|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
|
|
3
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
17
19
21
23
24
25
29
1 Executive Summary
California High- Speed Train Project
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Building on Worldwide Experience
2.3 Train Types and Amenities
2.4 The High- Speed Line and Physical Structures
2.5 Travel Times and Fares
2.6 High- Speed Train Stations
2.7 Environmental and Economic Benefits
Project Implementation Tasks and Schedules
3.1 Institutional Structure
3.2 Organizing Design, Construction and Operation Contracts
3.3 Technology Selection
3.4 Phasing and Staging Construction
3.5 Financing
3.6 Overview of Sample Schedule
3.7 Next Steps Forward
Endnotes
Sources
Photo Credits
2
3
4
5
31
32
6 33
Throughout California’s history,
our economic strength and develop-ment
have been led by advances
in transportation – first with the con-struction
of railroads and later by
investments in highways and airports.
In the mid- 1990s, inspired by stunning successes
in Japan and Europe, California began exploring
how an economically viable high- speed train line
linking major metropolitan areas could sustain
the state’s long- term mobility and economic
growth.
California’s burgeoning population and increas-ingly
congested highways and airports demand
new transportation solutions. Transportation
consistently ranks near the top of the list of
concerns expressed by the public. Yet, new
airport capacity has proven elusive. Planners in
San Diego and Orange counties, for example,
have been unable to site new airports after more
than a decade of effort. Highway construction
has become limited by environmental constraints,
development pressures and financing barriers.
As a result, in addition to the intercity travel
needs of the millions of visitors who come to our
state each year, Californians are confronted
with finding practical new options for accommo-dating
the intercity travel needs of 45 to 50 million
residents by the year 2020.
In 1996, the California High- Speed Rail Authority
was created to build a high- speed train network
connecting California’s major metropolitan areas.
By 2000, the Authority had developed invest-ment-
grade forecasts of ridership, revenue, cost
and benefits of the system.
In 2004, the Authority and the Federal Railroad
Administration ( FRA) issued a Draft Program
Environmental Impact Report/ Environmental
Impact Statement ( EIR/ EIS) ( two volumes and
64 technical reports), received and reviewed over
2,000 public and government agency comments,
and determined preferred corridors and stations
for the majority of the line.
With initial planning completed, the Authority
must next develop the structure and institutional
organization to manage construction worth tens
of billions of dollars, ensure maximum participa-tion
and risk- sharing from the private sector, and
successfully adapt the existing high- speed train
technology to California’s needs.
The first section of this implementation plan
summarizes the California high- speed project—
its alignment, stations and technologies— as well
as its financial and economic profile. The second
section lays out the roadmap for the Authority’s
evolution, from a planning authority with a small
staff to a construction management agency and,
finally, to a comprehensive long- term manager
of operations and assets.
Project Background
Created in 1996, the California High- Speed Rail
Authority has pursued the vision for a high- speed
train system connecting California’s major met-ropolitan
areas. The Authority has identified
preferred corridor alignments and stations from
the Central Valley through Los Angeles to San
Diego as well as inside much of the Bay Area.
Between the Central Valley and the Bay Area,
further study is needed to select a preferred
corridor alignment.
The recent program environmental review has
found that the high- speed train system will have
fewer impacts, create more economic stimulus
and cost less than half as much as the alterna-tive—
building more lanes, bridges and ramps
along highways; and terminals, gates and run-ways
at airports. The Authority’s studies show
that the full system, serving 30 stations, will
attract 42 to 68 million passengers per year in
2020, operate at a surplus and cost over
$ 33 billion to build. High- speed trains will be
capable of speeds of up to 220 mph and will be
similar to those in service today in Europe and
Asia. The system will be built mostly within or
alongside existing transportation corridors and
will be entirely grade- separated from parallel and
crossing roads, providing the same extremely
safe environment enjoyed in other countries,
where not a single passenger fatality has occurred
on new lines in 41 years of operation.
Trains will have multiple cars that can provide a
variety of accommodations for travelers, such
as a café car, business compartments, young
family play areas or even a “ Quiet Car” SM. Where
demand is high, trains could seat up to 1,600
passengers. Seat restraints or belts will not be
needed at any time and passengers will be free
to move around the train safely and comfortably.
Most of the high- speed train tracks will be at
ground level, needing a minimum path 50 feet
wide— comparable to a new two- lane road with
shoulders, but providing 20 times the transpor-tation
capacity.
In mountainous or hilly areas, or places where
road crossings and freight railroad spur tracks
are frequent, viaducts and tunnels may be used
to grade- separate the high- speed train tracks.
The high- speed train line will be fenced and
equipped with intrusion detection linked to a
state- of- the- art train control system.
Trains will draw electric power from overhead
wires connected to the commercial power grid
and, in braking, will regenerate electricity back
to the grid, thereby conserving power and reduc-ing
costs. Train maintenance will be performed
at several facilities throughout the state, whose
locations will be determined in the project- level
environmental work.
High- Speed Service and Station
Area Development
Express high- speed trains will take one hour and
fifteen minutes between San Diego and Los
Angeles, and a little over two and one- half hours
from San Francisco to Los Angeles. When time
to get to, through, and from stations and airports
is factored in, high- speed train travel will be as
quick or quicker than air travel for most trips,
and less time- consuming than all but the shortest
intercity trips by car.
High- speed train fares will be set between the
cost of driving and the fares for air travel and
will vary depending on the service chosen, the
demand for seats and time of booking. To meet
passenger demand forecast by 2020, 86 weekday
trains in each direction are expected to run in a
mix of express and local trains.
Each of the 30 potential stations are expected
to be significant hubs for transit- and pedestrian-oriented
community development. All sites will
be multi- modal transportation centers, serve a
share of the projected 115,000 to 186,000 daily
high- speed train passengers, and offer consid-erable
opportunities for new shopping and busi-ness
services.
Organizational Structure
Experience from recent successful large rail
projects shows that design and construction
staffing needs are highly dynamic, with large
numbers of expert, specialized staff needed for
relatively short periods of time. Even govern-ment-
owned railroads have made extensive use
of private sector consulting engineers and con-struction
contractors supervised by a core staff
of experts to manage contracts and ensure
fulfillment of public goals.
Increasingly, governments have looked to the
private sector for operation, maintenance and
financing of high- speed train lines. While some
projects have sought to assign the full responsi-bility
for implementation and operation to private
sector consortia, this is not possible in California,
because the high- speed train project is several
times more geographically extended, and finan-cially
several times more costly than the private
sector’s ability to obtain bonding to ensure com-pletion
of the project.
Consequently, the Authority has determined that
the best approach for the California high- speed
train is an institutional structure that relies upon
an experienced core public sector staff to manage
specialist contractors in civil and structural en-gineering,
architecture, train systems, construc-tion
management, operations and maintenance,
travel forecasting and marketing.
The Authority staff also will need strong capabil-ities
in environmental permitting, transportation
and procurement law, contract management and
finance to provide oversight and maintain its
fiduciary responsibilities.
Contracting for Design, Construction
and Operation
The Authority will divide the project into a variety
of contracts of different lengths, content and
dollar amounts to achieve the best combination
of cost, schedule, technical expertise and equi-table
distribution of work within California.
The Authority will generally use a “ design/ build”
approach in awarding infrastructure contracts,
integrating the final design and construction into
single contracts.
For the various high- speed trains and their power,
signaling, track and communications systems,
the Authority believes a single contract for design,
installation/ supply and maintenance is the best
guarantor of success and cost- effectiveness.
The Authority will seek bids on these terms and—
if warranted by the ridership and revenue studies
underway and the potential suppliers’ perception
of the revenue risks— may also seek to include
operations in those bids.
Choosing the California High- Speed
Train Technology
The Authority intends to adapt to U. S. require-ments
the electrically powered high- speed train
technology that has been proven extremely safe
and effective in revenue service in Europe and
Asia. This will minimize the risks of unproven
technology, lower costs, ensure a faster delivery
of rolling stock, and assure the use of the safest
transportation technology operating today.
Several train and systems manufacturing con-sortia
are expected to aggressively compete for
the chance to equip California’s high- speed train
line and to develop the nation’s first high- speed
train system that meets U. S. requirements. This
offers California the valuable opportunity to obtain
a competitively priced system.
The Authority and any potential high- speed train
supplier will have to obtain approval of operating
equipment, infrastructure and operating practices
from the FRA. As an early priority, the Authority
will assemble an industry group to cooperatively
study with the FRA whatever changes may be
needed to European or Asian designs. Based
on these results, the Authority will competitively
bid the high- speed train systems, select a winning
bidder and then formally apply to the FRA for
specific approval.
The Authority believes it will obtain approval
based on the demonstrated safety of high- speed
trains on mostly dedicated, grade- separated
lines with appropriate train control systems,
inspection and maintenance regimes, and afford-able
design changes.
Construction and Financing of
the Line
In deciding which parts of the line would start
construction and operation first, the Authority
will consider the following factors:
availability of capital
ridership
ability to operate without state subsidy
train maintenance
geographical distribution of
construction and service
scarcity- related cost increases
A full financing plan will be developed after
completion of the ongoing ridership and revenue
forecast update. Currently, the most likely funding
sources are through public/ state- issued bonds
and federal matching funds.
Sample Schedule Overview
It will take from eight to 11 years, depending on
the complexity of the segment, to develop and
begin operation of an initial segment of the
California high- speed train, assuming that the
Authority chooses a specific supplier of high-speed
train technology as an early action.
Next Steps
Complete selection of preferred
alignments and stations
Start project- level environmental
impact review on high- priority segments
Prepare financial plan
Develop Authority staffing resources
plan and scope- of- work for a
program management team
Select the program management team
Pre- qualify train system suppliers and
undertake joint industry/ FRA studies
Work with local governments and
transportation agencies on right-of-
way preservation.
With adequate funding, the Authority can move forward on the following next steps:
Introduction
Through California’s history, economic strength
and development have been led by advances in
transportation— first with the construction of
railroads and later by investments in highways
and airports. In the mid- 1990s, inspired by
stunning successes in Japan and Europe,
California began exploring how a high- speed
train line linking the major metropolitan areas
could cost- effectively sustain the state’s long-term
mobility and economic growth.
In 1996, the California High- Speed Rail Authority
( Authority) was created to implement a high-speed
train system connecting California’s major
metropolitan areas. By 2000, the Authority had
developed investment- grade forecasts of rider-ship,
revenue and cost, and quantified the ben-efits
of the high- speed line embodied in a busi-ness
plan. Shortly after the issuance of the
business plan, the Authority initiated the required
federal and state programmatic environmental
reviews in partnership with the U. S. Department
of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administra-tion
( FRA). In 2004, the Authority and the FRA
issued a Draft Program Environmental Impact
Report/ Environmental Impact Statement ( EIR/ EIS)
( two volumes and 64 technical reports), received
and reviewed over 2,000 public and government
agency comments, and determined preferred
corridors and stations for the majority of the line.
The Authority, having accomplished this initial
planning work with a small staff directing numer-ous
consultant teams, must now develop the
structure and organization to manage construc-tion
work worth tens of billions of dollars, ensure
maximum participation and risk- sharing from
the private sector, and successfully adapt existing
high- speed train technology to California’s needs.
The first section of this implementation plan
summarizes the California high- speed train pro-ject—
its alignment, stations and technologies—
as well as its financial and economic profile. The
second section lays out the roadmap for the
Authority’s evolution, from planning authority with
a small staff, to construction management agency
and, finally, to a comprehensive long- term manager
of operations and assets.
Building on Worldwide Experience
California’s high- speed trains will use state- of-the-
art electrified trains capable of speeds of up
to 220 mph in revenue service similar to those
in service today in Europe and Asia. The line
will consist of new infrastructure, often in or
alongside existing transportation corridors, but
mostly existing railroads. The entire high- speed
train system will be grade- separated from parallel
and crossing roads providing a very reliable and
extremely safe travel environment.
Proven high- speed train technology was chosen
because it meets the requirements of the enabling
legislation for the California High- Speed Rail
Authority to operate at sustained speeds of 200
mph ( 320 km/ h) or greater and because there is
extensive operational history for this technology
and there are competitive manufacturers. Addi-tionally,
high- speed trains like these have the
potential to share tracks at reduced speeds with
other conventional trains.
High- speed trains have steadily expanded their
market share and geographical coverage in
Europe and Asia.
Beginning in 1964 with the Tokyo– Osaka bullet
train ( Shinkansen), Japan showed that high-speed
trains could provide major transportation
capacity, deliver significant operating profits,
and reduce the need for new airports and high-ways.
Today’s 1,350 miles of high- speed line
continues to be expanded to serve most major
cities and the additional demand for travel that
comes with increasing income and population.
Today, the Shinkansen carries over 300 million
passengers a year.
In 41 years of high- speed train operation in
Japan, there has not been a single passenger
fatality, largely due to the separation of the rail
line from roads and the myriad of safety fea-tures
and operating procedures incorporated
into the service.
In Europe, the first high- speed train began op-erating
in 1976 on a short section of a new line
between Rome and Florence that was completed
in 1992. In 1981, the first TGVs were operating
on portions of a new line between Paris and
Lyon, eventually cutting the train trip time in half
and freeing up airline and airport capacity for
flights from overseas and the rest of Europe. In
1987, Germany launched its first high- speed
train and began operations of InterCity Express
( ICE) service.
With the addition of new lines in Italy, France
and Germany, and the construction of high-speed
lines in Spain, England, Belgium and the
Netherlands, over 2,550 miles of high- speed
lines have been completed in Europe. European
high- speed trains currently carry roughly 250
million passengers a year and have not had a
passenger fatality on new grade- separated high-speed
lines.
