Terrorist Attacks On Public Bus Transportation:
A Preliminary Empirical Analysis
MTI Report WP 09- 01
Terrorist Attacks On Public Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies ( MTI) was established by Congress as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U. S. Department of Transportation through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “ Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Con­gress
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MTI Report WP 09- 01
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION: A PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Brian Michael Jenkins
Bruce Robert Butterworth
Karl S. Shrum
March 2010
a publication of theMineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San Jose State University
San Jose, CA 95192- 0219
Created by Congress in 1991 TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Report No.
CA- MTI- 10- 2982
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipients Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis
5. Report Date
March 2010
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Authors
Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce Robert Butterworth, Karl S. Shrum
8. Performing Organization
Report No.
MTI Report WP 09- 01
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192- 0219
10. Work Unit No.
11. Contract or Grant No.
DTRT 07- G- 0054
2008 - ST 061 TS 0009
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
13. Type of Report and Period
Covered
Interim Report
California Department of Transportation
Sacramento, CA 94273- 0001
U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Dictorate
Washington, DC 20528
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
U. S. Department of Transportation
Research and Innovative Technology Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Rm. E33
Washington, D. C. 20590- 0001
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstract
This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public bus transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of December 17, 2009. Data include the frequency and lethality with which buses, bus stations, and bus stops are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against bus targets and the relationship between injuries and attacks against those targets; how often, relative to other surface transportation targets, buses are attacked, first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices; the relative lethality of attacks; and the distribution of attacks. It then presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data that can help stakeholders— governments, transit managers, and employees— to focus on the ways the most frequent and/ or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
17. Key Words
Terrorist attacks; Public bus transportation;
Targets; Lethality;
Distribution
18. Distribution Statement
No restrictions. This document is available to the public through
The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
19. Security Classif. ( of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classifi. ( of this page)
Unclassified
21. No. of Pages
120
22. Price
$ 15.00
Form DOT F 1700.7 ( 8- 72)
Copyright © 2010
by Mineta Transportation Institute
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2010925455
To oder this publication, please contact the following:
Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192- 0219
Tel ( 408) 924- 7560
Fax ( 408) 924- 7565
E- mail: mti@ mti. sjsu. edu
http:// transweb. sjsu. edu ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based, in paart, on work supported by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008- ST- 061- TS001. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
THE MTI DATABASE 3
Overview 3
Comparison of the MTI Database and UMSTART 6
LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE DATA
TO U. S. PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION 9
Data Limitations and Preliminary Conclusions 9
Relevance to the United States of Attacks on
Transportation in Other Countries 10
TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION 17
Overview 17
Frequency and Lethality of Attacks on Buses and Trains 19
Distribution of Attacks by Region and Country 22
Distribution of Attacks by Target 25
Distribution by Type of Attack and Weapon 27
Lethality by Target 29
Lethality by Attack and Weapon 31
BOMBS AND BOMBERS 33
Types of Bombing Attacks 33
Suicide Bombers 33
Outcomes of Bomb Attacks 34
Lethality of Bomb Attacks 35
The Most Lethal Combinations of Devices and Methods of Delivery
and Concealment 39
THE FINAL MTI REPORT 43 APPENDIX A: NOVEMBER 12, 2009, BRIEFING
FOR DHS COUNTER- IED WORKING GROUP 45
APPENDIX B: DECEMBER 3, 2009, PRESENTATION
TO DHS BUS OPERATOR FOCUS GROUP 81
ENDNOTES 109
BIBLIOGRAPHY 111
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 113
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Table of Contents
ii Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
1
INTRODUCTION
This interim report, produced by the Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transportation Security Center ( MTI/ NTSC), a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence ( NTSCOE) for the Science and Technology Directorate ( S& T) of the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS), provides data on terrorist attacks against public bus transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. It then presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data.
The report is part of MTI/ NTSC’s contribution to a project collaboratively funded by the Transportation Security Administration– Transportation Sector Network Management ( TSA- TSNM) and S& T- DHS to develop a Mass Transit Bus Operator Behavioral Awareness Program. Three other NTSCOEs are participating in the project: Rutgers University, Tougaloo College, and Texas Southern University. MTI/ NTSC has provided statistical analyses of bus attacks, case studies, and subject matter expertise throughout the project, which began in September 2009 and will end in December 2010.
The data presented here are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, to which additional incidents are added either as they occur or as they are painstakingly culled from existing collections that do not focus specifically on transportation security. This analysis is based on the database as of December 17, 2009; the most recent attack included in the analysis took place at an Israeli bus stop on December 13, 2009.
Most of the charts used in this report were used in presentations to the DHS Counter- IED working group on November 12, 2009, and to a bus- operator focus group on December 3, 2009. The charts from both presentations are reproduced in Appendices A and B.
This report will be revised and peer- reviewed and will be published as a formal MTI report in spring 2010. The final report will include MTI’s most current data, so some of the statistics and preliminary conclusions will probably differ from those presented here. The final report will also include a more detailed look at a smaller set of data that will include approximately 50 recorded attacks against bus targets in North America, Western and Eastern Europe, and modern industrialized countries of Asia, whenever they occurred. It will also include the most recent attacks for which information is available from campaigns in Israel, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. This more detailed analysis will attempt to identify sets of attacks in which
• Particularly lethal tactics and weapons have been employed, including the use of suicide attackers.
• Actions by on- scene security personnel, operators, or passengers would likely not have stopped or mitigated the attack without significant advance warning.
• Enhanced awareness and actions by security personnel, operators, or passengers did in fact prevent or mitigate attacks.
• Particularly lethal bombs or incendiary devices were used.
• Bombs or incendiary devices malfunctioned or were ineffective.
• Multiple bombs were involved, timed to detonate to increase casualties, especially among emergency responders. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Introduction
2 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
3
THE MTI DATABASE
OVERVIEW
MTI/ NTSC started publishing chronologies of attacks on public surface transportation in 1997. These chronologies, which included some, but not all, such attacks between 1920 and 2000, were published in two MTI reports, the first in 19971 and the second in 2001.2 These seminal publications on public surface transportation security helped to inform Congress; federal, state and local government agencies; and transit operators. Serious criminal attacks were included because terrorist groups observe and learn from criminal tactics and also sometimes conduct criminal actions to finance their operations.
In 2009, MTI/ NTSC began creating a database that includes both its own chronologies and all attacks captured in the second release of the Global Terrorism Database ( GTD) created by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ( START), based at the University of Maryland, a DHS Center of Excellence. The entries in this database, which we refer to as UMSTART, contain narratives of the details of surface transportation attacks between January 1,
1998, and December 31, 2007. MTI/ NTSC also regularly updates its database to include attacks found in lists created by U. S. and other government and industry entities. All of the lists either are not specifically designed for transportation threat and security analysis or lack details and require painstaking analysis and interpretation to sort aspects of each attack into sets that will facilitate trend analysis. The MTI database also includes attacks identified through open source searches, as well as attacks that are not captured in other lists. It seeks to include all attacks starting in 1970; its record of attempted train derailments goes back to 1920.
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolving nature of the database as attacks are added. Between Septem- ber 1, 2009, and November 12, 2009, 178 attacks were added, 80 percent of which ( 144) were against bus targets. Most of these attacks took place after 1974; 11 of the attacks took place between 1970 and mid- 1974. Most of the additional incidents were identified through concentrated searches of campaigns against transportation targets in Israel, Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Colombia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand.
On July 14, 2009, when MTI first described the database at the FTA/ TSA Safety and Security Roundtable, the database included 1,049 attacks. As of December 13, 2009, it contained 1,497 attacks. About 90 attacks are added each month, and MTI estimates that by mid- 2010, it could include as many as 2,000 attacks.
