libby,
Special Counsel Peter Fitzgerald
has announced his intention to
continue the investigation and has
empaneled a second grand jury.
Chronology
13
The Constitution in Crisis
individuals but has publicly stated that his investigation would remain open to
consider other matters. 52 On November 1, 2005, after numerous attempts to open an
investigation on the issue, Democrats demanded answers to the Administration= s use
of pre- war intelligence and led the Senate into a rare closed- door session, finally
receiving a promise from the Republican majority to speed up the process. 53
Since that time, numerous additional disclosures have come out calling into
question the Bush Administration= s pre- war veracity concerning WMD intelligence. On
November 6, Senator Levin disclosed a classified Defense Department document
showing that an al Qaeda prisoner, Iba al Shaykh al- Libi had been identified as a
fabricator months before the Bush Administration used his claims to allege that Iraq
had trained al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons. 54 On
November 20, the Los Angeles Times revealed that German intelligence officials had
informed the Administration that the Iraqi defector known as ACurveball@ was not a
reliable source for their mobile biological weapons charges. 55
Today, more than half of all Americans believe the Administration Adeliberately
misled@ the public on the reasons for going to war. 56 The invasion appears to have
increased and emboldened the terrorist movement. 57 As of the date of this report,
United States casualties are 2,138 and the Iraq war costs approximately $ 6 billion a
month and by some estimates the eventual cost could approach a trillion dollars. 58
Chapter III
Detailed Factual Findings
Chapter 3: Detailed Factual Findings
17
The Constitution in Crisis
Determination to go to War before Congressional
Authorization
There are numerous, documented facts now in the public record that indicate
the Bush Administration had made a decision to go to war before it sought
Congressional authorization or informed the American people of that decision.
Our investigation shows that while the roots of this decision existed even before
George W. Bush was first elected president, it became a foregone conclusion in the
aftermath of the September 11 tragedy. Due to the release of the so- called ADowning
Street Minutes@ materials, we are now able to confirm that there were agreements
between the Bush and Blair governments in the spring and summer of 2002 to go to
war in Iraq. Further evidence of that agreement to go to war exists by virtue of the
Bush Administration= s marketing campaign to sell the war to the American people
commencing in the fall of 2002, and the efforts to use the United Nations as a pretext
to go to war later in 2002 and early in 2003.
Even though the Administration had begun planning an invasion of Iraq, the
President and senior Administration officials continued to issue public denials
regarding this effort, including misleading statements made before Congress:
$ September 8, 2002: Vice President Dick Cheney insists that
Afirst of all, no decision's been made yet to launch a
military operation.@ 59
$ September 16, 2002: US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld states " The President hasn't made a decision with
respect to Iraq. Didn't I say that earlier? I thought I said
that." 60
$ September 19, 2002: Secretary of State Colin Powell states,
AOf course, the President has not decided on a military
option . . . nobody wants war as a first resort . . . [ n] obody
is looking for a war if it can be avoided.@ 61
$ October 1, 2002: The President made the first in a series of
statements, AOf course, I haven= t made up my mind we= re
going to war with Iraq.@ 62
$ November 7, 2002: AHopefully, we can do this peacefully C
don= t get me wrong. And if the world were to collectively
come together to do so, and to put pressure on Saddam
Hussein and convince him to disarm, there= s a chance he
Chapter 3
18
House Democratic Committee Staff
may decide to do that. And war is not my first choice, don= t
C it= s my last choice.@ 63
$ December 4, 2002: AThis is our attempt to work with the
world community to create peace. And the best way for
peace is for Mr. Saddam Hussein to disarm. It= s up to him to
make his decision.@ 64
$ December 31, 2002: AYou said we= re headed to war in Iraq
C I don= t know why you say that. I hope we= re not headed
to war in Iraq. I= m the person who gets to decide, not
you.@ 65
$ January 2, 2003: AFirst of all, you know, I= m hopeful we
won= t have to go war, and let= s leave it at that.@ 66
$ March 6, 2003: AI've not made up our mind about military
action.@ 67
$ March 8, 2003: AWe are doing everything we can to avoid
war in Iraq. But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm
peacefully, he will be disarmed by force.@ 68
$ March 17, 2003: AShould Saddam Hussein choose
confrontation, the American people can know that every
measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure
will be taken to win it.@ 69
Avenging the Father and Working with the Neo- Cons
Our investigation has found, in
retrospect, there were indications even before
September 11, 2001 that President Bush and key
members of his Administration were fixated on
the military invasion of Iraq, regardless of the
provocation. A key piece of the puzzle was
revealed in a series of interviews between then-
Governor Bush and writer and long- time family
friend Mickey Herskowitz when, according to
Herskowitz, Mr. Bush stated:
A> One of the keys to being seen as a great
leader is to be seen as a commander- in-chief.
. . . My father had all this political
AFrom the very beginning,
there was a conviction that
Saddam Hussein was a bad
person and that he needed to
go. It was all about finding a
way to do it. That was the
tone of it. The president
saying, > Go find me a way to
do this.=@
----- January 11, 2004, Paul
O= Neill, A60 Minutes@ 70
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capital built up when he drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait and he wasted it.
. . . If I have a chance to invade . . . if I had that much capital, I= m not
going to waste it.=@ 71
According to Mr. Herskowitz, George W. Bush= s beliefs on Iraq were based in part on a
notion ascribed to now- Vice President Dick Cheney: AStart a small war. Pick a
country where there is justification you can jump on, go ahead and invade.@ 72
In addition to Mr. Bush= s apparent belief that a successful military invasion
could cause him to be seen as a great leader, additional possible motivations include
responding to those right- wing critics who blamed his father for not entering Baghdad
during the first Gulf War, 73 and achieving revenge for Saddam Hussein= s reported plot
to assassinate his father. Discussing Saddam Hussein, on September 26, 2002, Bush
declared: AAfter all, this is the guy that tried to kill my dad at one time.@ 74
It is also significant that key members of the Bush Administration were part of
a group of so- called Aneo- conservatives@ or Aneo- cons@ who were dedicated to
removing Saddam Hussein by military force. The notion of toppling
Saddam Hussein and his regime dates as far back as the 1990s, when
it had been a priority of a circle of neo- conservative intellectuals,
led by Richard Perle, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense under
President Reagan, and Paul Wolfowitz, an Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy under President George H. W. Bush. 75 The
neocons did not have the power to effectuate their goals during the
Clinton Administration, but they remained tied to one another and
to Dick Cheney through a number of right- wing think tanks and
institutes, including the Project for the New American Century.
On January 26, 1998, the Project for the New American
Century issued a letter to President Bill Clinton explicitly calling for
Athe removal of Saddam Hussein= s regime from power.@ 76 Foretelling
of subsequent events, the letter calls for the United States to go to
war alone and attack the United Nations, and instructs that the
United States should not be Acrippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the
UN Security Council.@ 77 The letter was signed by 18 individuals; ten of them,
including Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, became members of the current
Bush Administration. Other documentary evidence of the neocon vision for an
invasion is manifested by the December 1, 1997 issue of the Weekly Standard, a
conservative magazine, which was headlined by a bold directive: ASaddam Must Go: A
How- to Guide.@ Two of the articles were written by current Administration officials,
including Paul Wolfowitz. 78
In September 2000, a strategy document commissioned from the Project for a
New American Century by Dick Cheney, argued that A[ t] he United States has for
decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the
Richard Perle: Former
Chair, Defense Policy Board
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House Democratic Committee Staff
unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a
substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime
of Saddam Hussein.@ 79
There is other evidence from within the highest levels of Bush= s cabinet of an
early fixation on invading Iraq. On 60 Minutes, former Bush Treasury Secretary Paul
O= Neill reported that as early as January 30, 2001, members of the Bush
Administration were discussing plans for Saddam Hussein= s removal from power:
AFrom the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad
person and that he needed to go. It was all about finding a way to do it. That was
the tone of it. The president saying, > Go find me a way to do this.=@ 80
This fixation on war with Iraq would seem to explain why, from the very
beginning of the Bush Administration, key officials were consulting with outsiders on
possible replacements for Saddam Hussein and contemplating possible means of
exploiting Iraqi oil fields. For example, in February 2001, White House officials
discussed a memo titled APlan for post- Saddam Iraq,@ which talks about troop
requirements, establishing war crimes tribunals, and divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. 81
During this time, Iraqi- born oil industry consultant Falah Aljibury was asked to
interview would- be replacements for a new US- installed dictator. As Mr. Aljibury
stated, AIt is an invasion, but it will act like a coup. The original plan was to liberate
Iraq from the Saddamists and from the regime, to stabilize the country.@ 82 In March of
2001, a Pentagon document titled, AForeign Suitors For Iraqi Oilfield Contracts@ was
circulated. 83 The document outlines areas of oil exploration and includes a table
listing 30 countries that have interests in Iraq's oil industry. The memorandum also
includes the names of companies that have interests and the oil fields with which
those interests are associated. 84
September 11 and its Aftermath: Beating the Drums for War
It was the September 11 tragedy that gave the President and members of his
Administration the political opportunity to invade Iraq without provocation. It was
also in the immediate aftermath of September
11 that it became clear that the President had
made up his mind to invade. We know this now
for several reasons B we have first- hand evidence
concerning President Bush= s intentions; we have
direct evidence concerning the intent of other
senior members of his Administration; we have
information provided through high- level
Administration sources; and we have
documentary and other evidence concerning
specific actions taken by the United States
“ F*** Saddam. We're
taking him out."
