Institute of Transportation Studies
UC Berkeley Transportation
Sustainability Research Center
( University of California, Berkeley)
Year 2007 Paper UCB - ITS - TSRC - RR - 2007 - 3
A Low- Carbon Fuel Standard for
California Part 2: Policy Analysis
This paper is posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California.
http:// repositories. cdlib. org/ its/ tsrc/ UCB- ITS- TSRC- RR- 2007- 3
Copyright  c 2007 by the authors.
A Low- Carbon Fuel Standard for
California Part 2: Policy Analysis
Abstract
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard ( LCFS) can play a major role in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and stimulating improvements in transportation fuel
technologies so that California can meet its climate policy goals. In Part 1
of this study we evaluated the technical feasibility of achieving a 10 percent
reduction in the carbon intensity ( measured in gCO2e/ MJ) of transportation
fuels in California by 2020. We identified six scenarios based on a variety of
different technologies that could meet or exceed this goal, and concluded that the
goal was ambitious but attainable. In Part 2, we examine many of the specific
policy issues needed to achieve this ambitious target. Our recommendations
are based on the best information we were able to gather in the time available,
including consultation with many different stakeholders. The recommendations
are intended to assist the California Air Resources Board, Energy Commission,
and Public Utility Commission, as well as private organizations and individuals,
in addressing the many complex issues involved in designing a low carbon fuel
standard. Choices about specific policies and calculation of numeric values for
use in regulation must, of course, be made by these regulatory agencies. The
analysis we present here is only illustrative.
A Low- Carbon Fuel Standard for California
Part 2: Policy Analysis
Project Directors: Alexander E. Farrell, UC Berkeley and Daniel
Sperling, UC Davis
Contributors: A. R. Brandt, A. Eggert, A. E. Farrell, B. K. Haya, J.
Hughes, B. M. Jenkins, A. D. Jones, D. M. Kammen, C. R. Knittel, M. W.
Melaina, M. O'Hare, R. J. Plevin, D. Sperling
RESEARCH REPORT
UCB- ITS- TSRC- RR- 2007- 3
August 1, 2007
The Transportation Sustainability Research Center fosters research,
education, and outreach so that transportation can serve to improve
economic growth, environmental quality and equity. It is housed at
the UC Berkeley Institute of Transportation Studies.
http:// www. its. berkeley. edu/ sustainabilitycenter/
A Low- Carbon Fuel Standard for California
Part 2: Policy Analysis
August 1, 2007
Project Directors
Alexander E. Farrell, UC Berkeley
Daniel Sperling, UC Davis
Contributors
A. R. Brandt, A. Eggert, A. E. Farrell, B. K. Haya, J. Hughes, B. M. Jenkins, A. D. Jones,
D. M. Kammen, C. R. Knittel, M. W. Melaina, M. O’Hare, R. J. Plevin, D. Sperling
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page ii
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A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures.................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. v
Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 1
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 8
1.1 Context ............................................................................................................... 9
1.2 Structure of the report......................................................................................... 9
2 Background ................................................................................................................ 12
2.1 Similar initiatives in the US and UK................................................................ 12
2.2 Challenges of innovative policy ....................................................................... 16
2.3 Market failures and barriers as a basis for policy design.................................. 19
2.4 Competition among fuels.................................................................................. 25
3 Program Design.......................................................................................................... 28
3.1 Scope of the standard........................................................................................ 28
3.2 Diesel fuel......................................................................................................... 30
3.3 Baselines & targets ........................................................................................... 34
3.4 Point of regulation ............................................................................................ 39
3.5 Upstream emissions.......................................................................................... 44
3.6 A default and opt in system for the carbon intensity of fuels ........................... 47
3.7 Trading and banking of credits......................................................................... 53
3.8 Compliance and penalties................................................................................. 55
3.9 Certification/ auditing processes........................................................................ 57
4 Measurement and certification ................................................................................... 60
4.1 Drivetrain efficiency adjustment factors .......................................................... 60
4.2 Offsets and opt- ins............................................................................................ 61
4.3 Carbon capture and storage .............................................................................. 62
4.4 Dealing with uncertainty in life cycle analyses ................................................ 64
4.5 Land use change ............................................................................................... 65
5 Related Issues............................................................................................................. 68
5.1 Interactions with AB1493 ( Pavley) GHG standards for vehicles..................... 68
5.2 Interactions with AB32 regulations.................................................................. 69
5.3 Interactions with other policy instruments and initiatives ................................ 70
5.4 Innovation credits ............................................................................................. 71
5.5 Environmental justice and sustainability issues ............................................... 74
5.6 Regulatory capacity needed by the state........................................................... 75
5.7 Program review................................................................................................. 76
5.8 Cost analysis..................................................................................................... 77
5.9 Research needs ................................................................................................. 79
6 References .................................................................................................................. 82
Appendix A: Structure of the California Oil, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries ..... 88
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page iv
List of Figures
Figure 2- 1: The eight modules used in the RTFO carbon calculation.......................................... 14
Figure 2- 2: The RD3 innovation pipeline: research, development, demonstration and deployment
( adapted from PCAST, 1999) ....................................................................................................... 17
Figure 3- 1: Illustrative compliance paths for the LCFS ............................................................... 38
Figure 3- 2: Illustrative example of the default and opt in system ................................................ 49
Figure 5- 1: Carbon reduction credits and technology innovation credits as a function of carbon
reductions relative to gasoline and fuel carbon intensity.............................................................. 72
List of Tables
Table 2- 1: Selected non- technical factors that will influence the competition among fuels ........ 26
Table 3- 1: Principal California transportation fuels and uses....................................................... 28
Table 3- 2: Illustrative LCFS compliance schedules ..................................................................... 38
Table 3- 3: Hierarchy of Biofuel Default Values from the UK RTFO. ( E4Tech 2007)................ 50
Table 3- 4: Selected estimates of GHG emissions costs................................................................ 57
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page v
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Energy Foundation. The authors would like to thank the
staffs of the California Air Resources Board, California Energy Commission, California Public
Utility Commission, and representatives of the many stakeholder organizations who participated
in the study. The view and opinions herein, as well as any remaining errors, are those of the
authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the sponsor or any other organization
or person.
© Copyright Regents of the University of California
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 1
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A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 2
Executive Summary
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard ( LCFS) can play a major role in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and stimulating improvements in transportation fuel technologies so that California
can meet its climate policy goals. In Part 1 of this study we evaluated the technical feasibility of
achieving a 10 percent reduction in the carbon intensity ( measured in gCO2e/ MJ) of
transportation fuels in California by 2020. We identified six scenarios based on a variety of
different technologies that could meet or exceed this goal, and concluded that the goal was
ambitious but attainable. In Part 2, we examine many of the specific policy issues needed to
achieve this ambitious target. Our recommendations are based on the best information we were
able to gather in the time available, including consultation with many different stakeholders. The
recommendations are intended to assist the California Air Resources Board, Energy
Commission, and Public Utility Commission, as well as private organizations and individuals, in
addressing the many complex issues involved in designing a low carbon fuel standard. Choices
about specific policies and calculation of numeric values for use in regulation must, of course, be
made by these regulatory agencies. The analysis we present here is only illustrative.
The need to significantly reduce greenhouse gas ( GHG) emissions from the transportation sector
opens up the possibility that new fuels and new vehicles may become economical and widely
used. The introduction of new transportation fuels that do not require petroleum will have a co-benefit:
reduced oil imports to the state and the nation. It is important to note that these new fuels
will compete on a very uneven playing field: the size, organization, and regulation of these
industries are radically different. It is unreasonable to think that these differences will be
eliminated by the LCFS. The LCFS should be designed to reduce the barriers and disincentives
facing energy companies that might offer low carbon fuels to consumers.
Technological innovation is crucial to the success of the LCFS and to the achievement of
California’s climate change goals. At the same time, imposing a new regulatory requirement will
cause markets to shift ( or rationalize) their existing production and sales so that improvements
appear on paper to have been made, when in reality no significant change has occurred.
Obviously, this rationalization does not represent the type of innovation needed to support the
state’s climate change goals. Implementation of the LCFS must recognize and manage both of
these effects, rewarding innovation while also minimizing unproductive “ rationalization.” For
this reason, we suggest that the LCFS require modest reductions in carbon intensity in the early
years, and steeper reductions later as innovations and new investments bring more low carbon
transportation fuels to market.
The LCFS should not be seen as a singular policy. It can provide complementary incentives to an
economy- wide GHG emission cap, should the state choose to impose one. Implementing the
LCFS requirement with a provision for trading and banking of credits will tend to keep costs
low. And the LCFS should also be coordinated with other climate change policies. In addition,
the LCFS may have implications for broader issues, such as environmental justice and
sustainability, and should be implemented with these issues in mind. Considerable increases in
the administrative capability of the regulating agencies will be needed in order to successfully
implement the LCFS, and this capability should be assisted by continued research support.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 3
One of the most challenging issues in the implementation of the LCFS is the climatic effect of
land use change due to expansion of biofuel production. Because food and energy markets are
global, all agricultural production contributes to the pressure to clear new land for crops. Recent
scientific investigations suggest that enormous amounts of greenhouse gases can be released
when lands are converted to more intensive cultivation ( and also cause other adverse effects such
as reduced biodiversity and changed water flows). These land use effects have been largely
ignored in earlier lifecycle greenhouse gas assessments of biofuels. If biofuels are to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions relative to fossil- based gasoline and diesel, then biofuels must: i) use
advanced production methods ( some of which are available now), ii) be derived from feedstocks
grown on degraded land, or iii) be produced from wastes or residues. Land use change effects
should be included in the LCFS, though cautiously at first, with the understanding that further
research may change our understanding of this issue and therefore how it should be regulated.
The LCFS provides a durable framework for reducing the large amount of greenhouse gases,
especially CO2, that are emitted from today’s petroleum- based transport fuel system. It will
facilitate the introduction of low- carbon fuels and restrain the trend toward investments in more
carbon intense transport fuels. These unconventional resources, including heavy oil, tar sands, oil
shale and coal, have higher, sometimes much higher, carbon emissions than fuels made from
conventional petroleum. The LCFS is a response to this recarbonization of transportation fuels,
as well as the many market failures blocking innovation and investments in low- carbon
alternatives to petroleum.
We have the following specific recommendations:
R1: Scope of the standard
For liquid fuels, the LCFS should apply to all gasoline and diesel used in California for use in
transportation, including freight and off- road applications. The LCFS should also allow
providers of non- liquid fuels ( electricity, natural gas, propane, and hydrogen) sold in California
for use in transportation to participate in the LCFS or have the associated emissions covered by
another regulatory program. If the number of non- liquid- fueled vehicles grows in the future,
mandatory participation in the LCFS may need to be considered.
R2: Diesel fuel
Differences in the drive train efficiencies of diesel and gasoline engines should be accounted for
and heavy and light duty diesel fuels should be treated differently to prevent the possibility that
unrelated increases in diesel consumption could lead to compliance without achieving the goals
of the LCFS.
R3: Baseline & targets
The baseline year should be the most recent year for which data are available before the LCFS
was announced. A uniform state- wide baseline should be applied to all regulated entities. We
recommend a compliance path that does not require significant near- term carbon intensity
reductions, in order to allow technologies to develop. If implemented through a decline in carbon
intensity, the ARB must evaluate the amount of shifting of production and sales
(“ rationalization”) that may occur. If implemented through a technology standard in the early
years, the ARB must evaluate what is an advanced biofuel and what is not. If rationalization can
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 4
account for a large fraction of the 2020 goal, the target may need to be made more stringent to
ensure the goals of the LCFS are met.
R4: Point of regulation
The LCFS regulation should be imposed upon entities that produce or import transportation fuel
for use in California. For liquid fuels, these are refiners, blenders and importers, and the point of
regulation should be the point at which finished gasoline or diesel is first manufactured or
imported. For electricity and gaseous fuel providers that choose to participate in the LCFS, the
regulated entities should be distributors of the fuel and the point of regulation should be the
supply of electricity or fuel to the vehicle.
