Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary
Empirical Analysis
MTI Report WP 09- 02
MTI
Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation
MTI Report WP 09- 02
March 2010 The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies ( MTI) was established by Congress as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U. S. Department of Transportation through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “ Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Con­gress
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MTI Report WP 09- 02
EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARIES USED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS ON PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: A PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
Brian Michael Jenkins
Bruce Robert Butterworth
March 2010
a publication of theMineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San Jose State University
San Jose, CA 95192- 0219
Created by Congress in 1991 TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Report No.
CA- MTI- 09- 2875
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipients Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist
Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis
5. Report Date
March 2010
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Authors
Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce Robert Butterworth
8. Performing Organization
Report No.
MTI Report WP 09- 02
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192- 0219
10. Work Unit No.
11. Contract or Grant No.
DTRT 07- G- 0054
2008 - ST 061 TS 0009
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
13. Type of Report and Period
Covered
Interim Report
California Department of Transportation
Sacramento, CA 94273- 0001
U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Dictorate
Washington, DC 20528
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
U. S. Department of Transportation
Research and Innovative Technology Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Rm. E33
Washington, D. C. 20590- 0001
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstract
This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public surface transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of February 20, 2010. Data include the frequency and lethality with which trains, buses, and road and highway targets are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against those targets; and the relationship between injuries and attacks against them. The report presents some preliminary observations drawn from the data that can help stakeholders— governments, transit managers, and employees— to focus on the ways the most frequent and/ or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
17. Key Words
Public surface transportation; Terrorism; Explosives and
incendiaries; Lethality;
Distribution
18. Distribution Statement
No restrictions. This document is available to the public through
The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
19. Security Classif. ( of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classifi. ( of this page)
Unclassified
21. No. of Pages
112
22. Price
$ 15.00
Form DOT F 1700.7 ( 8- 72)
Copyright © 2010
by Mineta Transportation Institute
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2010925454
To oder this publication, please contact the following:
Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192- 0219
Tel ( 408) 924- 7560
Fax ( 408) 924- 7565
E- mail: mti@ mti. sjsu. edu
http:// transweb. sjsu. edu ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based, in part, on work supported by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008- ST- 061- TS001. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
THE MTI DATABASE 3
Overview 3
Comparison of the MTI Database and UMSTART 8
LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE DATA TO U. S.
PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 11
Data Limitations and Preliminary Conclusions 11
Relevance to the United States of Attacks on Transportation
in Other Countries 12
TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 19
Attacks Against All Surface Transportation Targets 19
Bomb Attacks Against All Surface Transportation Targets 31
Bomb Attacks Against Trains 41
Attacks Against Buses 49
APPENDIX: NOVEMBER 12, 2009, BRIEFING FOR
DHS COUNTER- IED WORKING GROUP 63
ENDNOTES 99
BIBLIOGRAPHY 101
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 103 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Table of Contents
ii Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
1
INTRODUCTION
This interim report, produced by the Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transporta- tion Security Center ( MTI/ NTSC), a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence ( NTSCOE) for the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS), provides data on terrorist attacks involving explosives and incendiary devices against public transportation targets throughout the world and presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data. The report is part of MTI/ NTSC’s contribution to the Interagency Counter- IED ( improvised explosive device) Working Group managed by DHS. The Working Group began its work in 2008; MTI has been and will remain an active member.
The data presented here are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, to which additional incidents are added either as they occur or as they are painstakingly culled from existing collections that do not focus specifically on transportation security. On November 12, 2009, the database contained 1,384 attacks. Over the next three months, the database grew to 1,648 attacks, an average of 88 attacks a month. MTI is currently incorporating hundreds of attacks from the 1,700 transportation- attack entries in a chronology maintained by the RAND Corporation, which has graciously provided the data to MTI. The analysis in this report is based on the database as of February 20, 2010; the most recent attack included was the attempted bombing of a train station on February 12, 2010, in West Bengal, India.
Many of the charts in this report were used in a presentation to the DHS Counter- IED Working Group on November 12, 2009, but they have been updated, and some calculations have changed. The original charts are reproduced in the Appendix. The full database was also briefed to the TSA/ FTA Safety and Security Roundtable on July 14, 2009, in Portland, Oregon. The briefing to the Counter- IED Working Group focused on bomb attacks, with the emphasis on bomb attacks against train targets. Since then, additional data on bus targets have been included to provide broader treatment.
The charts have been improved by combining average lethality calculations with distribution calculations. They now show not only where, against what, and how most attacks take place, but also which of the attacks are most lethal. For all attacks, lethality is calculated as average fatalities and injuries per attack ( FPA and IPA); for attacks involving explosives or incendiaries, lethality is calculated as average fatalities and injuries per device ( FPD and IPD).
For ease of discussion, we use the term “ bomb attack” to refer to attacks that involve the use of both explosives and incendiary devices. Incendiary devices, the most famous of which is the Molotov cocktail— a crude device consisting of gasoline in a bottle with a flaming cloth as a timer and detonator— have been used with surprising lethality against transportation targets. In a 2007 attack on the “ Peace Train” at Dewanna, India, four devices killed 68 people and wounded 50. Official government assessments have noted that when explosives become difficult to acquire, terrorists turn to incendiaries to create fires. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Introduction
2
This interim report will be revised and peer- reviewed and will be published as a formal MTI report in spring 2010. The charts will be updated, based on MTI’s most current data, and some of the preliminary conclusions in this study probably will change. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
3
THE MTI DATABASE
OVERVIEW
MTI/ NTSC started publishing chronologies of attacks on public surface transportation in 1997. These chronologies, which included some, but not all, such attacks between 1920 and 2000, were published in two MTI reports, the first in 19971 and the second in 2001.2These seminal publications on public surface transportation security helped to inform Congress; federal, state, and local government agencies; and transit operators. Serious criminal attacks were included because terrorist groups observe and learn from criminal tactics and also sometimes conduct criminal actions to finance their operations.
In 2009, MTI/ NTSC began creating a database that includes its own chronologies and all attacks captured in the second release of the Global Terrorism Database ( GTD) created by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ( START), based at the University of Maryland, a DHS Center of Excellence. The entries in this database, which we refer to as UMSTART, contain narratives of the details of surface transportation attacks between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2007. MTI/ NTSC regularly updates its database to include attacks found in lists created by U. S. and other government and industry entities. The lists either are not specifically designed for transportation threat and security analysis or lack details and require painstaking analysis and interpretation to sort aspects of each attack into sets that will facilitate trend analysis. The MTI database also includes attacks identified through open source searches, as well as attacks that are not captured in other lists. It seeks to include all attacks starting in 1970; its record of attempted train derailments goes back to 1920, and its most recent entry was an attempted bombing of a train station on February 12, 2010, in West Bengal, India.
Figure 1 summarizes the number and types of attacks in the database as of February 20, 2010. All attacks include terrorist attacks and serious crimes involving all methods, from arson and robbery to rocket- propelled grenades ( RPGs) to grenades, mines, and unspecified improvised explosive devices ( IEDs) to bomb attacks ( attacks using only explosive or incendiary devices) against all public transportation targets. Attacks against public train, public bus, and public highway and road transportation targets are also considered separately. The time period covered is from 1970 to the present. The 181 derailment attacks in the database have been used to support a study on attempted derailments, particularly those relevant to high- speed rail transportation. 3
The term “ public” is important. The database does not include assassinations of individuals on trains, buses, or roads or attacks against private automobiles. The attacks recorded are those against assets created for use by the public, i. e., licensed trains or buses or constructed roads, bridges, and tunnels. 4
Figure 2 lists the sources MTI has and will use, along with continuing data- collection efforts.
Since the database was first briefed on July 14, 2009, about 75 attacks have been added per month ( Figure 3). Most of these additions came from concentrated searches of campaigns against transportation targets in Israel, Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Colombia, the Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Datbase
4
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as the detailed review of various lists. MTI also gleans from two to four attacks a week from open sources. It is also examining the entries in the RAND Corporation chronology and will incorporate about 500 of those into the database. 5
Figure 1
Figure 2 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database
5
Figure 3
MTI is currently making the database more robust. It is working with explosives experts within and outside the government to increase and share information to enable better analyses of the effects of IEDs and improvised incendiary devices ( IIDs). It is also testing the feasibility of adding new fields to a smaller set of data— including the data that will be used in the final MTI report on this topic. Those fields will require access to original data.
Finally, MTI is moving the database from its current Excel © platform to a platform that enables median calculations as well as mean ( average) calculations to be conducted, to provide a truer picture of both the likelihood and the lethality of different kinds of attacks.
Figures 4 and 5 list some of the current fields in the system. They include 37 categories of targets and 26 categories of attacks and weapons, eight of which are considered “ bombs or incendiaries.” The database also has 16 categories of methods of delivering and concealing devices and six categories of outcome, e. g., whether the devices detonated on target and on time, malfunctioned, or were rendered safe.