To make the database more robust, MTI is working with explosives experts within and outside the government to share information that will enable it to better analyze the effects of improvised explosive devices ( IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices ( IIDs). It is also using a smaller set of data— including those that will be used in the final MTI report— to test the feasibility of adding new fields that require access to original data. Finally, MTI is also moving the database from its current Excel © platform to a platform that enables median calculations as well as mean ( average) calculations to be conducted to provide a truer picture of both the past likelihood ( distribution) and the lethality of different kinds of attacks.
Figures 3 and 4 list some of the current fields in the system. There are 37 categories of targets and 26 categories of attacks and weapons, eight of which are considered “ bombs or incendiaries.” The database also has 16 categories of methods of delivering and concealing devices and six categories of outcome, e. g., whether the devices detonated on target and on time, malfunctioned, or were rendered safe. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database
4
Figure 1
Figure 2 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database
5
Figure 3
Figure 4
New fields being tested for inclusion on entries of recent attacks, for which more detailed information is available, are listed in Figure 5. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
6 The MTI Database
Figure 5
COMPARISON OF THE MTI DATABASE AND UMSTART
The MTI database does not compete with UMSTART; rather, it complements UMSTART. MTI’s database is designed to allow for updated trend analysis of attacks on public surface transportation. UMSTART allows more general analyses to be performed. The MTI database therefore serves a purpose that UMSTART does not provide because of its broad mandate and design.
Roughly 40 percent of the 1,497 attacks currently in the MTI database were obtained from UMSTART ( which is credited as the source of the data). The remaining 60 percent come from MTI’s own published chronologies and recent scans of news reports ( this percentage will inevitably increase). MTI also uses UMSTART’s list of countries and regions, and for incidents for which it is the sole source, its information on fatalities, injuries, and perpetrators. Both UMSTART and the MTI database indicate whether attacks involve suicide and also provide other useful information.
But there are important differences.
First, MTI’s database contains more early attacks against surface transportation and is continually being updated, whereas UMSTART’s published data currently extend only to December 31, 2007.
Second, there are significant differences in the level of aggregation. UMSTART aggregates transportation attacks into two categories: transportation and aviation ( airports and airlines). At the data analysis level, it does not distinguish between attacks against public buses, public trains, subway trains, and their stations and stops, or between highways, bridges, and tunnels. It also does not distinguish between attacks against public transportation and attacks against private citizens, or it does so inconsistently. Searching UMSTART for attacks against transportation will not capture all of those aimed at public surface transportation, nor will it allow the user to differentiate between train, bus, and road attacks. By contrast, MTI’s database includes only attacks against public surface transport, and it differentiates between different types of public Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database 7
surface transportation targets. It therefore enables reliable data analysis on all terrorist attacks against public surface transport and against subsectors within it.
Third, UMSTART’s data structure for targets and attacks is much less detailed than that in the MTI database. While UMSTART’s data elements for targets relevant to public surface transportation are limited to “ transportation,” MTI divides its targets into 37 categories. UMSTART codes attacks into nine categories, whereas MTI codes them into 26 categories, including eight categories for further analysis of attacks using explosives or incendiaries. Again, this allows for detailed analysis of the frequency and lethality of attacks against various subtargets.
Fourth, UMSTART provides only generic descriptions of the bombs used in attacks, placing them in a single category, “ explosives/ bombs/ dynamite.” In contrast, MTI lists the number of devices used in an attack and indicates whether the detonation took place above or below ground; more important, it provides subcategories for number of devices, type of explosive or incendiary ( eight subcategories), how it was delivered or concealed ( 16 subcategories), and outcome of each device ( seven subcategories). This allows MTI to provide critical analyses of the frequency and lethality of different combinations of bombs and incendiaries, delivered and concealed in different ways, against different targets. It also enables analysis of the frequency of use of single versus multiple devices, and how frequently they detonated on target, malfunctioned, or were rendered safe through Explosive Ordnance Disposal ( EOD).
Finally, the MTI database allows for separate analysis of train derailment attacks, coding them into instances in which it is known or suspected that bombs were placed on the tracks, or known or suspected that bolts or tracks were removed, or other methods were used. As of December 17, 2009, MTI’s database included more than 95 derailment events dating back to 1920. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
8 The MTI Database
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
9
LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE DATA
TO U. S. PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION
This section presents data on the frequency and lethality with which buses, bus stations, and bus stops are attacked. It is important to understand the preliminary nature of these data and also to place the attacks in context for U. S. stakeholders ( see Figure 6).
DATA LIMITATIONS AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Information on some of the attacks in the database is limited, and much of it is unreliable. This is true for attacks that took place decades ago or as recently as 10 years ago. It is also true for some attacks that take place in developing countries or in countries without a tradition of open reporting by government agencies. Also, regardless of where attacks or attempted attacks take place, if they occur during a news cycle dominated by other events, the amount of information available from open sources can be surprisingly limited. Finally, some reporting by local press may be speculative, unverified, or editorial, and the cooperative exchange of information on surface transportation attacks between governmental authorities— relative to that in the world of commercial aviation— appears to be only in its beginning stages.
For all these reasons, the MTI database entries assume certain default characteristics until more data are collected and verified. These “ default entries” are recorded as rules in the database. For example:
• The default entry for a bomb that explodes inside a bus is “ concealed or placed in the passenger compartment.” This is a reasonable assumption, but in many cases there is insufficient data to verify that this was actually the case. Similar default entries are made for bombs that explode in bus stations and at bus stops: “ concealed/ left in stations ( trash bins, under benches, near trains or buses)” and “ concealed/ left at bus stop.”
Figure 6 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation
10
• The default entry for bombs or incendiary devices that detonate is “ detonated or released on target.” This probably overstates, to some degree, the success of the attacks, particularly when casualties appear to be low, and it assumes precise knowledge of what the target was.
• Armed assault is considered to be “ assault with automatic weapons,” since in the absence of information to the contrary, the prevalence of these weapons makes it likely that they were used.
• “ IED– unspecified” describes any bomb for which there is no information detailing how it was constructed; and until more information is available on whether the targeted station was enclosed or open, it too is similarly categorized as “ bus ( or train) station, unspecified.”
Some default entries are fairly reliable. The method of delivery and concealment of weapons used in suicide attacks is coded as “ carried on person” ( although some vehicle- borne IEDs ( VBIEDs) are driven by suicide bombers as well), and a grenade is assumed ( with good reason, given the 4 seconds between the pulling of a pin and detonation) to be “ physically thrown,” unless there is information indicating that it was combined with other mechanisms as an IED.
Another important limitation of the database derives from the inability of the current data system to perform routine median calculations. Some of the averages ( means) are actually based on only two or three attacks, and in a few cases, only one attack. To put these figures into context, we have included the actual numbers of attacks on nearly all charts that provide average lethality, and some basic information is provided to explain these events. In cases where there are few attacks and the lethality or the success of the attacks is particularly high, the average should therefore be seen as what terrorists were able to accomplish in a particular incident, not what they usually accomplish.
MTI researchers will continue to capture attacks individually, and existing lists of data will be discovered and searched. MTI is, for example, now examining the extensive chronology maintained by the RAND Corporation and will incorporate new attacks gleaned from it into the database; questions about certain attacks will be answered, corrections will be made, and MTI’s new data platform will allow more powerful analyses. The results of our analyses of these attacks— unique as they are ( no institution to MTI’s knowledge has attempted to generate such statistics)— must be seen as preliminary. They answer some long- standing questions, but they raise many others.