R5: Upstream emissions
GHG emissions from the production of fuels should be included in the LCFS.
R6: A default and opt in system for the carbon intensity of fuels
To the degree possible, values used to certify the carbon intensity ( i. e., GWI) of different fuels
should be based upon empirical data representative of the specific inputs and processes in each
fuel’s life cycle. Pessimistic default values should be determined by state agencies for each of
these inputs and processes. Fuel providers will face the option of either adopting these
pessimistic values ( with GWI values higher than average values) or opting in by providing
sufficient data to certify a lower life cycle GWI value for a particular fuel.
R7: Trading and banking of credits
The ability of regulated firms to trade and bank credits is critical to the cost- effectiveness of the
LCFS. There should be no limit on the ability of any legal entity to trade or bank ( hold) LCFS
credits. Compliance using banked LCFS credits is allowed with no discount or other adjustment.
Borrowing should not be allowed.
R8: Compliance and penalties
Obligated parties should have the option to comply with the LCFS by paying a fee, which is
different from paying a fine for non- compliance. We discuss different approaches to setting the
fee level. In addition, high penalties should be imposed for willfully misreporting data or other
fraudulent acts.
R9: Certification/ auditing processes
Methods and protocols need to be established to verify that claimed credits are accurate. We
recommend that third party auditors be used, financed through fees paid by those companies
claiming credits beyond the default values.
R10: Drivetrain efficiency adjustment factors
The carbon intensity metric for the LCFS should take into account the inherent efficiency
differences with which different fuels are converted into motive power. The efficiency
adjustment factors associated with different fuels should ideally reflect actual vehicles on the
road, and be based upon empirical data. We discuss different approaches to developing and
measuring these drivetrain efficiency adjustment factors.
R11: Offsets and opt- ins
Offsets generated from within the transportation sector, such as “ opt- in” reductions from marine
or aviation transport, should be available as credits within the LCFS. Offsets from outside the
transportation sector should not be allowed, at least in the initial years of the LCFS.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 5
R12: Carbon capture and storage
If carbon capture and storage ( CCS) technologies that are safe and adequately monitored are
developed, CCS projects directly related to the supply of transportation energy should be
included within the LCFS. However, CCS activities outside of the transportation sector should
not count toward LCFS targets.
R13: Dealing with uncertainty in life cycle analysis
Life cycle analysis methods are an appropriate quantitative framework for the LCFS. Existing
data are of sufficient quality to use life cycle methods in LCFS implementation, but a program to
improve these methods should be implemented as well.
R14: Land use change
Develop a non- zero estimate of the global warming impact of direct and indirect land use change
for crop- based biofuels, and use this value for the first several years of the LCFS
implementation. Participate in the development of an internationally accepted methodology for
accounting for land use change, and adopt this methodology following an appropriate review.
R15: Interactions with AB1493 ( Pavley) GHG standards for vehicles
Keep LCFS and AB1493 separate initially but consider integration at a later date.
R16: Interactions with AB32 regulations
The design of both the LCFS and AB32 polices must be coordinated and it is not possible to
specify one without the other. However, it is clear that if the AB32 program includes a hard cap,
the intensity- based LCFS must be separate or the cap will be meaningless. Including the
transport sector in both the AB32 regulatory program and LCFS will provide complementary
incentives and is feasible.
R17: Interactions with other policy instruments and initiatives
The LCFS will likely interact with many other government policies and initiatives, but a
complete search for such interactions was not feasible here. More research is needed.
R18: Innovation credits
Assigning additional credits for more innovative low carbon fuels should be considered.
R19: Environmental justice and sustainability issues
Fuel providers should be required to report on the sustainability impacts of their fuels, especially
those related to biofuels. The state should perform a periodic assessment of the impacts of the
LCFS, in California, the US and globally, and should consider policies and sustainability metrics
to mitigate these effects as we learn about them. Biofuels produced on protected lands should be
excluded from the LCFS. The ARB should conduct more research on sustainability impacts,
paying close attention to international efforts. At the start of LCFS implementation, we
recommend against regulatory requirements beyond the reporting and land exclusion provisions.
At the mid- course review, the effectiveness of the reporting requirements should be evaluated
and the adoption of additional sustainability metrics should be considered.
R20: Program review
Conduct a 5 year review, beginning in 2013, of data, methods, fuel production technologies, and
advanced vehicle technologies. The intent is not to review the intensity targets, unless climate
science has so radically changed that we are much more confident than today that either greater
or lesser reductions are required.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 6
R21: Cost analysis
The ARB should conduct a cost analysis of the LCFS following the cost- effectiveness approach
used in evaluating the U. S. Clean Air Act. This analysis should acknowledge uncertainties due to
proprietary information and innovation in low- carbon energy technologies. It should also include
a discussion of non- climate related costs and benefits.
R22: Research needs
A great deal of research is needed to successfully implement the LCFS. Key areas include better
characterization of the global warming impacts of different fuels, tools to allow regulators and
obligated parties to assess different fuel production pathways, uncertainties in these values, the
role of land use, environmental justice and sustainability goals, and the GHG implications of the
vehicle lifecycle.
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1 Introduction
This report examines the implementation of a Low Carbon Fuel Standard ( LCFS) for California.
This program will reduce the global warming effect of vehicle fuels used in the state over the
decade beginning in 2010 and will begin the process of technological innovation to help stabilize
the climate system ( in conjunction with other policies). In Part 1 of this study, which examined a
wide range of vehicle fuel options, we found a 10 percent reduction in the carbon intensity of
transportation fuels by 2020 to be ambitious but attainable.
In this Part 2 report, we examine the design of the LCFS and recommend actions to implement it.
These suggestions and recommendations will be taken into consideration by the California Air
Resources Board, California Public Utilities Commission, and California Energy Commission in
their rulemaking processes.
Under the LCFS, fuel providers would be required to track the life cycle global warming
intensity ( GWI) of their products, measured on a per- unit- energy basis, and reduce this value
over time. The term life cycle refers to all activities included in the production, transport, storage
and use of the fuel. A more complete analysis would also include energy embodied in the
materials used in all these activities through their own production, such as batteries in electric
vehicles, tractors used for cultivating the biofuel crops, and oil refinery equipment. In practice,
taking the analysis to this more complete accounting would be very difficult, and in most cases it
probably would not substantially change the relative emissions ratings of the different fuel
paths. 1 Future improvements in methods used for the LCFS might include a more complete
materials analysis, but for now a more limited approach is adequate.
The term global warming intensity is a measure of all of the mechanisms that affect global
climate, including not only greenhouse gases ( GHGs) but also other processes. For instance,
conversion of land use to produce biomass feedstocks can change albedo and evapotranspiration,
both potentially important effects on climate change ( Gibbard, 2005; Marland, 2003). However,
it is not clear at this time how to measure these effects in the context of the LCFS and their
inclusion may need to be left to the future. Land use change effects are likely to increase the
GWI of some biofuels, but not biofuels made from wastes or residues. Thus, uncertainty in future
GHG emission estimates from biofuel production due to land use change apply to current
biofuels that are made from feedstocks grown on fertile soil and possibly biofuels made from
feedstocks grown on degraded land.
The unit of measure for GWI used in this study is grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per
megajoule used to propel a vehicle ( gCO2e/ MJ). It is calculated by adjusting the gCO2e/ MJ of
fuel entering the vehicle for inherent differences in the in- use energy efficiency of different fuels
( e. g., diesel, electricity and hydrogen) ( see Part 1 section 2.3). For convenience, the term carbon
intensity is used to refer to the total life cycle GWI per unit of fuel energy delivered to do useful
work at the wheel of a vehicle. The goal of the LCFS is to reduce the average fuel carbon
1 Possible exceptions include vehicles that use fuel cells or large storage batteries, which may have significantly
different energy and material requirements in their production or disposal. Evaluating these effects and what the
correct role ( if any) in regulating them is an important research task.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 9
intensity ( AFCI) for all transportation fuels used in the state of California, measured in units of
( adjusted) gCO2e/ MJ.
The findings and recommendations contained in this report are the result of extensive
consultation with representatives of oil companies, electric and natural gas utilities, biofuel
companies, environmental groups, CARB, and CEC, as well as with others from the PUC and
car companies. This report benefited from that extensive input, but it is a policy analysis and not
a political weighing of interests and values. Our recommendations are directed at the public
interest, broadly conceived, and is designed to inform and facilitate an administrative/ political
decision process to follow. In the end, though, the findings and recommendations, as well as any
errors, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the sponsor,
CARB, CEC, or any other organization or person.
1.1 Context
The larger context of the climate policy into which the LCFS is set is described in the
Introduction to Part 1 of this study. The goals of California climate policy are to:
1. Encourage investment and improvement in current and near- term technologies that will
help meet the 2020 target,
2. Stimulate innovation and development of new technologies that can dramatically lower
GHG emissions at low costs and can start to be deployed by 2020 or soon thereafter,
creating the conditions for meeting the later 2050 goal,
3. Contribute to attainment of related objectives as much as possible, including economic
growth, air quality, other environmental protection goals, affordable energy prices,
environmental justice, and diverse and reliable energy sources.
Accomplishing these three goals will help slow and eventually arrest global warming caused by
increasing levels of GHGs in the earth’s atmosphere, both by reducing the emission of these
gases in California and by setting an example for other jurisdictions – state, national, and
international – to consider.
A wide range of policies for addressing climate change have been identified ( Alic 1999), and
significant work has been done to articulate policy options specific to the transportation sector
( Bandivadekar and Heywood 2004, Greene et al. 2005). Three fundamental strategies may be
pursued to reduce GHG emissions in the transportation sector: improve vehicle technologies,
reduce GHGs associated with fuels, and reduce vehicle travel.
This report and this LCFS policy both are targeted at fuels. All three strategies will likely be
necessary to achieve transportation’s share of the state’s 2020 statutory GHG emission targets ( to
reduce economy- wide emissions back to 1990 levels by 2020), and all three will definitely be
necessary to achieve the goal of 80 percent reduction by 2050.
1.2 Structure of the report
This report has six sections, including this introduction. Section two provides background on
policy issues and relevant experiences elsewhere. Section three describes the main program
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 10
design elements necessary to implement the LCFS. Section four addresses measurement and
certification issues, and section five addresses a number of important related policy questions.
Recommendations are highlighted in each of these sections. References make up the final
section. An appendix that elaborates on the structure of several key industries is also included.
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2 Background
2.1 Similar initiatives in the US and UK
Other jurisdictions, notably in Europe, are beginning to provide examples of how the carbon
intensity of fuels can be regulated. California can learn and expand upon these other efforts.
Indeed, the proposed design of California’s LCFS discussed below borrows from efforts
elsewhere, especially in the United Kingdom. And the recommended LCFS design for California
is premised on being consistent and eventually integrated with initiatives elsewhere. Below, we
examine a renewable fuel program being implemented in the United Kingdom that includes
GHG emission tracking beginning in this year, and rules recently finalized by the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA) to implement the Renewable Fuel Standard ( RFS).
2.1.1 UK Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation
The UK Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation Programme2 ( RTFO) requires fossil transport
fuel suppliers, as of April 2008, to ensure that biofuels constitute 2.5% of total road transport
fuels in 2008- 09, 3.75% in 2009- 10, and 5% in 2010- 11 and beyond ( Department for Transport
2006). Draft RTFO legislation was released in February 2007 for a consultation period lasting
into May. The RTFO is expected to enter into force in April 2008. The RTFO was developed in
cooperation with a large number of stakeholders through the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership
and represents a practical approach to managing the carbon intensity of vehicle fuels. 3
The main objective of the RTFO is to reduce GHG emissions from the transport sector, while
avoiding unintended negative impacts associated with biofuels, including environmental and
social effects often called “ sustainability impacts” ( Department for Transport 2006). To meet
these goals, the RTFO includes reporting requirements and methodologies for calculating life
cycle GHG emissions as well as social and environmental sustainability aspects of individual
biofuel pathways. The GHG and sustainability metrics will not initially be used in the
calculations of compliance credits, however. The reporting requirement allows the regulators to
determine the feasibility, accuracy, and efficiency of such reporting and to provide industry
with some experience prior to linking these metrics to the incentive structure. We recommend a
similar reporting requirement for the California LCFS in section 3.5.