New fields being tested for inclusion on entries of recent attacks, for which more detailed information is available, are listed in Figure 6.
As Figure 7 indicates, MTI is creating a unique resource. Current lists of terrorist attacks have inaccuracies or are not focused on transportation. With the addition of new entries from the RAND Corporation, the MTI database will contain more than 2,000 attacks. Consultations with officials in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel have reinforced our belief that we are creating a unique resource for government officials and transportation operators. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
6 The MTI Datbase
Figure 4
Figure 5 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database 7
Figure 6
Figure 7 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
8 The MTI Datbase
COMPARISON OF THE MTI DATABASE AND UMSTART
The MTI database does not compete with UMSTART; rather, it complements UMSTART. MTI’s database is designed to allow for updated trend analysis of attacks on public surface transportation. UMSTART allows more- general analyses to be performed. The MTI database therefore serves a purpose that UMSTART does not provide because of its broad mandate and design.
Roughly 37 percent of the 1,633 attacks currently in the MTI database were obtained from UMSTART ( which is credited as the source of the data). MTI also uses UMSTART’s list of countries and regions, and for incidents for which it is the sole source, its information on fatalities, injuries, and perpetrators. Both UMSTART and the MTI database indicate whether attacks involve suicide and also provide other useful information. Most of the remaining 63 percent of the attacks come from MTI’s own published chronologies, a few come from the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism ( MIPT), many come from focused scans of open sources on particular campaigns, and an increasing number come from daily scans of news reports, a number that will inevitably grow.
But there are important differences.
First, MTI’s database contains more early attacks against surface transportation and is continually being updated, whereas UMSTART’s published data currently extend only to December 31, 2007.
Second, there are significant differences in the level of aggregation. UMSTART aggregates transportation attacks into two categories: transportation and aviation ( airports and airlines). At the data analysis level, it does not distinguish between attacks against public buses, public trains, subway trains, and their stations and stops, or between highways, bridges, and tunnels. It also does not distinguish between attacks against public transportation and attacks against private citizens, or it does so inconsistently. Searching UMSTART for attacks against transportation will not capture all of those aimed at public surface transportation, nor will it allow the user to differentiate between train, bus, and road attacks. By contrast, MTI’s database includes only attacks against public surface transport, and it differentiates between different types of public surface transportation targets. It therefore enables reliable data analysis on all terrorist attacks against public surface transport and against subsectors within it.
Third, UMSTART’s data structure for targets and attacks is much less detailed than that in the MTI database. While UMSTART’s data elements for targets relevant to public surface transportation are limited to “ transportation,” MTI divides its targets into 37 categories. UMSTART codes attacks into nine categories, whereas MTI codes them into 26 categories, including eight categories for further analysis of attacks using explosives or incendiaries. Again, this allows for detailed analysis of the frequency and lethality of attacks against various subtargets.
Fourth, UMSTART provides only generic descriptions of the bombs used in attacks, placing them in a single category, “ explosives/ bombs/ dynamite.” In contrast, MTI lists the number of devices used in an attack and indicates whether the detonation took place above or below ground; more important, it provides subcategories for number of devices, type of explosive or incendiary ( eight subcategories), how it was delivered or concealed ( sixteen subcategories), and the outcome of each device ( seven subcategories). This allows MTI to provide critical analyses of the frequency and lethality of different combinations of bombs and incendiaries, delivered and concealed in different ways, against different targets. It also enables analysis of the frequency of use of single Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The MTI Database 9
versus multiple devices, and how frequently they detonated on target, malfunctioned, or were rendered safe through Explosive Ordnance Disposal ( EOD).
Finally, the MTI database allows for separate analysis of train derailment attacks, coding them into instances in which it is known or suspected that bombs were placed on the tracks, or known or suspected that bolts or tracks were removed, or other methods were used. As of February 20, 2010, MTI’s database contained 181 derailment events going back to 1920, captured separately and analyzed. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
10 The MTI Datbase
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
11
LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE DATA TO U. S. PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
This section presents data on the frequency and lethality with which trains, buses, and road and highway targets are attacked. It is important to understand the preliminary nature of these data and also to place the attacks in context for U. S. stakeholders.
DATA LIMITATIONS AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Information on some of the attacks in the database is limited, and much of it is unreliable. This is true for attacks that took place decades ago or as recently as 10 years ago. It is also true for some attacks that take place in developing countries or in countries without a tradition of open reporting by government agencies. Also, regardless of where attacks or attempted attacks take place, if they occur during a news cycle dominated by other events, the amount of information available from open sources can be surprisingly limited. Finally, some reporting by local press may be speculative, unverified, or editorial, and the cooperative exchange of information on surface transportation attacks between governmental authorities— relative to that in the world of commercial aviation— appears to be only in its beginning stages.
For all these reasons, the MTI database entries assume certain default characteristics until more data are collected and verified. These “ default entries” are recorded as rules in the database. For example:
• The default entry for a bomb that explodes inside a bus is “ concealed or placed in the passenger compartment.” This is a reasonable assumption, but in many cases there are insufficient data to verify that this was actually the case. Similar default entries are made for bombs that explode in bus stations and at bus stops: “ concealed/ left in stations ( trash bins, under benches, near trains or buses)” and “ concealed/ left at bus stop.”
• The default entry for bombs or incendiary devices that detonate is “ detonated or released on target.” This probably overstates, to some degree, the success of the attacks, particularly when casualties appear to be low, and it assumes precise knowledge of what the target was.
• Armed assault is considered to be “ assault with automatic weapons,” since in the absence of information to the contrary, the prevalence of these weapons makes it likely that they were used.
• “ IED– unspecified” describes any bomb for which there is no information detailing how it was constructed; and until more information is available on whether the targeted station was enclosed or open, it is similarly categorized as “ bus ( or train) station– unspecified.”
Some default entries are fairly reliable. The method of delivery and concealment of weapons used in suicide attacks is coded as “ carried on person,” and a grenade is assumed ( with Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation
12
good reason, given the 4 seconds between the pulling of a pin and detonation) to be “ physically thrown,” unless there is information indicating that it was combined with other mechanisms as an IED.
Another important limitation of the database derives from the inability of the current data system to perform routine median calculations. Some of the averages ( means) are actually based on only two or three attacks, and in one case, only one attack. To put these figures into context, we have included the actual numbers of attacks on nearly all charts that provide average lethality, and some basic information is provided to explain these events. In cases where there are few attacks and the lethality or the success of the attacks is particularly high, the average should therefore be seen as what terrorists were able to accomplish in a particular incident, not what they usually accomplish.
MTI researchers will continue to capture attacks individually, and existing lists of data will be discovered and searched. Questions about certain attacks will be answered, corrections will be made, and MTI’s new data platform will allow more powerful analyses. The results of our analyses of these attacks— unique as they are— must be seen as preliminary. They answer some long- standing questions, but they raise many others.
Nevertheless, they serve an important purpose. They can help stakeholders— governments, transit managers, and employees— particularly in the United States, to focus on the ways the most frequent and/ or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF ATTACKS ON
TRANSPORTATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Only 15 of the attacks in the MTI database occurred in North America ( i. e., the United States, Canada, and Mexico):
1. Three attacks on or threats to road infrastructure. A 1984 threat to bomb the Sarasota- Bradenton Bridge in Florida; a 1977 explosion on the Route 1 bridge in Florida Homestead and Key West; and liquid explosives found underneath the Golden Gate Bridge in 1982.
2. Four bus attacks. One assault and one robbery on buses in Mexico; a 1989 Greyhound bus hijacking which was resolved peacefully; and a 2010 criminal hijacking in Edmonton, Canada.
3. Eight train attacks or threats. A 1980 bomb blast in New York’s Penn Station; the 1984 detonation of a bomb in the Montreal train station; a 1993 bomb explosion in a train station in Guadalajara; two December 1994 detonations of an incendiary device in the New York subway system by a disgruntled individual; a 1995 Amtrak derailment in Arizona; a grenade found in a train station in 1982 in Chicago; and a 2009 detonation of a device in a rail signal bungalow in Sugar Grove, Illinois. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation
13
All of these were isolated events, and only three were conducted by or specifically associated with an organized group: the Amtrak derailment ( Sons of Gestapo), the 1984 bomb threat to the bridge in Florida ( Luis Boitel Commandos), and the 1980 Penn Station bombing ( Puerto Rican Armed Resistance ( RAP)). None involved jihadist terrorists.
The overwhelming majority of the attacks against public surface transportation took place outside the United States. It is important to understand the context of many of the attacks, because while they are important, some have limited relevance to the domestic U. S. environment.