----- March, 2002,
President George W.
Bush, poking his head
into the office of
National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice. 85
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The Constitution in Crisis
military that brought our nation on the verge of war with Iraq before Congressional
authorization was sought.
Donald Rumsfeld began pushing for retaliatory attacks against Iraq almost
immediately after the September 11 attacks. CBS News reported that at 2: 40 p. m. on
September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld stated: A[ I want the] best info fast. Judge
whether good enough hit S. H. [ Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [ Osama
bin Laden].@ 86 Rumsfeld went on to say, A[ g] o massive.
Sweep it all up. Things related and not.@ 87 Spencer
Ackerman and John Judis of The New Republic reported
that, ADeputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz floated
the idea that Iraq, with more than 20 years of inclusion
on the State Department= s terror- sponsor list, be held
immediately accountable.@ 88
The very first evidence regarding President Bush= s
inclination to invade Iraq after the September 11 attacks
occurred the very next day when he instructed National
Security official Richard A. Clarke to go out of his way to
find a link between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist
attacks. Richard Clarke recounts the following in his
book, AAgainst All Enemies:@
[ On September 12th] I left the Video Conferencing Center and there,
wandering alone around the situation room, was the president. He
looked like he wanted something to do. He grabbed a few of us and
closed the door to the conference room. > Look,= he told us, > I know you
have a lot to do and all . . . but I want you, as soon as you can, to go
back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he's
linked in any way.= I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it
showed. ‘ But, Mr. President, al Qaeda did this.’ > I know, I know, but . .
. see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred’. . . .
‘ Look into Iraq, Saddam,= the President said testily and left us. Lisa
Gordon- Hagerty stared after him with her mouth hanging open. 89
This inclination was evidenced to other senior Republicans as well. For
example, Trent Lott observed in an interview on Meet the Press that shortly after
September 11, the President made clear his intention to go after Iraq:
Well, beginning in August that year and into the fall-- in fact, beginning
not too long after 9/ 11-- as we had leadership meetings at breakfast with
the president, he would go around the world and talk about what was
going on, where the threats were, where the dangers were, and even in
private discussions, it was clear to me that he thought Iraq was a
President Bush, September 12, 2001
“ See If Saddam Did This”
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House Democratic Committee Staff
destabilizing force, was a danger and a growing danger, and that we
were going to have to deal with that problem. 90
We have also received confirmation of the Bush Administration= s intention to
invade Iraq after the September 11 attacks from various high- level Administration
sources. For example, General Wesley Clark revealed on Meet the Press that shortly
after the September 11 attacks, the White House was asking people to link Saddam
Hussein with the September 11 attacks. Clark stated:
[ T] here was a concerted effort during the fall of 2001, starting
immediately after 9/ 11 to pin 9/ 11 and the terrorism problem on
Saddam Hussein. . . . Well, it came from the White House . . . it came
from all over. I got a call on 9/ 11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my
home saying, > You got to say this is connected. This is state- sponsored
terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein= I said,
> ButBI= m willing to say it but what= s your evidence?= And I never got any
evidence. 91
On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a 22- page document marked
ATOP SECRET@ that outlined the plan for going to war in Afghanistan as part of a global
campaign against terrorism. As one senior Administration official commented, the
direction to the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq
appeared Aalmost as a footnote.@ 92
“ On September 19 and 20, an advisory group known as the Defense Policy Board
met at the Pentagon B with Secretary Rumsfeld in attendance B and discussed the
importance of ousting Hussein.” 93 According to Administration sources:
They met in Rumsfeld's conference room. After a C. I. A. briefing on the
9/ 11 attacks, Perle introduced two guest speakers. The first was Bernard
Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton, a longtime associate of Cheney's
and Wolfowitz's. Lewis told the meeting that America must respond to
9/ 11 with a show of strength: to do otherwise would be taken in the
Islamic world as a sign of weakness- one it would be bound to exploit. At
the same time, he said, America should support democratic reformers in
the Middle East. " Such as," he said, turning to the second of Perle's guest
speakers, " my friend here, Dr. Chalabi” . . . . At the meeting Chalabi
said that, although there was as yet no evidence linking Iraq to 9/ 11,
failed states such as Saddam's were a breeding ground for terrorists, and
Iraq, he told those at the meeting, possessed W. M. D. During the later
part of the second day, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld listened carefully to the
debate. “ Rumsfeld was getting confirmation of his own instincts . . .”
Perle says. “ He seemed neither surprised nor discomfited by the idea
of taking action against Iraq.” 94
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The Constitution in Crisis
The 9- 11 Commission Report further notes that as early as September 20, 2001,
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, suggested attacking Iraq in
response to the September 11 attacks. In a draft memo, Feith Aexpressed
disappointment at the limited options immediately available in Afghanistan and the
lack of ground options. [ He] suggested instead hitting terrorists outside the Middle
East in the initial offensive, perhaps deliberately selecting a non- al Qaeda target
like Iraq.@ 95 Also, on September 20, it is reported that President Bush told Prime
Minister Blair of the need to respond militarily with Iraq. Blair told Bush he should
not get distracted from the war on terror. As noted above, Bush replied, AI agree with
you Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan,
we must come back to Iraq.@ 96
By late November 2001, the President essentially instructed Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to develop an Iraq war plan, which Rumsfeld began to
implement. In a CBS News 60 Minutes interview about his book, APlan of Attack,@ Bob
Woodward describes their meeting:
President Bush, after a National Security Council
meeting, takes Don Rumsfeld aside, collars him
physically, and takes him into a little cubbyhole
room and closes the door and says, AWhat have you
got in terms of plans for Iraq? What is the status
of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I want
you to keep it secret.@ 97
The evidence of the President= s determination to go
to war continues on through 2002. On January 29, 2002,
President Bush gave his State of the Union address in
which he stated that Iraq was part of an Aaxis of evil@
along with South Korea and Iran. 98 Although
Administration officials sought to temper the meaning of
that reference, the President= s own speech writers have
subsequently made it clear that the President was
intending to target Iraq. As James Mann recounts: ADavid
Frum, then one of Bush= s speech writers, later claimed that the original aim of the
axis- of- evil speech was specifically to target Iraq. Mark Gerson, Bush= s chief speech
writer had asked Frum first to find a justification for war against Iraq, he wrote; later
Iran was added, and finally North Korea as a seemingly casual afterthought. Frum= s
perspective reflected both his inexperience as a speech writer and also the thinking
of neoconservatives within the administration, who were eager for a regime change in
Iraq.@ 99
We have also learned from three sources that beginning as early as February
2002, the Bush Administration took specific concrete steps to deploy military troops
and assets into Iraq. First, in February 2002, Senator Bob Graham told the Council on
President Bush and Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld, “ What Have You Got in Terms
of Plans for Iraq?”
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House Democratic Committee Staff
Foreign Relations that a military commander had said to him: ASenator, we have
stopped fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan. We are moving military and
intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future
war in Iraq.@ 100
Second, it is clear from Bob Woodward= s book, APlan of Attack@ that the
redeployment began in the summer of 2002, well before authorized by Congress:
On July 17, Franks updated Rumsfeld on the preparatory tasks in the
region. He carefully listed the cost of each and the risk to the mission if
they didn= t proceed along the timeline which set completion by
December 1. Total cost: about $ 700 million . . . . Later the president
praised Rumsfeld and Franks for this strategy of moving troops in and
expanding the infrastructure. AIt was, in my judgment,@ Bush said, Aa
very smart recommendation by Don and Tommy to put certain elements
in place that could easily be removed and it could be done so in a way
that was quiet so that we didn= t create a lot of noise and anxiety.” . . .
He carefully added, AThe pre- positioning of forces should not be viewed
as a commitment on my part to use military.@ He acknowledged with a
terse ARight. Yup.@ that the Afghanistan war and war on terrorism
provided the excuse, that it was done covertly, and that it was
expensive . . . By the end of July, Bush had approved some 30
projects that would eventually cost $ 700 million. He discussed it with
Nicholas E. Calio, the head of White House congressional relations.
Congress, which is supposed to control the purse strings, had no real
knowledge or involvement, had not even been notified that the
Pentagon wanted to reprogram money. 101
In his interview on 60 Minutes, Mr. Woodward himself points out this was a basic
violation of the Constitution: ASome people are gonna look at a document called the
Constitution which says that no money will be drawn from the Treasury unless
appropriated by Congress.@ 102 The funds were diverted from appropriation laws
specifically allocated for the war in Afghanistan. 103
Third, Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker received similar confirmation from his
Administration sources of the reallocation of intelligence assets from Afghanistan to
Iraq in preparation for an invasion: AThe Bush Administration took many intelligence
operations that had been aimed at Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the
world and redirected them to the Persian Gulf. Linguists and special operatives were
abruptly reassigned, and several ongoing anti- terrorism intelligence programs were
curtailed.@ 104
Further, beginning in February 2002, senior White House officials were also
confirming to the press that military ouster of Saddam Hussein was inevitable. On
February 13, 2002, Knight Ridder reported that, according to their sources, APresident
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The Constitution in Crisis
Bush has decided to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power and ordered the
CIA, the Pentagon and other agencies to devise a combination of military, diplomatic
and covert steps to achieve that goal, senior U. S. officials said Tuesday.@ 105
White House officials were also telling Seymour Hersh that the decision to go to
war had been made and that a process to support that determination had been
created:
By early March, 2002, a former White House official told me, it was
understood by many in the White House that the President had
decided, in his own mind, to go to war . . . . The Bush Administration
took many intelligence operations that had been aimed at Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups around the world and redirected them to the
Persian Gulf. . . . Chalabi's defector reports were now flowing from the
Pentagon directly to the Vice- President's office, and then on to the
President, with little prior evaluation by intelligence professionals. 106
Also, in March 2002, President Bush reportedly poked his head into the office of
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and said AF*** Saddam. We're taking him
out.@ 107 At the time, Rice was meeting with three U. S. Senators and discussing
options for dealing with Iraq through the United Nations or other peaceful means.