In 2002, Korea opened a high- speed line from
Seoul to Pusan, which is now carrying around
100,000 passengers per day. Taiwan has begun
operational tests on a new 225- mile- long high-speed
line from Taipei to Kaohsiung, and expects
to carry around 186,000 passengers per day
within a decade.
Top commercial speeds on dedicated high- speed
lines continue to increase in response to market
demand, technological advancement and oper-ational
profitability. These trains have run daily
at top speeds of 187 mph ( 300 km/ h) for over
15 years, and the newest lines are being built to
accommodate 218 mph ( 350 km/ h). East Japan
Railways is testing prototype trains capable of
in- service speeds of 224 mph ( 360 km/ h).
Recorded test speeds routinely exceed commer-cial
speeds, providing significant confidence in
the capability of these train systems to operate
commercially at these higher speeds. Currently,
the TGV holds the train speed record at 323 mph
( 515 km/ h), and the ICE and various Shinkansen
trains have reached 255 mph and 277 mph,
respectively.
Figure 2.2
TGV
Mediterranean
line crosses A7
toll plaza near
Avignon
Figure 2.3
Shinkansen on elevated track travels
through Tokyo
Train Types and Amenities
In developing California’s system, the Authority
intends to take full advantage of the many years
of research and development and practical ap-plication
of high- speed train service by utilizing
train systems that have been proven in everyday
regular revenue service over extended periods
of time.
Operating “ trainsets” will have multiple cars and
will be up to 1,300 feet long, depending on the
type of train and the market demand. At peak
travel times, trains can be lengthened, or trainsets
can be connected, to operate as a single train,
providing seating for up to 1,600 passengers.
Seats will have more space than a conventional
airline seat and seat restraints or belts will not
be needed at any time. Passengers will be able
to comfortably and safely stroll to a café car to
purchase snacks and beverages. The precise
configuration of seating and accommodation
will depend on market demand. With multiple
cars, each trainset can provide different types
of accommodation for different passenger mar-kets.
The same train can have business com-partments
for conferencing en route, theater- or
airline- style seating, young family play areas, or
even “ Quiet Cars” SM where cell phones and loud
computer programs are not allowed. Tables,
power jacks, reliable cell phone connections,
wireless Internet service and video or audio
entertainment can also be provided, depending
on market demand.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6
High- speed train interiors –
seating, Shinkansen ( top),
TGV café car ( bottom)
0.70
3.60
5.70
8.30
9.30 9.40
10.40
11.20
12.40
16.30
21.60
26.50 28.90 32.10
32.90
37.40
42.30
48.50
52.70 53.30
10.70
27.90
53.30
41.80 41.70
46.10
58.40
40.80
55.40 55.90 57.40
64.40 66.00
72.20 74.20 73.10 72.60
68.20
70.80 72.00 73.20 71.00 70.00 71.30
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
BILLIONS OF PASSENGER- KILOMETERS
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH- SPEED TRAIN RIDERSHIP IN JAPAN AND EUROPE
Japan Europe
Figure 2.4
Source: UIC,
International
Union of
Railways
The High- Speed Line and Physical
Structures
The majority of the California high- speed train
system will be at- grade alongside existing rail-roads,
roads and highways. The minimum path
required for the two- track rail line is about 50
feet wide, or about the space required for a new
two- lane highway with shoulders and a small
median. However, this two- track high- speed
train line has 20 times the capacity of such a
road, allowing up to 20 trains per hour in each
direction.
Smooth transitions and grades of less than three
percent will assure a comfortable and safe ride
at high speeds. Mountainous and hilly areas
often will require viaducts and tunnels, as seen
in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. Also, in areas with many
consecutive at- grade road crossings or freight
railroad sidings, viaducts and tunnels may be
used to separate the high- speed line, rather than
building numerous bridges over the line.
California’s high- speed trains will mirror the
outstanding safety record of overseas systems.
Tracks will be fully grade- separated from road
traffic with bridges or underpasses. The high-speed
line will be fenced and equipped with
intrusion alarms linked to train controls that can
detect persons, animals or debris on the tracks.
And high- speed train control systems will provide
in- cab signaling and automatically stop trains if
necessary.
The electric trains will draw power from overhead
wires connected to the commercial power grid.
Trains will be regularly inspected at terminal
stations and train maintenance will be performed
at several new facilities throughout the state,
whose locations will be determined during the
project- level environmental work.
Figure 2.7
( far left)
TGV on viaduct,
near Sens, France
Figure 2.8 ( left)
Tungsiao tunnel
portal and high-speed
track,
Taiwan
Travel Times and Fares
The California high- speed train will be very com-petitive
with air travel times for many intercity
travelers and will be faster than all but the shortest
intercity trips by car. Figure 2.9 displays the
door- to- door time for several major markets;
while less time is spent on a plane than on the
high- speed train, extra time required to pass
through airport security and for access/ egress
to and from airports makes rail faster overall for
many trips, including the downtown- to- downtown
trips shown.
The high- speed train will not only save its pas-sengers
time but also will benefit those who
choose to use the airlines and roads— by reduc-ing
the additional peak demand and congestion
that is expected to grow by 2020.
Fares will be set to maximize the transportation
and environmental benefits of the investment
while still providing a positive cash flow to cover
operations. This level lies between the cost of
driving and the fares for air travel. As in systems
around the world, fares would vary depending
on how much in advance tickets were bought
and the class of service, such as coach or busi-ness.
To meet 2020 forecast passenger demand,
86 trains are projected to run in each direction
on weekdays in a mix of express and local trains
that maximize service to a variety of markets.
AVERAGE ESTIMATED TRAVEL TIME BY MODE IN 2020 WITH HIGH- SPEED TRAIN
Number
of trains
per day
Type of train service
20
21
20
21
4
Northern End Cities Intermediate Stops Southern End Cities
Express
Semi- Express
Suburban- Express
Local
Regional
YEAR 2020 POTENTIAL TRAIN STOPPING PATTERNS ( total per day each direction)
Figure 2.9
Figure 2.10
h= hours m= minutes
TOTAL
Door to Door
AUTO
On the plane
AIR
TOTAL
Door to Door On the train
HIGH- SPEED TRAIN
Express Times
TOTAL
CITY PAIRS Door to Door
Los Angeles to
San Francisco
Fresno to
Los Angeles
San Diego to
Los Angeles
Burbank to
San Jose
Sacramento to
San Jose
7h 36m
4h 18m
2h 41m
6h 32m
2h 33m
1h 20m
1h 05m
0h 48m
1h 00m
no service
3h 26m
3h 00m
2h 46m
3h 08m
2h 35m
1h 22m
1h 13m
1h 59m
0h 50m
3h 30m
2h 33m
2h 16m
3h 02m
1h 53m
High- Speed Train Stations
Stations providing travelers with access to high-speed
trains can be strong focal points for transit-oriented
community development. Approximately
30 potential stations have been identified based
on their ridership potential, cost to construct,
opportunity to connect with other modes of
transportation, and distribution of population
and major destinations along the routes.
Existing transportation hubs will be served, such
as Union Station in Los Angeles, Santa Fe Depot
in San Diego, Diridon Station in San Jose, Trans-bay
Terminal in San Francisco and Anaheim
( ARTIC) Station.
The high- speed train facilities at each station
will consist of tracks, controlled access platforms,
full access for disabled passengers and
ticketing/ waiting/ passenger service areas.
Many stations along the route will have platform
tracks off the main high- speed line to allow
express trains to pass unimpeded. Stations are
expected to have 1,300- foot- long platforms
allowing level boarding of the train.
Figure 2.11 High- speed train station in France
built for the TGV Mediterranean in Avignon
Figure 2.13
New TGV station
and development
at Perpignan
Figure 2.12 Multi- level Kyoto station combines
travel and commerce
In urban centers where trains would routinely
end their runs, larger and more complex track
and platform arrangements are planned. Such
stations also will provide sufficient passenger
traffic to create new opportunities for shopping,
business meetings, and provide offices and other
development not primarily dependent on the
automobile for mobility. Kyoto’s Shinkansen
station is shown in Figure 2.12 on the previous
page as an example of how this could occur.
Preferred station sites will all be multi- modal
transportation hubs with links to local and regional
transit, airports and highways. It is assumed
that parking at the stations would be provided
at market rates ( no free parking). Each station
site would support higher density, mixed- use,
pedestrian- oriented development around the
station. As the project proceeds to more detailed
study, local governments will have to plan and
zone for transit- oriented development around
high- speed train station locations and to finance
( e. g., through value capture or other financing
techniques) and maintain the public spaces
needed to support the pedestrian traffic gener-ated
by hub stations.
The precise location, configuration and number
of stations is not known at this time, but would
be decided during subsequent project- level
environmental review.
Environmental and Economic Benefits
Spurred by population and economic growth in
the next 35 years, intercity travel and long-distance
commuting in California is forecast to
nearly double from current levels. Comprehensive
studies comparing the environmental impacts
of high- speed trains and alternative highway/
airport expansion alone ( conducted from 2000
to 2004 in compliance with California and federal
requirements) concluded that high- speed trains
would:
create less impact on the natural and built
environment
– less potential impact on wetlands and
water resources, biology and farmlands
– less noise impact and even reductions
in areas where the high- speed train
project grade- separates existing roads
over adjacent rail lines
cost less than half as much to build over
30 years than other transportation options
and will not require operating subsidy
create more jobs and economic activity
and reduce the cost of travel in the state
encourage more compact transit- oriented
development, saving 67,000 acres from
urban/ suburban development, including
24,000 acres of farmland
avoid 10,000 auto accidents yearly with
their attendant deaths, injuries and property
damage compared to expanding only
highways
save up to five million barrels of oil per year
and reduce pollutant emissions, even with
future improvements in auto fuel efficiency.
Furthermore, economic studies show that the
high- speed trains would bring economic benefits
worth twice the cost of construction and would
directly result in creating 450,000 new permanent
jobs in California.
Institutional Structure
The Authority’s legislative mandate to develop
a high- speed train system includes broad powers
to enter into contracts for any of the stages and
activities of planning, design, construction, op-eration
and maintenance. To date, the Authority
has used this power to conduct its planning
work with a small staff directing numerous con-sultant
teams under contract.
Now, the Authority needs to transition into an
agency capable of handling much larger work-loads
and ensuring that the public interest is met
during all phases of the project. The agency
staff needs to have a broad range of expertise,
provide continuity and institutional stability, and
be able to adequately oversee private sector
contractors. At the same time, the Authority
wants to keep the permanent agency staff small
enough to be flexible, innovative and efficient
during the various phases of the project.
The Authority examined several recent successful
large high- speed train and related infrastructure
projects, both overseas and in the U. S., to identify
the institutional structure that would best meet
its objectives. Organizational alternatives ranged
from established government- owned railroads
to small new government agencies that issue
large, long- term franchise contracts to major
private sector conglomerates.
Each of the projects investigated had very
dynamic staffing needs. Large numbers of spe-cialized
engineering and construction personnel
were needed over a relatively short design and
construction period, and even during this phase,
the necessary specialties changed. Subsequent
long- term operations typically required yet a
different group of specialized personnel. All of
these projects used contractors to some extent
to meet these changing personnel needs.
The specialized expertise needed to oversee
implementation and operation of a high- speed
train system does not currently exist in California
state government, although the related expertise
of state agencies could be tapped for some
functions. Personnel needs would vary during
implementation ( e. g., to support the construction
effort, several hundred staff would be needed
for limited terms varying from two to 10 years).
Current state personnel hiring processes are
cumbersome and time- consuming and do not
provide recruitment incentives to attract the
specialized expertise needed to manage con-struction
and launch of the proposed system.
While rail operations and maintenance functions
will be ongoing, the capability to carry these
functions out is more readily available in the
private sector. Competitive private sector bidding
is increasingly used by California’s public transit
agencies and for high- speed train operations in
Europe and Asia.
The Authority has determined that the best ap-proach
for the California high- speed train is a
hybrid institutional structure which relies upon
an expert core public sector staff using compet-itive
contracting to the greatest extent possible.
Private sector contractors would best provide
the majority of personnel needed to implement
the high- speed train system. This structure
would allow for competitive bidding and targeted
recruitment to meet the ebbs and flows of ex-pertise
and labor needed to implement and
operate the proposed system. A key private
sector contract would provide for project man-agement
support.
Initially, the project management contractor/ s,
under the direction of Authority staff, would assist
in the development of design criteria, preliminary
designs, bid documents, project timeline and
controls, and system integration. When projects
enter the design and construction stage, the
project management contractor/ s would provide
oversight and coordination of the work being
done by other contractors. The project manage-ment
contractor/ s would need to be brought on
early in the implementation period through multi-year
contracts requiring continued close coordi-nation
with and oversight by the Authority staff.
Other private sector agreements would include
numerous contracts for civil works design and
construction, train systems design, procurement
and installation as well as operations, mainte-nance
and supply contracts.
The Authority would need to be able to manage
a number of separate activities for different parts
of the system simultaneously— planning, environ-mental
review and permitting; design, real estate
acquisition, negotiations with existing railroads
and public entities; construction and testing; and
finally, operation, maintenance and supply.
Figure 3.1
Organizing Design, Construction and
Operation Contracts
The Authority’s enabling legislation gives it the
ability to enter into contracts with private or
public entities for the design, construction and
operation of high- speed trains and allows for
contracts to be separated into individual tasks
or segments, including design/ build or de-sign/
build/ operate contracts.
At over $ 33 billion for the complete high- speed
train project, a single contract for the planning,
design, construction, operation and maintenance
of the entire system is neither practical nor
desirable. The project is simply too large to
consider such an approach. Numerous private
sector contracts in varying sizes and dollar
amounts will be required to complete system
implementation. Breaking the project tasks into
multiple contracts, where possible, would pro-mote
competition within the construction and
supply industry.