Most of the attacks have been part of essentially local guerrilla or terrorist campaigns designed to bring down a government or achieve independence, autonomy, separation, and/ or some kind of state governing the territory for which this independence, autonomy, or separation is sought. Public transportation has been routinely targeted by Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the robust collection of groups seeking a Palestinian state or the destruction of Israel; Sikh and Islamic separatists in India; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ( LTTE) in Sri Lanka, also known as the Tamil Tigers; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC) and the New People’s Army in Colombia; and the Moro National Liberation Front ( MLF) in the Philippines. Yet the ideologies of these groups range from Islamism to Marxism, and the groups themselves can be religious ( e. g., Hizballah and Hamas) or secular ( e. g., LTTE and FARC).
Most of the attacks take place in countries in which train or bus transportation is either the primary means of public transportation ( e. g., in Israel) or, along with trains, a large part of it, and in rural areas, the only public transportation. This is far from the situation in the United States, where aviation is the primary method of long- haul transportation, and with the exception of high- density urban centers such as New York, Boston, and San Francisco, the automobile is the primary method of local transportation. Where train or bus transportation is extremely important, it becomes an obvious terrorist target. Conversely, where it is not so important, it may be a less likely target.
Many of the tactics used in these attacks— some particularly lethal— are unlikely to be used in the United States. For example, Claymore mines were used exclusively in Sri Lanka and with particular effectiveness, and land mines have been used in rural areas of Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. These weapons most likely become available to terrorist groups that are linked with active insurgencies, obtain military training, and have access to military equipment. In the United States, where military equipment is controlled but automatic weapons, including assault rifles, are widely available, it seems unlikely that military weapons would be used.
Finally, in the United States, actual terrorist acts are so far dominated not by Islamic or Middle Eastern groups, but by groups or individuals energized by specific domestic issues. The terrorist attacks in the United States for the 10 years in which narrative descriptions are provided in UMSTART ( January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2007) illustrate this point ( Figure 8). Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
14 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation
Figure 8
With the exception of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001— which were conceived and orchestrated from outside the United States— U. S. “ domestic terrorism” during this period has not been particularly successful. Although jihadist plots certainly have been aimed at producing high body counts, the 143 remaining attacks resulted in only 11 deaths and 51 injuries. Also, although those plots included public transportation targets— specifically, the heavy rail urban mass transportation systems of major U. S. cities— no attacks against public transportation targets were recorded. 6 Further, only one of the attacks could be considered “ Middle Eastern.” It was conducted by a 70- year- old Palestinian male whose writings reveal a set of grievances that included not only Israel, but individuals who had cheated him out of funds and tourists in the Empire State Building.
The greatest percentage of attacks ( 43 percent) involved extremist anti- abortion groups and individuals; 25 percent were conducted by the Earth Liberation Front and similar groups; and 16 percent were conducted by the Animal Liberation Front. One attack was conducted by the Ku Klux Klan and a similar group, the Republic of Texas, and a smattering of single attacks were conducted by individuals or groups, most of them against government or corporate institutions for one cause or another. Finally, a large percentage of the attacks ( 16 percent) were conducted by unknown persons.
Indeed, non- jihadist U. S. domestic terrorist groups have shown little inclination to cause civilian casualties, and most, in fact, have attempted to avoid them. This point is illustrated by Figures 9 and 10, taken from a recent MTI report. 7 Even the devastating 1995 Oklahoma City attack by Timothy McVeigh was aimed primarily at the U. S. government; McVeigh considered innocent civilians to be acceptable collateral damage. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation 15
Figure 9
Figure 10
Nevertheless, many attacks that take place in other countries are relevant to the United States and to public transportation, for several reasons. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
16 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation
First, successful attacks against any target can be imitated. Terrorists seeking to attack public surface transportation have an extensive playbook of attacks against such targets. The description of successful results, particularly against very soft targets, simplifies the task for any terrorist seeking to make a similar attack and shortens the planning cycle. Attacks in London, Madrid, and Mumbai were considered major terrorist successes. Past success makes future attempts more likely.
Second, public transportation, particularly train transportation, fits the profile of a desirable terrorist target. As described in the following excepts from a recent MTI report, 8 terrorists are opportunists and are far more likely to attempt attacks that will, with high confidence, achieve a death toll of 25 to 50 than a risky, complicated operation that could kill 1,000 or more.
Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller- scale attack with certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational failure.
* * * *
Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek targets that have emotional or symbolic value— widely recognizable icons, targets whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains. The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
* * * *
The following assessment from the same report indicates the likelihood of al Qaeda or other jihadist groups targeting public transportation:
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier to analyze than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and attacks are fairly consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts and will have symbolic value— in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have “ emotional” value ( iconic targets)— and attacks that will cause serious economic damage. The iconic component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally recognized icon or to an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the target would not necessarily be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic backdrop that would increase the psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/ 11 have included iconic targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists consider sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat about economic warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the terrorist attacks since 9/ 11 has been incidental— for example, attacks on hotels do Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation 17
adversely impact tourism.
Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/ 11 have been directed against soft targets— that is, unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels ( Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs ( Indonesia, Morocco, United Kingdom), public surface transportation ( Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, India), residential compounds ( Saudi Arabia), and high- profile individuals. Terrorist attacks on embassies, consulates, and commercial buildings ( Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on the street; in other words, they have not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple of instances have terrorists attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery ( Saudi Arabia), which are likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a low tolerance for risk of failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any security perimeter, still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security does not mean that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these were suicide attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals greater operational ambition ( use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to attack more- diverse but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks on public surface transportation— the killing fields of terrorists bent upon slaughter. Embassies figured in several plots, along with other government buildings and military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks on naval or civilian vessels, like the attacks on the USS Cole or the French supertanker Limburg. However, soft targets predominate. ( emphasis added)
Third, until very recently, radical jihadist plots involving attacks inside the United States have been fairly amateurish, but four of them have focused on public transportation. All four targeted heavy rail mass transit systems of major U. S. cities; none involved bus targets.
• The 1997 Flatbush plot. In this plot, a suicide vest was prepared for use against the New York subway system. One conspirator hesitated, however, and approached the transit police. Authorities in turn conducted a raid and foiled the plot before it could be implemented.
• The 2003 New York poison gas plot. In February 2003, a cell of terrorists were arrested on their way to Bahrain from Saudi Arabia. They had designed devices to be placed near air intakes in ventilation systems or in closed areas and had undertaken surveillance of the New York subway system in fall 2002. They requested permission from al Qaeda’s central leadership, but the decision was made to cancel the operation because the leadership had “ something better in mind.” It is unclear what was meant by that comment.
• The 2004 Herald Square plot. In August 2004, two individuals, one born in the United States and the other a naturalized U. S. citizen, conspired to place a bomb in the Garden City subway station in New York City. Other targets in New York, particularly surface transportation targets, were discussed as well. A tip to the New York Police Department ( NYPD) from an anonymous caller led the NYPD to pay an informant to work his way into the Islamic community ( including mosques and book stores) to secure information about the plans of the conspirators. The informant taped conversations and provided key evidence. The NYPD also used an undercover officer and ended the plot before it could be put into operation. While the intelligence and emotional stability of the conspirators are questionable, the plot definitely included surveillance and operational planning. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
18 Limitations and Relevance of the Data to U. S. Public Surface Transportation
• The 2006 PATH Tunnels plot. In July 2006, FBI online surveillance uncovered a plot involving eight suspects, one of them ( Assem Hammoud) an al Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, to blow up New York City PATH tunnels. Hammoud was released on bail after serving 26 months in solitary confinement in Lebanon. Two other individuals were also arrested, one in Canada and the other in the United Kingdom. According to the FBI, the plan was to carry bombs on backpacks onto commuter trains and detonate them while moving through tunnels. Dates and the amounts of explosives were discussed, and financing was apparently secured. The plot was uncovered before an overseas operative could go to the United States to undertake serious operational planning. The conspirators also spoke of bombing New York subways, among other targets.
In addition, Bryant Neal Vinas, a U. S. citizen raised on Long Island who was captured by Pakistani authorities for taking part in al Qaeda operations in Pakistan, passed information to al Qaeda about the Long Island Rail Road system.
Fourth, the level of determination and sophistication of the plots, although still low in comparison with those originating and or conducted outside the United States, seems to be increasing, as illustrated by the recent Zazi plot, in which Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty to planning to detonate bombs in the New York City subways; co- conspirators have also been charged.