According to the Consultation on the Draft RTFO Order ( similar to a Regulatory Impact
Analysis), “ The [ UK] Government is committed to promoting the use of only the most
sustainable biofuels with a low carbon intensity towards meeting the RTFO. The Government
is keen to move as soon as possible to a system under which only those biofuels which can be
proved to come from sustainable sources are eligible for renewable transport fuel certificates
under the RTFO, and under which different biofuels are rewarded according to the level of
carbon savings that they offer” ( Department for Transport 2006).
2 The official website for the RTFO is http:// www. dft. gov. uk/ roads/ RTFO
3 See http:// www. lowcvp. org. uk/
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 13
Another important consideration— especially in the UK, which imports most of its biofuels— is
the legality under international trade rules of banning certain biofuels or feedstocks. Bans that
are strictly aligned with policy objectives, e. g., the reduction of GHG emissions, are considered
more likely to survive challenges in the World Trade Organization ( WTO). According to the
consultants developing the carbon reporting standard, the German government may soon test
this principle by implementing a ban on certain biofuels ( Watson 2007). This is relevant for the
LCFS because imports of biofuels might be a strategy for some regulated entities, although this
compliance strategy was not evaluated in Part 1 of this study due to data limitations.
The RTFO recognizes that in the short term, the primary strategy for reducing the GHG impact
of transportation fuels is to blend petroleum fuels with low- GHG biofuels. Unlike California’s
LCFS, the UK regulation does not cover gaseous fuels or electricity as transportation fuels
( although biogas is eligible for credits). In our view, apart from the more limited approach, the
RTFO represents a well- designed policy approach that can and should be adapted to the LCFS.
Below is a summary of elements of the RTFO that have inspired some of our recommendations
for the LCFS.
2.1.1.1 Renewable transport fuel certificates
The RTFO includes a certificate trading scheme in which fossil- based transport fuel suppliers
can meet their renewable fuel requirement by any combination of ( a) selling renewable transport
fuel, for which they receive certificates, ( b) purchasing certificates from another company, or ( c)
paying a “ buy- out” price per unit of renewable fuel that the company should have supplied, but
did not. For 2008/ 09, the buy- out price has been set at 15 pence per liter ($ 1.10/ gal) 4. The buy-out
fees will contribute to a fund that is disbursed at the end of each compliance period to all
entities that have submitted certificates to the RTFO administrator as evidence of having sold the
corresponding quantity of renewable fuel, in proportion with the number of certificates
submitted. This payout from the fund provides additional incentives to supply biofuels.
2.1.1.2 Default values and carbon accounting methodology
The two main goals of the carbon accounting methodology are ( 1) to encourage and facilitate
accurate reporting of actual fuel chains in use, and ( 2) to be easy to use, yet capable of handling
the GHG emissions from a wide range of biofuel pathways ( Bauen, Watson, and Howes 2006).
Regulated companies will report on the carbon savings delivered by their renewable transport
fuels, based on a defined calculation methodology. The methodology defines a series of modules
that compute the carbon intensity of each step in the biofuels production chain, as depicted in
Figure 2- 1.
4 Currency conversion on 1- 16- 07 using rate of 1 GBP = 1.96 USD.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 14
Figure 2- 1: The eight modules used in the RTFO carbon calculation
The methodology allows producers to accept default values for their fuel’s GHG intensity, but
these values are intentionally set high to encourage companies to provide more accurate, process-specific
data. ( Some default values are set as typical depending on their use, e. g. when they
represent a relatively minor part of the energy usage.) The methodology also includes default
values for individual parameters ( e. g., to compute the GHG intensity of feedstocks used) to allow
carbon savings to be estimated where figures are not available. Default values are determined by
panels of experts and maintained by the RTFO Administrator. ( Additional details of the RTFO
methodology are discussed in section 2.1 of this report, as our recommendations are informed
significantly by this work.)
2.1.1.3 Carbon accounting tool
The carbon accounting methodology software to be developed will be essential for both
compliance and for producers to explore the ramifications of potential changes to their
production methods. The tool will provide a simple interface allowing users to choose default
values or enter specific data to compute the carbon intensity of the various components of the
product chain ( Bauen, Howes, and Franzosi 2006). Users include feedstock producers or
collectors, intermediaries ( e. g., transport companies), and biorefineries. Each category of user
will need to provide data for a different set of modules. At each stage, users require the ability to
input and aggregate the results of prior stages to compute their total GWI of the production chain
through their portion of the process. The tool will produce data files that can be communicated
across the production chain with the feedstock or fuel, allowing downstream entities to correctly
account for upstream emissions.
2.1.1.4 Biofuels sustainability reporting
Regulated companies must also report on the broader environmental and social sustainability of
their renewable fuels. The methodology for this is still under development. These requirements
will apply to both UK- produced and imported biofuels.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 15
2.1.1.5 Implications of the RTFO for the LCFS
While the RTFO involves only biofuels, the basic approach can be readily expanded to
incorporate all fuels regulated under the LCFS, although applying this method to petroleum fuels
may be challenging. For a fuller elaboration of the RTFO approach and methods, see ( Bauen,
Watson, and Howes 2006; Bauen, Howes, and Franzosi 2006).
2.1.2 U. S. Renewable Fuel Standard ( RFS)
The other initiative that is most relevant to the LCFS is EPA’s recently established Renewable
Fuels Standard ( RFS) program, mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This program is
designed to ensure that a minimum volume of “ renewable fuels” is blended into US motor
vehicle fuels. The final rules were published in May 2007 ( EPA 2007) and enter into force
October 1, 2007. Interim rules apply for the months leading up to October 2007. The final rules
establish specific targets for renewable fuel volumes, a market- based compliance credit trading
scheme, and equivalency factors for different fuels such as corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and
biodiesel.
The renewable volume targets specified in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 begin with 4 billion
gallons in 2006, increasing to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. EPA is required to establish targets for
2013 and beyond based on a review of the first 6 years of the program. These targets have not
yet been set, but President Bush has proposed a future goal of 35 billion gallons of “ alternative”
fuels by 2017, which is defined to include not just renewable fuels, but also other alternatives
such as coal- to- liquids. ( An important distinction between the national EPA and California
LCFS programs is that the LCFS program is premised on a carbon metric, while the national
program has no environmental metric associated with it. This distinction is important since
greenhouse gas emissions from alternative fuels can exceed that of conventional gasoline,
depending on the production process. In the proposed new federal “ alternative fuel” program,
the use of liquids made from coal could cause increases in GHG emissions from transportation.)
The overall goal of the current RFS is to encourage the use of renewable fuels, which are defined
broadly as any motor vehicle fuel produced from plant or animal products or wastes, as opposed
to being produced from fossil fuels. Each renewable fuel is assigned an equivalency value based
on the energetic content of the fuel relative to denatured ethanol. Thus denatured starch- based
ethanol is assigned an equivalency value of 1, whereas FAME biodiesel is assigned an
equivalency value of 1.5 because it is more energy dense. For fuels made from both renewable
and fossil based feedstocks, the energetic proportion of renewable content in the final fuel
determines the equivalency value. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates that cellulosic
ethanol be credited 2.5 times the value of starch- based ethanol, despite equal energetic content in
the fuels. This multiplier is intended to incentivize investments in cellulosic biofuels, because
the production potential is greater and the environmental impacts less. As a mechanism to credit
more environmentally beneficial fuels, this is a rather ad- hoc measure compared to the life cycle
assessment approach called for by the LCFS.
The RFS rules require each batch of renewable fuels to be assigned a unique Renewable
Identification Number ( RIN). This number accompanies the fuel until it is blended into a
finished transportation fuel. At this point, the RIN can be separated from the fuel and sold in an
open market to regulated entities, which must acquire a set number of RIN equivalents each
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 16
calendar year in order to demonstrate compliance with the RFS. The equivalency value
discussed above is encoded in the RIN, thus some RINs count further toward compliance than
others.
2.1.2.1 Environmental Information in the RFS Program
The RINs do not include environmental information at this time, but they could in the future.
EPA considered two methods of incorporating environmental information about different fuels
into the RFS. One method consisted of assigning equivalency values to fuels based on life cycle
analyses of the energetic inputs or greenhouse- gas emissions associated with fuel production,
rather than simply the energy contained in the final fuel. This method would have been similar
to the LCFS. The second method was a voluntary environmental rating that could be
incorporated into the RIN number. EPA ultimately rejected both but has recently indicated that it
is willing to work with stakeholders to re- consider the use of environmental information in RINs.
2.1.2.2 Implications of the RFS for the LCFS
Inclusion of life cycle GWI information in the RIN would be very helpful as long as the life
cycle methodology used is consistent with the goals of the LCFS. This is true regardless of
where in the distribution cycle the fuel is regulated, because the environmental information in
RINs will remain attached to the fuels until they are blended into finished fuels. Trading of RINs
may create some accounting challenges because entities regulated under the RFS can purchase
RINs for fuels that they have not themselves blended, including fuels blended outside the state of
California. If environmental information in RINs is used to support the LCFS, then only RINs
which are still associated with their original fuel should be considered. The entities which
separate RINs under the RFS may or may not be those that are obligated to meet the LCFS
requirement. One way to incorporate environmental information in the RIN into the LCFS would
be to permit entities who separate RINs from fuels to generate LCFS paperwork that remains
attached to the fuel once RINs are sold.
2.2 Challenges of innovative policy
A wide range of studies have recognized the essential role of technology innovation as a basis for
economic growth and efficiency. The process of technology innovation is complex and
multifaceted, and varies significantly among sectors. A study of innovation in the energy sector
by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology ( PCAST, 1999) used a linear
model to describe the different activities associated with the innovation process. As shown in
Figure 2- 1, this linear model portrays innovation as a series of sequential phases linking the
results from basic R& D to commercialization. This “ RD3 innovation pipeline” begins with
invention and discovery in the research and development phase, followed by production increase
in the demonstration phase, cost reductions with increased production in the learning and
buydown phase ( Wene, 2000), and finally widespread deployment in the final commercialization
phase. Though this linear model is a simplification of a much more complex process, it is useful
for identifying and articulating the types of policies that can target specific activities within the
innovation process.
The LCFS serves as a “ demand pull” policy for technologies that have advanced to or beyond the
demonstration phase within the RD3 innovation pipeline, as distinguished from “ supply push”
policies, like subsidies for particular production practices or products. This policy influence has
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 17
the potential to fulfill the first climate change policy goal stated in the introduction, where
technologically proven or off- the- shelf technologies are deployed to meet the near- term 2020
intensity target. The second climate change policy goal, stimulating the development of new low
carbon fuels that will be sufficient to meet California’s long- term 2050 climate stabilization
target, will require advances in technologies that have yet to reach or move beyond the
demonstration phase. The LCFS will not necessarily provide sufficient support for advances at
this level of innovation; additional targeted policies may be required to assure the success of
these long- term and low carbon technologies. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the
LCFS also does not necessarily provide sufficient support for advanced vehicle technologies that
will likely be required for the success of some vehicle- fuel combinations, such as battery electric
vehicles ( BEVs) and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles ( HFCVs).