With a modest public sector staff supported by
private sector consultants and the Authority’s
broad contracting capabilities, the Authority
can choose the best procurement strategy for
each contract package, whether design/ build,
design/ bid/ build, design/ build/ operate,
design/ build/ operate/ maintain or other hybrid.
Design/ Build ( D- B)
This approach integrates the design and con-struction
functions into one contract. D- B will
generally be the most appropriate approach
for the large civil works construction contracts.
Detailed design and construction will be based
on the preliminary designs prepared by the
Authority and its consultants and the performance
criteria.
The D- B method brings many benefits:
it provides a single point of responsibility
for final design and construction
it typically reduces the time for project
completion
project costs are usually reduced due
to lower design costs ( as compared to
the DBB method)
the latest in construction methods are
integrated early into the design
it allows for “ fast- track” construction
( the ability to begin construction while the
design of the project element continues)
and D- B can effectively harness competition
among contractors and suppliers.
Design/ Bid/ Build ( DBB)
The DBB method is the conventional method for
building public works projects in the U. S. Pre-liminary
designs are prepared by either the project
management contractor/ s or other contractor/ s.
Based on the preliminary design and the perfor-mance
criteria, the Authority would contract for
the development of final designs and bid docu-ments.
The completed final designs would be
put out to bid for construction.
The DBB method would allow the Authority
greater control because the designer is exclu-sively
serving the Authority’s interests, and it
increases the involvement of smaller, local and
minority- owned contractors; however, it requires
more oversight, coordination and administration
from the Authority. The DBB method is not easily
fast- tracked due to the need to conduct two
procurement processes, and it requires extensive
coordination between the design and construc-tion
contractors.
Design/ Build/ Operate ( DBO),
Design/ Build/ Maintain ( DBM),
or Design/ Build/ Operate/ Maintain
( DBOM)
These methods initially are similar to the de-sign/
build option but continue over time with
added functions of operations or operations with
maintenance. While the Authority has found it
impractical and undesirable to enter into a single
franchise contract for the implementation of the
entire high- speed train system, there is the
possibility of entering into a single contract for
the systems ( signaling, communications, track
and electrification) and train technology for the
entire project. This option may provide the best
opportunity for private sector financing, risk
sharing and clear accountability for the perfor-mance
of trains and systems.
Although the Authority will utilize all contracting
mechanisms, the Authority believes that the
design/ build procurement strategy will likely be
preferred for the major, high- value construction
contracts, especially those in which final design
and construction problems are relatively well
understood at the end of preliminary design.
The Authority believes that the best procurement
strategy for the train technology and systems
will include design, construction/ supply/ instal-lation
and maintenance in a single contract
because it best supports the integration of high-speed
train systems and offers the possibility of
leveraging public/ private partnership opportuni-ties.
In some projects, operations of the train
service has also been included with provision
of train systems and, in others, maintenance
and operations have been kept separate. The
Authority may consider a train systems package
that includes maintenance and operations as
well; this decision will depend on the outcome
of the final ridership and revenue analyses
now underway and on the potential suppliers’
perception of the revenue risks.
Further discussions with technology providers
and others as well as additional analysis will be
needed to determine if a DBOM for the systems
and train technology is financially feasible and
preferable to a DBM. If a single DBOM or DBM
is not pursued, another approach would be to
break major system and operating elements into
separate contracts: 1) track; 2) electrification;
3) signaling/ communications and train technol-ogy;
4) operations; and 5) maintenance.
In any of these approaches, a single operator
would be responsible for providing a variety
of services ( local, regional, express, premium,
etc.). The Authority believes that a single high-speed
train operator would better ensure inte-gration
of services, accountability, reduced risk,
effective coordination and communication, and
would simplify Authority oversight.
Figure 3.2
Artist cross-section
of
proposed
Transbay
station
Technology Selection
In developing California’s high- speed train, the
Authority intends to build on technology devel-oped
over more than 40 years of increasingly
sophisticated and extensive high- speed train
service around the world. Having existing sup-pliers
adapt off- the- shelf equipment to an as-sortment
of U. S. requirements will minimize the
risks of unproven technology, lower the cost of
design and testing, ensure a faster delivery of
trainsets, and place more of the risk on the
supplier.
However, one issue will require the Authority to
work closely with the FRA on potential changes
to or waivers from FRA regulations in order to
operate the safest, most reliable high- speed train
service possible. Extremely successful European
and Asian technology differs significantly in one
major respect from the current U. S. regulatory
requirements governing passenger and freight
trains. The FRA currently requires all existing
U. S. passenger trains to be at least twice as
strong in certain aspects than the lightweight
equipment used in European and Asian high-speed
trains. In order to meet this strength
requirement, manufacturers would have to struc-turally
redesign their trains, at significant addi-tional
development cost and time, resulting in
higher costs to the Authority, but with uncertain
effect on the ultimate safety of the operation.
Such a redesign would make high- speed rolling
stock heavier, jeopardizing the low axle loadings
that have efficiently enabled the high speeds,
low operating and maintenance costs, and pos-itive
cash flows like those enjoyed by high- speed
train operations in Europe and Asia. In addition
to being more costly to purchase and operate,
heavier equipment may cause changes in other
system components such as track or bridges
and result in higher maintenance costs.
In the late 1990s, the FRA considered waiving
U. S. equipment strength requirements to allow
operation of a Florida high- speed line because
it was to be operated on rights- of- way dedicated
to high- speed train operation and separate from
other railroad lines. However, suspension of the
Florida project meant that FRA rule- making
was never completed. Under any circumstance,
California will have to start a similar federal
regulatory process that will lead to an FRA “ Rule
of Particular Applicability” governing operations
up to 220 mph on the high- speed- train- only
lines.
While the majority of the high- speed train system
is being planned with dedicated separate tracks,
there are two sections of the system that are
proposed to be shared with existing commuter
and intercity trains at reduced speeds. Under
current regulations, either the selected European
or Asian equipment would have to be modified
Figure 3.3
Shinkansen in the
countryside, Japan
structurally to meet the FRA requirements or the
proposed system would have to be modified in
other ways to avoid compatibility conflicts with
freight trains and conventional passenger trains.
The Authority will engage the FRA and a group
of pre- qualified high- speed train manufacturers
to investigate safety approaches that have been
applied successfully in other countries and to
consider how existing high- speed train vehicles
and systems might need to be modified for use
in California. Manufacturers would be pre- qualified
for future California contracts based upon their
existing ability to produce very high- speed trains
and their willingness to work with the state and
federal governments. Pre- qualification of manu-facturers
and safety studies will also improve
price competition and quality of bids on the trains
and systems as well as improve the Authority’s
ability to evaluate those bids.
Pre- qualification is intended to help streamline
FRA rule- making for California’s unique circum-stances.
Once the FRA/ high- speed train systems
compatibility studies are completed and financing
is secured, the Authority will proceed to a com-petitive
procurement of the high- speed train and
related systems from among the pre- qualified
high- speed train manufacturers. A decision on
which high- speed train system to use will then
allow the Authority to formally apply to the FRA
for the Rule of Particular Applicability.
The California high- speed train has been devel-oped
with criteria and standards that allow use
of any of the existing European and Asian tech-nologies.
Prior to selecting a train technology,
progress can be made on numerous planning,
environmental approval and preliminary design
tasks that will take several years. However,
detailed design will be made more efficient by
the selection of a specific train type and system,
and in some cases will require coordinated,
technology- specific parameters such as electric
power supply and signal systems. Optimally,
the train technology selection will be made and
rule- making will be substantially completed within
two to three years of obtaining significant funding
for the project and before the planning and
environmental work is completed.
Figure 3.4
High- speed
train station
with multiple
platforms
available for
arrivals and
departures
Phasing and Staging Construction
The California high- speed train project is over
700 miles long, with 30 potential station locations.
The estimated cost for the entire project is over
$ 33 billion. The sheer scale of this proposal
makes it impractical to construct and initiate
operations of the entire project all at once. Even
if sufficient funds were secured, constructing a
project this large all at once would strain the
California economy through excessive demand
for construction materials and labor. Like other
large transportation projects, the high- speed
train system can be divided into smaller seg-ments
that can be operated before the full system
is complete.
New ridership and revenue forecasts are being
prepared and further studies must be done for
the Authority to select a preferred route for the
northern mountain crossing between the Bay
Area and the Central Valley. Both are critical to
determining operable segments and in which
order to construct and open them for service.
Moreover, the amount of capital available to
implement the system and any limitations on the
use of those funds should be known prior to
making commitments regarding the phasing of
construction.
Selection of workable segments and the order
in which they are phased should include these
considerations:
the availability of capital to construct the
segment/ s and procure train systems
ridership and revenue potential and the
ability of the segment/ s to be operated
without state subsidy
the ability to service trainsets at appropriate
maintenance facilities
a distribution of construction and initiation
of service in regions of both Northern and
Southern California
the avoidance of cost increases related
to labor or material scarcity.
The High- Speed Passenger Train Bond Act
( SB 1865/ SB1169) directs that the first portion
of the high- speed train system to be funded will
be San Francisco to Los Angeles. Even along
that route there may be regional segments that
can be opened before construction is complete
on the entire north- south line.
Figure 3.5
Laying tracks, Taiwan, ROC
Financing
The California high- speed train project is one of
the world’s largest public works projects, with
estimated costs over $ 33 billion. Based on the
experience of other countries, a “ carefully
planned” high- speed train system is a smart
investment that is projected to return a benefit
of at least two dollars for every public dollar
invested. More importantly, once built, the service
provided by the system is expected to yield
annual operating surpluses in excess of $ 300
million ($ 1999/ Business Plan 2000).
High- speed lines worldwide generate surpluses
( 1) from their operations, unlike traditional pas-senger
service, because high- speed attracts
more passengers, generates more revenues and
lowers unit costs of production ( e. g., a crew can
make two round trips a day instead of one). The
resulting combination of higher revenue and
lower unit operating costs has made all high-speed
train services net contributors to the
financial performance of their operators. In
Europe and Japan, high- speed train systems
generate enough revenue to cover operational
costs ( 2), and most of the high- speed lines cover
some of their construction costs ( the Tokaido
Line between Tokyo and Osaka generated
enough operating surplus in the first decade
to completely match the capital costs). In Cali-fornia,
a high- speed train will compete with
automobiles and airplanes, which have enjoyed
a century of substantial public funding and
are well- established. Until the high- speed
train system operates at a surplus, public
resources will be needed for capital and de-ployment
costs.
In 2000, the Authority published its business
plan, which presented two funding approaches:
a full- funding scenario, which assumed
that the entire system be constructed
simultaneously
a phased- funding approach that focused
on securing resources required to com-plete
discrete sequential phases of the
project as expeditiously as possible.
The Authority concluded that the phased- funding
approach is the most prudent and business- like
approach and will ultimately be of better value
to the state’s taxpayers. The phased- funding
approach calls for development of a detailed
financing plan which would include state and
federal funding sources as well as the Authority’s
broad contracting powers to secure private sector
funds.
Since the preparation of the 2000 business plan,
there have been some developments in potential
funding sources for the high- speed train system.
Figure 3.6 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS; 1999 $$ UNLESS ANNOTATED
For sources see page 32
( 1) ( 2) see Endnotes
OVERSEAS HIGH- SPEED TRAIN COMPARISONS
COST
PER MILE
YEAR PASSENGERS
( millions)
REVENUE OPERATING
COST
NET OPERATING
CASH FLOW
CAPITAL
COST
MILES
Tokaido
Shinkansen
Tohoku/ Joetsu
Shinkansen
TGV Paris- Lyon
TGV Atlantique
$ 18
$ 72
$ 32
$ 29
1990
1992
1991
1991
191
76
19
18
$ 9,100
$ 3,230
$ 1,100
$ 810
$ 3,330
N/ A
$ 440
$ 355
$ 6,770
N/ A
$ 660
$ 455
$ 5,800
$ 33,300
$ 8,070
$ 5,000
320
460
250
170
THSRC 2009 68 $ 1,920 $ 650 $ 1,270 $ 15,300- $ 73- 92
$ 19,400
210
In 2002, The Safe, Reliable High- Speed Passen-ger
Train Bond Act for the 21st Century ( SB 1856
- Costa) was signed into law by former Governor
Gray Davis calling for voter approval in the
November 2004 general election of $ 9.95 billion
in General Obligation ( GO) bonds for rail devel-opment
in California. Nine billion was authorized
for high- speed trains and $ 950 million was
authorized for capital improvements to intercity
and commuter rail lines and urban rail systems.
Due to the state’s fiscal condition in 2004,
SB 1856 was amended by SB 1169 ( Murray)
and signed by Governor Schwarzenegger
delaying the vote until the November 2006
general election.
The potential availability of GO bonds, coupled
with the refinement of the high- speed train pro-gram
through environmental review, requires
development of an updated financing plan. That
plan will be developed concurrently with and
based on a new ridership/ revenue study currently
underway ( 3) and will take into consideration the
availability of GO bonds as a potential funding
source.
Overview of Sample Schedule
It will take from eight to 11 years to develop and
begin operation of an initial segment. The sched-ule
below illustrates the sequencing of major
tasks, assuming that the Authority chooses a
specific supplier of high- speed train technology
as an early action. Each of the line items is briefly
discussed on the following pages.
SAMPLE SCHEDULE
Major financing available
Organization and agreements
Segment planning, EIR/ EIS & permits
Preliminary design
Project control, mgmt., verification
FRA/ train systems compatibility studies
Train system selection
FRA rule
Train system testing, construction & delivery
Right- of- way acquisition
Final design
Earthworks, RR viaducts
Grade separation
Track, power
Signals, communications
Testing, open for service
Begin/ End marker
Completion milestone
Intermediate milestone
# of trains
Prototype train
Design & construction contractors
Train builders
Operators
Authority staff & direct contractors
Figure 3.7
( 3) see Endnotes
Major Financing Available
Completion of planning for the high- speed train
system, program- level environmental impact
reviews and FRA/ high- speed train systems
compatibility studies can be accomplished with
annual appropriations until major financing is
available. However, a significant portion of the
funding for the first segment of the high- speed
train will have to be available with a reasonably
certain plan to secure the remainder before pre-construction/
supply/ installation work can begin.