However, a source reported ABush wasn't interested. He waved his hand dismissively .
. . and neatly summed up his Iraq policy in that short phrase. The Senators laughed
uncomfortably; Rice flashed a knowing smile.@ 108
By late March 2002, Vice President Cheney was telling his fellow Republicans
that a decision to invade Iraq had been made:
Dick Cheney dropped by a Senate Republican policy lunch soon after his
10- day tour of the Middle East - the one meant to drum up support for a
U. S. military strike against Iraq. . . . Before he spoke, he said no one
should repeat what he said, and Senators and staff members promptly
put down their pens and pencils. Then he gave them some surprising
news. The question was no longer if the U. S. would attack Iraq, he
said. The only question was when.@ 109
In his book, Bob Woodward describes Cheney as a Apowerful, steamrolling force
obsessed with Saddam and taking him out.@ 110
By July of 2002, Condoleezza Rice was offering further confirmation that
President Bush= s mind was made up regarding a decision to invade Iraq. At this time,
State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard N. Haass held a meeting with
Rice and asked if they should discuss Iraq. Rice said, ADon= t bother. The president
has made a decision.@ 111
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House Democratic Committee Staff
We know that, in early August 2002, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
spoke by telephone and cemented the decision to go to war. A White House official
who read the transcript of their conversation disclosed that war was inevitable by the
end of the call. On August 29, 2002, after three months of war exercises conducted
by the Pentagon, President Bush reportedly approved a document entitled AIraq goals,
objectives and strategy.@ 112 The document cites far- reaching goals and the study
refers to " some unstated objectives" including installing a pro- American government in
Iraq and using it to influence events in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iran. 113
Not only is it clear that a decision had been made to go to war in early 2002, it
has also become apparent that the U. S. was actually engaging in acts of war by May
2002. On April 28, 2002, The New York Times wrote: AThe Bush administration, in
developing a potential approach for toppling President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq, is concentrating its attention on a
major air campaign and ground invasion, with initial
estimates contemplating the use of 70,000 to 250,000
troops. . . . Senior officials now acknowledge that any
offensive would probably be delayed until early next year,
allowing time to create the right military, economic and
diplomatic conditions.@ 114
Bombing activity designed to increase military
pressure on Iraq appears to have commenced by May 2002,
and intensified in August 2002, following a meeting of the
National Security Council. 115 The Sunday London Times
reported that, A[ b] y the end of August [ 2002] the raids had
become a full air offensive.@ 116 As former veteran CIA
intelligence officer Ray McGovern testified:
The step- up in bombing was incredible. In March-
April of 2002, there were hardly any bombs dropped
at all. By the time September came along, several
hundred tons of bombs had been dropped. The
war had really started. 117
On May 27, 2002, a former US Air Force combat veteran Tim Goodrich told the
World Tribunal on Iraq jury in Istanbul, Turkey: AWe were dropping bombs then, and I
saw bombing intensify. All the documents coming out now, the Downing Street Memo
and others, confirm what I had witnessed in Iraq. The war had already begun while
our leaders were telling us that they were going to try all diplomatic options first.@ 118
“ Tommy Franks, the allied commander, has since admitted that this operation was
designed to ‘ degrade’ Iraqi air defenses in the same way as the air attacks that began
the 1991 Gulf war.” 119
By the time of the declared war a
reported total of 21,736 sorties had been
flown over southern Iraq
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The Constitution in Crisis
The United States and Britain initially attempted to justify these raids by
claiming that “ the rise in air attacks was in response to Iraqi attempts to shoot down
allied aircraft.” 120 However, in July 2005, in response to British MP Sir Menzies
Campbell= s request for data, the British Ministry of Defence released figures that
would indicate that the true reason for the raids was to put pressure on the Iraqis. 121
The data shows that in Athe first seven months of 2001 the allies recorded a total of
370 > provocations= by the Iraqis against allied aircraft. But in the seven months
between October 2001 and May 2002 there were just 32.@ 122 The records show that
the allies dropped twice as many bombs on Iraq in the second half of 2002 as they did
in the whole of 2001.123
The Asecret air war@ was also confirmed by Iraq war Lieutenant- General Michael
Moseley, who said that Ain 2002 and early 2003 allied aircraft flew 21,736 sorties,
dropping more than 600 bombs on 391 > carefully selected targets= before the war
officially started.@ 124 Between March and November 2002, coalition forces attacked
Iraqi installations with 253,000 pounds of bombs. In June 2002 specifically, forces
bombed Iraq with 20,800 pounds of munitions; in September 2002, the tonnage
amounted to 109,200 pounds of bombs. 125
The Downing Street Minutes and Documentary Evidence of an
Agreement to go to War
The Downing Street Minutes, which cover a time period from early March 2002
to July 23, 2002, provide the most definitive documentary evidence that the Bush
Administration had not
only made up its mind
to go to war well before
it sought congressional
authorization to do so,
but that it had an
agreement with the
British government to do
so. Collectively, the
documents paint a
picture of US and British
officials eager to
convince the public that
war in Iraq was not a forgone conclusion, even as exacting plans for war were being
laid. This section of the Report includes a description of each of the critical elements
of these documents as they relate to that determination to go to war by the spring
and summer of 2002 and details how the Downing Street Minutes have been confirmed
and corroborated as accurate. ( The Downing Street Minutes also include critical
documentary evidence showing Bush and Blair Administration plans concerning
ABush wanted to remove Saddam, through military
action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and
WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy.@
AIt seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to
take military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided. But the case was thin.@
------ July 23, 2002, The Downing Street Minutes126
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House Democratic Committee Staff
Amarketing@ the war to the public and the United Nations, as well as the manipulation
of intelligence, both of which are discussed later in this Report.)
Description and Analysis of Various Downing Street Minutes Materials
Iraq: Options Paper ( March 8, 2002)
This paper, prepared by the Office of the Overseas and Defense Secretariat, is
the first of four documents written by various British authorities to prepare Prime
Minister Blair for his early April trip to Crawford, Texas. The document includes the
seeds of the upcoming war plan by the US and lays out a plan by which Iraq would
reject a UN ultimatum, paving the way to war.
Besides summarizing various legal and political restraints, the paper warns Blair
that a Alegal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers
advice, none currently exists.@ 126 The document also states, "[ t] he U. S. has lost
confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. The
success of Operation Enduring Freedom [ the military code name for the U. S.- led
invasion of Afghanistan], distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and
unfinished business from 1991 are all factors.@ 127
In this document, we learn of a nascent plan that the rejection of United
Nations weapons inspectors by Iraq would provide the needed justification for war:
A refusal to admit UN inspectors, or their admission and subsequent
likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by the
Security Council could provide the justification for military action.
Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated beofre
[ sic]. . .128
Iraq: Legal Background Paper ( Early March 2002)
This document, the second of four papers prepared to brief Prime Minister Blair
for his upcoming Crawford trip, describes various legal doctrines believed to be at
play with regard to military intervention in Iraq. The most significant aspect of this
document is its revelation that the British government did not agree with the Bush
Administration= s belief that any State can enforce United Nations resolutions. The
Bush Administration ultimately relied on this view to justify preemptive war one year
later.
One analysis of Security Council Resolutions suggests that, while the British
hold the view that Ait is for [ the Security] Council to assess whether any such breach
of those obligations has occurred,@ the United States has Aa rather different view:
they maintain that the assessment of breach is for individual member States. We
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The Constitution in Crisis
are not aware of any other State which supports this view.@ 129 The paper also notes
that Afor the exercise of the right of self- defence there must be more than > a threat.=
There has to be an armed attack actual or imminent.@ 130
David Manning Memo ( March 14, 2002)
This memo was prepared by British national security advisor David Manning
after having dinner with Condoleezza Rice. He observes that Ms. Rice is seen as an
unalloyed advocate of military action against Iraq and again emphasizes how an
ultimatum to Iraq on weapons inspectors could be helpful politically.
David Manning advises Prime Minister Tony Blair that President Bush had yet to
find the answers to the Abig@ questions, such as: how to persuade international
opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified; what value to put
on the exiled Iraqi opposition; how to coordinate a US/ allied military campaign with
internal opposition ( assuming there is any); what happens on the morning after? 131
Manning also wrote, A[ t] he issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in
a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of
the international framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a
legal base. Renwed refused [ sic] by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would
be a powerful argument.@ 132
Manning also attempted to prepare Blair for his upcoming trip to Crawford: AI
think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They
may agree that failure isn= t an option, but this really does not mean that they will
avoid it.@ The memo went on to say: " Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is
undimmed.@ 133
The Meyer Memo ( March 18, 2002)
In this memo from Christopher Meyer, the British Ambassador in Washington, to
David Manning, we first learn that the British had agreed to join the Bush
Administration in backing regime change through military action. The British also
suggest giving Hussein an ultimatum that he would reject as a way of justifying war.