Research &
Development
Demonstration &
Increase in Scale
Learning &
Buydown
Widespread
Deployment
Scale
Time
Small
Medium
Commercial
$/ unit
Cumulative
Production
Figure 2- 2: The RD3 innovation pipeline: research, development, demonstration and
deployment ( adapted from PCAST, 1999)
There are two possible pathways through which the LCFS can induce innovation. In the first, the
LCFS would reduce the carbon intensity of existing fuels and close substitutes, requiring little
change in vehicle technology. In the second more challenging path, the LCFS would induce a
shift toward different vehicle technologies such as electric- drive and fuel cells, and dedicated
non- petroleum vehicles. The second innovation pathway requires actions beyond the capacity of
any single economic decision- maker. It requires investments and decisions by a variety of fuel
suppliers and distributors, vehicle manufacturers, and consumers. Typically, fuels are not
substitutable in the short run. A driver of a gasoline vehicle can't use diesel or electricity
regardless of price. Vehicles capable of using the lower- GWI fuel must be built, consumers must
purchase them, and fueling infrastructure must be provided ( such as E85 filling stations,
dedicated vehicle charging stations and meters in residences, and hydrogen infrastructure). The
LCFS acts directly on the parties most involved in the first pathway and only indirectly on the
key decision- makers involved in the second, especially vehicle makers and vehicle consumers.
Short of a dramatic tightening of the LCFS beyond 2020, the LCFS, by itself, may be insufficient
to bring about the second pathway.
The case of bi- fueled vehicles like plug- in hybrid electric vehicles ( PHEVs) is somewhat
different. They have the advantage of running on multiple fuels, and are less dependent upon a
pervasive alternative fuel infrastructure. PHEVs do not face the infrastructure challenges of
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 18
hydrogen or other types of dedicated vehicles due to the widespread availability of electricity.
However, some infrastructure is likely to be needed, even for PHEVs, and especially if the
electricity they use is to be differentiated from other types of electricity ( say, with a special rate).
In this case a dedicated meter and plug are likely to be needed – which might be feasible in most
suburban homes, but less so in many urbanized locations.
Fuel flexibility may come at a higher vehicle cost ( as in the case of PHEVs) or it may reduce
other vehicle attributes ( such as size or interior space). The deployment of bi- fueled and flex-fueled
vehicles may be an important part of the development of low- carbon fuels, but the long-term
viability of some low carbon fuels may be dependent on the widespread success of
dedicated alternative fuel vehicles that have been optimized for a particular fuel.
The structural attributes of the vehicle- fuel systems discussed above exemplify specific
limitations of a market mechanism like the LCFS to promote innovation, and will probably result
in stronger incentives for clean fuels that require little change to the vehicle fleet and much
weaker incentives for fuels that also require vehicle switching. While the LCFS can be used to
send signals toward low carbon fuels, this signal is stronger for liquid fuels that power
conventional engines than for other alternative fuels. Additional incentives will probably be
needed to support markets for fuels that require dedicated vehicles.
The scenarios discussed in Part 1 of this study begin to explore some of these issues and
illuminate the large number of changes that may need to take place for the LCFS to be met. For
example, electric and CNG vehicles might need to be produced and offered for sale, ethanol
and/ or biodiesel may need to be manufactured differently and possibly in increased quantity, fuel
distributors would need to buy these products and prepare appropriate blends. Farmers would
need to plant and harvest feedstocks ( possibly new feedstocks), and solid waste handlers,
including governments, would need to extract cellulosic materials from waste streams. Some
new technologies may need to be developed and commercialized to meet even the 2020
reduction target. And regulators need to develop rules and certification programs that will guide
these activities.
Most firms will tend to respond to the LCFS in a manner that relies upon their existing
technological and organizational areas of expertise. In some cases, firms may branch out to
acquire additional expertise in areas specific to a particular low carbon fuel. For example, most
petroleum refiners do not currently have expertise with animal oil and fat markets, municipal
solid waste streams or land management practices. Acquiring expertise in these types of areas
might require significant human and capital resources, and significant effort would be necessary
to reach the level of learning attained by other firms with a history in these areas. These
investments in new expertise will most likely be decided strategically, and will likely be viewed
in terms of long- term payoffs resulting from technological advantage in future low carbon fuel
markets ( BCG 1968). It is unlikely that these innovation investment decisions would be made
only to comply with the LCFS in the near- term.
Despite the many opportunities to invest in new areas of expertise, compliance with the LCFS in
the near term will be achieved by either purchasing credits from other low carbon fuel producers
or by relying upon existing technological expertise. Purchasing credits allows a regulated entity
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 19
to comply with the LCFS without making the high- risk or long- term commitments needed to
attain additional expertise in novel or unfamiliar low carbon fuel technologies. And by selling
credits, low carbon fuel producing firms receive additional revenue to help recoup investments
made in innovation and learning. This transfer can, in theory, reinforce the expertise acquired by
firms that are most successful in producing low carbon fuels. This can lead to increased learning
( while partially offsetting R& D losses from spillover effects), resulting ultimately in reduced
costs for some low carbon fuels. Whether the key developments are the product of small
operators who sell their inventions to large companies, or the R& D efforts of the current
dominant players in the vehicle fuel market, remains to be seen. It bears emphasis that the
industrial organization of low- carbon transportation is not predictable at present even though
plausible scenarios can be sketched; our recommendations lean heavily on allowing the
maximum scope for innovation and market- guided evolution.
2.3 Market failures and barriers as a basis for policy design
Policy intervention in the energy sector has a long history. It has historically reflected both
actions to direct energy firms to better serve the public interest ( environmental controls on
extraction and refining, antitrust actions against oil monopolies, pollutant regulations) and
actions to favor parts of the industry ( depletion tax credits). The motivation for global warming
policy is a broadly accepted recognition that the market by itself will not achieve a socially
optimal level of GHG emissions, one much lower than presently observed and very much lower
than reasonably foreseeable in coming decades. As was the case for the regulatory approaches
employed when earlier energy types were introduced ( i. e., coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, etc.),
the approach taken for low carbon transportation fuels will reflect the political climate and
regulatory paradigms that dominate policy processes at the time that they are introduced ( Davis,
1993).
The range of possible policy instruments to reduce GHGs in the transport sector range from pure
market instruments, such as the carbon tax, to prescriptive regulatory instruments. Less
straightforward market instruments include fees and rebates on vehicle purchase based on GHG
emissions. Even more mixed approaches include caps on emissions with provisions for trading
and banking. They also include intensity and performance targets, again with provisions with
trading and banking. All of these approaches have pros and cons.
The LCFS is a hybrid of market and regulatory approaches, and therefore combines aspects of
two contemporary regulatory paradigms. It is regulatory in the sense that an intensity target is
assigned to energy providers in one sector. And it is market- based in that energy providers can
trade credits with each other ( and possibly with others in the future). The LCFS, implemented
properly, provides a framework for near- term reductions in emissions and also motivates a
process of technological innovation necessary ( but not sufficient) to meet long- term climate
stabilization goals.
The next section reviews different market failures and barriers associated with low carbon fuels.
In many instances, these market failures and barriers are similar to those found to limit
investments in energy efficiency technologies and other low- carbon energy production
technologies ( Brown 2001, Norberg- Bohm 2002). Our goal here is to highlight some of the
major issues that should be taken into account in designing a LCFS. Market failures occur due to
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 20
some imperfection in the operation of markets, and are typically exhibited as incorrect price
signals. Market barriers include obstacles to the introduction of economically viable technologies
that do not have their origin in market imperfections, but tend to result in less than optimal
investment choices and diffusion rates.
2.3.1 Market failures in vehicle fuels
The principal market failure within transportation is that firms and, in turn, consumers do not
shoulder the true social cost of fuels ( or vehicles that entail fuel choices) when they are
purchased. In other words, the market price of transportation fuels does not reflect the social and
environmental damages of resulting greenhouse gas emissions ( and other external social costs,
such as criteria pollutant emissions, congestion, energy insecurity, etc.), so people buy too much
of them. This has three effects on the market. First, society currently consumes too much fuel
relative to the efficient allocation. Second, alternative fuels with lower social costs approach
commercialization but are not economical because the price of gasoline is artificially low, though
inclusion of the true social cost of conventional fuels would make the alternative more
economical. Finally, because current prices do not send the correct incentives for investment in
low carbon fuel alternatives, investment in these technologies is inefficiently low.
In addition to this fundamental market failure, at least six others are worth noting. They relate to
design issues and potential limitations of a LCFS. In terms of preserving economic efficiency,
these market failures are best dealt with directly. Current efforts to do so may not be sufficient,
so other policies may be needed to complement the LCFS for best results.
First, there may exist research and development spillovers. Spillovers occur when the findings
from the R& D of one firm are used by another firm and the discovering firm is unable to profit
from this use. R& D is widely recognized as a non- rival, imperfectly excludible public good.
Because the discovering firm cannot appropriate all of the benefits from its R& D, the firm will
choose a level of R& D that is socially too low.
Second, there may exist spillovers in learning- by- doing, which often occur when a firm produces
more of a particular product and their costs of additional production fall because they are able to
fine tune the production process ( learning- by- doing). If the cost savings generated by firm A’s
production also flow to other firms in the industry ( by employees leaving firm A, for instance)
and firm A is unable to appropriate these savings, then firm A will produce too little compared to
the socially optimum amount. It is important to note that learning- by- doing by itself is not a
market failure. A firm faced with a technology that exhibits learning- by- doing that internalizes
all of the benefits from the learning will produce the socially optimal quantity.
While similar, the optimal policy tools for R& D spillovers and learning- by- doing spillovers are
quite different. Because R& D spillovers occur prior to production, the efficient policy is to
subsidize R& D or fix the appropriation problem. In contrast, learning- by- doing occurs at
production, therefore policymakers should subsidize production, or, again, fix the appropriation
problem. ( For an extensive discussion of policy directed at the characteristic market failures of
innovation, see Scotchmer 2006.)
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 21
A third market failure comes about because choices in transportation generally require
complementary products that require large non- recoverable investments and investments that
cannot be made by individual consumers. The obvious examples are when different vehicles or
different infrastructures are required ( Winebrake and Farrell 1997). For example, for hydrogen
to become a viable transportation fuel, consumers will need access to both hydrogen vehicles and
hydrogen refueling stations ( Melaina, 2003, Nicholas, Handy and Sperling 2004). Electric- drive
vehicles that can be recharged from a standard outlet need fewer changes in infrastructure
compared to the large investments needed in vehicle technologies, especially batteries and power
electronics. Biofuels tend to exhibit the opposite pattern: the marginal vehicle costs are relatively
small because the fuel can either be used in conventional vehicles ( e. g., biodiesel) or in vehicle
that have undergone modest changes ( e. g., E85 flex- fuel vehicles), but additional and significant
non- recoverable infrastructure investments are needed to make the fuel widely available. As with
R& D spillovers, the social value created by a firm offering a sufficient level of refueling
availability, or a broad array of innovative alternative fuel vehicle types, outweighs the private
value it can recover in sales; because of this, the firm has too little of an incentive to overcome
what may require large upfront and potentially non- recoverable investments.
Another example of this failure profoundly affects vehicle mode shifting. A consumer wanting to
walk or ride a bicycle for a given trip can obtain shoes or a bicycle easily as an individual
purchase, but a safe sidewalk or bike lane is beyond her ability to obtain alone even if many
people would each be happy to pay their shares of the cost. And to take a bus, tram, or train
requires an enormous initial investment in infrastructure that cannot be recovered by charging
users the marginal cost of service, and therefore requires government provision with public funds
to achieve the economically efficient level.
The market failures surrounding the issue of vehicle- fuel compatibility and the availability of
refueling are a type of “ network externality”. This effect is a major issue for some alternative
fuels ( e. g., hydrogen), it is modest for some fuels ( e. g., biodiesel), and it is either small or
nonexistent for other fuels ( e. g., low- blend ethanol). Furthermore, because many transportation
fuels can have very different carbon intensities depending on how they are manufactured, the
extent to which they display network externalities is not necessarily correlated with carbon
intensity. 5 Network externalities are common in other industries ( e. g., computers and software)
and the two groups of firms are often able to overcome these network externalities through
consortia, contracts, integration or other coordination devices. In some cases, however, the
interests of existing industries prevents the introduction of new technologies that would tend to
increase consumer choice and lower prices, such as in mobile telephony in some countries.