Key elements of that work include:
bids from train systems suppliers
specific FRA rules to govern the system
and operations at planned speeds over
150 mph
preliminary design of the alignment,
structures, stations and facilities
project- specific environmental review
bids for final design and construction
of the high- speed train.
The most likely sources are the state bond ref-erendum
placed on the ballot by the California
Legislature and federal matching funds.
Organization and Agreements
Critical to the success of the high- speed train
system are: institutional development of the
Authority, selection of project management and
other consultants, agreements with significant
stakeholders such as railroads and existing rail
operators, and establishment of guidelines and
agreements for station development. Agree-ments
would be sought with local agencies to
maximize infill transit- oriented joint development
of station areas. Preliminary agreements with
affected railroads and rail operators need to be
reached before project- specific EIR/ EIS work
can progress, with final agreements after the
EIR/ EIS work and FRA rule- making.
Segment Planning, EIR/ EIS & Permits
Project- specific EIR/ EIS work supported by
preliminary design will require one to two years
to reach a draft EIR/ EIS, followed by a final
EIR/ EIS and agency sign- off six to12 months
later. Major permits from federal and state agen-cies
would follow six to 12 months after that.
Preliminary Design
Preliminary design constitutes 15 to 30 percent
of the total design required for a segment and
is required to support the EIR/ EIS, permitting,
agreement and right- of- way acquisition.
Project Control, Management and
Verification
The Authority must systematically control sched-ules,
costs and system configuration as prelim-inary
design and the EIR/ EIS work are undertak-en.
As design and construction proceed, project
management responsibilities grow along with
quality control and construction inspection work-load.
Train and systems suppliers and future
operators would have a formal role at this point.
Rolling stock acceptance, warranty and project
wrap- up extend beyond the start of service.
FRA/ High- Speed Train Systems
Compatibility Studies
An early requirement is consultation among the
FRA, the Authority and a group of pre- qualified
high- speed train manufacturers to investigate
how existing high- speed trains and systems
might need to be modified for use in California.
This work likely would require six months to two
years, would result in better- informed and refined
bids from manufacturers and likely would shorten
the subsequent FRA rule- making.
Train System Selection
The Authority intends to select the high- speed
train technology and manufacturer/ s as early as
practical. Rolling stock specifications are needed
for final systems design, and the manufacturer
should participate in the oversight of the design
and construction of the high- speed train infra-structure.
Thus, it is vital that the Authority has qualified
staff and program management contractor/ s to
develop the appropriate bid requirements and
oversee selection of contractors. In the project
schedule of this document, the decision on
technology is anticipated to be made two
to three years after significant financing is se-cured.
Project- specific environmental studies,
preliminary engineering, and right- of- way pres-ervation
would all begin— and in some cases
may be nearing completion— prior to the selection
of the high- speed train technology.
An early selection of train and systems suppliers
is assumed in this schedule, allowing the setting
of final design criteria, finalizing preliminary design
issues and allowing for the initiation of FRA rule-making.
Federal Railroad Administration Rule
Rule- making is estimated to require two to three
years. The Authority and the selected train sys-tems
supplier would confer on issues to be
addressed by the rule with the FRA and would
consult with other affected rail operators. If the
rule can be concluded more rapidly, train system
testing, construction and delivery could be
accelerated.
Trainset Testing, Construction and
Delivery
This task depends on the completion of the
FRA rule. Design, construction and testing of
the prototype trainset is assumed to require
two and one- half years ( shown by “ P” on the
schedule ( Figure 3.7)). Testing of a prototype
for reliability, performance and compliance with
FRA and other requirements is assumed to take
one year. After testing of the prototype, six
months are assumed before the delivery of the
first trainsets, which then are delivered at the
rate of one per month. Operations can begin
when enough) trainsets are available to start a
service. The schedule ( Figure 3.7) shows the
complete acquisition of 38 trainsets ending two
years after the start of service.
Figure 3.8
TGV trains at Avignon station platform
Right– of- Way Acquisition
This task begins after the substantive completion
of the environmental work and is expected
to require up to three and one- half years. In
instances where the right- of- way is already as-sembled,
as in the shared segments and LAUS,
this activity will be subsumed into the agreement
negotiations, potentially saving a year of time.
Final Design and Construction/
Installation
The schedule assumes that the majority of the
work is performed through design/ build contracts
in which substantial overlap of work will be
possible through staging of subsegments by the
contractors. Completion of design will require
several years, and construction of long tunnels
and grade separations will take the longest
amount of time and will drive the construction
schedule. Depending on the segment, civil works
design and construction will require three and
one- half to five years. Installation of track, power
systems, signaling and other systems are esti-mated
to require up to three years for the longer
segments, but because work can start sequen-tially,
it can be completed in only one additional
year after the civil works.
Testing, Training and Service Opening
This task can begin after the first segments are
completed, with substantial overlap with instal-lation
of systems. Service is assumed to begin
six months after completing all the necessary
facilities in a given segment.
Figure 3.9
Series 700 Shinkansen
in Kyoto station
Next Steps Forward
In the next several years, coordinated action
on several fronts will be needed to move the
California high- speed train project forward:
Bay Area – Central Valley
Program EIR/ EIS
Through the programmatic environmental
impact review, the Authority has selected
preferred alignments and stations from
Sacramento through Fresno, Bakersfield,
Palmdale, and Los Angeles to Irvine,
Riverside and San Diego. Portions of the
alignment and the associated stations in the
San Francisco Bay Area have been selected,
but a preferred alignment is not yet defined
to link the Central Valley to the Bay Area.
Therefore, the Authority intends to develop a
next- tier “ Bay Area— Central Valley Program
EIR/ EIS” in order to identify a preferred
alignment.
Statewide Ridership/
Revenue Forecasts
A detailed study of high- speed train ridership
and revenue, conducted with the Bay Area
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, will
update statewide forecasts and determine
the effect of specific combinations of align-ments
and stations between the Bay Area
and Central Valley. Statewide ridership fore-casts
will be available in the first half of 2006.
Prepare Financial Plan
The financial plan will draw upon the results
of the ridership and revenue studies, the
alignment studies and the cost estimates of
preferred alignments as well as developments
in state and federal funding.
Develop Authority Staffing Plan
and Scope- of- Work For Program
Management Team and Select
Program Management Team
Over the next several years, the Authority will
begin the transition from a small study-oriented
agency to a mid- sized flexible con-struction
and operations oversight agency.
As explained in the section on institutional
structure, the Authority has decided to use a
consultant team as program manager to en-sure
the necessary technical expertise without
permanently enlarging state payroll. Before
this step is taken, the Authority will develop
a detailed organizational plan for the neces-sary
administrative and technical skills to
manage the consultants’ work and protect
and advance the state’s interest in the project.
The Authority will also develop a scope- of-work
for the program manager’s contract.
Once these steps have been completed, the
Authority will then select the program man-agement
team by competitive bid.
Pre- Qualify Train System
Suppliers and Undertake Joint
Industry/ FRA Studies
The Authority will identify a group of potential
high- speed train system suppliers who can
participate in a study with the FRA of how
existing high- speed train vehicles and systems
might need to be modified for use in California.
High- speed train manufacturers will be pre-qualified
to compete for future California high-speed
train contracts based upon their exist-ing
ability to produce very high- speed trains
and their willingness to work with the state
and federal governments in an open, com-petitive
process.
Project Specific EIR/ EIS
At the completion of the program environ-mental
review, implementation would begin
with preliminary engineering and project- level
environmental review to assess potential
environmental impacts not already addressed
in the Program EIR/ EIS.
30
Project- level environmental review would
focus on a portion of the proposed high-speed
system and would provide further
analysis of potential impacts and issues at
an appropriate site- specific level of detail
in order to obtain needed permits and to
implement segments of the high- speed train
system.
Figure 3.10 below shows the estimated cost
to construct major segments where a pre-ferred
alignment has been chosen as well as
a range of estimated costs for performing the
necessary preliminary engineering and
project- level environmental review. ( 4)
Right- of- Way Preservation
For the portions of the line where a general
alignment has been selected, the Authority
will conduct assessments to identify segments
at risk of imminent development or other
changes in use that could significantly in-crease
implementation costs and difficulty.
In conjunction with other state and local
agencies, the Authority will develop a plan
for protective advance acquisition consistent
with state and federal requirements and avail-able
funds. As each project- level EIR/ EIS is
approved and normal acquisition is permitted,
the Authority will conduct a similar review to
prioritize the use of acquisition funds. All ac-quisitions
will conform with the Federal Uni-form
Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended.
The Authority also will seek to reach agree-ment
on terms of access to shared rights- of-way
with rail line owners and operators,
shared capital and operating costs, types
of improvement required to maintain existing
operations while allowing high- speed train
operations, and other critical matters such
as liability indemnification, insurance require-ments,
and other legal and operational
matters.
CAPITAL AND PROJECT LEVEL ANALYSIS COST ESTIMATES
Fresno to Bakersfield
( FIGURES IN MILLIONS, 2003 $$)
SEGMENT LENGTH
( miles)
CAPITAL COST
ENGINEERING AND
PROJECT- LEVEL
EIR/ EIS COST
Bakersfield to Palmdale
Palmdale to Los Angeles
Los Angeles to Irvine
Los Angeles to Riverside
Riverside to Mira Mesa
Mira Mesa to San Diego
116
84
61
43
66
74
19
$ 3,100
$ 3,900
$ 4,800
$ 2,300
$ 2,900
$ 4,000
$ 1,200
$ 31 - $ 46
$ 39 - $ 58
$ 48 - $ 72
$ 23 - $ 34
$ 29 - $ 43
$ 40 - $ 60
$ 12 - $ 18
Figure 3.10
( 4) see Endnotes
Endnotes
( 1) – page 24
The “ net contribution” or “ net revenue from oper-ations”
or “ operating surplus” is calculated as
the difference between ticket revenues ( on- board
food purchases, sale of advertising space, station
concessions and the like are generally a separate
profit/ loss center) and costs of operation: items
such as driver and crew costs, including benefits,
insurance and other overhead; fuel and electricity;
maintenance of track, structures, signaling, power
supply lines and stations; maintenance and
overhaul of trainsets, locomotives and coaches,
including replacement parts; station operations;
commissions on ticket sales; ticket taxes, where
applicable; personnel and administration. Where
other services use track or other facilities, there
may be a sharing of the cost with that other
service. These costs do not include depreciation,
amortization, interest payments, income taxes
or opportunity costs of capital. High- speed train
operators typically report revenues two to two
and one- half times the operations costs.
( 2) – page 24
The first TGV line between Paris and Lyon is
reported by the French National Railway to have
covered its cost of construction and trainset
acquisition ( around $ 2 billion in then current U. S.
dollars) in less than 10 years, including depreci-ation
and interest payments. As a quasi-government
company, the French National Rail-way
pays no income tax. This reported profit
contrasts with the full non- TGV network, which
is reported to require significant subsidy for
freight operations, local light- density services,
regional commuter services and slower conven-tional
long- haul trains.
( 3) – page 25
The Authority is working in cooperation with the
MTC on statewide high- speed train ridership
forecasts.
( 4) – page 30
The estimated total capital costs ( in 2003 dollars)
for each of the corridor segments of the Author-ity’s
preferred system cover all aspects of imple-mentation,
including construction, rights- of- way,
environmental mitigation, and design and man-agement
services. Construction costs include
procurement and installation of line infrastructure
( tracks, bridges, tunnels, grade separations and
power distribution); facilities ( passenger stations,
storage and maintenance facilities); systems
( communications, train control); and removal or
relocation of existing infrastructure ( utilities, rail
tracks). The right- of- way costs are for acquisition
of property. The environmental mitigation costs
include a rough estimate of the proportion of
capital costs required for mitigating environmental
impacts based on similar completed highway
and rail line construction projects. No specific
mitigation costs are identified at the program
level of review. Other implementation costs are
included as estimated add- on percentages to
construction costs to account for agency costs
associated with administration of the program
( design, environmental review and management).
Rough order of magnitude costs are also esti-mated
for the project- level environmental review
and associated preliminary engineering for each
corridor segment. These costs are based on
approximately one percent of the estimated
capital costs for each segment; however, the
costs may vary ( up to 1.5%) according to the
level of construction complexity ( e. g., amount
of tunnels, structures, etc.). These percentages
are typical of large transportation projects.
Sources for figure 3.6, page 24
Tokaido Shinkansen
Construction and acquisition costs as reported
in multiple English language sources based on
original budgets, and clarified by JNR Vice
President of Engineering1955- 1963: Shima,
Hideo, “ Birth of the Shinkansen – A Memoir”,
Japan Railway and Transport Review, October
1994, pp 45- 48. Operations, ridership, and
revenue data derived from various sources
including extensive interviews with senior JNR
staff reported in Matthieu, Gérard, “ High Speed
in Japan: Accomplishments and Future”,
unpublished paper, SNCF, Paris, France, April
1992; JARTS, “ The Shinkansen”, Tokyo, Japan,
1979.
Tohoku/ Joetsu Shinkansen
Derived from Matthieu and JARTS, with 1994
East Japan Railways staff review and correction
of data.
See also Taniguchi, Mamoru, “ High Speed Rail
in Japan: A Review and Evaluation of the
Shinkansen Train”, Working Paper UCTC No.
103, University of California Transportation Center,
UC Berkeley, April 1992.