Finally, while the pace of radical and violent jihadist radicalization has been slower in the United States than in other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, the cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism and the plots that are sometimes involved appear to be increasing. Between September 12, 2001, and the end of 2009, 44 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were reported in the United States. Thirty- two cases took place between 2002 and 2008, an average of four a year. But in 2009 there were 12 cases, a considerable increase. 9
As Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano recently told Congress, “ Home- based terrorism is here…. And like violent extremism abroad, it is now part of the threat picture that we must confront.” Since public transportation is in the terrorist playbook and has yielded many successes, possible attacks against the public transportation system in the United States must be considered. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
19
TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
ATTACKS AGAINST ALL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TARGETS
Fatalities and Injuries
Figures 11, 12, and 13 illustrate several fundamental points. Figure 10 demonstrates that while public surface transportation has been around for about 150 years, terrorist attacks against it have been a relatively recent phenomenon. MTI has recorded 15 attacks against surface transportation that occurred between 1920 and 1970, almost all of which were train bombings or attempted train derailments. Terrorist attacks started in earnest in about 1970 and then accelerated in the 1990s and the current decade. The apparent drop in attacks in the past several years, as shown in Figures 12 and 13, is not an indication that the tempo of attacks has dropped, but rather reflects a lag in official reporting.
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the relationship between fatalities and attacks against surface transportation targets and injuries and attacks against those targets, respectively. The spikes in attacks correspond relatively well to the spikes in fatalities and injuries. More attention should be paid to fatalities than to injuries, however, for several reasons. Reporting on fatalities is generally more accurate than reporting on injuries; open source reports often provide a firm number of fatalities and “ at least” a certain number of persons injured. The minimum number is recorded in the MTI database. In some cases, the account defines injuries as “ several” or “ many”; until an estimate is obtained, these are given the value of zero. 10 Also, some injuries later become deaths. Finally, different countries may use different definitions of serious injuries and may record only those or all injuries. The bottom line is that death is easier to define.
Figure 11 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
20
Figure 12
Figure 13
As shown in Figure 14, attacks on public surface transportation are usually and increasingly designed to kill, and major attacks provide a very good return on investment for the terrorist. While 62 percent of the attacks result in no casualties, the attacks are usually poorly executed or stopped and in some instances are designed to achieve economic disruption. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
21
Figure 14
Nine percent of the attacks yielded more than 10 deaths, on average. Major attacks against trains, such as those in Moscow, Israel, Mumbai, London, and Madrid, resulted in as many as 50 or more fatalities. The bottom line is that public surface transportation targets are generally easy to hit and lucrative. They, along with hotels and public assemblies, are killing fields for terrorists.
Suicide Bombers
Figure 15 presents the results of attacks on public transportation by suicide bombers, which are foremost in the minds of those concerned with security. Suicide bombers strike particular fear into officials and populations of countries that have been hit by or are likely targets of such attacks, and for good reason: Suicide bombing signals a level of commitment and hatred well beyond that which countries normally experience, and the suicide bomber has the unique advantage of guiding the bomb to its destination. However, although this method of delivering a weapon is particularly lethal for bus targets, it is less lethal for train targets. Moreover, suicide bombers and bombs are generally not the most lethal combination of attack and weapon. In most terrorist campaigns, it is far easier and therefore more common to attack targets and deliver bombs in other ways. And particularly for open targets, other methods produce good results for the terrorists.
As Figure 15 shows, only 4.96 percent of all attacks and 6.69 percent of bomb attacks were suicide operations, but they caused more than twice their proportionate share of fatalities ( 9.76 percent and 15.11 percent). They represent a much higher percentage of attacks against buses ( 12.32 percent) than of attacks against train targets ( 4.14 percent). The figures for bus targets are based largely on suicide bombings against buses in Israel, Sri Lanka, and South Asia. Suicide bombings against subways in London in 2005 and passenger trains and subway stations in Moscow were also significant events. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
22 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 15
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figures 16 and 17 show the regions in which most attacks take place and in which they are most lethal. Figure 16 provides these data for all 1,633 attacks in the database, and Figure 17 provides them for the 1,211 bomb attacks.
Figure 16 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 23
Figure 17
The largest percentage of all attacks have taken place in South Asia, followed by the Middle East and North Africa. Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Russia, and the Newly Independent States ( NIS) also experienced a high percentage of attacks, followed by South America and Sub- Saharan Africa. Relatively few attacks occurred in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean, and only Australasia and Oceania and Central Asia had fewer attacks than North America.
When only bomb attacks are considered, there are relatively few shifts in regional distribution. The top three regions remain the same; Russia and the NIS have more attacks than Southeast Asia; and a few other regions switch places, but they do not involve a large number of attacks. North America ranks tenth among developed countries for all attacks and ninth for bomb attacks, but these rankings are very low in view of its large population.
Lethality follows a somewhat different track. Largely because of a single 2003 case of arson in a subway in South Korea ( which resulted in 198 deaths), East Asia has a the highest fatality rate ( 11.9 FPA). The next highest rate is in Sub- Saharan Africa ( 10.2 FPA), the result of particularly deadly attacks against passenger trains ( the single most lethal attack in the entire database is an attack on a passenger train by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ( UNITA), in which a bomb and automatic weapons killed 259 people and injured 165). Except for these attacks, average lethality more closely follows distribution, with the highest FPA being in South Asia ( 5 FPA), followed by the Middle East and North Africa ( 3.2 FPA), Southeast Asia, ( 2.7 FPA), Russia and the NIS ( 2.4 FPA), and Western Europe ( 1.8 FPA), all of which are below average. The lethality of attacks in North America is exceedingly low ( 0.2 FPA and 2.1 IPA). The only region where a large number of attacks have occurred that has a higher- than- average FPA is South Asia. Even attacks in the Middle East and North Africa— which includes Israel— do not have higher- than- average lethality. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
24 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
When only bomb attacks are considered, few differences are seen between regions. East Asia still leads at 7.1 FPD ( even though the subway arson attack is excluded), followed by Sub- Saharan Africa ( 5.5 FPD). As with all attacks, South Asia is the region hit frequently in which the average FPD is highest ( 4.9 FPD), followed by Russia and the NIS ( 2.7 FPD), and only then by the Middle East and North Africa ( 2.6 FPD). All other regions, including Western Europe ( 2.2 FPD) fall below the average of 2.6 FPD.
Figure 18 lists the ten developing and developed11 countries in which most attacks have occurred, and Figure 19 lists the top ten for bomb attacks.
For all attacks, the distribution among leading countries yields no real surprises. The countries that received the bulk of the attacks are India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in South Asia; the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia; Israel, Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt in the Middle East and North Africa; Japan and China in East Asia; the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Greece in Western Europe; Russia in Russia and the NIS; and the United States in North America. For bomb attacks, there are no real shifts of any significance, for the simple fact that bomb attacks constitute the majority of attacks.
The data on lethality for all attacks are somewhat surprising, probably because the international press generally reports only the major incidents. The average lethality for all attacks is 3.8 FPA, and the average injuries are 11.8 IPA. The countries that rise above this level are, in order, China at 9.5 FPA ( reflecting a few serious bomb and bus attacks); Sri Lanka at 9.0 FPA ( reflecting the intense and lethal campaign by LTTE); Italy at 7.9 FTA ( again reflecting a few lethal train attacks); Algeria at 6.1 FPA ( reflecting some execution- style assaults on buses, including throat slittings); and India at 5.3 FPA ( which includes the Mumbai attack and other very lethal incidents). Countries that were at or
Figure 18 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 25
Figure 19
slightly below average lethality were Pakistan and Spain ( reflecting the March 11, 2004, bombings) at 3.8 FPA, followed by Israel at 3.2 FPA and Russia at 2.6 FPA, which reflects the continuing violence of Chechen separatists. Lethality for attacks in the United States is very low, 0 FPA and 0.3 IPA.
The lethality data for bomb attacks are similar. The average lethality for all attacks is 2.6 FPD and 10.7 IPD, but more countries rise above the average than in the findings for all attacks. China’s average is 10.7 FTD, and Italy’s is 9.3 FPD; next comes Sri Lanka at 8.6 FPD, Spain at 5.0 FPD ( which reflects the Madrid attacks), India at 4.9 FPD, Pakistan at 3.6 FPD, Israel at 3.4 FPD, Colombia at 3.3 FPD, Russia at 3.0 FPD, and Algeria at 2.7 FPD. Lethality for the United States is again very low, 0 FPD and 0.7 IPD, a very slight rise over the averages for all attacks.
Distribution and Lethality by Target Group
Next we examine the frequency and lethality of attacks on bus, train, and road targets using all weapons and the comparable data for attacks using only explosive and incendiary devices.
Figures 20 and 21 place the nine passenger train target subcategories into three groups: passenger trains, train stations, and train tracks. Passenger trains include trolleys, subway
trains, and intercity trains. Attacks on tracks are most often attempted derailments, and many, but not all, of these are aimed at passenger trains. The eight bus target subcategories are grouped into buses ( including passenger bus, minivans, school buses, and tour buses), bus stations, and bus stops. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
26 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 20
Figure 21
In the figures, the data on all attacks include all 26 categories of attacks, ranging from IEDs to sabotage by derailing to assault with automatic weapons to kidnapping. Data on bomb attacks include only the eight categories of explosive and incendiary devices. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 27
Combining all train and bus targets into a single group, we observe the following for all attacks: First, bus targets are involved in 50 percent of all attacks; passenger train targets are involved in roughly 40 percent, followed by track attacks ( 7.5 percent), many of which are aimed at passenger trains, and road attacks ( mostly bridge attacks) at 5.4 percent.