A fourth market failure explains why consumers tend to focus on upfront costs when purchasing
a vehicle and to overlook fuel efficiency as a significant vehicle attribute. Consumers may
discount future fuel savings too much because they do not have adequate access to capital
markets, or face interest rates that are above competitive levels, or simply fail to calculate future
fuel costs. A related market failure occurs when consumers do not have adequate information or
5 Additional research into the generality of this correlation is probably warranted. Some long- term low carbon
scenarios may require fuels with strong networks externalities and others may not. This trend will depend upon a
combination of resource availability constraints and the likely dominance of different types of energy carriers.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 22
the cognitive ability to determine the “ correct” fuel efficiency. 6 In theory, the most effective
way to deal with these types of vehicle- purchase market failures is to address them directly. For
example, if consumers do not have adequate access to capital markets, government agencies
could provide appropriate financing to remedy this failure. And if consumers do not have
adequate information or the ability to calculate future expenses, policies could focus on
providing this information and the capability to accurately and rationally weigh the significance
of future fuel expenses. 7 The role of vehicle efficiency within the vehicle purchase decision, and
the early success of CAFE standards in overcoming these challenges, has been discussed in
depth by Greene ( 1998). If similar market failures arise in consumer fuel purchase decisions
related to the LCFS, policy makers may attempt to target the exact nature of the failure in order
to improve the effectiveness of either the LCFS or complementary policies.
We also note that there exists a fifth market failure that lessens the efficiency losses associated
with carbon not being priced, namely market power. Market power may exist at a number of
points of the gasoline production process, e. g., at extraction and refining. Market power implies
that, in the absence of other market failures, consumers face a price that is above the socially
optimal price ( i. e., leading to too little consumption relative to the socially optimal level).
Therefore, market power tends to offset the problems from negative externalities, and, in
principle, can even completely cancel their effect. However, in this instance, the additional cost
paid by the consumer become revenue for fuel providers rather than revenue for government that
would be generated if external costs were internalized through a tax.
A related imperfection of the market for transportation fuels is that it contains a few ( about
seven) very large private firms that operate in all aspects of the petroleum industry, some smaller
firms in individual parts of the industry, and many ( over thirty) national oil companies that do
not always behave competitively ( Adelman 1993; Falola and Genova 2005; Gately 2004). In
addition, key parts of the oil industry, refining in particular, have high costs of entry. However,
because of the size and efficiency of world oil markets, the high value of oil products, and the
fact that they are easily transported, the global oil industry is generally thought to be competitive,
at least outside of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC).
In general, firms that will be regulated by the LCFS are large, vertically integrated enterprises
that derive the bulk of their revenue and profits from crude oil production and less from refining
and retailing. Thus, some potential approaches for compliance with the LCFS ( e. g., electricity)
directly compete with their entire business operation while others ( e. g., biofuels) only tend to
substitute for the most profitable parts of their business. In addition, all private firms use
substantially higher discount rates than those considered appropriate for optimal public policy,
and especially public policies involving long time- frames, like climate change.
6 See Stango and Zinman ( 2007) for evidence of this.
7 Related to this are “ time inconsistent” preferences, e. g., hyperbolic discounting. Here the consumer’s discount rate
appears to fall the farther in the future the decision is to be made. For example, faced with a choice of $ 50 today
versus $ 100 next year, evidence suggests a large fraction of consumers will choose $ 50 today. But, faced with a
choice of $ 50 five years from now and $ 100 six years from now, these same consumers will choose the $ 100
option.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 23
Because of this structure, existing firms may have an incentive to protect their existing interests
in petroleum exploration, production and refining by pursing compliance options that are not
socially optimal. This may explain a motivation to support policies that would allow the
purchase of offsets from other sectors, under the rationale that lower- cost GHG emission
reductions can be made by relying on options in other sectors and delaying the development and
deployment of newer, low- carbon fuels and technologies in the transportation sector.
Less perfectly modeled as a market failure, but historically important in the last three decades of
energy policy, is the difficulty industry players have had in predicting the costs of both
compliance with new regulations and new technologies. These predictions naturally play a role
in the politics and policy analysis of legislation and rulemaking, but it’s cautionary that they have
been remarkably off the mark in many important instances. The cost of removing sulfur from
coal- fired power plant stack gas, and of making clean automobiles, were both greatly
overestimated by industry sources when those policies were put in place; in contrast, the cost per
capacity of new battery types for electric vehicles has been underestimated for years.
2.3.2 Market barriers in vehicle fuels
In addition, several market barriers that have been discussed elsewhere for energy efficiency
( Brown 2001) technologies may also apply, in a slightly different form, to stakeholder responses
to a LCFS. Alternative fuel ( or feedstock) producers may rank GHG emissions as a low priority.
Within the range of issues that influence decisions and drive technological or innovation
investments ( standard operating procedures, preexisting contracts, competitive advantage, etc.),
opportunities for marginal reductions in GHG emissions may be overlooked. An example might
be land use management or crop fertilization practices for biofuel feedstock producers. Another
such market barrier is the use of high internal hurdle rates in rationing capital within a firm ( Ross
1986, DeCanio 1993). While some investments in innovation or carbon intensity reduction
options across a fuel value change may be small, the decisions required to make these
investments may face higher effective interest rates than the cost of capital.
Finally, there is the problem of incomplete markets for GHG emission reductions. A large
number of decisions are made across the life cycle of a fuel, and some input products or
feedstocks may be associated with different levels of GHG intensity. If these differences are not
presented explicitly, and it is not clear which option is the low- carbon option, potentially low-cost
opportunities to reduce GHG intensity will be missed. A comprehensive life cycle
framework, with accurate accounting of all inputs and outputs, may help to overcome this market
barrier.
2.3.3 Comparisons with a theoretically optimal policy
The existence of additional market failures and barriers ( beyond failing to account for the costs
of climate change) open the door for alternative policy instruments, including an intensity target
such as the LCFS. A recent evaluation comparing a carbon tax, an absolute cap, and an intensity
policy showed that the relative efficiencies of these options depend on quantities that are very
uncertain for GHG emissions from transportation ( Quirion 2005). 8 Uncertainty in these
8 The key factors are the slope of the marginal benefits curve, the slope of the marginal cost curve, and the level of
uncertainty about business- as- usual emissions. Uncertainty about the marginal benefits curve comes about due to
uncertainties in the scientific understanding of climate change and in the social and technological response to
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 24
quantities suggests that the choice of policy instruments should depend on factors other than
cost.
Holland et al. use a formal economic model that evaluates some market failures and provides a
useful analysis of the economic incentives of firms operating under a LCFS; from this they
derive some policy implications ( Holland, Knittel, and Hughes 2007). 9 Most importantly, they
show that the LCFS leads to an implicit tax on all fuels with an AFCI above the standard and an
implicit subsidy for all fuels with an AFCI below the standard and that such a policy is likely to
be less efficient than a carbon tax or cap and trade system where the cap is on total carbon
emission rather than intensity.
Holland et al. show that, when pollution is the only market failure, such a policy cannot achieve
the economically efficient outcome because this goal would require that all carbon be taxed,
even that carbon emitted from a low carbon fuel. They also show that a slight adjustment to the
LCFS can be efficient by turning the LCFS into a policy that is essentially a cap. To do this,
Holland et al propose that a firm's AFCI be defined as the carbon content of its current sales
relative to the amount of transportation energy sold in the state in a year prior
The distinction that Holland et al make can be described in this way. The approach to
calculating AFCI values used in Part 1 of this study was:
' ( )
' ( ) 2
This year s fuel sales MJ
AFCI This year s carbon emissions gCO e current !
The approach to calculating AFCI values proposed by Holland et al is:
' ( )
' ( ) 2
Base year s fuel sales MJ
AFCI This year s carbon emissions gCO e historical !
If a firm’s fuel production were decreasing, it would be easier to comply with an LCFS that used
AFCIhistorical than if AFCI current were used. However if a firm’s fuel production were increasing,
using AFCIhistorical would be more challenging. In California, because of the expected increase in
demand for freight transportation fuel one would expect the historical baseline LCFS proposed
by Holland et al to be much more difficult to meet them what is shown in Part 1.
climate change ( Stern et al. 2006). Uncertainty about the marginal cost curve comes about due to the very wide
range of possible compliance options that have different cost structures ( some need only need changes in fuel
manufacturing processes, while others require new fuel distribution or new vehicles), and the even wider range of
research and development activities currently underway to lower these costs ( see Part 1 of this report). Uncertainty
about business as usual emissions comes about due to the potential for both lower- carbon fuels ( e. g. electricity)
and higher- carbon fuels ( e. g. coal to liquids) to enter the market in the absence of climate policy ( Brandt and
Farrell 2006; Lemoine, Kammen, and Farrell 2006).
9 This paper but ignores taxes, network effects, non- financial aspects of transportation decision- making, and other
effects, but this does not affect their conclusions so much as suggest that further study may be warranted before
broader policy inferences can be made ( Parry 1998; Heffner, Kurani, and Turrentine 2007; Turrentine et al. 2006;
Hess and Lombardi 2004; Winebrake and Farrell 1997; Levine 2006).
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 25
2.4 Competition among fuels
The LCFS is likely to lead to increased competition among transportation fuels, which are
currently dominated by petroleum- based gasoline and diesel. Consumers will view the
competition among different fuels as part of the choice about what sort of vehicle to purchase;
indeed the type of car you buy largely determines what your fuel choices are. For consumers, key
issues will be the cost of vehicles and fuels ( including expected costs of fuels), perceptions of
vehicle reliability and fuel availability, and a range of symbolic values ( Turrentine et al. 2006).
In addition to competing on technological grounds and cost, very large differences exist among
the organizations that provide these fuels and this may strongly affect how this competition
proceeds. Table 2- 1 below describes some of the key industrial organization and regulatory
issues that will influence this competition. 10
This table is a simplification of a set of complex issues, but illustrates the key concept that the
organizations that will be competing to help meet the LCFS have very different industrial
structure and regulatory contexts. For the purposes of the LCFS, it would be preferable if these
differences could be eliminated and the technologies competed on price and other attributes
alone. But this is unrealistic. These differences exist for good reasons. Some of these differences
might be mitigated somewhat, by implementing appropriate policies. For instance, emissions
associated with “ fuel electricity” could be excluded from the anticipated AB32 electric sector
cap on GHG emissions ( see section 5.2) and covered under the LCFS in order to make the terms
of competition between electricity and petroleum fuels more similar. Other key issues include the
potential for cross- subsidization among different ratepayers.
Perhaps the most important factors in Table 2- 1 are GHG emission regulations, capital, and
profit structure. For GHG emission regulations, the fact that the bulk of the emissions from
petroleum fuels are not capped while all of the emissions from electricity generators may create a
significant disincentive for electricity providers to actively promote electric vehicles, especially
because under “ de- coupling,” their profits do not increase when sales go up. Such a disincentive
will be especially strong if the cost of emissions reductions in the electricity sector is high. 11 On
the other hand, energy pricing and policies in the electricity sector are very different from those
in the gasoline and diesel markets. For example, electricity prices are set by the California Public
Utility Commission to recover the variable costs of investor- owned utilities and provide a
moderate, guaranteed rate of return on approved capital projects. Public power does not feature
profits at all. In addition, various cross- subsidies have been put in place in the electricity sector
( e. g. energy efficiency and low- income programs). Also, electricity policies vary significantly
across states. In contrast, capital in the oil sector is at greater risk and ( correctly) earns higher
returns, and pricing is market based, not regulated. There is relatively little state regulation of the
petroleum industry.