Yen- dollar exchange rates from R. McKinnon,
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research,
pre 1971; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System G. 5 Foreign Exchange Rates,
post 1971; inflation adjustments from Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and R. Sahr, Ohio
State University CPI factors.
TGV Paris- Lyon and Atlantique
Berlioz, Claude and Leboeuf, Michel; “ Economic
balance sheet of the TGV- Sud- Est”; French
Railway Review, Vol 1, # 4, September 1983;
Mathieu, Gérard; “ Ten Years TGV Sud- Est – a
resounding success”; Rail Engineering
International Edition, 1991, Number 3. Also
information extracted from various articles in
Revue Génerale des Chemins de Fer, January-
February 1992, October 1991, September 1983,
and September 1981, edited by SNCF, published
by Dunod, Paris, France. See also Arduin, J. P.
& Ni, J., “ French TGV Network Development”,
Japan Railway and Transport Review, March
2005, pp 22- 28, and Lucas, M. & Brand, N.,
“ Operating and Maintenance Costs of the
TGV System in France and North America”;
Journal of Transportation Engineering, American
Society of Civil Engineers, January, 1989.
THSRC – Taiwan
From Client’s Brief material prepared for the
THSRC in 1998, and ongoing reports and
progress. See also Web sites www. thsrc. com
and www. hsr. gov. tw.
French franc and New Taiwan dollar – U. S. dollar
exchange rates and inflation adjustments from
Federal Reserve bank data.
Other U. S.
For a national perspective on HSR potential in
the U. S, see Federal Railroad Administration,
U. S. Department of Transportation, “ High- Speed
Ground Transportation for America”, Washington,
D. C., August, 1996.
Click tabs to swap between content that is broken into logical sections.
| Rating | |
| Title | [California high-speed rail. Implementation plan]. |
| Subject | HE2771.C2 C35 2005; High speed trains--California--Planning.; High speed ground transportation--California--Planning. |
| Description | Downloaded and printed from the internet.; Title supplied by cataloger (from online PDF viewed March 19, 2010).; Publication date taken from PDF's "document properties" box.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-32). |
| Publisher | California High-Speed Rail Authority |
| Contributors | California High-Speed Rail Authority. |
| Type | Text |
| Identifier | http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/images/chsr/20080123171537_ImplementationPlan.pdf |
| Language | eng |
| Relation | http://worldcat.org/oclc/560810158/viewonline |
| Date-Issued | [2005] |
| Format-Extent | 32 p. : col. ill., col. chart, col. map ; 22 x 28 cm. |
| Transcript | 3 9 9 11 12 13 14 15 17 19 21 23 24 25 29 1 Executive Summary California High- Speed Train Project 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Building on Worldwide Experience 2.3 Train Types and Amenities 2.4 The High- Speed Line and Physical Structures 2.5 Travel Times and Fares 2.6 High- Speed Train Stations 2.7 Environmental and Economic Benefits Project Implementation Tasks and Schedules 3.1 Institutional Structure 3.2 Organizing Design, Construction and Operation Contracts 3.3 Technology Selection 3.4 Phasing and Staging Construction 3.5 Financing 3.6 Overview of Sample Schedule 3.7 Next Steps Forward Endnotes Sources Photo Credits 2 3 4 5 31 32 6 33 Throughout California’s history, our economic strength and develop-ment have been led by advances in transportation – first with the con-struction of railroads and later by investments in highways and airports. In the mid- 1990s, inspired by stunning successes in Japan and Europe, California began exploring how an economically viable high- speed train line linking major metropolitan areas could sustain the state’s long- term mobility and economic growth. California’s burgeoning population and increas-ingly congested highways and airports demand new transportation solutions. Transportation consistently ranks near the top of the list of concerns expressed by the public. Yet, new airport capacity has proven elusive. Planners in San Diego and Orange counties, for example, have been unable to site new airports after more than a decade of effort. Highway construction has become limited by environmental constraints, development pressures and financing barriers. As a result, in addition to the intercity travel needs of the millions of visitors who come to our state each year, Californians are confronted with finding practical new options for accommo-dating the intercity travel needs of 45 to 50 million residents by the year 2020. In 1996, the California High- Speed Rail Authority was created to build a high- speed train network connecting California’s major metropolitan areas. By 2000, the Authority had developed invest-ment- grade forecasts of ridership, revenue, cost and benefits of the system. In 2004, the Authority and the Federal Railroad Administration ( FRA) issued a Draft Program Environmental Impact Report/ Environmental Impact Statement ( EIR/ EIS) ( two volumes and 64 technical reports), received and reviewed over 2,000 public and government agency comments, and determined preferred corridors and stations for the majority of the line. With initial planning completed, the Authority must next develop the structure and institutional organization to manage construction worth tens of billions of dollars, ensure maximum participa-tion and risk- sharing from the private sector, and successfully adapt the existing high- speed train technology to California’s needs. The first section of this implementation plan summarizes the California high- speed project— its alignment, stations and technologies— as well as its financial and economic profile. The second section lays out the roadmap for the Authority’s evolution, from a planning authority with a small staff to a construction management agency and, finally, to a comprehensive long- term manager of operations and assets. Project Background Created in 1996, the California High- Speed Rail Authority has pursued the vision for a high- speed train system connecting California’s major met-ropolitan areas. The Authority has identified preferred corridor alignments and stations from the Central Valley through Los Angeles to San Diego as well as inside much of the Bay Area. Between the Central Valley and the Bay Area, further study is needed to select a preferred corridor alignment. The recent program environmental review has found that the high- speed train system will have fewer impacts, create more economic stimulus and cost less than half as much as the alterna-tive— building more lanes, bridges and ramps along highways; and terminals, gates and run-ways at airports. The Authority’s studies show that the full system, serving 30 stations, will attract 42 to 68 million passengers per year in 2020, operate at a surplus and cost over $ 33 billion to build. High- speed trains will be capable of speeds of up to 220 mph and will be similar to those in service today in Europe and Asia. The system will be built mostly within or alongside existing transportation corridors and will be entirely grade- separated from parallel and crossing roads, providing the same extremely safe environment enjoyed in other countries, where not a single passenger fatality has occurred on new lines in 41 years of operation. Trains will have multiple cars that can provide a variety of accommodations for travelers, such as a café car, business compartments, young family play areas or even a “ Quiet Car” SM. Where demand is high, trains could seat up to 1,600 passengers. Seat restraints or belts will not be needed at any time and passengers will be free to move around the train safely and comfortably. Most of the high- speed train tracks will be at ground level, needing a minimum path 50 feet wide— comparable to a new two- lane road with shoulders, but providing 20 times the transpor-tation capacity. In mountainous or hilly areas, or places where road crossings and freight railroad spur tracks are frequent, viaducts and tunnels may be used to grade- separate the high- speed train tracks. The high- speed train line will be fenced and equipped with intrusion detection linked to a state- of- the- art train control system. Trains will draw electric power from overhead wires connected to the commercial power grid and, in braking, will regenerate electricity back to the grid, thereby conserving power and reduc-ing costs. Train maintenance will be performed at several facilities throughout the state, whose locations will be determined in the project- level environmental work. High- Speed Service and Station Area Development Express high- speed trains will take one hour and fifteen minutes between San Diego and Los Angeles, and a little over two and one- half hours from San Francisco to Los Angeles. When time to get to, through, and from stations and airports is factored in, high- speed train travel will be as quick or quicker than air travel for most trips, and less time- consuming than all but the shortest intercity trips by car. High- speed train fares will be set between the cost of driving and the fares for air travel and will vary depending on the service chosen, the demand for seats and time of booking. To meet passenger demand forecast by 2020, 86 weekday trains in each direction are expected to run in a mix of express and local trains. Each of the 30 potential stations are expected to be significant hubs for transit- and pedestrian-oriented community development. All sites will be multi- modal transportation centers, serve a share of the projected 115,000 to 186,000 daily high- speed train passengers, and offer consid-erable opportunities for new shopping and busi-ness services. Organizational Structure Experience from recent successful large rail projects shows that design and construction staffing needs are highly dynamic, with large numbers of expert, specialized staff needed for relatively short periods of time. Even govern-ment- owned railroads have made extensive use of private sector consulting engineers and con-struction contractors supervised by a core staff of experts to manage contracts and ensure fulfillment of public goals. Increasingly, governments have looked to the private sector for operation, maintenance and financing of high- speed train lines. While some projects have sought to assign the full responsi-bility for implementation and operation to private sector consortia, this is not possible in California, because the high- speed train project is several times more geographically extended, and finan-cially several times more costly than the private sector’s ability to obtain bonding to ensure com-pletion of the project. Consequently, the Authority has determined that the best approach for the California high- speed train is an institutional structure that relies upon an experienced core public sector staff to manage specialist contractors in civil and structural en-gineering, architecture, train systems, construc-tion management, operations and maintenance, travel forecasting and marketing. The Authority staff also will need strong capabil-ities in environmental permitting, transportation and procurement law, contract management and finance to provide oversight and maintain its fiduciary responsibilities. Contracting for Design, Construction and Operation The Authority will divide the project into a variety of contracts of different lengths, content and dollar amounts to achieve the best combination of cost, schedule, technical expertise and equi-table distribution of work within California. The Authority will generally use a “ design/ build” approach in awarding infrastructure contracts, integrating the final design and construction into single contracts. For the various high- speed trains and their power, signaling, track and communications systems, the Authority believes a single contract for design, installation/ supply and maintenance is the best guarantor of success and cost- effectiveness. The Authority will seek bids on these terms and— if warranted by the ridership and revenue studies underway and the potential suppliers’ perception of the revenue risks— may also seek to include operations in those bids. Choosing the California High- Speed Train Technology The Authority intends to adapt to U. S. require-ments the electrically powered high- speed train technology that has been proven extremely safe and effective in revenue service in Europe and Asia. This will minimize the risks of unproven technology, lower costs, ensure a faster delivery of rolling stock, and assure the use of the safest transportation technology operating today. Several train and systems manufacturing con-sortia are expected to aggressively compete for the chance to equip California’s high- speed train line and to develop the nation’s first high- speed train system that meets U. S. requirements. This offers California the valuable opportunity to obtain a competitively priced system. The Authority and any potential high- speed train supplier will have to obtain approval of operating equipment, infrastructure and operating practices from the FRA. As an early priority, the Authority will assemble an industry group to cooperatively study with the FRA whatever changes may be needed to European or Asian designs. Based on these results, the Authority will competitively bid the high- speed train systems, select a winning bidder and then formally apply to the FRA for specific approval. The Authority believes it will obtain approval based on the demonstrated safety of high- speed trains on mostly dedicated, grade- separated lines with appropriate train control systems, inspection and maintenance regimes, and afford-able design changes. Construction and Financing of the Line In deciding which parts of the line would start construction and operation first, the Authority will consider the following factors: availability of capital ridership ability to operate without state subsidy train maintenance geographical distribution of construction and service scarcity- related cost increases A full financing plan will be developed after completion of the ongoing ridership and revenue forecast update. Currently, the most likely funding sources are through public/ state- issued bonds and federal matching funds. Sample Schedule Overview It will take from eight to 11 years, depending on the complexity of the segment, to develop and begin operation of an initial segment of the California high- speed train, assuming that the Authority chooses a specific supplier of high-speed train technology as an early action. Next Steps Complete selection of preferred alignments and stations Start project- level environmental impact review on high- priority segments Prepare financial plan Develop Authority staffing resources plan and scope- of- work for a program management team Select the program management team Pre- qualify train system suppliers and undertake joint industry/ FRA studies Work with local governments and transportation agencies on right-of- way preservation. With adequate funding, the Authority can move forward on the following next steps: Introduction Through California’s history, economic strength and development have been led by advances in transportation— first with the construction of railroads and later by investments in highways and airports. In the mid- 1990s, inspired by stunning successes in Japan and Europe, California began exploring how a high- speed train line linking the major metropolitan areas could cost- effectively sustain the state’s long-term mobility and economic growth. In 1996, the California High- Speed Rail Authority ( Authority) was created to implement a high-speed train system connecting California’s major metropolitan areas. By 2000, the Authority had developed investment- grade forecasts of rider-ship, revenue and cost, and quantified the ben-efits of the high- speed line embodied in a busi-ness plan. Shortly after the issuance of the business plan, the Authority initiated the required federal and state programmatic environmental reviews in partnership with the U. S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administra-tion ( FRA). In 2004, the Authority and the FRA issued a Draft Program Environmental Impact Report/ Environmental Impact Statement ( EIR/ EIS) ( two volumes and 64 technical reports), received and reviewed over 2,000 public and government agency comments, and determined preferred corridors and stations for the majority of the line. The Authority, having accomplished this initial planning work with a small staff directing numer-ous consultant teams, must now develop the structure and organization to manage construc-tion work worth tens of billions of dollars, ensure maximum participation and risk- sharing from the private sector, and successfully adapt existing high- speed train technology to California’s needs. The first section of this implementation plan summarizes the California high- speed train pro-ject— its alignment, stations and technologies— as well as its financial and economic profile. The second section lays out the roadmap for the Authority’s evolution, from planning authority with a small staff, to construction management agency and, finally, to a comprehensive long- term manager of operations and assets. Building on Worldwide Experience California’s high- speed trains will use state- of-the- art electrified trains capable of speeds of up to 220 mph in revenue service similar to those in service today in Europe and Asia. The line will consist of new infrastructure, often in or alongside existing transportation corridors, but mostly existing railroads. The entire high- speed train system will be grade- separated from parallel and crossing roads providing a very reliable and extremely safe travel environment. Proven high- speed train technology was chosen because it meets the requirements of the enabling legislation for the California High- Speed Rail Authority to operate at sustained speeds of 200 mph ( 320 km/ h) or greater and because there is extensive operational