In the memo, the Ambassador describes a lunch he recently had with Paul Wolfowitz,
then US Deputy Secretary of Defense:
On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with
Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to
be clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us
domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could
go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there
had to be a strategy for building support for military action against
Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongnfoot [ sic] Saddam on
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House Democratic Committee Staff
the inspectors and the UN SCRs [ Security Council Resolutions] and the
critical importance of the MEPP [ Middle East Peace Process] as an
integral part of the anti- Saddam strategy. If all this could be
accomplished skilfully, we were fairly confident that a number of
countries would come on board. 134
Meyer goes on to note that AWolfowitz said that it was absurd to deny the link
between terrorism and Saddam.@ 135 Meyer told Wolfowitz that Aif the UK were to join
the US in any operation against Saddam, we would have to be able to take a critical
mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us.@ 136
Mr. Meyer had previously recalled that in the fall of 2001, Blair told Bush he
should not get distracted from the war on terror. As noted above, Bush replied, AI
agree with you Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with
Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.@ 137 This statement of intent by President
Bush with regard to Iraq was made at a private White House dinner between the
leaders on September 20, 2001.
The Ricketts Memo ( March 22, 2002)
Peter Ricketts, the Political Director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote
this memo to the U. K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as the third of four documents
advising the Prime Minister on his trip to Crawford. This memo
is an early indication that at least the British were concerned
that unmanipulated intelligence did not provide a strong case
for Iraq possessing dangerous WMD that could target the United
States.
In the memo, Ricketts expressed relief at the
postponement of the publication of a dossier that detailed the
limited state of Iraq= s weapons program: AMy meeting
yesterday showed that there is more work to do to ensuer [ sic]
that the figures are accurate and consistent with those of the
U. S.@ 138 Ricketts goes on to argue that Aeven the best survey of
Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent
years on the nuclear, missile or CW/ BW [ chemical
weapons/ biological weapons] fronts: the programmes are extremely worrying but
have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.@ 139
Ricketts offered one final piece of advice: AThe truth is that what has
changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD programmes, but our tolerance
of them post- 11 September . . . attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase
scepticism about our case.@ 140
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
Crawford, Texas ( April 6, 2002)
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The Straw Memo ( March 25, 2002)
U. K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote this final of four memos to Tony Blair
before his April trip to Crawford. 141 The memo confirms once again that the Bush
Administration anticipates military action to remove Saddam Hussein and again
advocates the efficacy of delivering a legal ultimatum to Iraq. Straw emphasizes the
need for a legal justification for military action, and the fact that Awe have a long
way to go@ to convince the public that regime change is acceptable. 142
According to Secretary Straw, the legal obstacles are difficult to surmount:
regime change per se is no justification for military action; it could
form part of the method of any strategy, but not a goal. Of course, we
may want credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part of
the strategy by which we have to achieve our ends - that of the
elimination of Iraq's WMD capacity: but the latter has to be the goal. 143
Echoing the advice of Peter Ricketts, Straw notes that A[ o] bjectively, the
threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September.@ 144 Straw cautions
Blair that A[ t] he rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few@ and that, while
the U. S. has Aassumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq= s WMD threat,@
virtually no assessment Ahas satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be
secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be
better.@ 145 Straw also writes to Blair: AI believe that a demand for the unfettered
readmission of weapons inspectors is essential, in terms of public explanation, and in
terms of legal sanction for any subsequent military action.@ 146
The Cabinet Office Paper ( July 21, 2002)
The British Cabinet Office prepared a briefing paper for participants at the
upcoming July 23 meeting from which the Downing Street Minutes would be
generated. The paper reiterates that Prime Minister Blair had already agreed to back
military action to eliminate Saddam Hussein= s regime at the April summit in Crawford,
Texas and again confirms US determination to go to war.
The memo again highlights the need to make an ultimatum for Hussein that he
would reject, and expresses concern about US preparedness for occupying Iraq:
[ I] t is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally
support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US
will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very
difficult to support . . . US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of
British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia . . . [ i] t is just possible that an
ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject
( because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which
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House Democratic Committee Staff
would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international
community . . . [ a] post- war occupation of Iraq could lead to a
protracted and costly nation- building exercise. As already made
clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. 147
The Cabinet Office Paper also provides additional evidence of the concerted
strategy to use the United Nations route as a pretext for war. The Paper confirms the
now accepted notion that the United Nations could be used as an excuse for going to
war, and broaches the idea of using the United Nations to create a legal deadline for
military action. The Paper states, A[ w] e need to set a deadline, leading to an
ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR [ United Nations
Security Council Resolution] for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to
explore with Kofi Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving
this.@ 148 Significantly, the Cabinet Office Paper goes on to conclude that the onus is
on the United States to insure that the preconditions for war are met, writing, the
Bush Administration would need to Acreat[ e] the conditions necessary to justify
government military action . . .@ 149
The Downing Street Minutes ( July 23, 2002)
The July 23, 2002 Downing Street Minutes, the most important and well
publicized of the Downing Street Minutes materials B sometimes described as the
Asmoking gun memo@ B is a document obtained from an undisclosed source that
contains the minutes taken during a meeting among the highest officials in the United
Kingdom government and defense intelligence figures. The
British authorities discuss the build up to the Iraq invasion of
March 2003, and it is clear to those attending that President
Bush intends to remove Saddam Hussein from power by force.
The minutes run through military options and then consider a
political strategy by which an appeal for support would be
positively received by the public. They again suggest that
President Bush issue an ultimatum for Saddam to allow back
United Nations weapons inspectors, and that this tactic would
help to make the use of force legal. Tony Blair is quoted as
saying that under these conditions the British public would
support regime change. 150
Perhaps the most important passage in the July 23
Minutes is a report of a recent visit to Washington by Sir
Richard Dearlove, head of MI- 6 and known in official
terminology as AC@:
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
Prime Minister Blair and Vice- President
Cheney
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The Constitution in Crisis
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the
UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi
regime= s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action. 151
The Minutes also record British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon as saying, Athe
U. S. had already begun > spikes of activity= to put pressure on the regime.@ 152 In
addition, Foreign Secretary Straw articulates his idea for justifying an attack in light
of the fact that Saddam was not threatening to attack his neighbors and his weapons
of mass destruction program was less extensive than those of a number of other
countries: AWe should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in
the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for
the use of force.@ 153
The British realized they needed " help with the legal justification for the use of
force" because, as the British Attorney General pointed out, " the desire for regime
change was not a legal base for military action." 154 Moreover, the Attorney General
stated that of the " three possible legal bases: self- defence, humanitarian
intervention, or [ United Nations Security Council] authorisation," the first two " could
not be the base in this case." 155 In other words, Iraq was not attacking the United
States or the United Kingdom, so the leaders could not claim to be acting in self-defense;
nor was Iraq's leadership in the process of committing genocide, so the
United States and the United Kingdom could not claim to be invading for humanitarian
reasons. This left Security Council authorization as the only conceivable legal
justification for war.
At this point in the meeting Prime Minister Tony Blair weighed in. Responding
to his minister's suggestion about drafting an ultimatum demanding that Saddam let
United Nations inspectors back in the country, Blair acknowledged that such an
ultimatum could be politically critical B but only if the Iraqi leader turned it down:
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime
change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that
was producing the WMD. . . . If the political context were right, people
would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the
military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give
the military plan the space to work156
As if there were any doubt about the intentions of using the United Nations to provoke
war, U. K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw observes, A[ w] e should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard- ball with the UN.@ 157
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House Democratic Committee Staff
Confirmation and Corroboration of Downing Street Minutes Materials
While the Bush Administration has sought to either ignore or diminish the
Downing Street Minutes, they have ultimately proved to be important not only
because they were in documentary form, but also because of their source, a critical
Bush Administration ally. Unlike other disclosures by ex- Administration officials and
others, which the White House has characterized as biased, these disclosures cannot
be dismissed as mere sour grapes. 158
As Cindy Sheehan stated so eloquently at the June 10, 2005 hearing on the
Downing Street Minutes, convened by Representative Conyers: AI am even more
convinced now, that this aggression on Iraq was based on a lie of historic proportions
and was blatantly unnecessary. The so- called Downing Street Memo dated 23 July
2002, only confirms what I already suspected, the leadership of his [ sic] country
rushed us into an illegal invasion of another sovereign country on prefabricated and
cherry- picked intelligence. Iraq was no threat to the United States of America, and
the devastating sanctions and bombing against the Iraqis were working.@ 159
Our research indicates there is little doubt as to the accuracy of the Downing
Street Minutes and related documents. Sources within the Blair and Bush
Administrations have confirmed their accuracy, and we have been able to
independently confirm and corroborate the major precepts of the various documents.