Nevertheless, they serve an important purpose. They can help stakeholders— governments, transit managers, and employees— particularly in the United States, to focus on the ways the most frequent and/ or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF ATTACKS ON
TRANSPORTATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Only three of the attacks in the MTI database were conducted in North America: two robberies in Mexico and a 1989 Greyhound bus hijacking in Canada, which was resolved peacefully. The overwhelming majority of the attacks have taken place elsewhere. It is important to understand the context of many of the attacks against public bus targets outside of the United States, because while these attacks are important, some have limited relevance to the domestic U. S. environment.
First, most of the attacks have been part of essentially local guerrilla or terrorist campaigns designed to bring down a government or achieve independence, autonomy, separation, and/ or Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation
11
some kind of state governing the territory for which this independence, autonomy, or separation is sought. Public buses, bus stops, and bus stations have been routinely targeted by Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the robust collection of groups seeking a Palestinian state or the destruction of Israel; Sikh and Islamic separatists in India; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ( LTTE) in Sri Lanka, also known as the Tamil Tigers; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC) and the New People’s Army in Colombia; and the Moro National Liberation Front ( MLF) in the Philippines. Yet the ideologies of these groups range from Islamism to Marxism, and the groups themselves can be religious ( e. g., Hizballah and Hamas) or secular ( e. g., LTTE and FARC).
Second, most of the attacks take place in countries in which public bus transportation is either the primary means of public transportation ( e. g., in Israel) or, along with trains, a large part of it, and in rural areas, the only public transportation. This is far from the situation in the United States, where aviation is the primary method of long- haul transportation, and with the exception of high- density urban centers such as New York, Boston, and San Francisco, the automobile is the primary method of local transportation. Where public bus transportation is extremely important, it becomes an obvious terrorist target. Conversely, where it is not so important, it may be a less likely target.
Finally, many of the tactics used in these attacks— some particularly lethal— are unlikely to be used in the United States. For example, Claymore mines were used exclusively in Sri Lanka and with particular effectiveness, and land mines have been used in rural areas of Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. These weapons most likely become available to terrorist groups that are linked with active insurgencies, obtain military training, and have access to military equipment. In the United States, where military equipment is controlled but automatic weapons, including assault rifles, are widely available, it seems unlikely that military weapons would be used.
Finally, in the United States, actual terrorist acts are dominated not by Islamic or Middle Eastern groups, but by groups or individuals energized by specific domestic issues. The terrorist attacks in the United States for the 10 years in which narrative descriptions are provided in UMSTART ( January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2007) illustrate this point ( Figure 7).
Figure 7 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
12 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation
With the exception of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001— which were conceived and orchestrated from outside the United States— U. S. “ domestic terrorism” during this period has not been particularly successful. Although jihadist plots certainly have been aimed at producing high body counts, the 143 remaining attacks resulted in only 11 deaths and 51 injuries. Also, although those plots included public transportation targets— specifically, the heavy rail urban mass transportation systems of major U. S. cities— no attack against public transportation targets was recorded. 3 Further, only one of the attacks could be considered “ Middle Eastern.” It was conducted by a 70- year- old Palestinian male whose writings reveal a set of grievances that included not only Israel, but individuals who had cheated him out of funds and tourists in the Empire State Building.
The greatest percentage of attacks ( 43 percent) involved extremist anti- abortion groups and individuals; 25 percent were conducted by the Earth Liberation Front and similar groups; and 16 percent were conducted by the Animal Liberation Front. One attack was conducted by the Ku Klux Klan and a similar group, the Republic of Texas, and a smattering of single attacks were conducted by individuals or groups, most of them against government or corporate institutions for one cause or another. Finally, a large percentage of the attacks ( 16 percent) were conducted by unknown persons.
Indeed, non- jihadist U. S. domestic terrorist groups have shown little inclination to cause civilian casualties, and most, in fact, have attempted to avoid them. This point is illustrated by Figures 8 and 9, taken from a recent MTI report. 4 Even the devastating 1995 Oklahoma City attack by Timothy McVeigh was aimed primarily at the U. S. government; McVeigh considered innocent civilians to be acceptable collateral damage.
Nevertheless, attacks that take place in other countries are relevant to the United States and to public bus transportation for several reasons.
Figure 8 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation 13
Figure 9
First, successful attacks against any target can be imitated. Terrorists seeking to attack public buses have an extensive playbook of attacks against public surface transportation. The description of successful results, particularly against very soft targets, simplifies the task for any terrorist seeking to make a similar attack and shortens the planning cycle. Attacks in London, Madrid, and Mumbai were considered major terrorist successes. Past success makes future attempts more likely.
Second, public bus transportation fits the profile of a desirable terrorist target. As described in the following excepts from a recent MTI report, 5 terrorists are opportunists and are far more likely to attempt attacks that will, with high confidence, achieve a death toll of 25 to 50 than a risky, complicated operation that could kill 1,000 or more.
Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller- scale attack with certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational failure.
* * * *
Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek targets that have emotional or symbolic value— widely recognizable icons, targets whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains. The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
* * * * Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
14 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation
The following assessment from the same report indicates the likelihood of al Qaeda or other jihadist groups targeting public transportation:
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier to analyze than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and attacks are fairly consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts and will have symbolic value— in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have “ emotional” value ( iconic targets)— and attacks that will cause serious economic damage. The iconic component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally recognized icon or to an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the target would not necessarily be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic backdrop that would increase the psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/ 11 have included iconic targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists consider sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat about economic warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the terrorist attacks since 9/ 11 has been incidental— for example, attacks on hotels do adversely impact tourism.
Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/ 11 have been directed against soft targets— that is, unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels ( Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs ( Indonesia, Morocco, United Kingdom), public surface transportation ( Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, India), residential compounds ( Saudi Arabia), and high- profile individuals. Terrorist attacks on embassies, consulates, and commercial buildings ( Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on the street; in other words, they have not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple of instances have terrorists attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery ( Saudi Arabia), which are likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a low tolerance for risk of failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any security perimeter, still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security does not mean that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these were suicide attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals greater operational ambition ( use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to attack more- diverse but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks on public surface transportation— the killing fields of terrorists bent upon slaughter. Embassies figured in several plots, along with other government buildings and military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks on naval or civilian vessels, like the attacks on the U. S. S. Cole or the French supertanker Limburg. However, soft targets predominate ( emphasis added).
Third, until very recently, radical jihadist plots involving attacks inside the United States have been fairly amateurish, but four of them have in fact focused on public transportation. All four targeted heavy rail mass transit systems of major U. S. cities, however; none considered bus targets. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation 15
• The 1997 Flatbush plot. In this plot, a suicide vest was prepared for use against the New York subway system. One conspirator hesitated, however, and approached the transit police. Authorities in turn conducted a raid and foiled the plot before it could be implemented.
• The 2003 New York poison gas plot. In February 2003, a cell of terrorists were arrested on their way to Bahrain from Saudi Arabia. They had designed devices to be placed near air intakes in ventilation systems or in closed areas and had undertaken surveillance of the New York subway system in fall 2002. They requested permission from al Qaeda’s central leadership, but the decision was made to cancel the operation because the leadership had “ something better in mind.” It is unclear what was meant by that comment.
• The 2004 Herald Square plot. In August 2004, two individuals, one born in the United States and the other a naturalized U. S. citizen, conspired to place a bomb in the Garden City subway station in New York City. Other targets in New York, particularly surface transportation targets, were discussed as well. A tip to the New York Police Department ( NYPD) from an anonymous caller led the NYPD to pay an informant to work his way into the Islamic community ( including mosques and book stores) to secure information about the plans of the conspirators. The informant taped conversations and provided key evidence. The NYPD also used an undercover officer and ended the plot before it could be put into operation. While the intelligence and emotional stability of the conspirators are questionable, the plot definitely included surveillance and operational planning.