More research on how these varied policies interact and how to best implement the LCFS within
this context is needed.
10 See Appendix A for a more complete description.
11 Depending on how AB32 is implemented, this could be interpreted as high prices for AB32 GHG emissions
allowances or stringent regulations that impose high emission control costs.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 26
Table 2- 1: Selected non- technical factors that will influence the competition among fuels
Petroleum Ethanol Electricity
GHG
emission
regulations
Upstream emissions (~ 20%
of total) from in- state
activities may be capped
under AB32. Tailpipe
emissions will be included
in the LCFS intensity target
and are not capped.
In- state emissions may
be capped under AB32.
Out of state emissions
will not be.
All emissions, including those from
out- of- state electricity generation are
under AB32, and are likely to be
capped. Additional rules include
renewable portfolio standard and
utility restrictions on procurement of
high- carbon power ( i. e. SB 1368).
Types of
organizations
that may be
regulated
Five very large global
corporations that have
businesses in most parts of
the oil sector ( e. g.
exploration and production,
refining, chemicals, etc.)
Also a few smaller national
and regional firms.
A wide range of firms
from small co- ops in the
Midwest to startups in
California to larger
specialty firms, to global
agro- industrial
companies.
Three large investor- owned utilities
( IOUs) with an obligation to serve
and guaranteed rates of return on
capital investment. Various non- profit
public organizations including
municipal utilities, cooperatives and
city departments, some fairly small.
Markets Crude oil is a fairly
competitive global market
moderated by OPEC
oligopoly. Gasoline is a
localized market due to
California air pollution
rules.
Largely a national
market due to import
tariffs, but high prices in
recent years have
enabled some imports
(~ 400 million gallons)
last year from Brazil.
Retail markets for electricity are
highly regulated. Wholesale market
includes the area west of the Rocky
Mountains. Somewhat larger markets
for coal and natural gas, the latter
tending towards a global market.
Subsidies Oil depletion allowance,
preferential tax treatments,
waivers of royalty
payments, etc.
Agricultural subsidies,
tax credits for ethanol
blenders. Sales
mandates in some states.
Price- Anderson Act insurance for
nuclear power, accelerated
depreciation on capital, etc.
Tax status Corporate Mostly corporate, some
tax- exempt.
IOUs are corporate, public
organizations are tax exempt
Capital Typically at risk, but very
profitable in recent years.
Typically at risk, but
very profitable in recent
years.
IOUs risk is limited by prudency
review. Approved capital projects
earn a guaranteed return. Public
projects face different risks.
Profit
structure
Crude oil production is the
most profitable part of this
business, but refinery profits
have been good in recent
years. More sales typically
means more profit. Fuels are
one of many types of
products.
Profits rely on sales of
both ethanol and co-products.
High prices for
fuel are currently offset
somewhat by high corn
prices. More sales
typically means more
profits.
Public organizations ( munis and co-ops)
do not have profits. The private
IOUs have “ decoupled” profits so that
more electricity sales do not result in
greater profits. These rules exist to
encourage utilities to undertake
energy efficiency programs for which
electric vehicles might qualify.
Retail pricing Market- based but somewhat
differentiated by location
and customer types.
Market- based, with
some long- term
contracts.
Closely regulated with special ( time-of-
use) rates for electric vehicles in
most cases. The Legislature or the
CPUC has, in some cases established
cross- subsidies across different rates
and rate classes.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 27
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A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 28
3 Program Design
This section reviews key elements of an LCFS policy, discussing policy options and including
recommendations where there was agreement among the authors.
3.1 Scope of the standard
RECOMMENDATION 1: For liquid fuels, the LCFS should apply to all gasoline and
diesel used in California for use in transportation, including freight and off- road
applications. The LCFS should also allow providers of non- liquid fuels ( electricity, natural
gas, propane, and hydrogen) sold in California for use in transportation to participate in
the LCFS or have the associated emissions covered by another regulatory program. If the
number of non- liquid- fueled vehicles grows in the future, mandatory participation in the
LCFS may need to be considered.
Executive Order S- 1- 07 refers to “ California’s transportation fuels,” which CARB officials
interpret reasonably as meaning fuels sold in California and typically used in transportation and
therefore including the small amounts of gasoline and diesel used in lawnmowers, generators,
pumps, and the like. These fuels, with their most common uses, are shown in Table 3- 1.
Gasoline and diesel fuel are widely used in many different transportation uses, and compete with
each other indirectly ( through choices of transportation modes and vehicle purchases). Gasoline
makes up 70 percent of California’s transportation energy, diesel 17 percent, and almost all the
rest is jet fuel ( 12 percent). Included in the gasoline and diesel figures are biofuels blended with
or substituting for fossil fuels. In general, we recommend that the LCFS cover as wide an array
of fuels sold in state as possible, limited only by jurisdictional authority and practicality. This
includes all gasoline and diesel, subject to the exception for aviation discussed below, and
bunker fuel to the full extent of its legal authority.
Table 3- 1: Principal California transportation fuels and uses
Use
Fuel On- road Off- road
Cars, light
trucks,
motorcycles
Heavy
duty
trucks &
buses
Other vehicles
( forklifts, trains,
construction
equipment, etc)
Marine Aircraft Non- vehicle
( pumps, generators,
lawnmowers, etc.)
Gasoline X X + + +
Diesel + X X + X
Kerosene X
Bunker oil X
Propane and
natural gas + + X +
Electricity &
hydrogen + X
Note: + Minor use, X Major use, shaded column is outside of California’s authority. Biofuels may be blended with
or used instead of gasoline and diesel. California reformulated gasoline contains 5.7% ethanol by volume ( about
3.7% by energy content).
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 29
It appears that international treaties to which United States is a party prevent California from
regulating aviation fuel, so the small amount of gasoline for small aircraft and a much larger
amount of jet fuel are not covered by the LCFS. Thus the “ Aircraft” column of Table 3- 1 is
shaded to indicate that these fuels should not be regulated by the LCFS. Fortunately, aviation
gasoline is extra- high- octane and not commingled with other gasoline in the marketplace, and
aviation jet fuel accounts for nearly the entire production of kerosene, so these are found in
separate markets that can practically be excluded from LCFS administration. We note, though,
that efforts are underway in Europe and internationally to reduce sharply the GHG emissions
from aviation. There may be opportunities in the future to create an opt- in procedure where
emission reductions in jet fuels and aviation gain LCFS credits.
Other hydrocarbon fuels such as natural gas and propane are commonly used in specialized
transportation applications, including an increasing number of buses, but this is not a typical nor
large use of either of those fuels ( compared to total fuel sales). Allowing participation by ( and
potential regulation of) providers of these fuels poses no particular conceptual or administrative
problems. For instance, natural gas used in vehicles must be either compressed or liquefied and
then dispensed from a vehicle fueling station, lowering the administrative burden of including
this fuel in the LCFS. We recommend that the LCFS cover natural gas and propane.
Similarly, electricity and hydrogen play only a very small role in on- road fuels but may be more
widely used in the future. In addition, electricity currently supplies some energy to rail and
trolley buses ( especially in San Francisco). Either or both of these fuels may play an important
role in the future of transportation energy, and considerable innovation and investment may
occur in these fuel systems. There is some complexity with allowing participation by providers
of electricity in the LCFS, and some overlap with other policies, but these problems are minor
and therefore we recommend that providers of electricity and hydrogen used in transportation be
allowed to participate in the LCFS.
However, if providers do not choose to participate in the LCFS, they should not be allowed to
escape GHG regulation entirely; this would create a loophole. All GHG emissions associated
with transportation should be regulated in some way, either by the LCFS or another regulatory
program. For instance, electricity and natural gas providers might have the choice of including
transportation- related emissions in either the LCFS or an AB32- related program designed by the
ARB or PUC. The reason for this flexibility is that transportation is a very small fraction of
electricity and natural gas consumption and the fixed costs required to participate in the LCFS
may not be justified, especially for smaller distribution organizations such as municipal utilities.
Over time, if the use of electricity, natural gas, hydrogen, or other fuels grows, however, it may
be necessary to make participation in the LCFS mandatory in order to make the competition
between fuels as level as possible. This should be an issue for the 5- year review of the LCFS.
We now discuss some of the complications.
Both electricity and hydrogen have the potential to provide very low- carbon energy for
transportation, as long as low- carbon generation technologies, such as solar, wind, and nuclear,
and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, are used. Electricity from natural gas generation
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 30
also provides large carbon reductions when displacing petroleum fuels in transportation.
Considering ( for simplicity) only light duty vehicles, Tables 2- 1 and 2- 2 in Part 1 of this study
show that gasoline produced within California has a carbon intensity of 92 gCO2e/ MJ and the
target AFCI is a ten percent reduction on the gasoline carbon intensity, or about 83 gCO2e/ MJ.
Compare these values to a carbon intensity of 27 gCO2e/ MJ for average California electricity,
and 48 gCO2e/ MJ for hydrogen from natural gas. 12 If we assume that all transportation fuels can
generate emission reduction credits under the LCFS, then fueling electric and hydrogen vehicles
will create a significant number of credits per vehicle- mile if the providers choose to participate
in the LCFS.
The next question is whether all fuels should face the same target GHG level in any given year.
For example, should the 2020 target AFCI for transportation fuels ( 83 gCO2e/ MJ) be applied to
electric vehicles, or should they be required to attain a ten percent reduction from the current
average performance of electric vehicles ( about 24 gCO2e/ MJ)? Our view is that providers of
transportation fuels regulated by or participating in the LCFS should be held to the same
standard, which is the target value for all transportation fuels – in this case, 83 gCO2e/ MJ in
2020. This approach accurately reflects the fact that switching from gasoline to electricity
significantly lowers the carbon intensity of the energy used for transportation.
Excluding electricity from the LCFS would simplify the program because it would not be
necessary to distinguish electricity used in vehicles from other electricity, and the potential for
double counting would be avoided. However, excluding particular fuels from the LCFS would
reduce incentives to develop and use the full range of low- carbon technologies. Indeed, imposing
a separate reduction target for transportation electricity would operate as an implicit tax on this
fuel, which would actually obstruct its increased use as a replacement for higher- carbon fuels. A
uniform target across all fuels is a core element of the LCFS.
Because GHG emissions from electricity production are expected to be regulated by both the
CPUC as well as by the ARB under AB32, one option is to disregard electricity for the purposes
of the LCFS. We disagree. Electricity that powers vehicles under the LCFS may lead to
significant reductions in GHG emissions associated with transportation, as well as reduce
dependence on petroleum in the transport sector. Including electricity in the LCFS may generate
significant credits and may stimulate technological innovation.
3.2 Diesel fuel
RECOMMENDATION 2: Differences in the drive train efficiencies of diesel and gasoline
engines should be accounted for and heavy and light duty diesel fuels should be treated
differently to prevent the possibility that unrelated increases in diesel consumption could
lead to compliance without achieving the goals of the LCFS.
Gasoline and diesel fuel are both refined from crude petroleum. But the fuels are refined in
different ways, have different attributes, and are used in different types of engines. Diesel fuel
has a higher carbon/ hydrogen ratio, but requires less refining energy ( in U. S. refineries), and also
has differences in weight density and heating value. On a “ well- to- tank” lifecycle basis, diesel
12 These values are from the AB1007 study performed for CEC and are for comparison only ( Unnasch 2007).
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 31
fuel has an AFCI rating about 1- 3 g/ CO2e/ MJ higher than gasoline. But diesel engines are more
efficient than gasoline engines ( see section 4.1 for further elaboration on measuring and
accounting for differences in drivetrain efficiencies). The net result is that on a well- to- wheel
lifecycle basis, diesel fuel use generates less CO2 per unit of energy than does gasoline, if all
other factors are held constant. 13 The exact life cycle numbers will need to be finalized by CARB
in its rulemaking process, based on additional reviews of existing models and analyses. The
illustrative numbers used in the Part 1 report and in this Part 2 report indicate a 22 percent
advantage for diesel when compared to gasoline. ( This value relies on the assumptions in the
GREET model and does not include indirect land use.)