It is telling that when the Downing Street Minutes were first published by the
Sunday London Times, shortly before the 2005 British election, the Blair
Administration chose not to deny their authenticity. Shortly after the Minutes were
released, sources within both the Bush and Blair Administrations confirmed their
accuracy to the press. A former senior US official told Knight Ridder that the Downing
Street Minutes were Aan absolutely accurate description of what transpired.@ 160 Two
senior British officials, who asked not to be further identified because of the
sensitivity of the material, told Newsweek in separate interviews that they had no
reason to question the authenticity of the Downing Street Minutes. 161
In addition, elements of the Downing Street Minutes can be independently
corroborated. Consider the core, specific provisions of the July 23 Downing Street
Minutes from Richard Dearlove, in which he describes his recent discussions with the
Bush Administration:
$ By mid- July 2002, eight months before the war began, President Bush
had decided to Aremove Saddam, through military action.@
This statement that ABush wanted to remove Saddam, through military
action@ has been proven true B on March 20, 2003, the U. S. military invaded
Iraq and follow- up aspects of the Downing Street Minutes bear out that this
decision was made well in advance of the war. In addition to the wealth of
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The Constitution in Crisis
verification in Sections III( A)( 1), ( 2), and ( 4) of this Report, and in particular as
noted in the previous section, we know that in early August 2002, President
Bush and Prime Minister Blair spoke by telephone. It was a short call, about 15
minutes. According to a White House official who has studied the transcript of
the phone call, AThe way it read was that, come what may, Saddam was
going to go; they said they were going forward, they were going to take out
the regime, and they were doing the right thing. Blair did not need any
convincing. There was no > come on Tony, we've got to get you on board.= I
remember reading it then and thinking, O. K., now I know what we're going to
be doing for the next year.@ 162 Before the call, this official says, he had the
impression that the probability of invasion was high, but still below 100
percent. Afterward, he says, Ait was a done deal.@ 163
It is also worth noting that in March 2003, Tony Blair reportedly said,
A[ l] eft to himself, Bush would have gone to war in January. No, not January,
but back in September.@ 164
$ Bush had decided to " justify" the war " by the conjunction of terrorism
and WMD."
This statement is borne out by the entire Amarketing campaign,@ which
fixated on these twin justifications ( see Section III( A)( 4) of this Report). For
example, the Bush Administration formed the White House Iraq Group ( WHIG)
in August 2002 to persuade the public of Saddam= s supposed threat and to
market the war. The Administration waited to introduce the WHIG= s product to
the public until September 2002, because, as White House Chief of Staff
Andrew Card told The New York Times in an unusually candid interview, A[ y] ou
don't introduce new products in August.@ 165
$ Already " the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy."
The statement that Athe intelligence and facts were being fixed around
the policy@ is confirmed by the multi- layered effort by the Administration to
pressure officials within the Administration to find links between Saddam and
September 11 and to manipulate intelligence officials and agencies into
overstating WMD threats ( see Section III( B) of this Report).
$ Many at the top of the administration Ahad no patience@ with Athe UN
route.@
This statement is consistent with the realities of the Bush
Administration= s intentions at the time. For example, Vice President Cheney= s
stated opinion was that there was no need to seek any approval from the UN to
invade. He has stated: AA return of inspectors would provide no assurance
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House Democratic Committee Staff
whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is
great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow
Aback in the box.@ 166 Mr. Cheney, like other administration Ahard- liners,@ was
said to have feared Athe UN route@ not because it might fail but because it
might succeed and thereby prevent a war that they were convinced had to be
fought.@ 167
$ AThere was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath of military
action.@
Unfortunately, this statement has been verified by events following the
war ( see Sections II and III( A)( 3), ( 4) of this Report). Among other things, in an
ironic assessment of the events to follow, Vice President Dick Cheney made an
appearance on Meet the Press and stated that the war was not going to be
long, costly or bloodly because Awe will be greeted as liberators.@ 168 As the war
unfolded, numerous gaps in planning became apparent.
$ The US had already begun Aspikes of activity@ to put pressure on the
regime.
The statement that the US had already begun Aspikes of activity@ to
pressure Iraq has been subsequently confirmed by numerous accounts ( see
Section III( A) of the Report). As reported in the Sunday London Times, in May
2002, with a conditional agreement in place with Britain for war, the US and
UK began to conduct a bombing campaign in Iraq described by British and US
officials as Aspikes of activity@ designed to put pressure on the Iraqi regime. 169
The bombing campaign was initiated a full ten months before the Bush
Administration determined that all diplomatic means had been exhausted and
six months before Congressional authorization for the use of force. 170
$ The British believed A[ w] e should work up a plan for an ultimatum to
Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help
with the legal justification for the use of force.@ 171
The initiative of the British to go back to the UN to force an Aultimatum@
has also been proven true ( see Section III( A)( 5) of this Report). The U. S. and
Britain asked for UN authorization to demand the reintroduction of weapons
inspectors, which they received on November 8, 2002.
Other documents released in conjunction with the Downing Street
Minutes have also been independently corroborated. For example, the Cabinet
Office Paper from July 21, 2002 and the Iraq Options Paper from March 8, 2002
include the following:
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The Constitution in Crisis
$ Blair had already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam
Hussein at a summit in Crawford, Texas in April 2002.
This agreement has been corroborated by numerous sources, including
British newspapers The Guardian172 and The Daily Telegraph. 173
$ US plans assume, at a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and
Diego Garcia.
This plan came to fruition. Akrotiri, the British air base in Cyprus, has
been used extensively since the beginning of the war as a refueling and
resupply base for U. S. and British aircraft and warships. 174 At the start of the
war, the US also used the base in Diego Garcia. 175
$ UK contribution could include deployment of a Division ( i. e. Gulf War-sized
contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases.
Britain did provide a sizable troop contribution, with over 11,000 troops
currently in Iraq. 176
$ An international coalition is necessary to provide military platform
and desirable for political purposes, even though this coalition was made up
of small powers, since the US would probably not receive the support of the
major powers for UN authorization.
The US ended up gathering a number of small powers to form an
Ainternational coalition,@ including, among others, Armenia, Bulgaria, Denmark,
El Salvador, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Mongolia, and Poland. 177
$ ATime will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is
necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also
need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An
information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an
overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the
Islamic World and the wider international community.@ 178
The British Administration engaged in such a marketing campaign, with
the Prime Minister persuading the Parliament and public of the case for war. 179
$ AThe optimal times to start action are in early spring.@
The war began on March 20, 2003, the first day of spring.
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House Democratic Committee Staff
Manipulating Public Opinion
The Bush Administration manipulated public opinion by engaging in what
Andrew Card, President Bush= s Chief of Staff, described as a Amarketing@ plan to
justify the war. 180 In retrospect, it is apparent that this marketing plan was decided
and implemented well before Mr. Card= s admission. The Downing Street Minutes,
written in the spring and summer of 2002, provide valuable insights into the upcoming
marketing of the justifications for war. Not only was the British government well
aware of the planned U. S. marketing campaign, but it too, was planning to engage in
such an effort. Thus, the
Cabinet Officer Paper notes
that ministers are planning to
A[ a] gree to the establishment
of an ad hoc group of
officials under Cabinet Office
Chairmanship to consider the
development of an
information campaign to be
agreed with the U. S.@ 181
In August 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ramped up the rhetoric to a
significant degree, comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler, and deriding those
asking the Bush Administration to substantiate their Weapons of Mass Destruction
claims:
Think of the prelude to World War Two. Think of all the countries that
said, well, we don= t have enough evidence. I mean, Mein Kampf had
been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to do. Maybe he
won= t attack us. Maybe he won= t do this or that. Well, there were
millions of people dead because of the miscalculations. The people
who argued for waiting for more evidence have to ask themselves how
they are going to feel at that point where another event occurs. 182
By August 2002, the Aso- called@ White House Iraq Group ( WHIG) was formed as a
coordinating center to convince the public of the need for the Iraq war. The group
met weekly in the White House Situation Room. Among its participants were Karl
Rove; Karen Hughes; Mary Matalin; James R. Wilkinson; legislative liaison Nicholas E.
Calio; Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Stephen J. Hadley; and Scooter Libby. 183
According to The Washington Post, Athe escalation of nuclear rhetoric a year ago,
including the introduction of the term > mushroom cloud= into the debate,
coincided with the formation of a White House Iraq Group.@ 184 It was reportedly
created to persuade the public, the Congress and allies of the need to invade Iraq. 185
During this time period, there is additional evidence of other Bush
Administration officials seeking to manipulate public opinion to support war. For
AFrom a marketing point of view … you don't
introduce new products in August.@
----- August 2002, White House Chief of Staff
Andrew Card commenting on the formation
of the White House Iraq Group ( WHIG) to
market the war.
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The Constitution in Crisis
example, ABC News reported that officials both inside and outside the government
said the Bush Administration would emphasize the danger of Saddam= s weapons to
gain the legal justification for war from the United Nations and also emphasize the
danger at home to Americans, A> We were not lying,= said one official. > But it was just
a matter of emphasis.=@ 186 Consider also Paul Wolfowitz= s statement regarding why
Iraq= s supposed control over weapons of mass destruction was ultimately used to pitch
the public on the war: A[ F] or bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue,
weapons of mass destruction ( as justification for invading Iraq) because it was the
one reason everyone could agree on.@ 187
Early September was a critical period in the WHIG= s existence. It was on
September 6 that The New York Times reported that Andrew Card explained the
reason for delaying the roll- out of their pro- war campaign:
AFrom a marketing point of view ... you don= t introduce new
products in August.@ 188 It is quite telling that he referred to
their Iraq war initiative as a Aproduct.@ Another senior
Administration official made the following admission when
asked why our nation really went to war: AAs it was, the
administration took what looked like the path of least
resistance in making its public case for the war: WMD and
intelligence links with Al Qaeda. If the public read too much
into those links and thought Saddam had a hand in September
11, so much the better.@ 189
Two days later, on September 8, the Amarketing@
campaign began in earnest. As described in one publication:
The PR campaign intensified Sunday, September 8 . . . in
a choreographed performance worthy of Riverdance,
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Condoleezza Rice and Gen.