Second, we calculate lethality by attack for both all attacks and bomb attacks. Lethality is higher for passenger train attacks than for bus attacks. The average FPA and IPA for train targets are 5.4 FPA and 19.4 IPA, whereas the averages for bus targets are 3.8 FPA and 10.4 IPA. Track attacks achieved only 0.9 FPA and 0.9 IPA, and road attacks resulted in almost no fatalities or injuries, as they are usually aimed primarily at destroying infrastructure, not at creating casualties.
The corresponding observations for bomb attacks are as follows. First, bus targets still predominate, being involved in 42.7 percent of attacks, but the difference between the percentage of attacks on buses and the percentage on trains decreases from 10 percent to 6 percent, as the percentage of attacks directed at bus targets decreases from 50 percent to 40 percent, and the percentage of attacks against trains decreases only from 40 percent to 36 percent. Track attacks increase slightly, to 8.75 percent, and road attacks increase slightly, to 6.52 percent.
The difference in lethality between train and bus targets is less for bomb attacks than for all attacks. Average lethality for passenger train bomb attacks is 4.2 FPA and 16.4 IPA, less than for all attacks, while average lethality for bus targets increases to 3.9 FPA and 11.5 IPA. Further, the lethality of track attacks decreases to 0.1 FPA and 0.5 IPA, reflecting the lethality of mechanical sabotage. Finally, the lethality of road fatalities increases somewhat, to 0.8 FPA and 0.5 IPA. This probably reflects the fact that some attacks using both IEDs and assault weapons take place on roads and are classified as road attacks. 12
Distribution and Lethality by Target Type
Figures 22 and 23 present data on the distribution and lethality of all attacks against various types of public surface transportation targets.
Attacks on scheduled buses and passenger trains dominate, followed by attacks on train and bus stations and railroad tracks, then on tourist buses and bus stops and vehicle bridge targets. Lethality of all attacks is greatest for subway train attacks, at 13.2 FPA, no doubt reflecting not only the attacks in London and Russia, but also the arson attack in South Korea ( a non- bomb event). Lethality of attacks on passenger trains is 6.7 FPA. Next are scheduled passenger and company or government buses at 4.8 FPA, followed by trucks ( rare but often deadly attacks, at 4.7 FPA). All other targets result in below- average lethality, with train stations at 3.3 FPA.
The distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against all targets is shown in Figures 24 and 25. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
28 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 22
Figure 23 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 29
Figure 24
Figure 25 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
30 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
There are no significant differences in distribution between all attacks and bomb attacks, but there are some differences in lethality. Attacks against truck convoys and government or company buses have the greatest lethality ( 6.8 FPD and 5.9 FPD, respectively), but again the data represent relatively few, highly focused attacks. The lethalities of bomb attacks against passenger train and bus targets are almost identical ( both at 5.3 FPD), and subway trains follow at 4.0 FPD ( still reflecting Madrid, London, and Moscow, but now without the South Korean arson event). The only target against which attacks are at or above average lethality is train stations ( 3.3 FPD), followed closely by school buses ( 3.2 FPD). Lethality of attacks against bus stations is low for both all attacks and bomb attacks at 1.3 FPA and 1.3 FPD, respectively.
The average lethality for all attacks is 3.8 FPA and 11.8 IPA. This is higher than the average lethality for bomb attacks ( 3.3 FPA and 13.6 IPA), probably because of the frequency and lethality of assaults with automatic weapons, multiple weapons ( e. g., the use of an IED or a blockade), and high- lethality attacks such as execution- style killings. While bombs may be the preferred method of conducting terrorism, they are not the most lethal means of attacking public surface transportation.
Distribution and Lethality by Type of Attack and Weapon
Figures 26 and 27 show distribution and lethality of all categorized means of attacking public surface transportation. 13
Figure 26 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 31
Figure 27
Explosive and incendiary devices are used in the most attacks, as noted above. Unspecified IEDs are used in 62 percent of the attacks, and 74 percent of all attacks involve IEDs, IIDs, or vehicle- borne IEDs ( VBIEDS). The next most common method is the use of readily available ( in some countries) automatic assault weapon ( 10 percent), followed by arson ( 3.4 percent), then armed hijacking and multiple- weapons assault— which often starts with an IED ( 2 percent). A few methods account for most of the attacks.
Trends in lethality are different. Attacks with multiple weapons ( 19.8 FPA) and Claymore mines ( 19.3 FPA) are the most lethal, followed by sabotage through derailing ( i. e., mechanical sabotage), which can be surprisingly lethal ( 8.0 FPA), and other assaults, which include executions in which all the occupants of a bus or train are killed ( 5.9 FPA). The more commonly used automatic assault weapons and mines planted on roads or on railway tracks are about equally lethal ( 5.5 FPA and 5.4 FPA, respectively). Slightly below the average are arson ( 3.6 FPA) and the most commonly used attack method, unspecified IED ( 3.2 FPA).
BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST ALL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TARGETS
As shown in Figure 28, 85.5 percent of all bomb attacks involve a single bomb; this seems to be a constant with no evolving trend over time. It should be noted that some of the attacks involving multiple devices were aimed at the same target, possibly indicating attempts at redundancy, and because of the way the data are entered in the database, a few are single- device attacks against identical targets at the same time. Also, some of the multiple- device attacks were designed so that one or more devices detonated just as responders or explosives personnel arrived on the scene. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
32 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 28
Figure 29 provides more detail on the number of bombs used in various attacks. The highest number, 10, was recorded in the attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004.
Figure 29 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 33
Figure 30 illustrates the “ outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in attacks. The majority ( 77 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released on target. However, 6 percent of the devices did not work as planned, and 16.8 percent were found and rendered safe. These findings suggest that devices can be found and defused and passengers can be evacuated before an explosion when drivers, conductors, intelligence, police and security officials, and passengers are alert. In some instances, devices were also poorly designed. It appears that fatalism is not an appropriate response to explosive and incendiary devices used against public transportation.
The lethality calculations in this interim report are based on either attack or device; they are not yet based on explosions— where we would count only the bombs that detonated or were released on target. The basis of calculation can have important effects when comparing the lethality of different means of concealment and delivery, particularly in suicide attacks. Since the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks in the database detonated on target and on time and because suicide bombers can guide their bombs to the target, a comparison of lethality between bombs placed in parcels or bags or in passenger compartments of buses and trains with bombs carried on persons may be misleading. If we compare only bombs that exploded on target, as we intend to do in further work, we may find that the difference in lethality between bombs placed in bags or parcels or hidden in passenger compartments and bombs carried on persons decreases significantly.
Figure 30
Distribution and Lethality by Target
The following calculations of distribution and lethality combine target, device, and concealment method, as was shown in Figures 24 and 25. The lethalities of bomb attacks against passenger train and bus targets are almost identical ( 5.3 FPD), and attacks on Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
34 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
subway trains follow at 4.0 FPD ( reflecting Madrid, London, and Moscow, but not the South Korean arson incident). Train stations are the only target with at or above average lethality ( 3.3 FPD), followed closely by school buses ( 3.2 FPD). Bus station lethality is low for both all attacks and bomb attacks— 1.3 FPA and 1.3 FPD, respectively.
Distribution and Lethality by Device
Figure 31 shows the lethality of each device. Unspecified IEDS are the most widely used ( 83.8 percent of all devices), but Claymore mines, land mines, and VBIEDS have higher- than- average lethality, whereas unspecified IEDs are of average lethality with 2.6 FPD and 11.6 IPD.
Figure 31
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 32 provides distribution and lethality statistics for different methods of delivery and concealment.
The most frequently used delivery method is placement in a bus or train passenger compartment, followed by placement on a train track. Concealing bombs in stations or placing them on vehicle roads are next most common. Placing a bomb in a parcel or bag, physically throwing a device ( usually a grenade), or carrying one ( always a suicide operation) follow, being used at about the same frequency. Although suicide attacks account for only 6.68 percent of all bomb attacks, they cause 15 percent of the fatalities and 18.6 percent of the injuries; they are the most lethal method of delivery and concealment at 6.85 FPD and 34.86 IPD. This may be because relatively few suicide bombs fail to detonate on target and on time. It certainly reflects their greater effectiveness against bus targets than against train targets. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 35
Figure 32
Bombs ( usually VBIEDs) placed near the target are the next most lethal method of delivery, achieving 5.38 FPD and 14.56 IPD. Some attacks using VBIEDs are also suicide operations. Bombs left in parcels or bags ( as was done in Madrid in 2004) follow at 4.70 FPD and 25.84 IPD. The only other method that is significantly above the average— concealment in the passenger compartment of trains or buses— is also the most commonly used, and it achieves 3.86 FPD and 14.5 IPD. Other methods that have nearly average lethality include concealment in stations ( 2.44 FPD and 10.10 IPD) and placement ( usually mines) on vehicle roads ( 2.14 FPD and 4.50 IPD). Placing a bomb in the non- passenger area of a train or bus has higher- than- average lethality ( 2.75 FPD), but this largely reflects a single attack against a bus that will be described later.