However, differences in the use of diesel fuel between heavy duty ( e. g. buses and large trucks)
and light duty ( e. g. automobiles and light trucks) complicates the treatment of diesel fuel in the
LCFS. 14 The discussion above is from the perspective of a single vehicle, considering what
happens if a consumer decides to replace a gasoline vehicle with a diesel vehicle. From the
perspective of the regulated parties, any increase in the ratio of diesel fuel sales to gasoline sales
will tend to improve the AFCI, whether this is due to the switch from a gasoline- powered car to a
diesel- powered car ( as above) or simply by selling more heavy duty diesel fuel. In the case of
increased sales of heavy duty fuel, no improvement in engine efficiency occurs, as essentially all
heavy duty vehicles are already diesels. This is problematic because freight hauling in California
is expected to grow faster than passenger travel because of increases in U. S. imports of goods
into California ports. The CEC forecasts that diesel fuel use will grow at a rate if 2.75 percent for
2005- 2025, compared to only 0.13 percent per year for gasoline ( Kavalec 2005). If this turns out
to be the case, and gasoline and diesel fuel regulation is pooled, the goals of the LCFS will be
undermined because the regulated parties will find this natural growth in diesel sales will aid
them in compliance – even though emissions will be rising and less technological innovation will
be needed. In other words, the incentive of the LCFS will be swamped by trends that would
occur in any case.
Another concern with the pooled ( gasoline and diesel) approach is that regulated parties might
respond by lowering the price of diesel fuel in order to stimulate increased sales, which could
have several implications. First, consumers would have increased incentives to purchase light
duty diesel vehicles, which would support the goals of the LCFS. Some stakeholders have
expressed concern that while this is true, lower diesel prices would tend to reduce the appeal of
other vehicle technologies that do not use petroleum ( e. g. electric vehicles) that offer the added
benefits of lowering oil imports and air pollution. However, attempting to account for differences
in petroleum consumption within the LCFS will add complication, and at least lower diesel
prices will provide the correct incentive to consumers to purchase a lower- carbon technology
than gasoline vehicles. Further, the increased competition between different low carbon fuels is
advantageous to consumers because it will lower costs.
The second concern is that heavy duty vehicle users would have lower costs for using the same
fuel, a reduction that does not indicate lower social costs, which would tend to encourage them to
13 But, as discussed below, other factors have not held constant as diesel engines have been introduced into
European markets.
14 There is also a potential complication associated with the fact that different refineries have different ratios of
gasoline to diesel production, so could be treated unevenly by the LCFS.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 32
use somewhat more fuel than they would otherwise. This might encourage transit operators to
expand service or lower ticket prices, which substitutes for private car use, but would also tend to
reduce any incentive to purchase more efficient heavy duty diesel vehicles or to use trucks more
efficiently. It is not clear if this change in prices for heavy duty fuel overall would tend to
support the goals of the LCFS or not, but this effect is likely to be small relative to the potential
change in the state- wide gasoline/ diesel ratio due to the faster expected growth in fuel used in
freight vehicles ( discussed above).
Encouraging diesel fuel use raises concerns about local air pollution and effects on
disadvantaged communities near ports and other places with high diesel fuel use. Diesel cars
must meet the same pollutant standard as gasoline cars, so we are less concerned about air
quality impacts of shifts from gasoline to diesel in light duty vehicles. But we are concerned
about incentives to increase diesel fuel use in heavy duty trucks, since each truck produces large
amounts of particulates and oxides of nitrogen, even with new tighter heavy duty truck
regulations. Adopting a policy that tends to stimulate additional heavy duty fuel use could have
environmental justice impacts, though we have not analyzed this issue.
Thus, the key issue is how to reflect the fact that increased sales of diesel fuel to light duty
vehicles will help to achieve the goals of the LCFS, while increased sales of diesel fuel to heavy
duty vehicles will not necessarily do so and also has environmental justice concerns. The policy
question is: Should light duty and heavy duty diesel sales be treated differently, and if so, how?
We considered three options for treating diesel, with variations ( and recommend options 2b or
3).
1. Ignore the difference in efficiency between the gasoline and diesel drivetrains15
This option could be accomplished several ways. The first would be to pool diesel and gasoline
to create a single AFCI baseline ( using Table 2- 3 of Part 1) of 92 gCO2e/ MJ. 16 The second would
be to treat gasoline and diesel separately. Two separate baselines would be created and the target
carbon intensity of each fuel should be reduced by 10 percent compared to its respective
baseline. This is very similar to the pooling option above, but is administratively more complex
and less flexible ( and therefore more expensive). This second option would not recognize the
advantage of shifts in light duty vehicles to diesel fuel use, but would avoid the problem of
expected increases in diesel fuel sales facilitating compliance with the LCFS without achieving
the desired goals.
2. Adjust diesel’s carbon intensity using an adjustment factor to reflect efficiency
differences in drive trains.
An important part of this option is to ensure the adjustment factor accurately reflects the
differences in drive train efficiencies. In comparing matched pairs of vehicles ( models available
15 In this option, there would be little concern about differential effects among refineries based on variations in their
gasoline to diesel ratios.
16 A similar approach was recommended by Jean- Francois Larivé, Technical Coordinator of CONCAWE in an
email to the authors, based on the complexity of differentiating between gasoline and diesel and the relatively
small effect on consumer behavior it might have.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 33
in both diesel and gasoline options, like the Jeep Grand Cherokee), diesel drivetrains appear to
be approximately 22 percent more efficient in U. S. models. 17 In this case, the carbon intensities
of gasoline and diesel would be 92 gCO2e/ MJ and 71 gCO2e/ MJ, respectively. However, this
difference will change over time as automakers adapt to meet consumer demand and regulatory
requirements. In Europe, for instance, where light duty diesels account for about half the new car
market, the efficiency advantage for diesel vehicles has almost vanished over the last few years.
If a diesel adjustment is included in the LCFS, it will have to be updated over time.
This second option could be accomplished in several ways. The simplest approach ( call it 2a)
would be to treat all diesel fuel sales the same and apply the adjustment factor. This would
appropriately reflect the difference between light duty vehicles powered by gasoline or diesel,
but would lead to problems of allowing compliance through the increased sales of heavy duty
diesel fuel, frustrating the goals of the LCFS.
Alternatively ( 2b), diesel sales to heavy duty and light duty vehicles could be treated differently.
This 2b option could be realized in several ways. For instance, the carbon intensity of fuel sold to
heavy duty vehicles could be assigned an un- adjusted carbon intensity of 91 gCO2e/ MJ, while
fuel sold to light- duty vehicles could be assigned the adjusted value of 71 gCO2e/ MJ. Or
increased sales of diesel for use in trucks ( but not buses) over the base year level, or that level
increased in proportion to population growth, could be excluded from LCFS averaging. Any
version of these 2b options would serve three key purposes:
( a) Retain incentives to reduce upstream diesel GWI for all diesel.
( b) Retain incentives to displace gasoline use with diesel.
( c) Overcome ( to some degree) the perverse incentive to improve AFCI by merely selling
more diesel.
This 2b approach requires distinguishing between light duty and heavy duty sales, which appears
to be difficult because this distinction is not made at the point of sale. Estimates of the amount of
diesel fuel sold to light duty vehicles could be developed from data ( or estimates) of the number
of miles such vehicles drive in the state each year and the characteristics of the light duty diesel
fleet in California. Depending on how important this adjustment becomes in the future, new data
might need to be collected. In addition, credits to individual firms for light duty diesel sales
would likely have to be calculated on an average basis across California, significantly lowering
the marginal benefit that each regulated party would gain from the sale of an additional unit of
light duty diesel fuel. While this approach would have some uncertainties and seems somewhat
artificial, it is not clear how important these problems are if the incentives are correct and the
number of light duty diesel vehicles remains modest.
3. Use gasoline sales as a compliance tool, with diesel opt- ins.
Owing to the complexities of including diesel fuel in the LCFS, one possibility is to simply not
regulate diesel fuel and focus only on gasoline, which accounts for 70 percent of the
transportation energy market in California. However, this would be a relaxation of the LCFS and
17 A “ matched pair” of vehicles have approximately the same engine power.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 34
contrary to the intent of the Executive Order. Most problematic, this would tend to reduce the
scope of innovation that would be encouraged. For these reasons, we recommend using this
option only if one of the following modifications is included.
One modification would be to increase the AFCI intensity target ( for gasoline) above 10 percent
to represent what the intensity target would be if the carbon intensity for all of the fuels being
regulated were included. The target would be about 12.4 percent in this case, assuming the
regulated fuels are gasoline and diesel. 18 In this case, diesel ( and any other petroleum fuels)
would have no target carbon intensity, but incentives would exist to reduce the carbon content of
the other fuels and apply those credits against the now- lower gasoline target.
Establishing rules for these opt- in credits would face the same fundamental question as the
previous two options: should heavy- duty and light- duty diesel be treated the same or differently?
One answer might be that diesel opt- in credits could be generated by sales of light duty diesel
fuel and by reductions in the carbon intensity of diesel fuel.
We recommend options 2b and 3. They seem to be administratively feasible and most likely to
achieve the goals of the LCFS.
3.3 Baselines & targets
RECOMMENDATION 3: The baseline year should be the most recent year for which data
are available before the LCFS was announced. A uniform state- wide baseline should be
applied to all regulated entities. We recommend a compliance path that does not require
significant near- term carbon intensity reductions, in order to allow technologies to develop.
If implemented through a decline in carbon intensity, the ARB must evaluate the amount
of rationalization that may occur. If implemented through a technology standard in the
early years, the ARB must evaluate what is an advance biofuel and what is not. If
rationalization can account for a large fraction of the 2020 goal, the target may need to be
made more stringent to ensure the goals of the LCFS are met.
3.3.1 Rationalization
A key question in designing the LCFS is how much the reported AFCI may change simply due
to “ rationalization,” whereby existing low- carbon fuels are used in California and high- carbon
fuels are either exported or not imported. 19 This effect is undesirable because it helps achieve
neither of the two primary goals of the LCFS, reducing GHG emissions and stimulating
technological innovation. Rationalization may occur in any fuel, petroleum, biofuels, or
electricity. It is an inherent problem when performance- based regulations are imposed in only
part of a market, but not in other parts.
Rationalization could be a significant effect, which raises the question of how the 2020 target
should be set. For instance, what if the entire 10 percent could be met through rationalization?
Ignoring rationalization would violate the intent of the LCFS – GHG emissions would not
18 Using 2004 data from CEC- 2006- 013- SF Table A- 4, p. 64, this value is determined by ( 130.71)/( 130.71+ 32.16)
19 This effect is also called “ shuffling” or “ gaming,” see ( Bushnell, 2007).
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 35
decline and technological innovation would not be stimulated. If even more rationalization were
possible, it could even lead to the creation of excess LCFS credits, which could possibly be sold
into other markets.
In Part 1 ( Section 2.6) we recommended a compliance path with more aggressive reductions in
the early years to account for rationalization, and then a more modest emission reduction path
after that. The result, we anticipate, would be get the unavoidable rationalization out of the way
to hasten the time when companies experience an incentive to invest in lower- carbon
technologies. Such an approach would require an evaluation of the amount of rationalization that
is likely to occur
Several stakeholders have noted that requirements for early emission reductions will tend to
enhance the rationalization effect because current generation biofuels would have to be used due
to the short time frame. This could interfere with the development of advanced biofuels, the
preferred compliance option for some stakeholders, and delay the date by which they become
competitive. According to this view, an immediate rationalization at the start of the LCFS
compliance period ( 2010) would divert resources, delay essential investment, and … likely cause
[ emission] increases as added transportation energy is used to segregate imported “ low- carbon”
ethanol from “ high- carbon” ethanol.