Richard Myers said on separate talk shows that the
aluminum tubes, suitable only for centrifuges, proved
Iraq= s pursuit of nuclear weapons.@ 190
Frank Rich describes the flurry of activity on that day:
All the references to nuclear threats were beginning to have their
intended impact. As The Washington Post recounts, the administration's
talk of clandestine centrifuges, nuclear blackmail and mushroom clouds
had a powerful political effect, particularly on Senators who were facing
fall election campaigns. AWhen you hear about nuclear weapons, this is
the national security knock- out punch,@ said Senator Ron Wyden. 191
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card
“ From a marketing point of view..”
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House Democratic Committee Staff
In early October, in advance of a congressional vote to authorize military
action, the WHIG released a Awhite paper.@ The paper is based on the rushed,
confidential CIA intelligence assessment. As Newsweek reported:
The publicly released white paper unequivocally backed up the White
House= s case about the dangers posed by Iraq= s weapons of mass
destruction ( WMD) programs. It stated boldly and without caveats in
the first paragraph that Baghdad Ahas chemical and biological
weapons@ and Aif left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear
weapon during this decade.@ If Iraq obtains sufficient weapons- grade
material from abroad, the white paper further warned, Baghdad
could make a nuclear weapon Awithin a year.@ To support its
conclusions about an Iraqi nuclear program, it prominently cited, among
other factors, Iraq= s Aaggressive attempts@ to purchase high- strength
aluminum tubesCan effort that Miller and her colleague Michael Gordon
had first written about in an influential front- page story for the New
York Times the previous September [ apparently based on a leak from
Scooter Libby]. . . . But . . . the more detailed version of the NIE was
hardly stronger. In fact, it revealed for the first time, in the very
first paragraphCright after the sentence that Aif left unchecked,
[ Iraq] probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade@ Cthe
fact that the State Department= s intelligence arm, the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research ( INR), had an Aalternative view@ of the
matter. 192
The more detailed, classified NIE also included the State and Energy
departments= dissents about the intended use of aluminum tubes. Both agencies had
concluded that the tubes were not suited for use in
centrifuges. Yet the publicly released white paper
mentioned no disagreement on the aluminum tubes issue,
removed qualifiers and added language to distort the
severity of the threat. 193
Communications Director James Wilkinson, who
played a prominent role in the writing of the white paper,
emphasized the importance the group placed on nuclear
threat imagery, no matter how attenuated:
By summer 2002, the White House Iraq Group
assigned Communications Director James R.
Wilkinson to prepare a white paper for public
release, describing the " grave and gathering
danger" of Iraq's allegedly " reconstituted" nuclear
weapons program. Wilkinson gave prominent place
to the claim that Iraq " sought uranium oxide, an
VP Cheney Chief of Staff Scooter Libby,
Member, White House Iraq Group
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The Constitution in Crisis
essential ingredient in the enrichment process, from Africa." That claim,
along with repeated use of the " mushroom cloud" image by top officials
beginning in September, became the emotional heart of the case against
Iraq. The uranium claims had never been significant to career analysts -
- Iraq had plenty already and lacked the means to enrich it. But the
allegations proved irresistible to the White House Iraq Group, which
devised the war's communications strategy and included Libby among
its members. Every layman understood the connection between
uranium and the bomb, participants in the group said in interviews at
the time, and it was the easiest way for the Bush administration to
raise alarms. 194
This characterization of the WHIG and its product, as using a no- holds barred
approach to develop strategy and rhetoric designed to pursue war, is consistent with
what we have learned from other sources. For example, Bush Administration officials
who observed the white paper= s development noted that the WHIG Awanted gripping
images and stories not
available in the hedged and
austere language of
intelligence.@ 195 Even Bush
Administration supporter
David Brooks was forced to
acknowledge Afrom Day
One," the Bush White
House " decided our public
relations is not going to be
honest." 196
The strong
congressional vote on
October 11, was also aided
in large part by the timing B
less than one month before
the mid- term elections.
This favorable timing was
not an accident. Among
other things, it was anticipated as early as the July 23 Downing Street meeting that
war= s timing would be premised on United States elections. According to the British
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, no decisions had been taken, but Athe most likely
timing in U. S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline
beginning 30 days before the U. S. Congressional elections.@ 197 Although the eventual
date slipped because of delays regarding UN approval, it is quite telling that the
British thought that military engagement would commence at such a politically
opportunistic time. Former United States Ambassador Raphael, who was involved in
Iraq policy, acknowledged much of the timing premised on United States elections
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: “ I am reasonably certain that they will gre
us as liberators...”
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42
House Democratic Committee Staff
when he said that the Administration was Anot prepared@ when it invaded Iraq due to
Aclear political pressure, election driven and calendar driven.@ 198
Also, on September 12, 2002, President Bush gave a speech at the United
Nations in which he declared that AIraq has answered a decade of U. N. demands with
a decade of defiance.@ 199 Simultaneous with Bush= s United Nations speech, the Which
House released a report, AA Decade of Deception and Defiance,@ seeking to set forth
evidence that Iraq was violating bans on possessing chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons. 200
Other reports on the manner in which the Bush Administration was planning its
campaign to convince the public and the Congress of the need for war further confirm
the sense that this was more a public relations endeavor than an honest and frank
sharing of information with the American public. For example, in December 2002,
when the President was being briefed on WMD evidence, his basic concern appears to
have been with the public relations value of the information, rather than its actual
efficacy. Bob Woodward reported that when Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin
presented his best evidence of weapons of mass destruction, complete with satellite
photos and flip charts, the President responded by exclaiming ANice try, but that isn= t
gonna sell Joe Public. That isn= t gonna convince Joe Public. . . . This is the best
we= ve got?@ 201
By January, of course, there were fewer and fewer doubts that the decision to
go to war had been made. As noted in Bob Woodward= s APlan of Attack,@ January was
when the Bush White House Awas planning a big rollout of speeches and documents@
to advance the war. 202 By January 12, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell had
become exasperated with the head long push for war. State Department officials
have said that after White House meetings, Secretary Colin Powell would return to his
office on the seventh floor of the State Department, roll his eyes and say, AJeez, what
a fixation about Iraq.@ 203 In this regard, another Administration official added, AI do
believe certain people have grown theological about this. It= s almost a religion B that
it will be the end of our society if we don= t take action now.@ 204
Finally, on January 28, 2003, President Bush gave his State of the Union
Speech, in which he declared the now infamous 16 words: AThe British government
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa.@ 205 Again, in retrospect, this uranium reference appears to have been
part and parcel of the pre- mediated marketing plan launched earlier that summer. It
has been reported that one of the speech writers conceded the phrase= s marketing
impact: AFor a speech writer, uranium was valuable because anyone could see its
connection to an atomic bomb.@ 206
Just as the Bush Administration engaged in a public relations style campaign to
convince the nation to support the war, the record shows it also sought to manipulate
public opinion to convince the American public that the upcoming occupation would
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The Constitution in Crisis
be straight forward and relatively peaceful. Prior to the war, senior members of the
Bush Administration repeatedly downplayed the risks and overstated the ease of the
occupation. For example, rejecting Army Secretary Eric Shinseki's assessment that
the mission would require large numbers of troops for a long duration, Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated: AI am reasonably certain that they will greet
us as liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down. In short, we don't
know what the requirement will be, but we can say with reasonable confidence that
the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark.@ 207
Later, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld echoed these remarks, stating that A[ t] he
idea that it would take several hundred thousand U. S. forces I think is far off the
mark@ 208 Vice President Dick Cheney made an appearance on Meet the Press and
stated that the war would be quick and easy: AI really do believe that we will be
greeted as liberators. I've talked with a lot of Iraqis in the last several months myself.
. . . The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want
to the get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United
States when we come to do that.@ 209
Also in this regard, comprehensive reports written by four ex- CIA analysts and
led by former Deputy Director Richard Kerr found:
Policymakers worried more about making the case for the war;
particularly the claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction,
than planning for the aftermath. . . . In an ironic twist, the policy
community was receptive to technical intelligence ( the weapons
program), where the analysis was wrong, but apparently paid little
attention to intelligence on cultural and political issues ( post- Saddam
Iraq), where the analysis was right.@ 210
The evidence we have identified indicates that the Bush Administration
deliberately chose to downplay real and credible risks regarding the occupation in
order to help make the strongest case for war for the public. Thus, for example, in
January 2003, when President Jacques Chirac= s top advisor, Maurice Gourdault-
Montagne, warned Condoleezza Rice that the war would lead to an increase in
terrorism, the National Secretary Advisor ignored the warnings:
Gourdault- Montagne talked of the unrest that would no doubt erupt
among Iraq= s many ethnic groups, and he warned of increased terror.