history for this technology and there are competitive manufacturers. Addi-tionally, high- speed trains like these have the potential to share tracks at reduced speeds with other conventional trains. High- speed trains have steadily expanded their market share and geographical coverage in Europe and Asia. Beginning in 1964 with the Tokyo– Osaka bullet train ( Shinkansen), Japan showed that high-speed trains could provide major transportation capacity, deliver significant operating profits, and reduce the need for new airports and high-ways. Today’s 1,350 miles of high- speed line continues to be expanded to serve most major cities and the additional demand for travel that comes with increasing income and population. Today, the Shinkansen carries over 300 million passengers a year. In 41 years of high- speed train operation in Japan, there has not been a single passenger fatality, largely due to the separation of the rail line from roads and the myriad of safety fea-tures and operating procedures incorporated into the service. In Europe, the first high- speed train began op-erating in 1976 on a short section of a new line between Rome and Florence that was completed in 1992. In 1981, the first TGVs were operating on portions of a new line between Paris and Lyon, eventually cutting the train trip time in half and freeing up airline and airport capacity for flights from overseas and the rest of Europe. In 1987, Germany launched its first high- speed train and began operations of InterCity Express ( ICE) service. With the addition of new lines in Italy, France and Germany, and the construction of high-speed lines in Spain, England, Belgium and the Netherlands, over 2,550 miles of high- speed lines have been completed in Europe. European high- speed trains currently carry roughly 250 million passengers a year and have not had a passenger fatality on new grade- separated high-speed lines. In 2002, Korea opened a high- speed line from Seoul to Pusan, which is now carrying around 100,000 passengers per day. Taiwan has begun operational tests on a new 225- mile- long high-speed line from Taipei to Kaohsiung, and expects to carry around 186,000 passengers per day within a decade. Top commercial speeds on dedicated high- speed lines continue to increase in response to market demand, technological advancement and oper-ational profitability. These trains have run daily at top speeds of 187 mph ( 300 km/ h) for over 15 years, and the newest lines are being built to accommodate 218 mph ( 350 km/ h). East Japan Railways is testing prototype trains capable of in- service speeds of 224 mph ( 360 km/ h). Recorded test speeds routinely exceed commer-cial speeds, providing significant confidence in the capability of these train systems to operate commercially at these higher speeds. Currently, the TGV holds the train speed record at 323 mph ( 515 km/ h), and the ICE and various Shinkansen trains have reached 255 mph and 277 mph, respectively. Figure 2.2 TGV Mediterranean line crosses A7 toll plaza near Avignon Figure 2.3 Shinkansen on elevated track travels through Tokyo Train Types and Amenities In developing California’s system, the Authority intends to take full advantage of the many years of research and development and practical ap-plication of high- speed train service by utilizing train systems that have been proven in everyday regular revenue service over extended periods of time. Operating “ trainsets” will have multiple cars and will be up to 1,300 feet long, depending on the type of train and the market demand. At peak travel times, trains can be lengthened, or trainsets can be connected, to operate as a single train, providing seating for up to 1,600 passengers. Seats will have more space than a conventional airline seat and seat restraints or belts will not be needed at any time. Passengers will be able to comfortably and safely stroll to a café car to purchase snacks and beverages. The precise configuration of seating and accommodation will depend on market demand. With multiple cars, each trainset can provide different types of accommodation for different passenger mar-kets. The same train can have business com-partments for conferencing en route, theater- or airline- style seating, young family play areas, or even “ Quiet Cars” SM where cell phones and loud computer programs are not allowed. Tables, power jacks, reliable cell phone connections, wireless Internet service and video or audio entertainment can also be provided, depending on market demand. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 High- speed train interiors – seating, Shinkansen ( top), TGV café car ( bottom) 0.70 3.60 5.70 8.30 9.30 9.40 10.40 11.20 12.40 16.30 21.60 26.50 28.90 32.10 32.90 37.40 42.30 48.50 52.70 53.30 10.70 27.90 53.30 41.80 41.70 46.10 58.40 40.80 55.40 55.90 57.40 64.40 66.00 72.20 74.20 73.10 72.60 68.20 70.80 72.00 73.20 71.00 70.00 71.30 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 BILLIONS OF PASSENGER- KILOMETERS DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH- SPEED TRAIN RIDERSHIP IN JAPAN AND EUROPE Japan Europe Figure 2.4 Source: UIC, International Union of Railways The High- Speed Line and Physical Structures The majority of the California high- speed train system will be at- grade alongside existing rail-roads, roads and highways. The minimum path required for the two- track rail line is about 50 feet wide, or about the space required for a new two- lane highway with shoulders and a small median. However, this two- track high- speed train line has 20 times the capacity of such a road, allowing up to 20 trains per hour in each direction. Smooth transitions and grades of less than three percent will assure a comfortable and safe ride at high speeds. Mountainous and hilly areas often will require viaducts and tunnels, as seen in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. Also, in areas with many consecutive at- grade road crossings or freight railroad sidings, viaducts and tunnels may be used to separate the high- speed line, rather than building numerous bridges over the line. California’s high- speed trains will mirror the outstanding safety record of overseas systems. Tracks will be fully grade- separated from road traffic with bridges or underpasses. The high-speed line will be fenced and equipped with intrusion alarms linked to train controls that can detect persons, animals or debris on the tracks. And high- speed train control systems will provide in- cab signaling and automatically stop trains if necessary. The electric trains will draw power from overhead wires connected to the commercial power grid. Trains will be regularly inspected at terminal stations and train maintenance will be performed at several new facilities throughout the state, whose locations will be determined during the project- level environmental work. Figure 2.7 ( far left) TGV on viaduct, near Sens, France Figure 2.8 ( left) Tungsiao tunnel portal and high-speed track, Taiwan Travel Times and Fares The California high- speed train will be very com-petitive with air travel times for many intercity travelers and will be faster than all but the shortest intercity trips by car. Figure 2.9 displays the door- to- door time for several major markets; while less time is spent on a plane than on the high- speed train, extra time required to pass through airport security and for access/ egress to and from airports makes rail faster overall for many trips, including the downtown- to- downtown trips shown. The high- speed train will not only save its pas-sengers time but also will benefit those who choose to use the airlines and roads— by reduc-ing the additional peak demand and congestion that is expected to grow by 2020. Fares will be set to maximize the transportation and environmental benefits of the investment while still providing a positive cash flow to cover operations. This level lies between the cost of driving and the fares for air travel. As in systems around the world, fares would vary depending on how much in advance tickets were bought and the class of service, such as coach or busi-ness. To meet 2020 forecast passenger demand, 86 trains are projected to run in each direction on weekdays in a mix of express and local trains that maximize service to a variety of markets. AVERAGE ESTIMATED TRAVEL TIME BY MODE IN 2020 WITH HIGH- SPEED TRAIN Number of trains per day Type of train service 20 21 20 21 4 Northern End Cities Intermediate Stops Southern End Cities Express Semi- Express Suburban- Express Local Regional YEAR 2020 POTENTIAL TRAIN STOPPING PATTERNS ( total per day each direction) Figure 2.9 Figure 2.10 h= hours m= minutes TOTAL Door to Door AUTO On the plane AIR TOTAL Door to Door On the train HIGH- SPEED TRAIN Express Times TOTAL CITY PAIRS Door to Door Los Angeles to San Francisco Fresno to Los Angeles San Diego to Los Angeles Burbank to San Jose Sacramento to San Jose 7h 36m 4h 18m 2h 41m 6h 32m 2h 33m 1h 20m 1h 05m 0h 48m 1h 00m no service 3h 26m 3h 00m 2h 46m 3h 08m 2h 35m 1h 22m 1h 13m 1h 59m 0h 50m 3h 30m 2h 33m 2h 16m 3h 02m 1h 53m High- Speed Train Stations Stations providing travelers with access to high-speed trains can be strong focal points for transit-oriented community development. Approximately 30 potential stations have been identified based on their ridership potential, cost to construct, opportunity to connect with other modes of transportation, and distribution of population and major destinations along the routes. Existing transportation hubs will be served, such as Union Station in Los Angeles, Santa Fe Depot in San Diego, Diridon Station in San Jose, Trans-bay Terminal in San Francisco and Anaheim ( ARTIC) Station. The high- speed train facilities at each station will consist of tracks, controlled access platforms, full access for disabled passengers and ticketing/ waiting/ passenger service areas. Many stations along the route will have platform tracks off the main high- speed line to allow express trains to pass unimpeded. Stations are expected to have 1,300- foot- long platforms allowing level boarding of the train. Figure 2.11 High- speed train station in France built for the TGV Mediterranean in Avignon Figure 2.13 New TGV station and development at Perpignan Figure 2.12 Multi- level Kyoto station combines travel and commerce In urban centers where trains would routinely end their runs, larger and more complex track and platform arrangements are planned. Such stations also will provide sufficient passenger traffic to create new opportunities for shopping, business meetings, and provide offices and other development not primarily dependent on the automobile for mobility. Kyoto’s Shinkansen station is shown in Figure 2.12 on the previous page as an example of how this could occur. Preferred station sites will all be multi- modal transportation hubs with links to local and regional transit, airports and highways. It is assumed that parking at the stations would be provided at market rates ( no free parking). Each station site would support higher density, mixed- use, pedestrian- oriented development around the station. As the project proceeds to more detailed study, local governments will have to plan and zone for transit- oriented development around high- speed train station locations and to finance ( e. g., through value capture or other financing techniques) and maintain the public spaces needed to support the pedestrian traffic gener-ated by hub stations. The precise location, configuration and number of stations is not known at this time, but would be decided during subsequent project- level environmental review. Environmental and Economic Benefits Spurred by population and economic growth in the next 35 years, intercity travel and long-distance commuting in California is forecast to nearly double from current levels. Comprehensive studies comparing the environmental impacts of high- speed trains and alternative highway/ airport expansion alone ( conducted from 2000 to 2004 in compliance with California and federal requirements) concluded that high- speed trains would: create less impact on the natural and built environment – less potential impact on wetlands and water resources, biology and farmlands – less noise impact and even reductions in areas where the high- speed train project grade- separates existing roads over adjacent rail lines cost less than half as much to build over 30 years than other transportation options and will not require operating subsidy create more jobs and economic activity and reduce the cost of travel in the state encourage more compact transit- oriented development, saving 67,000 acres from urban/ suburban development, including 24,000 acres of farmland avoid 10,000 auto accidents yearly with their attendant deaths, injuries and property damage compared to expanding only highways save up to five million barrels of oil per year and reduce pollutant emissions, even with future improvements in auto fuel efficiency. Furthermore, economic studies show that the high- speed trains would bring economic benefits worth twice the cost of construction and would directly result in creating 450,000 new permanent jobs in California. Institutional Structure The Authority’s legislative mandate to develop a high- speed train system includes broad powers to enter into contracts for any of the stages and activities of planning, design, construction, op-eration and maintenance. To date, the Authority has used this power to conduct its planning work with a small staff directing numerous con-sultant teams under contract. Now, the Authority needs to transition into an agency capable of handling much larger work-loads and ensuring that the public interest is met during all phases of the project. The agency staff needs to have a broad range of expertise, provide continuity and institutional stability, and be able to adequately oversee private sector contractors. At the same time, the Authority wants to keep the permanent agency staff small enough to be flexible, innovative and efficient during the various phases of the project. The Authority examined several recent successful large high- speed train and related infrastructure projects, both overseas and in the U. S., to identify the institutional structure that would best meet its objectives. Organizational alternatives ranged from established government- owned railroads to small new government agencies that issue large, long- term franchise contracts to major private sector conglomerates. Each of the projects investigated had very dynamic staffing needs. Large numbers of spe-cialized engineering and construction personnel were needed over a relatively short design and construction period, and even during this phase, the necessary specialties changed. Subsequent long- term operations typically required yet a different group of specialized personnel. All of these projects used contractors to some extent to meet these changing personnel needs. The specialized expertise needed to oversee implementation and operation of a high- speed train system does not currently exist in California state government, although the related expertise of state agencies could be tapped for some functions. Personnel needs would vary during implementation ( e. g., to support the construction effort, several hundred staff would be needed for limited terms varying from two to 10 years). Current state personnel hiring processes are cumbersome and time- consuming and do not provide recruitment incentives to attract the specialized expertise needed to manage con-struction and launch of the proposed system. While rail operations and maintenance functions will be ongoing, the capability to carry these functions out is more readily available in the private sector. Competitive private sector bidding is increasingly used by California’s public transit agencies and for high- speed train operations in Europe and Asia. The Authority has determined that the best ap-proach for the California high- speed train is a hybrid institutional structure which relies upon an expert core public sector staff using compet-itive contracting to the greatest extent possible. Private sector contractors would best provide the majority of personnel needed to implement the high- speed train system. This structure would allow for competitive bidding and targeted recruitment to meet the ebbs and flows of ex-pertise and labor needed to implement and operate the proposed system. A key private sector contract would provide for project man-agement support. Initially, the project management contractor/ s, under the direction of Authority staff, would assist in the development of design criteria, preliminary designs, bid documents, project timeline and controls, and system integration. When projects enter the design and construction stage, the project management contractor/ s would provide oversight and coordination of the work being done by other contractors. The project manage-ment contractor/ s would need to be brought on early in the implementation period through multi-year contracts requiring continued close coordi-nation with and oversight by the Authority staff. Other private sector agreements would include numerous contracts for civil works design and construction, train systems design, procurement and installation as well as operations, mainte-nance and supply contracts. The Authority would need to be able to manage a number of separate activities for different parts of the system simultaneously— planning, environ-mental review and permitting; design, real estate acquisition, negotiations with existing railroads and public entities; construction and testing; and finally, operation, maintenance and supply. Figure 3.1 Organizing Design, Construction and Operation Contracts The Authority’s enabling legislation gives it the ability to enter into contracts with private or public entities for the design, construction and operation of high- speed trains and allows for contracts to be separated into individual tasks or segments, including design/ build or