The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
We combine all three factors— devices, method of delivery and concealment, and target— to derive the 12 most lethal combinations ( Figure 33). Again, some of these findings are based on very few attacks and therefore show what terrorists have achieved in particular incidents, not what they normally do achieve.
Concealing an unspecified IED in a parcel or bag and placing it in a passenger train is the only combination that was used more than 10 times in the attacks in the database and therefore is considered the most common. Attacks using other combinations of concealment and delivery include
• A 1996 attack in Pakistan in which a bomb was placed in the gas tank of a passenger bus ( 40 FPA). Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
36 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 33
• A 2007 attack against the Peace Train in India, in which four gasoline bombs were used ( 68 FPA).
• A single suicide bomb used against a truck convoy carrying Chinese workers in Pakistan ( 30 FPA).
• Two attacks in Sri Lanka in which a Claymore mine was exploded on the side of the road ( 21 and 16 FPA) ( our data indicate that this method has been used thus far only in that campaign).
• A 1989 train attack in China in which dynamite was hidden in a toilet ( 20 FPA).
• A 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan ( 18 FPA).
• A motorcycle bomb used against a bus carrying military personnel in Sri Lanka ( 13 FPA).
• Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses ( 12 FPA).
Only three suicide bombings against passenger trains have been recorded; two of them were not successful, and one— conducted by the Black Widows against a commuter train in Moscow in 2003— killed 35 people and injured 170. ( The London attacks targeted subway trains, and a suicide bomber attacked a subway station in Moscow in 2004.)
Attacks Against Trains
As Figure 34 indicates, body counts are certainly a factor in attacks on trains. The percentage of attacks with more than 10 fatalities is slightly higher than the percentage for all attacks, and some bomb attacks on trains have yielded an average lethality of 24 fatalities per bomb. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 37
Figure 34
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figure 35 shows the regional distribution and lethality of all the train attacks in the database.
Figure 35 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
38 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
As shown in Figure 36, there are some differences in regional distribution between all attacks against trains and all attacks against all targets. Although trains have not yet been attacked in the United States with great frequency or lethality, recent plots involving the subway or commuter rail systems of major U. S. cities have been uncovered.
With the exception of South Asia, the four regions where attacks have had above- average lethality, shown in Figure 37, were not where the bulk of the attacks took place. Obviously, the lethality of attacks in North America is very low.
Figures 38 and 39 show the distribution and lethality of all train attacks and bomb attacks on trains in the countries where the most incidents have occurred.
For all train attacks, distribution follows a fairly predictable pattern. Among developing countries, India and Pakistan have the highest percentage of attacks, followed by Turkey, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Algeria. India experiences a large number of train attacks, but that is not surprising given the extensive use of railroads in India and the size of the country. Among developed countries, Russia— which has been dealing with Chechen separatists— has had the largest number of train attacks, followed by the United Kingdom ( dealing with IRA and IRA dissident groups, and now with al Qaeda affiliates), Spain ( dealing with the Basque separatist organization ETA and also jihadist groups), and then Germany, Israel ( with a small but important train system), and Italy. Only five attacks have occurred in North America.
Figure 36 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 39
Figure 37
Figure 38 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
40 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 39
Lethality follows a somewhat different pattern. The average lethality for all train attacks is 5.5 FPA, and the country with the highest FPA is Cambodia. A number of attacks were made against Cambodian trains by the Khmer Rouge, including an attack involving a bomb and assault weapons used against a passenger train in 1980 in which 150 people were killed and 250 people were injured. The next most lethal attacks occurred in Italy ( 11.1 FPA), largely reflecting a deadly bombing in the Bologna train station in 1980, followed by Sri Lanka, which suffered lethal bombings and multiple attacks by LTTE. India, which suffered the largest percentage of attacks, had an average fatality rate of 8.0 FPA, followed by Spain at 7.8 FPA ( reflecting the 2004 Madrid attacks), then Algeria ( 5.8 FPA), where multiple attacks have been made against trains. All other countries, including the United Kingdom, had below- average lethality, demonstrating the extent to which the IRA targeted trains to create economic havoc and not to generate body counts.
The relative ranking of both developing and developed countries having more than 10 bomb attacks against trains are similar to those for all train attacks. However, Israel drops off the list. North America experienced only four attacks.
The highest lethality was recorded in Italy ( 12.3 FPD), again reflecting the Bologna station bombing, followed by Spain ( 10.0 FPD), reflecting the Madrid bombings. The next most lethal attacks took place in India ( 7.7 FPD), Algeria ( 6.5 FPD), Pakistan ( 3.5 FPD), and Russia ( 3.4 FPD). The average lethality was 3.5 FPD.
Train bombings are the only incidents in which developed countries ( Italy and Spain) suffered the highest lethality, and in which developed countries such as Russia have suffered lethality close to that of developing countries such as Pakistan. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 41
Distribution and Lethality by Method of Attack
Distribution and lethality by method of attack are shown in Figure 40.
Figure 40
As shown in Figure 41, explosive attacks dominate frequency in passenger train attacks more than in all attacks. Still, explosives are not the most lethal method of attack, and in fact the lethality of unspecified IEDs is below the overall average ( Figure 42).
Distribution and Lethality by Target
Figure 43 shows the distribution and lethality of attacks on specific train targets. Attacks on subway trains and passenger trains are the most lethal, and these are the only targets for which lethality of attacks is above average.
BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST TRAINS
In contrast to attacks against buses ( discussed below), suicide bombers may not be the greatest threat against trains, as indicated in Figure 44.
The suicide method of delivering a bomb (“ carried on person”) is more lethal than average, but so are bombs concealed in passenger compartments or in parcels or bags ( see Figure 45). Data on the other aspects of bombs placed on trains are roughly the same as those for all bomb attacks against all targets. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
42 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 41
Figure 42 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 43
Figure 43
Figure 44 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
44 Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation
Figure 45
Distribution and Lethality by Target
The distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against train targets are shown in Figure 46.
Figure 46 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation 45
Attacks on passenger and subway trains dominate distribution and, except for attacks on tourist trains ( which are relatively rare), also are the most lethal train attacks ( see Figure 47). These figures reflect the Madrid and London attacks, showing the effect of recent and major attacks on overall lethality.
Figure 47
Distribution and Lethality by Device
Figure 48 shows the distribution and lethality of explosive and incendiary devices used against train targets. The overall lethality of these devices— often used in enclosed areas— is greater than average. Unspecified IEDs are more lethal in train attacks than in all bomb attacks, and not only do they dominate distribution, they are the only device with above- average lethality for such attacks.
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 49 provides distribution and lethality figures for methods of delivery and concealment of devices used in train bomb attacks.
The most frequent method of concealment of bombs is placement in passenger compartments ( 31.8 percent), then placement on tracks ( 25.1 percent), then concealment or placement in stations ( 21.2 percent). Other methods with more than 10 recorded attempts include leaving bombs in parcels or bags ( 7.8 percent), placing a bomb ( or VBIED) outside of a station ( 5.3 percent), and finally, suicide bombers ( 4.15 percent). The rest of the methods have been used fewer than 10 times in events in the database. Thus, concealment methods for trains have about the same distribution as that for all bomb attacks. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 48
Figure 49
The most notable difference between lethality in train bomb attacks and that in all bomb attacks is that concealing a bomb in the passenger compartment of a train or in a bag or parcel is about as lethal as a suicide bombing. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
The 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and delivery and concealment method for passenger train targets are shown in Figure 50.
As in the case of all bomb attacks, the most lethal combinations in train attacks ( e. g., the 2007 Peace Train attack, the dynamite bombing in China, and the female suicide bomber in the Moscow subway) are not necessarily the most commonly used. Attacks against tourist trains are rare ( with an average lethality of 8 FPA), and the unknown attacks include one particularly lethal attack against a train station in Sri Lanka ( 5 FPA) in which the attackers used a method that is not described in the source material.
The methods of concealment and delivery that are used most commonly or that have been used in particularly notorious attacks include the following:
• The most lethal method that has been used in more than 10 attacks is concealment of bombs in parcels or bags in passenger trains, yielding an FPD of 13, higher than that of the suicide bombings. This method was used in the Madrid subway bombings.