Rice pooh- poohed his every objection. AEverything was dismissed,@
says a French diplomat, recalling Rice= s reaction. AThere is terror already
in the world and the rest of the Arab world won= t feel resentment. If it
does, the leaders of the Arab world will support the administration.@ . . .
AEvery good reason not to go to war was irrelevant." It was clear, says
this diplomat, > that the decision to go to war was taken.=@ 211
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As a matter of fact, it has been reported that the National Intelligence Council
specifically warned President Bush in January 2003 that Athe conflict could spark
factional violence and an anti- U. S. insurgency . . . [ o] ne of the reports said the U. S.-
led occupation could > increase popular sympathy for terrorist objectives.=@ 212
State Department officials warned not only about the lack of planning for the
occupation, but also of future human rights abuses in Iraq. On February 7, 2003, one
month before the U. S. invasion, three State Department bureau chiefs prepared a
secret memo for their superior and cited Aserious planning gaps for post- conflict
public security and humanitarian assistance.@ 213 The State Department officials noted
that the military was reluctant Ato take on > policing= roles@ in Iraq after the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein. 214 The three officials also warned that Aa failure to address short-term
public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious
human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military
campaign, and our reputation internationally.@ 215 Again, these risks were ignored by
the Bush Administration= s intent on developing the strongest possible case for war.
The Downing Street Minutes also indicate that the United Kingdom had sought
to warn the Bush Administration of the perils of post- war occupancy. In the spring of
2002, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote,
Awe have a long way to go to convince [ the Bush
Administration] as to . . . whether the
consequence of military action really would be a
compliant law abiding replacement
government.@ 216
There is also considerable evidence
indicating that the Bush Administration went into
armed conflict in Iraq without a real or viable
plan for the occupation. United Kingdom Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw, in writing a memo to
Prime Minister Blair concerning his upcoming
April 2002 trip to Crawford, Texas, expressed
alarm at the Bush Administration= s failure to
consider these issues. He wrote:
We have also to answer the big question B
what will this action achieve? There seems to be a larger hole in this
than on anything. Most of the assessments from the U. S. have assumed
regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq= s [ weapons of mass
destruction] threat. But no one has satisfactorily answered how that
regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty
that the replacement regime will be better. 217
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: “... no one has
satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be
secured, and how there can be any certainty that the
replacement regime will be better.” ( AFP)
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Around the same time, British Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning wrote a
memo to Prime Minister Blair in which, based on Manning= s dinner with Condoleezza
Rice, he continued to express concern regarding the lack of United States preparation
for an Iraq occupation: AFrom what [ Rice] said, Bush has yet to find the answers to
the big questions including what happens on the morning after?@ 218 Later on in the
memo, Manning again raises questions regarding the Bush Administration= s
preparedness for a post- occupation of Iraq noting, AI think there is a real risk that the
Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn= t an
option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it. Will the Sunni majority really
respond to an uprising led by Kurds and Shias? Will Americans really put in enough
ground troops to do the job if the Kurdish/ Shi= ite stratagem fails?@ 219
Perhaps most famously, in the Downing Street Minutes, when AC,@ ( Sir Richard
Dearlove) reported on his recent discussions in Washington, he discerned that the
Bush Administration was not focused on post- occupation issues. Mr. Dearlove noted,
A[ t] here was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military
action.@ 220 While the British at least seemed concerned about the risks of Anation
building,@ their impression was that the Bush Administration was blithely ignoring
these matters. Further, as detailed in the Cabinet Office Paper, A[ a] post- war
occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation- building exercise. As
already made clear, the U. S. military plans are virtually silent on this point.@ 221
Finally, we now know that a classified State Department report, disclosed by
The Los Angeles Times, concluded that it was unlikely that installing a new
government in Iraq would encourage the spread of democracy in the region. The
paper found that in the unlikely event a democracy did take root in Iraq, it would
likely result in an Islamic- controlled government antipathetic to the United States. 222
Using the United Nations as a Pretext for War
The manipulation and
marketing of the Iraq war by
the Bush Administration
extended beyond domestic
opinion to include the United
Nations as well. Our review
indicates that the very
concept of seeking UN
resolutions was merely to
provide an ultimatum that
Iraq would reject. Moreover,
from the time the Bush
Administration committed to
obtaining United Nations
The United States was Aready to discredit
inspections in favor of disarmament.@
---- October 2002 statement by Vice
President Cheney, recounted by Iraq Survey
Group head Hans Blix as a Apretty straight
way . . . of saying that if we did not soon
find the weapons of mass destruction that
the U. S. was convinced Iraq possessed . . . ,
the U. S. would be ready to say that the
inspectors were useless and embark on
disarmament by other means.@ 223
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approval in September 2002, it engaged in a series of actions intended to pursue
military action regardless of the efficacy of the United Nations Security Council
process.
From the very outset, the Bush Administration was antagonistic to any
successes the United Nation inspectors may have achieved. It pursued language that
would most easily have paved the way for war and then sought to discredit the very
inspections process the Security Council had just approved. When the weapons
inspections process appeared to be working and the votes appeared lacking to obtain
a Security Council vote to authorize war, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair met
on January 31, 2003, to discuss alternative scenarios of provoking war. Finally, when
the plan to provoke war failed and the Security Council made clear it would not
authorize military action, the Bush Administration was forced to adopt a contorted
and extreme view of international law in order to justify military intervention.
As early as August 2002, British Foreign Secretary Straw arrived in the
Hamptons to " discreetly explore [ an] ultimatum [ given to Saddam Hussein]" with
Secretary of State Powell. 224 As Bob Woodward notes in his book APlan of Attack,@ Mr.
Straw told the Secretary, " If you are really thinking about war and you want us
Brits to be a player, we cannot be unless you go to the United Nations.@ 225
As we now know, this course of action was set forth in the various Downing
Street Minutes materials described earlier in Section III( A)( 3) of this Report. The
deceptiveness of this course of events has not been lost on other observers. As Mark
Danner of the New York Review of Books has written, these discussions were not
about preserving the peace, or even allowing the inspectors to do the job, but about
finding a legal justification for war:
Though > the UN route= would be styled as an attempt to avoid war, its
essence, as the Downing Street memo makes clear, was a strategy to
make the war possible, partly by making it politically palatable . . .
[ t] hus, the idea of UN inspectors was introduced not as a means to
avoid war, as President Bush repeatedly assured Americans, but as a
means to make war possible. War had been decided on; the problem
under discussion here was how to make, in the prime minister's
words, > the political context . . . right= . . . [ t] he demand that Iraq
accept UN inspectors, especially if refused, could form the political
bridge by which the allies could reach their goal: > regime change=
through > military action.= 226
By September 7, 2002, Woodward detailed a personal visit by Blair to persuade
President Bush to go to the United Nations: AIt was critical domestically for the Prime
Minister to show his own Labour Party, a pacifist party at heart, opposed to war in
principle, that he had gone the UN route. Public opinion in the UK favored trying to
make international institutions work before resorting to force. Going through the UN
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The Constitution in Crisis
would be a large and much- needed plus.@ 227 The President told Blair that he had
decided " to go to the UN" and the Prime Minister, " was relieved." 228 After the session
with Blair, Bush walked into a conference room and told the British officials gathered
there that Ayour man has got cojones.@ 229 This particular conference with Blair would
be known, Bush declared, as " the cojones meeting." 230
Five days later, on September 12, 2002, President Bush announced that the
United States would Awork with the U. N. Security Council for the necessary
resolutions.@ 231 It is notable that the President envisaged more than one resolution.
Almost immediately, however, the Bush Administration began to distant itself from
any suggestion that the reintroduction of weapons inspectors would work B the
purported purpose of the resolutions:
Four days later, on September 16, Annan stood before the
microphones at the U. N. and announced he had received a letter
from Iraqi authorities that said Iraq would allow inspectors access
" without conditions." . . . White House staffers flew into a rage. In
their view Annan was giving Saddam the kind of wiggle room that would
allow him to avert military action. Reportedly, later that night, Powell
and Rice, in a conference call, chewed out Annan for taking matters into
his own hands. . . . [ r] elations between the U. N. leadership and the
White House deteriorated in the following days as word of American
military preparations seeped out . . . Bush's U. N. strategy was
becoming clear: the goal was not to get Saddam to disarm through
peaceful means, but rather to get a U. N. stamp of approval for
American military action as quickly as possible. Indeed, Bush's speech
before the General Assembly was soon seen by the delegates for what it
was: a tell-' em- what- they- want- to- hear spiel even though you don't
believe it. 232
Thereafter, the Bush Administration engaged in an effort to discredit the
weapons inspectors before they were even able to do their work. For example, on
September 19, 2002, Donald Rumsfeld testified before the Senate that " the more
inspectors that are in there, the less likely something's going to happen." 233 The same
day, President Bush threatened that, " if the United Nations Security Council won't
deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will." 234 Richard
Perle attacked Hans Blix by saying Aif it were up to me, on the strength of his previous
record, I wouldn= t have chosen Hans Blix. 235
After this initial round of Asaber- rattling,@ the Administration then pursued an
extreme B and ultimately unsuccessful B resolution that would have allowed an
automatic trigger path to military action. The initial draft of Resolution 1441,
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prepared by the Bush Administration, threatened the use of " all necessary means"
should Iraq fail to comply with strict new inspections. 236 Hans Blix, chief inspector of
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission ( AUNMOVIC@)
remarked: AIt was so remote from reality . . . [ i] t was written by someone who didn't
understand how ( inspections) function.@ 237
Lacking the votes, the Bush Administration was
forced to abandon the idea of an Aautomatic
trigger,@ and by November 8, a revised
resolution was approved. As Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the British ambassador to the UN,
acknowledged: AWe heard loud and clear
during the negotiations about > automaticity=
and > hidden triggers= C the concerns that on a
decision so crucial we should not rush into
military action. . . . Let me be equally clear. .