• The 2006 PATH Tunnels plot. In July 2006, FBI online surveillance uncovered a plot involving eight suspects, one of them ( Assem Hammoud) an al Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, to blow up New York City PATH tunnels. Hammoud was released on bail after serving 26 months in solitary confinement in Lebanon. Two other individuals were also arrested, one in Canada and the other in the United Kingdom. According to the FBI, the plan was to carry bombs on backpacks onto commuter trains and detonate them while moving through tunnels. Dates and the amounts of explosives were discussed, and financing was apparently secured. The plot was uncovered before an overseas operative could go to the United States to undertake serious operational planning. The conspirators also spoke of bombing New York subways, among other targets.
In addition, Bryant Neal Vinas, a U. S. citizen raised on Long Island who was captured by Pakistani authorities for taking part in al Qaeda operations in Pakistan, passed information to al Qaeda about the Long Island Rail Road system.
Fourth, the level of determination and sophistication of the plots, although still low in comparison with those originating and/ or conducted outside the United States, seems to be increasing, as illustrated by the recent Zazi plot, in which Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty to planning to detonate bombs in the New York City subways; co- conspirators have also been charged.
Finally, while the pace of jihadist radicalization has been slower in the United States than in other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, domestic radicalization and recruitment and the plots that are sometimes involved appear to be increasing. Between September 12, 2001, and the end of 2009, 44 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were reported in the United States; 32 cases were reported between 2002 and 2008, an average of four a year. However, in 2009 there were 12 cases, a considerable increase. 6 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
16 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Bus Transportation
As Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano recently told Congress, “ Home- based terrorism is here…. And like violent extremism abroad, it is now part of the threat picture that we must confront.” Since public transportation is in the terrorist playbook and has yielded many successes, attacks against the public transportation system in the United States must be considered.
Is public bus transportation a potential target for jihadist plots inside the United States? Is it, relative to other targets, a likely one? Should we be concerned about public bus transportation and eager to protect it? It is hard to provide firm answers to these questions, but it is safe to say that a public bus, bus station, or bus stop in the United States is
• A target containing a sufficient number of people to provide an adequate body count for a potential terrorist.
• A target that has been attacked repeatedly elsewhere with a high degree of success, creating a kind of menu of successful and relatively simple attack methods.
• A target that, although it has not yet appeared in jihadist plots to attack targets inside the United States, can be an important part of an urban mass transit system that has been targeted and might reasonably appear on the radar screens of radical jihadist groups seeking an operational success, particularly if heavy rail mass transit targets become hardened in anticipation of attacks or in response to them.
Therefore, while it is important that governmental officials, public transit managers, and public transit employees consider the data in this report in context, it is also important that they not take false comfort in the lack of attacks in the United States. It would be prudent to learn from the attacks elsewhere and to develop a program of bus operator security- awareness training and corresponding procedures and equipment that mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks and also assist bus operators in dealing with the much more likely dangers they face from common crime and deranged individuals. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
17
TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION
OVERVIEW
Figures 10, 11, and 12 illustrate several fundamental points. Figure 10 demonstrates that while public surface transportation has been around for about 150 years, terrorist attacks against it have been a relatively recent phenomenon. MTI has recorded 15 attacks against surface transportation that occurred between 1920 and 1970, almost all of which were train bombings or attempted train derailments. Terrorist attacks started in earnest in about 1970 and then accelerated in the 1990s and the current decade. The drop in attacks in the past several years, as shown in Figure 10 and in Figures 11 and 12, is not an indication that the tempo of attacks has dropped, but rather reflects a lag in official reporting.
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the relationship between fatalities and attacks against bus targets and the relationship between injuries and attacks against bus targets, respectively. The spikes in attacks correspond relatively well to the spikes in fatalities and injuries. More attention should be paid to fatalities than to injuries, however, for several reasons. Reporting on fatalities is generally more accurate than reporting on injuries; open source reports often provide a firm number of fatalities, and “ at least” a certain number of persons injured. The minimum number is recorded in the MTI database. Also, some injuries later become deaths. Finally, different countries may use different definitions of serious injuries and may record only those or all injuries. The bottom line is that death is easier to define.
Figure 10 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
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Figure 11
Figure 12 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
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FREQUENCY AND LETHALITY OF ATTACKS ON BUSES AND TRAINS
We next examine how often, relative to other surface transportation targets, buses are attacked, first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices. We then consider the relative lethality of the attacks.
Figures 13 through 16 place the passenger train target subcategories into three groups: passenger trains, train stations, and train tracks. Passenger trains include, for example, trolleys, subway trains, and intercity trains. Attacks on tracks are most often attempted derailments, and many, but not all, of these are aimed at passenger trains. The same general approach holds for buses. The eight bus target subcategories are grouped into buses ( including passenger buses, minivans, school buses, and tour buses), bus stations, and bus stops.
Two methods of looking at attacks are shown in the figures. “ All attacks” include all 26 categories of attacks, ranging from IEDs to sabotage by derailment to assault with automatic weapons to kidnapping. “ All bomb attacks” include only the eight categories of explosive and incendiary devices.
Figure 13 shows that 51.1 percent of the attacks in the database are against bus targets; 35.7 percent are against trains; and 6.2 percent are against road targets— combining vehicle bridges, one tunnel, and highway and road targets.
When only bomb attacks are considered ( Figure 14), the percentages shift somewhat, in two ways. First, the percentage of attacks against bus targets decreases from nearly 51.1 percent to 44 percent, and the percentage of attacks against train targets increases from 36 percent to 41 percent. Second, the percentage of attacks against bus stops and stations increases, indicating another way in which bomb attacks tend to equalize the frequency with which target groups are hit. Buses are hit by explosive and incendiary devices about 32 percent of the time instead of 41 percent, and bus stations and stops are hit roughly 12 percent of the time instead of 10 percent.
Figure 13 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
20 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Figure 14
The reasons for these shifts have yet to be studied in detail, and they are counter to what most would expect, perhaps because of the large number of publicized bombings of Israeli buses.
A word of caution is needed regarding these data. MTI may well find a set of passenger train attacks that are not yet entered. Two lists provided by DHS/ TSA have been examined, and extensive RAND data will be examined, to identify any attacks on trains that MTI ( along with the UMSTART system) may have missed. Previously published MTI chronologies generally found the ratio of bus to train attacks to be 1: 1. Regardless of the final ratio, public bus service is clearly a major surface transportation target.
Figures 15 and 16 show the lethality of attacks against these same target groups.
When all attacks are considered, bus targets are attacked more often, but train targets are attacked with greater lethality. The average death toll of surface transportation attacks is four, which is also the average for buses, bus stations, and bus stops. The average number of deaths from attacks against passenger train targets, when only trains and train stations are considered ( not all track attacks are designed to derail passenger trains— some are designed to create general disruption), is five.
Considering only attacks in which bombs are used does not change the overall fatality rates of attacks against train and bus targets, nor does it change their relative differences ( Figure 16). But bombs do increase the lethality of attacks against road targets— typically bridges and highways— and they decrease the lethality of track attacks, showing the relatively higher lethality of attempts to derail trains mechanically ( by removing bolts, tracks, etc.). Thus, bomb attacks have lower overall lethality, but only marginally. ( MTI has just completed a detailed study of terrorist derailments, based on an analysis of 181 attempted derailments since 1920.7) The overall lethality of attacks not only does not increase, it decreases from four to three deaths per attack, on average, when only bomb attacks are considered. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 21
Figure 15
Figure 16 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
22 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS BY REGION AND COUNTRY
The regions in which all attacks against buses occur most often are shown in Figure 17, along with the distribution among the various regions. The data generally reflect the focused and deadly terrorist campaigns that include bus targets in certain countries of these regions ( which will become apparent in figures below).