• Suicide bombing was used in the 2003 attack on a commuter train in Moscow ( 12 FPD), and also in the three London subway bombs on July 7, 2005 ( 11 FPD) and attacks in India, China, Sri Lanka, Israel, Turkey, and Indonesia that yielded a relatively low FPD of 3.
• The most commonly used concealment methods for train attacks are placement of a bomb in the passenger compartment, used in 118 attacks in the database ( 6 FPD), and placement of a bomb in the station, used in 66 attacks ( 5 FPD). These data derive from a large enough number of attacks to be particularly relevant.
Figure 50 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Attacks, Fatalities, and Injuries Over Time
Figures 51 and 52 show the pattern of attacks and fatalities and attacks and injuries, respectively, over time. There is a curious difference between attacks and fatalities between 1998 and 2003, and a confluence that starts again in 2005. The same pattern seems to exist for injuries. Further analysis is needed to explore the reasons for this.
Figure 51
Figure 52 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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ATTACKS AGAINST BUSES
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figures 53 and 54 provide regional distribution and lethality calculations for all bus attacks and for bombing attacks against bus targets.
Figure 53
Figure 54 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figures 55 and 56 compare the distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against buses with those of bomb attacks against all targets. Although the Middle East and North Africa dominate at least the Western consciousness about terrorism, this is not the most lethal region for either all attacks or bomb attacks against buses; its lethality is actually below average for all attacks and only slightly above average for bomb attacks.
Figure 55
Figure 56 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 57 lists the 10 developed and developing countries that have experienced the most bus attacks of all types, and Figure 58 lists those that have had the most bomb attacks on bus targets.
Figure 57
Figure 58 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Clearly, with the exception of Israel, the majority of the attacks have taken place in developing countries. Also notable are campaigns in Russia ( largely by Chechen separatists) and the United Kingdom. Attacks in the United Kingdom included a jihadist attack on July 7, 2005, and— although the IRA generally avoided transportation attacks that generated large civilian casualties, particularly in Great Britain itself— one IRA bus bomb in 1974 in England that killed 11 soldiers, and another execution- style assault in Northern Ireland in 1976 that killed 10 Protestant workers.
For developing countries, the only significant shift in ranking ( more than two positions) occurred as a result of the increase in bomb attacks in China and the decrease in Colombia and Egypt. For developed countries, the rankings shifted very little when there were more than three attacks.
The list of countries with the most attacks reflects the presence of terrorist campaigns that have included public bus transportation targets. While the largest single terrorist group listed in the MTI database is “ unknown,” because of the lack of claims or suspicions confirmed by authorities, specific organizations and generic groups seem to be primarily responsible for attacks against bus targets in these countries. In developing countries, campaigns appear to be dominated by the following organizations and groups:
• India. Kashmiri and Sikh separatists, Naga and other tribal separatists, Islamic extremists and Lashkar- e- Taiba ( LeT), United Liberation Front of Asom ( ULFA), and Maoists.
• Pakistan. Baloch Liberation Army, Islamic extremists and separatists, and, in earlier decades, Afghan government agents.
• The Philippines. The MLF and the New People’s Army, particularly in Mindanao.
• Colombia. FARC and the National Liberation Army.
• Sri Lanka. LTTE.
• Turkey. PKK ( Kurdish separatists).
• Algeria. The Armed Islamic Group ( GIA) and Islamic extremists.
• Egypt. Al- Gamya and other Islamic extremists.
• China. Muslim separatists.
• Indonesia. The Free Aceh Movement ( GAM).
In the developed countries, the following organizations and groups— in addition to deranged individuals— are primarily responsible for attacks on public transportation:
• Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its various factions, and the Al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
• Russian Federation. Chechen separatists.
• The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. the Provisional, Real, and Continuity IRA, al Qaeda- inspired conspiracies.
• Greece. ELA and other left- wing groups.
• Spain, France, and Italy. Basque separatists.
• Poland. Robbers.
• Estonia. One bomber.
• Japan. Deranged individuals.
• Canada. A disturbed Lebanese Christian who hijacked a bus ( the incident was resolved peacefully in front of Parliament Square in Ottawa) and a recent criminal hijacking of a bus in Edmonton. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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For U. S. stakeholders who have a tendency to see all terrorism as directed against Americans and their allies by “ Middle Easterners,” these figures provide some interesting contrasts.
First, terrorist attacks have taken place in a number of Islamic countries, including Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
Second, the ideological motivation of the attacking groups runs from religious ( Hamas and Hizballah in Israel, LeT in Pakistan, and al Qaeda), to groups advocating secular independence ( LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, Chechen fighters in the Russian Federation), to Marxist or left- wing groups ( FARC and NLA in Colombia, MLF in the Philippines, and ELA in Greece).
Third, if there is a common thread, it is the desire for some kind of local, regional, or national independence or autonomy. Although groups communicate, observe and imitate tactics, sometimes provide funding, and even form alliances ( often uneasy), most terrorist campaigns, like politics and many wars, are local in their objectives and have to be understood locally, not simply with broad brushstrokes.
Fourth, some of most bloody campaigns have been conducted outside of the Islamic orbit, most notably by LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Thus, while terrorism against public transportation, including and perhaps especially bus transportation, has increased, this is the result of different campaigns, born out of different grievances. Nevertheless, the tactics are known, communicated, imitated, or improved upon as the general threshold against attacks involving innocent civilians erodes. It is alleged, for example, that LTTE in Sri Lanka, which may have observed Hamas’s first suicide car bombs during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, invented the suicide belt and first used female suicide bombers, two tactics that were then adopted and enhanced by Hizballah, Hamas, and other groups in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.
Distribution and Lethality by Type of Attack and Weapon
Figures 59 and 60 show distribution and lethality by type of attack for all bus attacks.
Figure 59 indicates that explosives and incendiary devices are the weapons most widely used in bus attacks, being used in 63 percent of the attacks since 1970; automatic weapons were used in about 16 percent, arson in 5 percent, and armed hijacking and robbery ( combined) in 7 percent. Many of the “ multiple attacks” involve a combination of explosives and sometimes incendiaries, followed by assault with automatic weapons.
The highest lethality was achieved by LTTE’s use of Claymore mines in Sri Lanka, yielding an FPD of 10.8. The next highest figure comes from two attacks, one of which was the sabotage of a tour bus ( which sources do not describe) in Istanbul in which 36 people were killed. Multiple weapons follow at 8.6 FPA, and execution- style “ other assaults” at 8.1 FPA.
The more commonly used attack methods that are above average include mines placed on vehicle roads ( 7.1 FPA), assault with automatic weapons 5.5 FPA), and VBIEDS used against buses ( 5.3 FPA). All of these are roughly two or more times as lethal as the most commonly used device, the unspecified IED ( 3.7 FPA). This is not what one would expect, but it reflects the reality of bus attacks since 1970. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 59
Figure 60
Distribution and Lethality by Target
We next consider the frequency with which various public bus transportation targets have been attacked since 1970, first by all methods, and then by only explosives and incendiaries. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 61 provides distribution and lethality calculations by attack and weapon for all bus attacks. Scheduled passenger buses— including minivan and minibus scheduled service— have been the targets of roughly 70 percent of the attacks, and when tourist and school buses are included, they constitute 80 percent of the targets. Bus stations and bus stops have been the targets of about 20 percent of the attacks. Lethality generally follows distribution, with only scheduled buses, school buses, and minivans and buses ( often a part of scheduled bus transportation in developing countries) above or close to the average FPA. The lethality of attacks on bus stations and bus stops is low, but interestingly, the lethality for bus stops ( 1.8 FPA) is greater than that for bus stations ( 1.3 FPA).
Figure 62 provides distribution and lethality figures for bus bomb attacks.
When only bomb attacks are considered, the percentage of attacks against scheduled bus service decreases to 63 percent, and that of attacks against all buses decreases to around 70 percent; the percentages against stops and stations increase correspondingly.
Attacks on scheduled buses ( including minivans) continue to have the highest lethality, though somewhat less, not more, than when all attacks against buses are considered, and these remain the only targets above or nearly at average lethality. Tourist and school buses, less often hit, follow at around 2.4 FPA. Attacks on bus stops remain at 1.8 FPD, and attacks on bus stations fall to 1.0 FPD.
Figure 61 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 62
In the database, the terms “ bus station– enclosed building” and “ bus station– open air” are used only when there is enough information to determine that they are in fact enclosed or open air. If the type of station cannot be determined from the available evidence, the station is coded as “ unspecified.” Since most of the attacks occur in developing countries, it is likely that the majority of the stations are open air.
Bomb Attacks Against Buses
Figure 63 shows the proportions of attacks in which single and multiple explosive and
incendiary devices are used and the percentage of attacks involving bombs that are conducted by suicide bombers.