Other stakeholders are also very seriously concerned that near- term carbon intensity reductions
will result in ( or exacerbate) a rapidly increasing demand for current generation biofuels, and
bring significant environmental damage. They, too, prefer to incentivize the development of
advanced technologies, including next- generation biofuels, electric vehicle technologies, and
hydrogen.
3.3.2 A technology forcing option
An alternative to steady reductions in carbon intensity would be a technology- forcing approach
in which volumetric requirements for fuels with specified low- GHG performance are set for
several interim steps before 2010, followed by a carbon intensity reduction in the last few years
of the LCFS. Stakeholders who support this approach have agreed that technological innovation
is a crucial part of the LCFS and that setting strict performance standards is a more appropriate
way to stimulate innovation than simply setting a carbon intensity target that declines gradually
to the target value. Specifically, these supporters argue that current- generation biofuels ( e. g. the
best current corn ethanol or Brazilian sugar cane- based ethanol) are inappropriate long- term
solutions to the climate change problem and that policies that permit their use as part of a low-cost
compliance strategy would be counter- productive. In addition, by using a technology
standard during the interim years rather than a carbon intensity target, this approach would delay
the effect of rationalization for several years. This approach is also compatible with an
accelerating carbon intensity reduction schedule, where only small changes in carbon intensity
are required in the beginning years of the LCFS and reductions accelerate in the later years to
meet the 10 percent target in 2020. Supporters argue this approach is most compatible with a
multi- year R& D program followed by investment to bring new technologies to scale. An
example of such an alternative policy is given in Box 1 below.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 36
A few observations about a technology- forcing implementation of the LCFS are possible. First,
rationalization cannot be avoided entirely if a performance standard like a ten percent reduction
in carbon intensity is used, although it can be delayed through the use of technology- forcing
mandates. Second, because this approach excludes some options ( e. g. Brazilian ethanol), it is less
flexible than one that uses a performance standard alone ( that is, a carbon intensity target) and
therefore may have higher costs. If this approach is adopted, then those that support it would be
inconsistent if they were to also argue that high costs of this approach made the carbon intensity
target infeasible. Third, such an approach needs to be open to the potential that advanced low-
GHG fuels may be produced overseas and imported. The LCFS should not be designed so that it
acts as a barrier to trade. Fourth, this approach requires considerable regulatory activity and
judgment ( e. g., What is an advanced low- GHG fuel? Does the electricity used in a Tesla roadster
count? Do the biofuels produced in the DOE pilot plants scheduled to come on line by 2012
count?). The more judgment that is required, the more open the process is to second- guessing
and litigation. The history of the Zero Emission Vehicle program is a good example of this
problem. The ARB should take these non- technical issues into account when it decides whether
to adopt a technology- forcing implementation of the LCFS.
Another approach to addressing this issue is the allocation of innovation credits. These credits
would increase in proportional to greater carbon intensity reductions, and would be allocated in
addition to credits that are directly proportional to GHG emission reductions ( where GHG
emissions are the product of the carbon intensity of the fuel and the volume of fuel sold). This
approach is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.
BOX 1: Illustrative technology of a technology forcing compliance path
2010: Mandatory reporting of carbon intensity of transportation fuels. Mandatory labeling of the
carbon intensity of fuels to provide consumers with information. Advanced fuels
( including electricity) can begin to earn credits based on a standard designed to promote
technological innovation to be used in later years. ARB determines benchmark for
advanced low- GHG fuel to meet the technology standards for 2012 and 2015.
2012: Mandatory use of low- GHG fuels that perform better than the best biofuel available in
2010 in sufficient quantity to achieve a 1 percent reduction in carbon intensity. 20 Credits
created by the use advanced fuels such as cellulosic ethanol or electricity prior to this
date can be used to meet this requirement. Compliance by payment of a non- criminal fee
to meet this requirement is also permitted.
2015: Mandatory use of low- GHG fuels that perform better than the best biofuel available in
2010 in sufficient quantity to achieve a 3 percent reduction in carbon intensity. The ARB
conducts a mid- course program review, including an evaluation of whether the
implementation of the LCFS is a reasonable way to achieve the 10 percent carbon
intensity goal.
2018: 6 percent carbon intensity reduction is required.
2020: 10 percent carbon intensity reduction is required.
20 The values given in this example, like 1%, are illustrative only. The ARB should determine appropriate values.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 37
3.3.3 Recommended compliance paths
The concerns about the cost, innovation, and environmental problems with near- term reductions
in carbon intensity to account for rationalization are important and the ARB should consider
them when implementing the LCFS. However, the problem of rationalization is also serious and
cannot be ignored. In addition, the traditional challenge of different objectives between
government and industry, and among industry participants means that the LCFS cannot rely on
the cooperation and good heartedness of regulated parties. If firms can identify a way to gain a
competitive advantage while complying with the letter of the LCFS but violating it’s spirit, they
may face financial pressures to do so.
Figure 3- 1 and Table 3- 2 illustrate four possible compliance paths. The Linear and Rationalized
pathways are taken from Figure 2- 1 of Part 1. The Technology Forcing compliance path is
described above in Box 1. The Accelerating compliance path assumes that 3 percentage points of
rationalization are likely to occur, and that a carbon intensity reduction beyond rationalization of
0.3 percent is required. Subsequent carbon intensity reductions are given in Table 3- 2. Because
the technology forcing compliance pathway is immune from rationalization in the beginning, the
modest carbon intensity reductions in the beginning of the period are acceptable. This is not the
case for the Accelerating compliance path, so rationalization must be accounted for.
These compliance pathways assume it is appropriate to allow rationalization to be used as
compliance options. This is not necessarily the case, and rationalization could be excluded from
acceptable compliance options. Alternatively rationalization could be allowed, but the 2020
targets tightened to achieve the goals of the LCFS.
We recommend either the Technology Forcing or Accelerated compliance paths be chosen. Both
of them will require careful analysis and judgment, either about what is an advanced technology,
or about how much rationalization is likely to occur. The ARB should study both carefully. Key
factors to include in deciding between them and designing the LCFS include:
" # Quality and reliability of the data underlying each evaluation
" # Ensure that the 2020 target is appropriate based on the results of the rationalization
analysis
" # Allow a wide array of technologies to compete and do not pick winners
" # Ensure the 5- year review evaluates progress in technological innovation, but is not
designed to allow delays or cancellations of the LCFS ( i. e. “ off- ramps”).
The “ Technology Forcing” path relies on volumetric requirements for advanced biofuels for
2012- 2017 and is immune from rationalization during this period. The “ Accelerating” and
“ Rationalized” paths both account for the amount of rationalization expected ( which CARB must
estimate), but at different times. If rationalization is determined to enable a substantial part of the
LCFS target, the ARB should consider adjusting the target downward ( to – 12 percent, for
instance) at the 2015 mid- course review.
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 38
LCFS compliance schedule
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
2005 2010 2015 2020
AFCI ( gCO2e/ MJ)
Tech. Forcing
Accelerating
Linear
Rationalized
Figure 3- 1: Illustrative compliance paths for the LCFS
Table 3- 2: Illustrative LCFS compliance schedules
Linear Rationalized Tech. Forcing Accelerating
AFCI AFCI AFCI AFCI
Annual
change
2005 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9
2006 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9
2007 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9
2008 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9
2009 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9
2010 87.1 85.1 87.9 87.9
2011 86.3 84.5 87.9 87.9
2012 85.5 83.9 87.1 85.1 - 3.3%
2013 84.7 83.4 87.1 85.0 - 0.1%
2014 83.9 82.8 87.1 84.9 - 0.2%
2015 83.1 82.2 86.2 84.6 - 0.4%
2016 82.3 81.6 86.2 84.1 - 0.6%
2017 81.5 81.1 86.2 83.3 - 0.9%
2018 80.7 80.5 82.7 82.3 - 1.2%
2019 79.9 79.9 82.7 80.9 - 1.7%
2020 79.1 79.4 79.1 79.2 - 2.2%
Implied from technology standard
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 39
3.3.4 State- level baseline
We recommend a single, average, state- wide baseline which implies a single carbon- intensity
target that would apply to all regulated entities. The alternative is firm- specific or facility-specific
carbon intensity baselines, such as would require each firm or facility to lower their
carbon intensity by 10 percent compared to their own carbon intensity in the baseline year.
This recommendation is distinct from the recommendations in section 3.2 regarding diesel and
gasoline. Here we address the issue of whether to use a single, average, state- wide baseline
target, or firm- specific baselines. A single state- wide baseline will be harder for some regulated
entities to meet than others. Firm- specific baselines reduce these differences. But there are
several problems with firm- specific baselines. Generally firms will avail themselves of the least
expensive reductions first, and the cost of additional reductions increases as more emission
reduction actions are taken. Thus, firms that took steps to lower their GHG emissions before the
LCFS was announced would be penalized, because those actions would not be allowed to count
towards meeting their LCFS targets; instead those actions result in a deeper target. Most
important, such a choice would signal to many firms in a variety of industries anticipating
possible future regulation not to risk good environmental behavior ( O'Hare and Mundel 1983).
Lastly, firm- level targets would not necessarily result in a 10 percent reduction in total carbon
intensity of California vehicle fuels, since the proportions of fuel produced by different firms,
with different targets, could change by 2020.
The argument for a single state- wide target, which would involve a wider range of compliance
costs for different firms depending on their current carbon intensities, is greatly simplified by the
existence of the market for credits. Therefore the choice of a single baseline or firm- specific
baselines should not change the actions firms take— the least expensive options would be taken
first; it only changes who pays the costs of those actions. Another justification for differential
costs of a single state- wide baseline and target is that it would result in a larger difference in
costs across high GHG and low GHG fuels in the state, more effectively internalizing some
amount of the costs of GHG emissions.
3.4 Point of regulation
RECOMMENDATION 4: The LCFS regulation should be imposed upon entities that
produce or import transportation fuel for use in California. For liquid fuels, these are
refiners, blenders and importers, and the point of regulation should be the point at which
finished gasoline or diesel is first manufactured or imported. For electricity and gaseous
fuel providers that choose to participate in the LCFS, the regulated entities should be
distributors of the fuel and the point of regulation should be the supply of electricity or fuel
to the vehicle.
3.4.1 Liquid Fuels
3.4.1.1 Liquid fuel production and distribution in California
The production of gasoline in California generally goes through the following stages ( Lockyear
2000; Borenstein, Bushnell, and Lewis 2004; Energy Information Administration 2003). The
California production and distribution system and the fuel itself are unique, the indirect result of
strict air pollution criteria pollutant standards. Diesel production and distribution is similar to
A Low Carbon Fuel Standard for California Part II: Policy Analysis Page 40
gasoline, except that there is no parallel to the ubiquitous blending of ethanol in gasoline.
Biodiesel is used in only very limited cases.
Crude oil is taken from the ground and then transported to a refinery where it is separated into
various refinery products, including the material that eventually goes into gasoline and diesel
fuel. Slightly less than half of the crude oil refined in California is produced in California, and
much of California oil production is heavy oil that is more viscous than conventional oil.
California refineries manufacture over 95 percent of all California gasoline. There are 21
refineries in California, which are owned by 15 independent firms.
To reduce air pollution, California imposes very strict rules on the formulation of gasoline ( and
diesel fuel). Refineries serving California’s gasoline market produce a material called CARBOB
( California Reformulated Gasoline Blendstock for Oxygenate Blending). Finished gasoline ready
for sale to consumers is manufactured by blending CARBOB with ethanol. All refineries
produce essentially identical CARBOB because a lot of gasoline is shipped to distribution
centers in common carrier pipelines that mix gasoline from different refineries. The gasoline that
emerges must be standardized so that after being blended with ethanol at the distribution
terminals, the gasoline still meets strict formulation requirements. The result is that all refiners
in California