Nearly all ( 94 percent) of attacks against bus transportation have occurred outside of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Australasia, and North America, and all but three attacks took place outside of North America. In addition, with the important exceptions of Israel and the Russian Federation, most of these attacks have taken place in developing countries.
When only attacks involving explosives and incendiaries are concerned, the regions in which the most attacks have occurred remain South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, with Southeast Asia having the next highest number. But then there are some interesting shifts, as shown in Figure 18.
Western Europe— which ranks seventh for all attacks— ranks fifth for bomb attacks, which reflects the extent to which explosives and incendiary devices dominate the relatively few attacks in the region, most of them from the Provisional, Real, and Continuity IRA, along with two 2005 al Qaeda attacks in London; the Madrid subway attacks; the ETA fire bombings of tour buses in France; and bus bombings and fire bombings in Greece. South America decreased from fourth to sixth, most likely reflecting the use of assault weapons and arson in Colombia. Finally, North America is in last place, with no cases of bus bombings.
We turn now to the 10 developed and developing countries8 that lead in all bus attacks and all bus bomb attacks ( Figures 19 and 20).
Figure 17 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 23
Figure 18
Figure 19 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
24 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Figure 20
For developing countries, the only significant shift in ranking ( more than two positions) occurred as a result of the increase in bomb attacks in China and the decrease in Colombia and Egypt. For developed countries, the rankings shifted very little when there were more than three attacks.
The lists of countries with the most attacks reflect the presence of terrorist campaigns that have included public bus transportation targets. While the largest single terrorist group listed in the MTI database is “ unknown,” because of the lack of claims or suspicions confirmed by authorities, specific organizations and generic groups seem to be primarily responsible for attacks against bus targets in these countries. In developing countries, campaigns appear to be dominated by the following organizations and groups:
• India. Kashmiri and Sikh separatists, Naga and other tribal separatists, Islamic extremists and Lashkar- e- Taiba ( LeT), United Liberation Front of Asom ( ULFA), and Maoists.
• Pakistan. Baloch Liberation Army, Islamic extremists and separatists, and, in earlier decades, Afghan government agents.
• The Philippines. MLF and the New People’s Army, particularly in Mindanao.
• Colombia. FARC and the National Liberation Army.
• Sri Lanka. LTTE.
• Turkey. PKK ( Kurdish separatists).
• Algeria. The Armed Islamic Group ( GIA) and Islamic extremists.
• Egypt. Al- Gamya and other Islamic extremists.
• China. Muslim separatists.
• Indonesia. The Free Aceh Movement ( GAM).
In the developed countries, the following organizations and groups— in addition to deranged individuals— are primarily responsible for attacks on public transportation: Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 25
• Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its various factions, and the Al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
• Russian Federation. Chechen separatists.
• The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Provisional, Real, and Continuity IRA, al Qaeda- inspired conspiracies.
• Greece. ELA and other left- wing groups.
• Spain, France, and Italy. Basque separatists.
• Poland. Robbers.
• Estonia. One bomber.
• Japan. Deranged individuals.
• Canada. A disturbed Lebanese Christian who hijacked a bus; the incident was resolved peacefully in front of Parliament Square in Ottawa.
For U. S. stakeholders who have a tendency to see all terrorism as directed against Americans and their allies by “ Middle Easterners,” these figures provide some interesting contrasts.
First, terrorist attacks take place in a number of Islamic countries, including Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
Second, the ideological motivation of the attacking groups runs from religious ( Hamas and Hizballah in Israel, LeT in Pakistan, and Al Qaeda), to groups advocating secular independence ( LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, Chechen fighters in the Russian Federation), to Marxist or left- wing groups ( FARC and NLA in Colombia, MLF in the Philippines, and ELA in Greece).
Third, if there is a common thread, it is the desire for some kind of local, regional, or national independence or autonomy. Although groups communicate, observe and imitate tactics, sometimes provide funding, and even form alliances ( often uneasy), most terrorist campaigns, like politics and many wars, are local in their objectives and have to be understood locally, not simply with broad brushstrokes.
Fourth, some of most bloody campaigns have been conducted outside of the Islamic orbit, most notably by LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Thus, while terrorism against public transportation, including and perhaps especially bus transportation, has increased, this is the result of different campaigns, born out of different grievances. Nevertheless, the tactics are known, communicated, imitated, or improved upon as the general threshold against attacks involving innocent civilians erodes. It is alleged, for example, that LTTE in Sri Lanka, which may have observed Hamas’s first suicide car bombs during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, invented the suicide belt and first used female suicide bombers, two tactics that were then adopted and enhanced by Hizballah, Hamas, and other groups in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS BY TARGET
We next look at the various target categories for public bus transportation and consider how frequently each has been attacked since 1970. As shown in Figure 21, passenger buses— including minivan and minibus scheduled service— are the targets of roughly 80 percent of all the attacks, and bus stations and stops are the targets of about 20 percent. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
26 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Figure 21
When only explosives and incendiary attacks are considered ( Figure 22), the percentage of attacks against passenger buses decreases significantly, by 9.4 percent, to about 70.6 percent, and the percentage of attacks aimed at bus stations and stops increases significantly, from 20 percent to about 29.4 percent.
Figure 22 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 27
In Figures 21 and 22, the terms “ bus station— enclosed building” and “ bus station— open air” are used only when there is enough information to determine that they are in fact enclosed or open air. If the type of station cannot be determined from the available evidence, the station is coded as “ unspecified.” Since most of the attacks occur in developing countries, it is likely that the majority of the stations are open air.
DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF ATTACK AND WEAPON
Figures 23 and 24 illustrate how frequently various attacks and weapons are used against all passenger bus targets and all passenger train targets, respectively.
Figure 23 indicates that explosives dominate, with explosives and incendiary devices being used in 63 percent of the attacks since 1970; automatic weapons were used in about 11 percent, arson in 5 percent, and armed hijacking and robbery ( combined) in 7 percent. Many of the “ multiple attacks” involve a combination of explosives and sometimes incendiaries, followed by assault with automatic weapons.
As shown in Figure 24, explosives dominate in attacks on passenger trains far more than they do in attacks on buses. Explosives and incendiary devices were used in 81 percent of the attacks on trains, in contrast to 63 percent of bus attacks.
From the data in Figures 23 and 24, we can determine the relative distributions of explosive devices for attacks on buses and trains. The distributions are shown in Figures 25 and 26. ( The category “ IED– unspecified” is used not only for attacks with so- called homemade bombs, but also for attacks in which the details of the explosive charge are not known, and this percentage would probably decrease somewhat if better information were available.)
For reasons discussed below, unspecified IEDs are used in 77 percent of the attacks against bus targets, as opposed to 90 percent of the attacks against train targets. The percentages also differ for attacks in which other devices are used:
• Grenades are more often tossed into buses than into trains ( 7.24 percent for buses, 1.1 percent for trains).
Figure 23 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
28 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Figure 24
Figure 25 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 29
Figure 26
• Land mines are used more often on roads where buses travel, although they are also used in train derailments ( 4.5 percent for buses, 2.5 percent for trains).
• VBIEDs are used not only against bus stations and train stations, but also directly against buses ( 3.1 percent for buses, 1.3 percent for train targets, exclusively train stations).
• Claymore mines ( used in 1.2 percent of all bomb attacks against buses) have not been used against trains and have been used almost exclusively against buses in Sri Lanka.