de-sign/ build/ operate contracts. At over $ 33 billion for the complete high- speed train project, a single contract for the planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the entire system is neither practical nor desirable. The project is simply too large to consider such an approach. Numerous private sector contracts in varying sizes and dollar amounts will be required to complete system implementation. Breaking the project tasks into multiple contracts, where possible, would pro-mote competition within the construction and supply industry. With a modest public sector staff supported by private sector consultants and the Authority’s broad contracting capabilities, the Authority can choose the best procurement strategy for each contract package, whether design/ build, design/ bid/ build, design/ build/ operate, design/ build/ operate/ maintain or other hybrid. Design/ Build ( D- B) This approach integrates the design and con-struction functions into one contract. D- B will generally be the most appropriate approach for the large civil works construction contracts. Detailed design and construction will be based on the preliminary designs prepared by the Authority and its consultants and the performance criteria. The D- B method brings many benefits: it provides a single point of responsibility for final design and construction it typically reduces the time for project completion project costs are usually reduced due to lower design costs ( as compared to the DBB method) the latest in construction methods are integrated early into the design it allows for “ fast- track” construction ( the ability to begin construction while the design of the project element continues) and D- B can effectively harness competition among contractors and suppliers. Design/ Bid/ Build ( DBB) The DBB method is the conventional method for building public works projects in the U. S. Pre-liminary designs are prepared by either the project management contractor/ s or other contractor/ s. Based on the preliminary design and the perfor-mance criteria, the Authority would contract for the development of final designs and bid docu-ments. The completed final designs would be put out to bid for construction. The DBB method would allow the Authority greater control because the designer is exclu-sively serving the Authority’s interests, and it increases the involvement of smaller, local and minority- owned contractors; however, it requires more oversight, coordination and administration from the Authority. The DBB method is not easily fast- tracked due to the need to conduct two procurement processes, and it requires extensive coordination between the design and construc-tion contractors. Design/ Build/ Operate ( DBO), Design/ Build/ Maintain ( DBM), or Design/ Build/ Operate/ Maintain ( DBOM) These methods initially are similar to the de-sign/ build option but continue over time with added functions of operations or operations with maintenance. While the Authority has found it impractical and undesirable to enter into a single franchise contract for the implementation of the entire high- speed train system, there is the possibility of entering into a single contract for the systems ( signaling, communications, track and electrification) and train technology for the entire project. This option may provide the best opportunity for private sector financing, risk sharing and clear accountability for the perfor-mance of trains and systems. Although the Authority will utilize all contracting mechanisms, the Authority believes that the design/ build procurement strategy will likely be preferred for the major, high- value construction contracts, especially those in which final design and construction problems are relatively well understood at the end of preliminary design. The Authority believes that the best procurement strategy for the train technology and systems will include design, construction/ supply/ instal-lation and maintenance in a single contract because it best supports the integration of high-speed train systems and offers the possibility of leveraging public/ private partnership opportuni-ties. In some projects, operations of the train service has also been included with provision of train systems and, in others, maintenance and operations have been kept separate. The Authority may consider a train systems package that includes maintenance and operations as well; this decision will depend on the outcome of the final ridership and revenue analyses now underway and on the potential suppliers’ perception of the revenue risks. Further discussions with technology providers and others as well as additional analysis will be needed to determine if a DBOM for the systems and train technology is financially feasible and preferable to a DBM. If a single DBOM or DBM is not pursued, another approach would be to break major system and operating elements into separate contracts: 1) track; 2) electrification; 3) signaling/ communications and train technol-ogy; 4) operations; and 5) maintenance. In any of these approaches, a single operator would be responsible for providing a variety of services ( local, regional, express, premium, etc.). The Authority believes that a single high-speed train operator would better ensure inte-gration of services, accountability, reduced risk, effective coordination and communication, and would simplify Authority oversight. Figure 3.2 Artist cross-section of proposed Transbay station Technology Selection In developing California’s high- speed train, the Authority intends to build on technology devel-oped over more than 40 years of increasingly sophisticated and extensive high- speed train service around the world. Having existing sup-pliers adapt off- the- shelf equipment to an as-sortment of U. S. requirements will minimize the risks of unproven technology, lower the cost of design and testing, ensure a faster delivery of trainsets, and place more of the risk on the supplier. However, one issue will require the Authority to work closely with the FRA on potential changes to or waivers from FRA regulations in order to operate the safest, most reliable high- speed train service possible. Extremely successful European and Asian technology differs significantly in one major respect from the current U. S. regulatory requirements governing passenger and freight trains. The FRA currently requires all existing U. S. passenger trains to be at least twice as strong in certain aspects than the lightweight equipment used in European and Asian high-speed trains. In order to meet this strength requirement, manufacturers would have to struc-turally redesign their trains, at significant addi-tional development cost and time, resulting in higher costs to the Authority, but with uncertain effect on the ultimate safety of the operation. Such a redesign would make high- speed rolling stock heavier, jeopardizing the low axle loadings that have efficiently enabled the high speeds, low operating and maintenance costs, and pos-itive cash flows like those enjoyed by high- speed train operations in Europe and Asia. In addition to being more costly to purchase and operate, heavier equipment may cause changes in other system components such as track or bridges and result in higher maintenance costs. In the late 1990s, the FRA considered waiving U. S. equipment strength requirements to allow operation of a Florida high- speed line because it was to be operated on rights- of- way dedicated to high- speed train operation and separate from other railroad lines. However, suspension of the Florida project meant that FRA rule- making was never completed. Under any circumstance, California will have to start a similar federal regulatory process that will lead to an FRA “ Rule of Particular Applicability” governing operations up to 220 mph on the high- speed- train- only lines. While the majority of the high- speed train system is being planned with dedicated separate tracks, there are two sections of the system that are proposed to be shared with existing commuter and intercity trains at reduced speeds. Under current regulations, either the selected European or Asian equipment would have to be modified Figure 3.3 Shinkansen in the countryside, Japan structurally to meet the FRA requirements or the proposed system would have to be modified in other ways to avoid compatibility conflicts with freight trains and conventional passenger trains. The Authority will engage the FRA and a group of pre- qualified high- speed train manufacturers to investigate safety approaches that have been applied successfully in other countries and to consider how existing high- speed train vehicles and systems might need to be modified for use in California. Manufacturers would be pre- qualified for future California contracts based upon their existing ability to produce very high- speed trains and their willingness to work with the state and federal governments. Pre- qualification of manu-facturers and safety studies will also improve price competition and quality of bids on the trains and systems as well as improve the Authority’s ability to evaluate those bids. Pre- qualification is intended to help streamline FRA rule- making for California’s unique circum-stances. Once the FRA/ high- speed train systems compatibility studies are completed and financing is secured, the Authority will proceed to a com-petitive procurement of the high- speed train and related systems from among the pre- qualified high- speed train manufacturers. A decision on which high- speed train system to use will then allow the Authority to formally apply to the FRA for the Rule of Particular Applicability. The California high- speed train has been devel-oped with criteria and standards that allow use of any of the existing European and Asian tech-nologies. Prior to selecting a train technology, progress can be made on numerous planning, environmental approval and preliminary design tasks that will take several years. However, detailed design will be made more efficient by the selection of a specific train type and system, and in some cases will require coordinated, technology- specific parameters such as electric power supply and signal systems. Optimally, the train technology selection will be made and rule- making will be substantially completed within two to three years of obtaining significant funding for the project and before the planning and environmental work is completed. Figure 3.4 High- speed train station with multiple platforms available for arrivals and departures Phasing and Staging Construction The California high- speed train project is over 700 miles long, with 30 potential station locations. The estimated cost for the entire project is over $ 33 billion. The sheer scale of this proposal makes it impractical to construct and initiate operations of the entire project all at once. Even if sufficient funds were secured, constructing a project this large all at once would strain the California economy through excessive demand for construction materials and labor. Like other large transportation projects, the high- speed train system can be divided into smaller seg-ments that can be operated before the full system is complete. New ridership and revenue forecasts are being prepared and further studies must be done for the Authority to select a preferred route for the northern mountain crossing between the Bay Area and the Central Valley. Both are critical to determining operable segments and in which order to construct and open them for service. Moreover, the amount of capital available to implement the system and any limitations on the use of those funds should be known prior to making commitments regarding the phasing of construction. Selection of workable segments and the order in which they are phased should include these considerations: the availability of capital to construct the segment/ s and procure train systems ridership and revenue potential and the ability of the segment/ s to be operated without state subsidy the ability to service trainsets at appropriate maintenance facilities a distribution of construction and initiation of service in regions of both Northern and Southern California the avoidance of cost increases related to labor or material scarcity. The High- Speed Passenger Train Bond Act ( SB 1865/ SB1169) directs that the first portion of the high- speed train system to be funded will be San Francisco to Los Angeles. Even along that route there may be regional segments that can be opened before construction is complete on the entire north- south line. Figure 3.5 Laying tracks, Taiwan, ROC Financing The California high- speed train project is one of the world’s largest public works projects, with estimated costs over $ 33 billion. Based on the experience of other countries, a “ carefully planned” high- speed train system is a smart investment that is projected to return a benefit of at least two dollars for every public dollar invested. More importantly, once built, the service provided by the system is expected to yield annual operating surpluses in excess of $ 300 million ($ 1999/ Business Plan 2000). High- speed lines worldwide generate surpluses ( 1) from their operations, unlike traditional pas-senger service, because high- speed attracts more passengers, generates more revenues and lowers unit costs of production ( e. g., a crew can make two round trips a day instead of one). The resulting combination of higher revenue and lower unit operating costs has made all high-speed train services net contributors to the financial performance of their operators. In Europe and Japan, high- speed train systems generate enough revenue to cover operational costs ( 2), and most of the high- speed lines cover some of their construction costs ( the Tokaido Line between Tokyo and Osaka generated enough operating surplus in the first decade to completely match the capital costs). In Cali-fornia, a high- speed train will compete with automobiles and airplanes, which have enjoyed a century of substantial public funding and are well- established. Until the high- speed train system operates at a surplus, public resources will be needed for capital and de-ployment costs. In 2000, the Authority published its business plan, which presented two funding approaches: a full- funding scenario, which assumed that the entire system be constructed simultaneously a phased- funding approach that focused on securing resources required to com-plete discrete sequential phases of the project as expeditiously as possible. The Authority concluded that the phased- funding approach is the most prudent and business- like approach and will ultimately be of better value to the state’s taxpayers. The phased- funding approach calls for development of a detailed financing plan which would include state and federal funding sources as well as the Authority’s broad contracting powers to secure private sector funds. Since the preparation of the 2000 business plan, there have been some developments in potential funding sources for the high- speed train system. Figure 3.6 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS; 1999 $$ UNLESS ANNOTATED For sources see page 32 ( 1) ( 2) see Endnotes OVERSEAS HIGH- SPEED TRAIN COMPARISONS COST PER MILE YEAR PASSENGERS ( millions) REVENUE OPERATING COST NET OPERATING CASH FLOW CAPITAL COST MILES Tokaido Shinkansen Tohoku/ Joetsu Shinkansen TGV Paris- Lyon TGV Atlantique $ 18 $ 72 $ 32 $ 29 1990 1992 1991 1991 191 76 19 18 $ 9,100 $ 3,230 $ 1,100 $ 810 $ 3,330 N/ A $ 440 $ 355 $ 6,770 N/ A $ 660 $ 455 $ 5,800 $ 33,300 $ 8,070 $ 5,000 320 460 250 170 THSRC 2009 68 $ 1,920 $ 650 $ 1,270 $ 15,300- $ 73- 92 $ 19,400 210 In 2002, The Safe, Reliable High- Speed Passen-ger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century ( SB 1856 - Costa) was signed into law by former Governor Gray Davis calling for voter approval in the November 2004 general election of $ 9.95 billion in General Obligation ( GO) bonds for rail devel-opment in California. Nine billion was authorized for high- speed trains and $ 950 million was authorized for capital improvements to intercity and commuter rail lines and urban rail systems. Due to the state’s fiscal condition in 2004, SB 1856 was amended by SB 1169 ( Murray) and signed by Governor Schwarzenegger delaying the vote until the November 2006 general election. The potential availability of GO bonds, coupled with the refinement of the high- speed train pro-gram through environmental review, requires development of an updated financing plan. That plan will be developed concurrently with and based on a new ridership/ revenue study currently underway ( 3) and will take into consideration the availability of GO bonds as a potential funding source. Overview of Sample Schedule It will take from eight to 11 years to develop and begin operation of an initial segment. The sched-ule below illustrates the sequencing of major tasks, assuming that the Authority chooses a specific supplier of high- speed train technology as an early action. Each of the line items is briefly discussed on the following pages. SAMPLE SCHEDULE Major financing available Organization and agreements Segment planning, EIR/ EIS & permits Preliminary design Project control, mgmt., verification FRA/ train systems compatibility studies Train system selection FRA rule Train system testing, construction & delivery Right- of- way acquisition Final design Earthworks, RR viaducts Grade separation Track, power Signals, communications Testing, open for service Begin/ End marker Completion milestone Intermediate milestone # of trains Prototype train Design & construction contractors Train builders Operators Authority staff & direct contractors Figure 3.7 ( 3) see Endnotes Major Financing Available Completion of planning for the high- speed train system, program- level environmental impact reviews and FRA/ high- speed train systems compatibility studies can be accomplished with annual appropriations until major financing is available. However, a significant portion