. . There is no > automaticity= in this Resolution.
If there is a further Iraqi breach of its
disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as
required.@ 238
After this failure, the Bush Administration continued to pursue its strategy of
using the United Nations action to justify military action, dismissing the inspection
process recently approved by the UN. Almost immediately, United States officials
made it clear that the Bush Administration would invade Iraq regardless of the
outcome of the recently authorized weapons inspection process. In late November,
Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board, attended a meeting on global
security with members of the British Parliament. At one point he argued that the
weapons inspection team might be unable to find Saddam's arsenal of banned
weapons because they are so well hidden. According to the London Mirror, he then
states that the US would Aattack Iraq even if UN inspectors fail to find weapons,@
admitting that a " clean bill of health" from UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix
would not halt America's war machine. 239
On December 7, 2002, the Iraqis issued a 12,000- page document, accounting
for the state of Iraq= s weapons programs. The Bush Administration immediately
asserted that the report constituted a " material breach," 240 zeroing in on the charge
that the Iraqi declaration failed to mention the now- discredited theory that Iraq was
attempting to acquire uranium from Niger. 241 Vice President Cheney went so far as to
inform Hans Blix that the purpose of the inspectors was to find WMD, and that war
was coming in any event. Blix recounted that Cheney:
stated the position that inspections, if they do not give results, cannot
go on forever, and said the U. S. was Aready to discredit inspections in
favor of disarmament.@ A pretty straight way, I thought, of saying that
if we did not soon find the weapons of mass destruction that the U. S.
United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix
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was convinced Iraq possessed ( though they did not know where), the
U. S. would be ready to say that the inspectors were useless and
embark on disarmament by other means. 242
By December 2002 and January 2003, it was becoming increasingly apparent
that the Bush Administration was not providing full cooperation with UN inspection
teams. In December, UNMOVIC weapons inspection leader Hans Blix had called on the
United States to share its intelligence information with inspectors. AOf course we
would like to have as much information from any member state as to evidence they
may have on weapons of mass destruction, and, in particular, sites,@ he says. 243
ABecause we are inspectors, we can go to sites. They may be listening to what's going
on and they may have lots of other sources of information. But we can go to the sites
legitimately and legally.@ 244 As observed in The New York Times: AOn one hand,
administration officials are pressing him to work faster and send out more inspectors
to more places to undermine Baghdad's ability to conceal any hidden programs. At the
same time, Washington has been holding back its intelligence, waiting to see what
Iraq will say in its declaration.@ 245
On February 20, 2003, CBS News reported: AUN arms inspectors are privately
complaining about the quality of US intelligence and accusing the United States of
sending them on wild- goose chases. . . . The inspectors have become so frustrated
trying to chase down unspecific or ambiguous US leads that they've begun to express
that anger privately in no uncertain terms. . . . UN sources have told CBS News that
American tips have lead to one dead end after another.@ And whatever intelligence
has been provided, reports CBS, has turned out to be Acircumstantial, outdated or just
plain wrong.@ 246
Moreover, despite repeated assurances of cooperation, the IAEA received no
information on the Niger- uranium claim until the day before Powell= s United Nations
presentation, even though Bush Administration officials had such information for over
a year and provision of information was mandated by U. N. Resolution 1441:
The U. S. Mission in Vienna provided the IAEA with an oral briefing while
Jacques Baute was en route to New York, leaving no printed material
with the nuclear inspectors. As IAEA officials recount, an astonished
Baute told his aides, AThat won= t do. I want the actual documentary
evidence.@ He had to register his complaints through a United Nations
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission ( UNMOVIC) channel
before receiving the documents the day Powell spoke. It was an
incident that would characterize America= s intelligence- sharing with the
IAEA. 247
By late January, the UN was not finding any evidence that Iraq had reinitiated
its nuclear program, which in turn was leading to a furor in the Bush Administration.
Thus on January 27, the UN issued a press release regarding Iraq's response to
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Resolution 1441 and stated that Ait would appear that Iraq had decided in principle to
provide cooperation on substance in order to complete the disarmament task through
inspection.@ 248 Although there were some outstanding issues and questions concerning
chemical and biological weapons, the press release stated that the UN weapons
inspectors had reported that after 60 days of inspections with a total of 139
inspections at 106 locations, they had found Ano evidence that Iraq had revived its
nuclear weapons programme@ and " no prohibited nuclear activities had been
identified" 249
According to Bob Woodward, the accounts of Iraqis cooperating with UN
weapons inspectors by opening up buildings Ainfuriated@ President Bush, who believed,
in Woodward's words, that the Aunanimous international consensus of the November
[ UN] resolution was beginning to fray.@ 250 President Bush told Rice that the Apressure
isn't holding together.@ President Bush also commented about the antiwar protests in
the United States and Europe. 251
These issues arose in the run up to Secretary of State Colin Powell= s February 5,
2003, presentation to the United Nations Security Council. To the Bush
Administration= s chagrin, the presentation did not produce a Asmoking gun@ that would
cause other members of the Council to join in efforts to authorize the use of force.
Indeed, it now appears clear that by this time, the Bush Administration had no
intelligence of its own that could provide hard evidence to support any claim that
Saddam Hussein possessed any WMD threatening the United States.
On February 14, Hans Blix appeared before the Security Council and essentially
contradicted Powell's presentation: AThe trucks that Powell had described as being
used for chemical decontamination, Blix said, could just as easily have been used for
> routine activity.= He contradicted Powell's assertion that the Iraqis knew in advance
when the inspectors would be arriving. Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA weighed in as
well, insisting that, at least on the nuclear front, there was no evidence Saddam had
any viable program. Further, Blix said that Iraq was finally taking steps toward real
cooperation with the inspectors, allowing them to enter Iraqi presidential palaces,
among other previously proscribed sites.@ 252
On February 24, 2003, the Bush Administration opted to propose the long-awaited
Asecond resolution@ authorizing war. 253 Although the resolution was
ultimately withdrawn on March 17, 2003, without a vote B even though President Bush
had assured all concerned that there would be a vote Ano matter what the whip count
is@ 254 B the Bush Administration= s desperate tactics to obtain passage, even to the
point of wiretapping the communications of Security Council Members, belie the true
purpose of the United Nations route.
For example, the Bush Administration engaged in a secret Adirty tricks@
campaign against UN Security Council delegations as part of its struggle to win votes
in favor of the requisite second resolution. A memorandum written by a top official
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The Constitution in Crisis
at the U. S. National Security Agency details an aggressive surveillance operation that
involved the interception of home and office telephone calls and e- mails and was
particularly directed at AUN Security Council Members ( minus US and GBR, of
course).@ 255 The memo was directed at senior NSA officials and advises them that the
agency is Amounting a surge@ aimed at gleaning information not only on how
delegations on the Security Council will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but
also Apolicies,@ Anegotiating positions,@ Aalliances@ and Adependencies@ B the Awhole
gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results
favorable to US goals or to head off surprises.@ 256
The existence of this surveillance operation severely undercut the credibility
and efforts of the Administration to win over undecided delegations. In addition,
diplomats complained about the outright Ahostility@ of U. S. tactics to persuade them
to fall in line, including threats such as receiving the Aunpleasant economic
consequences of standing up to the US.@ 257
Further proof that the Bush Administration used the United Nations as a pretext
for war can be seen in the fact that by March, after it was clear the votes did not
exist for a second resolution, the Administration engaged in furious and frantic efforts
to develop the legal cover to justify military action. 258 Thus, the Bush Administration
began to argue that the invasion would be pursuant to a Security Council
Resolution. 259 In a speech immediately preceding the invasion, President Bush cited
to three previous UN Security Council resolutions that purportedly conferred legal
authorization for force. These were: ( 1) the recent Resolution 1441, which dealt with
the renewed weapons inspections; ( 2) Resolution 678, adopted in 1990, authorizing
force in the Persian Gulf war; and ( 3) Resolution 687, adopted shortly after the war
ended, imposing economic sanctions and calling for the surrender for WMD. 260
The Bush administration= s legal justifications for changing course and action
without a second resolution also lack credibility. With respect to Resolution 1441, the
clear weight of authority signaled that it did not in itself authorize force and that the
Administration would need a second resolution from the Security Council. In fact, the
U. K. Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, expressed this view to Prime Minister Blair
days before the invasion of Iraq. 261 With respect to a violation of Resolution 687,
which would trigger the use of force contemplated in 678, the British authorities cited
in the March 2002 Legal Background Paper included in the Downing Street Minutes
note that the United States is the only country in the world that was claiming that an
explicit authorization from the U. N. to enforce U. N. resolutions by invading Iraq was
not needed: AAs the cease- fire was proclaimed by the Council in 687 ( 1991), it is for
the Council to assess whether any such breach of those obligations has occurred . .
.[ t] he US have a rather different view: they maintain that the assessment of breach is
for individual member States. We are not aware of any other State which supports
this view.@ 262
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