• IIDs are used more frequently against buses than against trains ( 6.2 percent for buses, 2.7 percent for trains). IIDs, often multiple devices, have been used in eight attacks against bus targets in Israel, six attacks in Turkey, three attacks in Egypt, and elsewhere, including two each in Bangladesh, Colombia, France, Greece, and Nepal. By contrast, IIDs ( again, often multiple devices) have been used in four attacks against passenger train targets in the United Kingdom, one attack in India ( the February 19, 2007, Peace Train firebombing that killed 68 people), and one each in Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
LETHALITY BY TARGET
As shown in Figure 27, enclosed spaces such as scheduled buses ( including minivans and minibuses) are, not surprisingly, where the most lethal attacks occur. Scheduled buses are the only targets in which lethality is above the average, but the lethality increase achieved by using bombs and incendiaries over that achieved by all weapons is not as great as might be expected: The average increase is one fatality for scheduled buses, and lethality is not affected or is even diminished in attacks against other targets.
In Figures 27 and 28, as in nearly all lethality charts, the number of attacks conducted is specified to indicate how often targets are attacked, rather than how lethal the attacks are. The number of attacks also helps identify potential outliers— particularly deadly attacks that indicate what terrorists have achieved once or twice, not what they normally achieve. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
30 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Figure 27
Figure 28
Figure 28 indicates how much more lethal all attacks against trains are than all attacks against bus targets: Attacks on scheduled passenger trains have resulted in an average of six deaths, as opposed to five deaths per attack on scheduled buses, and an average of four deaths per attack on unspecified train stations, as opposed to an average of one death per attack on unspecified Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation 31
bus stations. This may be because more people gather at train stations than at bus stations in many areas. Certainly, these are significant differences that need to be explored.
With an important exception, when only bomb attacks are considered, the lethality for train targets shifts, but only slightly. The overall average— which for buses remains constant— decreases by one fatality. When the targets most often hit— passenger trains and train stations— are considered, lethality drops when bombs are used against passenger trains, but remains constant for train stations. However, it increases significantly when bombs are used against enclosed train stations and most subway stations. By contrast, lethality increases for passenger buses but remains constant for bus stations and stops.
LETHALITY BY ATTACK AND WEAPON
Another way to look at lethality is to consider different types of attacks against particular targets. Figure 29 presents the lethality of all attacks against bus targets, showing the number of times each attack method has been used next to the average lethality. This leads to the following observations.
First, the two most lethal attack methods have been used infrequently. Claymore mines were particularly effective against buses in Sri Lanka, and the two attacks coded as “ sabotage, other” include a deadly 1991 sabotage of a tourist bus in Greece in which the exact weapon was unspecified in open sources. The next most lethal attack methods include the use of VBIEDs against bus targets in Israel; attacks involving “ other or unspecified” assault, which include the execution by firearms of bus passengers in Colombia, two 1996 attacks in Algeria in which passengers’ throats were slit, and a 1989 attack in Israel in which a bus was forced off the side of the road; and the use of mines in various countries, including a June 2005 attack in Nepal in which 53 people were killed and 73 were injured. Attacks with multiple weapons, which produced body counts similar to those of the most commonly used methods, often involved the use of an IED to stop a bus and automatic weapons to kill passengers.
Figure 29 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
32 Trends in Attacks on Public Bus Transportation
Second, the most lethal widely used attack method is assault with automatic weapons, which produced an average body count of six, and the ubiquitous unspecified IED, which produced an average body count of four. Not coincidentally, given that the majority of attacks are carried out with IEDs, this is the overall average for all attacks. The fact that automatic weapons are more lethal than IEDs is significant.
All other attack methods, including IIDs and grenades, have less- than- average lethality. This is not surprising for some types of attack, such as robbery and kidnapping, which are not intended to kill passengers, and arson, which is usually against buses emptied of passengers.
There are some interesting similarities and contrasts to be drawn when the same data are generated for the lethality of attacks against all train targets ( Figure 30). The average lethality when all attacks are considered is one fatality more than in bus attacks.
Assaults with automatic weapons against trains also have a higher death toll than attacks with IEDs, topping the list of attack methods used. The lethality of derailments illustrates how deadly the mechanical sabotage of train tracks can be. Multiple weapons— again, often the use of a bomb to stop a train and assault weapons to kill passengers— have been a deadly combination. IIDs can be more lethal than IEDs, but the data primarily reflect the February 18, 2007, attack on the Peace Train in India.
Interestingly, IEDs are somewhat more lethal against trains than against buses— a result that needs more exploration, particularly in view of the bus bombing campaigns in Israel. The rest of the results represent relatively few attacks, and some of the same observations that applied to buses— i. e., about armed hijacking, kidnapping, and arson— apply here as well.
Figure 30 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
33
BOMBS AND BOMBERS
TYPES OF BOMBING ATTACKS
Figure 31 illustrates two key aspects of attacks on surface transportation in which explosive and incendiary devices are used: whether single or multiple devices are used, and how many of the attacks are suicide operations.
The proportion of all attacks involving a single device is quite high— about 88 percent, which is slightly higher than the equivalent figure for trains ( 87 percent). It should be noted that some of the attacks involving multiple devices were aimed at the same target, indicating attempts at redundancy, and because of the way the data are entered in the database, a few are single- device attacks against identical targets at the same time. Also, some of the multiple- device attacks were designed so that one or more devices detonated just as responders or explosives personnel arrived on the scene.
Almost 12 percent of the attacks on buses were suicide attacks. The fact that there were 57 suicide operations and 57 of the attacks used multiple bombs is purely a coincidence
SUICIDE BOMBERS
We next compared the percentages of all attacks, train attacks, and bus attacks that were suicide operations and the percentages of fatalities and injuries they generated. The results are shown in Figure 32.
Figure 31 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bombs and Bombers
34
Figure 32
The percentages of all attacks against buses and all bomb attacks against buses that are suicide operations ( nearly 7.5 percent of all attacks on buses and 12 percent of bomb attacks on buses) are roughly two and three times the percentages of attacks against trains that involve suicides ( roughly 3 percent of all attacks on trains and 4 percent of all bomb attacks on trains). More striking, however, is the fact that suicide bombers create 13.7 percent of the fatalities in all attacks on buses and 21.5 percent of the fatalities in all bomb attacks on buses— twice their proportional share. The comparable figures for suicide train attacks are significantly less: 2.9 percent for all attacks and 3.21 percent for bomb attacks— less than their proportional share. Thus, suicide bombers are roughly five times more lethal when attacking bus targets than when attacking train targets.
There may be several reasons for this. The use of suicide bombers against bus targets in Israel, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India has been particularly lethal, and there are fewer passengers on buses and at bus stations than on trains. It is another trend that is worth exploring in more detail as more information on explosives and incendiary devices is collected.
OUTCOMES OF BOMB ATTACKS
Figure 33 illustrates the “ outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in bus attacks. The majority ( 87 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released on target, considerably higher than the average for trains ( 74 percent). For bus targets, 82 percent of the devices were rendered safe, and 5.1 percent detonated early or away from the target or malfunctioned. These findings suggest— and are supported by case studies that will appear in the final report— that devices can be found and defused and passengers can be evacuated before an explosion when drivers, conductors, intelligence, police and security officials, and passengers are alert. In some instances, devices were also poorly designed. It appears that fatalism is not an appropriate response to explosive and incendiary devices used against public bus transportation. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bombs and Bombers
35
Figure 33
LETHALITY OF BOMB ATTACKS
Finally, we look at the lethality of bomb attacks in three ways. First, we consider the lethality of the device used. Second, we examine the lethality of different methods of delivering and concealing explosive or incendiary devices. Third, having already examined the bus subtarget categories where all attacks occur, we look at these same categories for bomb attacks. We then combine these three factors— device, method of delivery and concealment, and target— to determine the most lethal combinations for bus attacks, and we compare the lethality of these combinations to the 12 most lethal attacks against all public surface transportation targets.
Figure 34 illustrates the lethality of devices used against bus transportation, showing again the number of times various devices were used.