of the funding for the first segment of the high- speed train will have to be available with a reasonably certain plan to secure the remainder before pre-construction/ supply/ installation work can begin. Key elements of that work include: bids from train systems suppliers specific FRA rules to govern the system and operations at planned speeds over 150 mph preliminary design of the alignment, structures, stations and facilities project- specific environmental review bids for final design and construction of the high- speed train. The most likely sources are the state bond ref-erendum placed on the ballot by the California Legislature and federal matching funds. Organization and Agreements Critical to the success of the high- speed train system are: institutional development of the Authority, selection of project management and other consultants, agreements with significant stakeholders such as railroads and existing rail operators, and establishment of guidelines and agreements for station development. Agree-ments would be sought with local agencies to maximize infill transit- oriented joint development of station areas. Preliminary agreements with affected railroads and rail operators need to be reached before project- specific EIR/ EIS work can progress, with final agreements after the EIR/ EIS work and FRA rule- making. Segment Planning, EIR/ EIS & Permits Project- specific EIR/ EIS work supported by preliminary design will require one to two years to reach a draft EIR/ EIS, followed by a final EIR/ EIS and agency sign- off six to12 months later. Major permits from federal and state agen-cies would follow six to 12 months after that. Preliminary Design Preliminary design constitutes 15 to 30 percent of the total design required for a segment and is required to support the EIR/ EIS, permitting, agreement and right- of- way acquisition. Project Control, Management and Verification The Authority must systematically control sched-ules, costs and system configuration as prelim-inary design and the EIR/ EIS work are undertak-en. As design and construction proceed, project management responsibilities grow along with quality control and construction inspection work-load. Train and systems suppliers and future operators would have a formal role at this point. Rolling stock acceptance, warranty and project wrap- up extend beyond the start of service. FRA/ High- Speed Train Systems Compatibility Studies An early requirement is consultation among the FRA, the Authority and a group of pre- qualified high- speed train manufacturers to investigate how existing high- speed trains and systems might need to be modified for use in California. This work likely would require six months to two years, would result in better- informed and refined bids from manufacturers and likely would shorten the subsequent FRA rule- making. Train System Selection The Authority intends to select the high- speed train technology and manufacturer/ s as early as practical. Rolling stock specifications are needed for final systems design, and the manufacturer should participate in the oversight of the design and construction of the high- speed train infra-structure. Thus, it is vital that the Authority has qualified staff and program management contractor/ s to develop the appropriate bid requirements and oversee selection of contractors. In the project schedule of this document, the decision on technology is anticipated to be made two to three years after significant financing is se-cured. Project- specific environmental studies, preliminary engineering, and right- of- way pres-ervation would all begin— and in some cases may be nearing completion— prior to the selection of the high- speed train technology. An early selection of train and systems suppliers is assumed in this schedule, allowing the setting of final design criteria, finalizing preliminary design issues and allowing for the initiation of FRA rule-making. Federal Railroad Administration Rule Rule- making is estimated to require two to three years. The Authority and the selected train sys-tems supplier would confer on issues to be addressed by the rule with the FRA and would consult with other affected rail operators. If the rule can be concluded more rapidly, train system testing, construction and delivery could be accelerated. Trainset Testing, Construction and Delivery This task depends on the completion of the FRA rule. Design, construction and testing of the prototype trainset is assumed to require two and one- half years ( shown by “ P” on the schedule ( Figure 3.7)). Testing of a prototype for reliability, performance and compliance with FRA and other requirements is assumed to take one year. After testing of the prototype, six months are assumed before the delivery of the first trainsets, which then are delivered at the rate of one per month. Operations can begin when enough) trainsets are available to start a service. The schedule ( Figure 3.7) shows the complete acquisition of 38 trainsets ending two years after the start of service. Figure 3.8 TGV trains at Avignon station platform Right– of- Way Acquisition This task begins after the substantive completion of the environmental work and is expected to require up to three and one- half years. In instances where the right- of- way is already as-sembled, as in the shared segments and LAUS, this activity will be subsumed into the agreement negotiations, potentially saving a year of time. Final Design and Construction/ Installation The schedule assumes that the majority of the work is performed through design/ build contracts in which substantial overlap of work will be possible through staging of subsegments by the contractors. Completion of design will require several years, and construction of long tunnels and grade separations will take the longest amount of time and will drive the construction schedule. Depending on the segment, civil works design and construction will require three and one- half to five years. Installation of track, power systems, signaling and other systems are esti-mated to require up to three years for the longer segments, but because work can start sequen-tially, it can be completed in only one additional year after the civil works. Testing, Training and Service Opening This task can begin after the first segments are completed, with substantial overlap with instal-lation of systems. Service is assumed to begin six months after completing all the necessary facilities in a given segment. Figure 3.9 Series 700 Shinkansen in Kyoto station Next Steps Forward In the next several years, coordinated action on several fronts will be needed to move the California high- speed train project forward: Bay Area – Central Valley Program EIR/ EIS Through the programmatic environmental impact review, the Authority has selected preferred alignments and stations from Sacramento through Fresno, Bakersfield, Palmdale, and Los Angeles to Irvine, Riverside and San Diego. Portions of the alignment and the associated stations in the San Francisco Bay Area have been selected, but a preferred alignment is not yet defined to link the Central Valley to the Bay Area. Therefore, the Authority intends to develop a next- tier “ Bay Area— Central Valley Program EIR/ EIS” in order to identify a preferred alignment. Statewide Ridership/ Revenue Forecasts A detailed study of high- speed train ridership and revenue, conducted with the Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission, will update statewide forecasts and determine the effect of specific combinations of align-ments and stations between the Bay Area and Central Valley. Statewide ridership fore-casts will be available in the first half of 2006. Prepare Financial Plan The financial plan will draw upon the results of the ridership and revenue studies, the alignment studies and the cost estimates of preferred alignments as well as developments in state and federal funding. Develop Authority Staffing Plan and Scope- of- Work For Program Management Team and Select Program Management Team Over the next several years, the Authority will begin the transition from a small study-oriented agency to a mid- sized flexible con-struction and operations oversight agency. As explained in the section on institutional structure, the Authority has decided to use a consultant team as program manager to en-sure the necessary technical expertise without permanently enlarging state payroll. Before this step is taken, the Authority will develop a detailed organizational plan for the neces-sary administrative and technical skills to manage the consultants’ work and protect and advance the state’s interest in the project. The Authority will also develop a scope- of-work for the program manager’s contract. Once these steps have been completed, the Authority will then select the program man-agement team by competitive bid. Pre- Qualify Train System Suppliers and Undertake Joint Industry/ FRA Studies The Authority will identify a group of potential high- speed train system suppliers who can participate in a study with the FRA of how existing high- speed train vehicles and systems might need to be modified for use in California. High- speed train manufacturers will be pre-qualified to compete for future California high-speed train contracts based upon their exist-ing ability to produce very high- speed trains and their willingness to work with the state and federal governments in an open, com-petitive process. Project Specific EIR/ EIS At the completion of the program environ-mental review, implementation would begin with preliminary engineering and project- level environmental review to assess potential environmental impacts not already addressed in the Program EIR/ EIS. 30 Project- level environmental review would focus on a portion of the proposed high-speed system and would provide further analysis of potential impacts and issues at an appropriate site- specific level of detail in order to obtain needed permits and to implement segments of the high- speed train system. Figure 3.10 below shows the estimated cost to construct major segments where a pre-ferred alignment has been chosen as well as a range of estimated costs for performing the necessary preliminary engineering and project- level environmental review. ( 4) Right- of- Way Preservation For the portions of the line where a general alignment has been selected, the Authority will conduct assessments to identify segments at risk of imminent development or other changes in use that could significantly in-crease implementation costs and difficulty. In conjunction with other state and local agencies, the Authority will develop a plan for protective advance acquisition consistent with state and federal requirements and avail-able funds. As each project- level EIR/ EIS is approved and normal acquisition is permitted, the Authority will conduct a similar review to prioritize the use of acquisition funds. All ac-quisitions will conform with the Federal Uni-form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended. The Authority also will seek to reach agree-ment on terms of access to shared rights- of-way with rail line owners and operators, shared capital and operating costs, types of improvement required to maintain existing operations while allowing high- speed train operations, and other critical matters such as liability indemnification, insurance require-ments, and other legal and operational matters. CAPITAL AND PROJECT LEVEL ANALYSIS COST ESTIMATES Fresno to Bakersfield ( FIGURES IN MILLIONS, 2003 $$) SEGMENT LENGTH ( miles) CAPITAL COST ENGINEERING AND PROJECT- LEVEL EIR/ EIS COST Bakersfield to Palmdale Palmdale to Los Angeles Los Angeles to Irvine Los Angeles to Riverside Riverside to Mira Mesa Mira Mesa to San Diego 116 84 61 43 66 74 19 $ 3,100 $ 3,900 $ 4,800 $ 2,300 $ 2,900 $ 4,000 $ 1,200 $ 31 - $ 46 $ 39 - $ 58 $ 48 - $ 72 $ 23 - $ 34 $ 29 - $ 43 $ 40 - $ 60 $ 12 - $ 18 Figure 3.10 ( 4) see Endnotes Endnotes ( 1) – page 24 The “ net contribution” or “ net revenue from oper-ations” or “ operating surplus” is calculated as the difference between ticket revenues ( on- board food purchases, sale of advertising space, station concessions and the like are generally a separate profit/ loss center) and costs of operation: items such as driver and crew costs, including benefits, insurance and other overhead; fuel and electricity; maintenance of track, structures, signaling, power supply lines and stations; maintenance and overhaul of trainsets, locomotives and coaches, including replacement parts; station operations; commissions on ticket sales; ticket taxes, where applicable; personnel and administration. Where other services use track or other facilities, there may be a sharing of the cost with that other service. These costs do not include depreciation, amortization, interest payments, income taxes or opportunity costs of capital. High- speed train operators typically report revenues two to two and one- half times the operations costs. ( 2) – page 24 The first TGV line between Paris and Lyon is reported by the French National Railway to have covered its cost of construction and trainset acquisition ( around $ 2 billion in then current U. S. dollars) in less than 10 years, including depreci-ation and interest payments. As a quasi-government company, the French National Rail-way pays no income tax. This reported profit contrasts with the full non- TGV network, which is reported to require significant subsidy for freight operations, local light- density services, regional commuter services and slower conven-tional long- haul trains. ( 3) – page 25 The Authority is working in cooperation with the MTC on statewide high- speed train ridership forecasts. ( 4) – page 30 The estimated total capital costs ( in 2003 dollars) for each of the corridor segments of the Author-ity’s preferred system cover all aspects of imple-mentation, including construction, rights- of- way, environmental mitigation, and design and man-agement services. Construction costs include procurement and installation of line infrastructure ( tracks, bridges, tunnels, grade separations and power distribution); facilities ( passenger stations, storage and maintenance facilities); systems ( communications, train control); and removal or relocation of existing infrastructure ( utilities, rail tracks). The right- of- way costs are for acquisition of property. The environmental mitigation costs include a rough estimate of the proportion of capital costs required for mitigating environmental impacts based on similar completed highway and rail line construction projects. No specific mitigation costs are identified at the program level of review. Other implementation costs are included as estimated add- on percentages to construction costs to account for agency costs associated with administration of the program ( design, environmental review and management). Rough order of magnitude costs are also esti-mated for the project- level environmental review and associated preliminary engineering for each corridor segment. These costs are based on approximately one percent of the estimated capital costs for each segment; however, the costs may vary ( up to 1.5%) according to the level of construction complexity ( e. g., amount of tunnels, structures, etc.). These percentages are typical of large transportation projects. Sources for figure 3.6, page 24 Tokaido Shinkansen Construction and acquisition costs as reported in multiple English language sources based on original budgets, and clarified by JNR Vice President of Engineering1955- 1963: Shima, Hideo, “ Birth of the Shinkansen – A Memoir”, Japan Railway and Transport Review, October 1994, pp 45- 48. Operations, ridership, and revenue data derived from various sources including extensive interviews with senior JNR staff reported in Matthieu, Gérard, “ High Speed in Japan: Accomplishments and Future”, unpublished paper, SNCF, Paris, France, April 1992; JARTS, “ The Shinkansen”, Tokyo, Japan, 1979. Tohoku/ Joetsu Shinkansen Derived from Matthieu and JARTS, with 1994 East Japan Railways staff review and correction of data. See also Taniguchi, Mamoru, “ High Speed Rail in Japan: A Review and Evaluation of the Shinkansen Train”, Working Paper UCTC No. 103, University of California Transportation Center, UC Berkeley, April 1992. Yen- dollar exchange rates from R. McKinnon, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, pre 1971; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System G. 5 Foreign Exchange Rates, post 1971; inflation adjustments from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and R. Sahr, Ohio State University CPI factors. TGV Paris- Lyon and Atlantique Berlioz, Claude and Leboeuf, Michel; “ Economic balance sheet of the TGV- Sud- Est”; French Railway Review, Vol 1, # 4, September 1983; Mathieu, Gérard; “ Ten Years TGV Sud- Est – a resounding success”; Rail Engineering International Edition, 1991, Number 3. Also information extracted from various articles in Revue Génerale des Chemins de Fer, January- February 1992, October 1991, September 1983, and September 1981, edited by SNCF, published by Dunod, Paris, France. See also Arduin, J. P. & Ni, J., “ French TGV Network Development”, Japan Railway and Transport Review, March 2005, pp 22- 28, and Lucas, M. & Brand, N., “ Operating and Maintenance Costs of the TGV System in France and North America”; Journal of Transportation Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, January, 1989. THSRC – Taiwan From Client’s Brief material prepared for the THSRC in 1998, and ongoing reports and progress. See also Web sites www. thsrc. com and www. hsr. gov. tw. French franc and New Taiwan dollar – U. S. dollar exchange rates and inflation adjustments from Federal Reserve bank data. Other U. S. For a national perspective on HSR potential in the U. S, see Federal Railroad Administration, U. S. Department of Transportation, “ High- Speed Ground Transportation for America”, Washington, D. C., August, 1996. |
|
|
| B |
| C |
| I |
| S |
|
|