The reasons for the high lethality of Claymore mines have already been described, but it is interesting to note that VBIEDS and land mines are more lethal than unspecified IEDs, which are at the average point, followed by grenades, IIDs, and dynamite
Figure 35 presents the comparable data for passenger train attacks. Once again, unspecified IEDs and dynamite are more lethal, on average, in train attacks than in bus attacks. Also, the figure for the lethality of IIDs is influenced by the February 2007 Peace Train attack in India.
Figure 36 shows the average lethality of bus attacks by method of delivery and concealment of the device used, again indicating the number of times each method has been used. Concealing or placing the device in a non- passenger area is shown to be the most successful method. However, this finding is based on only two attacks, one in Sri Lanka in which there were no casualties and the 1996 attack in Pakistan that resulted in 40 fatalities. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
36 Bombs and Bombers
Figure 34
Figure 35 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bombs and Bombers 37
Figure 36
Most of the other concealment methods are used frequently enough to suggest valid averages, with the next most lethal method—“ placed near the bus or other target, unspecified”— usually referring to VBIEDs, which can include suicide bombers.
The third most lethal method, “ carried on person,” refers exclusively to suicide bombers. As noted above, suicide attacks are particularly lethal in buses, achieving an average of seven deaths. The next most frequently used methods are concealing the device in a parcel or bag ( five deaths) and concealing or leaving the device in the passenger compartment ( four deaths, which is also the average lethality for all types of bomb attacks).
Figure 37 shows the comparable data on concealment and method of delivery for attacks on passenger trains.
The average lethality achieved by suicide bombers in train attacks ( five fatalities) is considerably lower than that achieved by the two most common methods of placing a bomb on a train— concealing it in parcels or bags ( eight fatalities) or placing it in a passenger compartment ( seven fatalities). The fatality rate of the most common method of attacking a train— placing a bomb on the tracks, on a bridge, or near a train9 ( three fatalities) is considerably lower than the lethality of suicide bombers. However, these are preliminary findings that could change with further scrutiny.
Figures 38 and 39 show the lethality of attacks on various bus and train subtargets. The targets most frequently attacked are scheduled buses, passenger trains, bus stations, and train stations. These two figures show that bombs are, on average, considerably more lethal when used against train targets than against bus targets. For both sets of targets, devices are more lethal when released or detonated in enclosed spaces, starting with tourist trains ( although our data come from only one attack), followed by enclosed train and subway stations, then scheduled buses and passenger trains, followed by subway trains and unspecified train stations, and finally by minivans and minibuses. All other targets yielded only two fatalities or less. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
38 Bombs and Bombers
Figure 37
Figure 38 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bombs and Bombers 39
Figure 39
THE MOST LETHAL COMBINATIONS OF DEVICES AND METHODS OF DELIVERY AND CONCEALMENT
For bus attacks, the small number of incidents that achieved greater average lethality than the most commonly used methods include
1. A 1996 attack in Pakistan ( 40 fatalities), in which a bomb was placed near the gasoline tank of a bus.
2. Two attacks involving Claymore mines in Sri Lanka ( 21 and 20 fatalities), one against a scheduled bus and the other against a government bus.
3. One 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan ( 18 fatalities).
4. Two instances in which flammable devices ignited in passenger buses ( perhaps accidentally) in China in 1994 ( an average of 14 fatalities).
5. A motorcycle bomb in Sri Lanka used against a government bus ( 13 fatalities).
6. Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses ( an average of 12 fatalities).
All 12 of the most lethal combinations of devices and methods used in bus attacks are shown in Figure 40. The combinations used most frequently were VBIEDs against buses ( 17 fatalities in Israel), which included some suicides; the much more common use of IEDs carried on buses by suicide bombers ( averaging nine fatalities) and left in parcels or bags ( averaging eight fatalities); and land mines in several countries ( averaging eight fatalities). One of the most common combinations— concealing an IED in the passenger compartment of a bus, of which there were Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
40 Bombs and Bombers
Figure 40
slightly more than 140 instances— yielded an average of only four fatalities, less than half the lethality of suicide bombers carrying an IED and exactly half that of IEDs left in parcels or bags.
The final report will address the lethality rates of various delivery/ concealment methods when only bombs that detonated on target are considered. Since nearly all suicide bombers detonate on target, the difference in lethality between suicide and non- suicide operations may decrease.
Again, all of these preliminary findings must be explored further.
Figure 41 shows the most lethal combinations for all attacks against public surface transportation. Eight of the 12 most lethal combinations were used in attacks on buses, and this does not include the 2007 suicide bombing of a truck convoy carrying Chinese workers, which we really consider an ersatz bus or minibus.
The remaining three attacks involving train targets were
1. A 1989 train attack in China in which dynamite was hidden in a toilet ( 20 fatalities).
2. The detonation of four gasoline bombs ( IIDs) on the Peace Train in India in 2007 ( 68 deaths and 50 injuries).
3. The placement of 19 bombs on the commuter rail system of Madrid on March 11, 2004 ( 191 deaths and 1,800 injuries).
The most common combination of target, device, and concealment method— hiding an IED in the passenger compartment of a passenger train, which was used 103 times— achieved an average of eight fatalities, twice the fatality rate of placing an IED in the passenger compartment of a scheduled bus, the most common combination used in bus attacks. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bombs and Bombers 41
Figure 41 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
42 Bombs and Bombers
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THE FINAL MTI REPORT
Security measures that help alert security and intelligence officials, bus operators and managers, and passengers to suspicious behavior and devices can potentially increase the difficulty of mounting a successful attack or decrease the lethality of an attack that does occur.
To help guide the development of such measures, the final report will use data from the most current version of the MTI database, which will prompt some changes in the empirical analysis. Also, to help determine what actions can be most effective in reducing risk, the final report will explore attacks in which
• Particularly lethal tactics and weapons have been employed, including the use of suicide attackers.
• Actions by on- scene security personnel, operators, or passengers would likely not have stopped or mitigated the attack without significant advance warning.
• Enhanced awareness and actions by security personnel, operators, or passengers did in fact prevent or mitigate attacks.
• Particularly lethal bombs or incendiary devices were used.
• Bombs or incendiary devices malfunctioned or were ineffective.
• Multiple bombs were involved, timed to detonate to increase casualties, especially among emergency responders. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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APPENDIX
NOVEMBER 12, 2009, BRIEFING FOR DHS COUNTER- IED WORKING GROUP Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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APPENDIX B
DECEMBER 3, 2009, PRESENTATION TO DHS BUS OPERATOR FOCUS GROUP Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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ENDNOTES
1. Brian Michael Jenkins, MTI Report # 97- 04: Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 1997.
2. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01- 07: Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 2001.
3. Twice in December 1994, a disgruntled individual detonated incendiary devices on subway trains in New York; he was not connected to any terrorist organization.
4. Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report # 09- 03: Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway- Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, January 2010.
5. Ibid.
6. It is important to put these cases in context in terms of actual plots. Twenty- four of the 44 cases involved actual plots. In 19 of these 24 plots, potential targets were identified, and operational plans were discussed. In 10 of the plots, the would- be terrorists actually conducted reconnaissance, and in 11 cases, they possessed, acquired, or tried to acquire explosives or other weapons, often without taking much care to avoid being identified.
7. See Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean- François Clair, MTI Report # XXXX: Off the Rails; The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV ( High- Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 91 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, February 2010.
8. The categorization of developed and developing countries may not fit all regions of all countries. Major cities of Turkey and South America are quite developed, yet the two countries are categorized as developing. MTI will seek a more updated approach to this problem in line with current economic classifications from the United Nations.
9. This method is used not only to derail trains, which often involves multiple bombs, but also in some attacks where bombs are placed near trains. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jenkins, Brian Michael, MTI Report # 97- 04: Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 1997.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report # 09- 03: Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway- Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, January 2010.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean- François Clair, MTI Report # 09- 12: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV ( High- Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, March 2010.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01- 07: Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 2001. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bibliography
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS
Brian Michael Jenkins is the Director of the Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence and since 1997 has directed the Institute’s continuing research on protecting surface transportation against terrorist attacks. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in fine arts and a Masters degree in history, both from UCLA. He also studied at the University of Guanajuato, Mexico, and in the Department of Humanities at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala, where he was a Fulbright Fellow and received a second fellowship from the Organization of American States.
Commissioned in the infantry at the age of 19, Mr. Jenkins became a paratrooper and ultimately a captain in the Green Berets. He is a decorated combat veteran, having served in the Seventh Special Forces Group in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention and later as a member of the Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam ( 1966– 1967). He returned to Vietnam on a special assignment in 1968 to serve as a member of the Long Range Planning Task Group; he remained with the Group until the end of 1969, receiving the Department of the Army’s highest award for his service. Mr. Jenkins returned to Vietnam on an additional special assignment in 1971.
In 1983, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the Long Commission, convened to examine the circumstances and response to the bombing of the U. S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon. In 1984, he assisted the Inman Panel in examining the security of American diplomatic facilities abroad. In 1985– 1986, he served as a member of the Committee of the Embassy of the Future, which established new guidelines for the construction of U. S. diplomatic posts. In 1989, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the national commission established to review terrorist threats following the bombing of Pan Am 103. In 1993, he served as a member of the team contracted by the New Jersey– New York Port Authority to review threats and develop new security measures for the World Trade Center following the bombing in February of that year.
In 1996, President Clinton appointed Mr. Jenkins to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. From 1999 to 2000, he served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism, and since 2000, he has been a member of the U. S. Comptroller General’s Advisory Board. Mr. Jenkins is a Special Advisor to the International Chamber of Commerce ( ICC) and a member of the advisory board of the ICC’s investigative arm, the Commercial Crime Services. Over the years, he has served as a consultant to or carried out assignments for a number of government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS). As part of its international project to create a global strategy to combat terrorism, the Club of Madrid in 2004 appointed Mr. Jenkins to lead an international working group on the role of intelligence.
Mr. Jenkins is the author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict; the editor and co- author of Terrorism and Personal Protection; the co- editor and co- author of Aviation Terrorism and Security; and a co- author of The Fall of South Vietnam. His latest books are Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves and Will Terrorists Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Go Nuclear? He is also the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and published research reports on conflict and crime.
BRUCE ROBERT BUTTERWORTH
Bruce Butterworth is a Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence Research Associate. He has had a distinguished government career working at congressional, senior policy, and operational levels. Between 1975 and 1980, as a professional staff member for the House Government Operations Committee, he ran investigations and hearings on many transportation safety issues, particularly in aviation. He spent 11 years in the Department of Transportation, eight of them in the Office of the Secretary. He managed negotiations on air and maritime services in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT) ( now the World Trade Organization ( WTO)), chaired U. S. delegations to United Nations committees, dealt with transport issues related to border inspections, and was part of the U. S. response to the Lockerbie bombing.
Mr. Butterworth has held two executive posts in aviation security and in both worked closely with Congress as the informal but primary liaison. He was Director of Policy and Planning ( l991– 1995), establishing strategic, long- term, and contingency plans and federal rules. As Director of Operations ( l995– 2000), he was responsible for federal air marshals, hijacking response, and 900 field agents; he worked to improve security and the performance of security measures by U. S. airports in this country and by U. S. airlines worldwide. He ran the Federal Air Administration’s ( FAA’s) Aviation Command Center, successfully managing the resolution of hijackings and security emergencies. He launched a successful program of regulation of dangerous goods and cargo security after the 1995 ValuJet crash, oversaw the conversion of the air marshal program to a full- time program with high standards, was a key player in the response to the ValuJet and TWA 800 accidents, and was a frequent media spokesperson. He has worked closely with Congress, the National Security Council staff, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and authorities of other nations.
He was an Associate Director at the U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum ( 2000– 2003), responsible for security and building operations. He designed and implemented a “ best practice” procedure to deal with mail possibly containing anthrax powder and developed and conducted comprehensive emergency planning and exercises. Between January 2003 and September 2007, he was one of two deputy directors in a 1,300- person Engineering Directorate at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, managing workforce planning, budgeting, and human- capital management for complex robotics space missions, substantially reducing overhead and improving workplace safety there. In addition to having helped the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS) in information sharing, he is a research associate at the Mineta Transportation Institute. He has written a peer- reviewed report on security risks created by highway- borne hazardous materials for the State of California, is updating prior work on selective screening in the rail environment, and is constructing an IED- focused database of surface transport attacks, along with Brian Michael Jenkins. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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He co- authored with Mr. Jenkins the following reports published by the Mineta Transportation Institute: Selective Screening of Rail Passengers ( MTI Report 06- 07), February 2007; a supplement to that report, published in January 2010; Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway Borne Hazardous Materials ( MTI Report 09- 03), January 2010; and Implementation and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization Technologies ( MTI Report 09- 04). He also co- authored a study with P. J. Crowley, Senior Fellow and Director of Homeland Security at the Center for American Progress, Keeping Bombs Off Planes: Securing Air Cargo, Aviation’s Soft Underbelly, May 2007. In February 2009, he published with Mr. Jenkins an opinion piece on information sharing entitled “ A Campaign the Secretary Must Win.”
Mr. Butterworth received a Master of Science degree from the London School of Economics in 1974 and a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Pacific in 1972 ( Magna Cum Laude). He was a California State Scholar and a Rotary Foundation Fellow and has received numerous special achievement and performance awards.
KARL S. SHRUM
Karl Shrum retired in 2006 after a 28- year career in the federal government that spanned three agencies and included key leadership positions in aviation and transportation security. He began his federal career in 1979 as a motor carrier safety investigator in the Federal Highway Administration. In 1982, he earned special distinction as the case agent in the first felony conviction under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. In 1986, Mr. Shrum transferred to the Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA) as an aviation security inspector and then became the regional hazardous- materials coordinator. In 1989, he was promoted to FAA Headquarters as an aviation security specialist, became air carrier branch manager, and then served eight years as manager of the Civil Aviation Security Division in the Office of Policy and Planning. These were tumultuous years in aviation security, years that saw the Pan Am 103 bombing, the Gulf War, Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot, and ultimately 9/ 11. In 1997, Mr. Shrum was nominated for the honor of Government Security Professional of the Year by the American Society for Industrial Security. When the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA) was created in 2002, Mr. Shrum became director of cargo, maritime and land policy and then senior advisor in the Office of Intermodal Policy. At TSA, Mr. Shrum was heavily engaged in the analysis of risk scenarios and countermeasures for bulk shipments of hazardous material by highway and rail in the context of critical infrastructure such as bridges and tunnels. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
116 About the Authors
MTI FOUNDER
Hon. Norman Y. Mineta
MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES
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House Transportation and
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Digital Recorders, Inc.
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Association ( APTA)
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New York, NY
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Karen E. Philbrick, Ph. D.
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Brian Michael Jenkins
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph. D.
National Transportation Finance Center
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph. D.
Urban and Regional Planning
San José State University
Jan Botha, Ph. D.
Civil & Environmental Engineering
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Katherine Kao Cushing, Ph. D.
Enviromental Science
San José State University
Dave Czerwinski, Ph. D.
Marketing and Decision Science
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Frances Edwards, Ph. D.
Political Science
San José State University
Taeho Park, Ph. D.
Organization and Management
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Diana Wu
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library
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Directors
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^ Vice Chair
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