The proportion of attacks involving a single device is quite high— about 87 percent, which is the same as the equivalent figure for trains. Again, multiple devices are sometimes used in attacks on the same target, demonstrating an attempt at redundancy, and a few— because of how the data are entered in the database— are single- device attacks against identical targets at the same time. Also, some of the multiple- device attacks were designed so that one or more devices detonated just as responders or explosives personnel arrived on the scene.
More than 12 percent of the attacks on buses have been suicide attacks. As noted earlier, the percentage of bomb attacks that are suicides is far higher for bus targets than for all targets and especially for train targets, a reflection primarily of the campaigns in Israel, Sri Lanka, and, to a lesser degree, Russia. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 63
Figure 64 illustrates the “ outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in bus attacks. The majority ( 87 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released on target, considerably higher than the average for trains ( 72.8 percent) and for all targets ( 72.3 percent). Nevertheless, for bus targets, 8 percent of the devices were
Figure 64 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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rendered safe, and 4.6 percent detonated early or away from the target or malfunctioned. Once again, it is important to note that devices can be found and defused and passengers can be evacuated before an explosion when drivers, conductors, intelligence, police and security officials, and passengers are alert. In some instances, devices were also poorly designed.
Distribution and Lethality by Device
Figure 65 shows the distribution and lethality of devices used against bus targets. Unspecified IEDs are used most commonly, but Claymore mines, land mines, and VBIEDs are the most lethal, followed by unspecified IEDs, which have slightly above- average lethality. All other devices have below- average lethality.
Figure 65
Distribution and Lethality by Target
The distribution and lethality for bomb attacks against bus targets were shown in Figure 62. Attacks on scheduled buses ( including minivans) had the highest lethality. Attacks on tourist and school buses, which have been attacked less often, follow at around 2.4 FPD. Attacks on bus stops achieved 1.8 FPD and were more lethal than attacks on bus stations ( 1.0 FPD).
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 66 shows the distribution and lethality of various methods of delivery and concealment. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 66
Placing a bomb in the passenger compartment is the most common method, followed by throwing grenades, hiding bombs in stations, and delivery via a suicide bomber. Other techniques include parcel bombs, land mines, and attacks at bus stops. As shown in Figure 67, Claymore mines have the greatest lethality, but unlike the case of trains,
Figure 67 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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suicide bombers are the most lethal means of attack on buses that occurred more than 50 times— twice as deadly as placing bombs in passenger compartments.
The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
Figure 68 presents the 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and concealment method for bus attacks. Again, some of these combinations reflect very few attacks and therefore show what terrorists have achieved in particular instances, not what they normally achieve.
For bus attacks, the combinations used in small numbers of attacks that provided greater average lethality than the most common methods include the following:
1. A 1996 attack in Pakistan ( 40 fatalities), in which a bomb was placed near the gasoline tank of a bus.
2. Two attacks involving Claymore mines in Sri Lanka ( 21 and 20 fatalities), one against a scheduled bus and the other against a government bus.
3. One 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan ( 18 fatalities).
4. Two instances in which flammable devices ignited in passenger buses ( perhaps accidentally) in China in 1994 ( an average of 14 fatalities).
5. A motorcycle bomb in Sri Lanka used against a government bus ( 13 fatalities).
6. Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses ( an average of 12 fatalities).
The most lethal attacks with more commonly used combinations on scheduled buses involve IEDs carried in parcels or bags in 13 attacks, yielding an average of 9 FPD. The next most lethal were 46 attacks in which suicide bombers detonated inside of passenger buses, and 21 attacks in which mines were placed on vehicle roads. Seven attacks in
Figure 68 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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which suicide bombers detonated at bus stops— not stations— achieved an average FPD of 7, and 6 attacks in which VBIEDS were used against buses yielded an average FPD of six ( once again, VBIEDs can be used in suicide operations).
Suicide bombers play a more important role in bus attacks than in train attacks. When we consider the 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and method of concealment and delivery, the most commonly used is suicide bombing on board a bus ( the data are
clearly influenced by campaigns in Israel and Sri Lanka). However, the same lethality has been achieved using land mines, and bombs hidden in parcels and bags are more lethal than suicide bombs carried on the person.
The most common combination— concealment of an IED in a passenger compartment of a bus, of which there were more than 120 instances— yielded an average FPD of 4, only half that of suicide bombers carrying IEDs and less than half that of IEDs left in parcels or bags.
The final report will explore the lethality rates of various delivery and concealment methods when only bombs that detonated on target are considered. This may affect the relative lethality of suicide bombers and other commonly used methods of concealment and delivery.
Attacks, Fatalities, and Injuries Over Time
Figures 69 and 70 show patterns of attacks and fatalities and patterns of attacks and injuries, respectively. The patterns in bus attacks track more closely than those in train attacks.
Figure 69 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Figure 70 Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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ENDNOTES
1. Brian Michael Jenkins, MTI Report # 97- 04: Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 1997.
2. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01- 07: Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 2001.
3. See Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean- François Clair, MTI Report # XXXX: Off the Rails: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV ( High- Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 91 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, February 2010.
4. Attacks against ferries are also not included, as MTI’s current mandate extends only to surface or land transportation and does not include maritime transport.
5. Although the results should not be pre- judged, a quick review of the data suggests that a number of attacks that resulted in no fatalities or injuries will be entered; these entries may decrease the average lethality of many kinds of attacks.
6. Twice in December 1994, a disgruntled individual detonated incendiary devices on subway trains in New York; he was not connected to any terrorist organization.
7. Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report # 09- 03: Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway- Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, January 2010.
8. Ibid.
9. It is important to put these cases in context in terms of actual plots. Of these 44 cases, 24 involved actual plots. In 19 of these 24 plots, potential targets were identified and operational plans discussed. In 10, the plotters actually conducted reconnaissance, and in 11, they possessed, acquired, or tried to acquire explosives or other weapons, often without taking much care to avoid detection.
10. To reduce counting, the database interprets “ dozens” to mean literally 24.
11. The categorization of developed and developing countries may not fit all regions of all countries. Major cities of Turkey and South America are quite developed, yet the two countries are categorized as developing. MTI will seek a more updated approach to this problem in line with current economic classifications from the United States. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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12. Unique among fatality calculations for bomb attacks, these fatalities and injuries are calculated per attack ( FPA and IPA), and not per device ( FPD and IPD), in order compare general target lethality. The final database should enable calculation of fatality by device, by attack, and by device that explodes on target.
13. References to other and unknown methods indicate methods not yet categorized in the database and those for which the description of the attack did not include the method, respectively. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jenkins, Brian Michael, MTI Report # 97- 04: Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 1997.
Jenkins, Brian Michae, and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report # 09- 03: Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway- Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, January 2010.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean- François Clair, MTI Report # 09- 12: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV ( High- Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 91 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, March 2010.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01- 07: Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 2001. Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Bibliography
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS
Brian Michael Jenkins is the Director of the Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence and since 1997 has directed the Institute’s continuing research on protecting surface transportation against terrorist attacks. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in fine arts and a Masters degree in history, both from UCLA. He also studied at the University of Guanajuato, Mexico, and in the Department of Humanities at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala, where he was a Fulbright Fellow and received a second fellowship from the Organization of American States.
Commissioned in the infantry at the age of 19, Mr. Jenkins became a paratrooper and ultimately a captain in the Green Berets. He is a decorated combat veteran, having served in the Seventh Special Forces Group in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention and later as a member of the Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam ( 1966– 1967). He returned to Vietnam on a special assignment in 1968 to serve as a member of the Long Range Planning Task Group; he remained with the Group until the end of 1969, receiving the Department of the Army’s highest award for his service. Mr. Jenkins returned to Vietnam on an additional special assignment in 1971.
In 1983, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the Long Commission, convened to examine the circumstances and response to the bombing of the U. S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon. In 1984, he assisted the Inman Panel in examining the security of American diplomatic facilities abroad. In 1985– 1986, he served as a member of the Committee of the Embassy of the Future, which established new guidelines for the construction of U. S. diplomatic posts. In 1989, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the national commission established to review terrorist threats following the bombing of Pan Am 103. In 1993, he served as a member of the team contracted by the New Jersey– New York Port Authority to review threats and develop new security measures for the World Trade Center following the bombing in February of that year.
In 1996, President Clinton appointed Mr. Jenkins to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. From 1999 to 2000, he served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism, and since 2000, he has been a member of the U. S. Comptroller General’s Advisory Board. Mr. Jenkins is a Special Advisor to the International Chamber of Commerce ( ICC) and a member of the advisory board of the ICC’s investigative arm, the Commercial Crime Services. Over the years, he has served as a consultant to or carried out assignments for a number of government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS). As part of its international project to create a global strategy to combat terrorism, the Club of Madrid in 2004 appointed Mr. Jenkins to lead an international working group on the role of intelligence.
Mr. Jenkins is the author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict; the editor and co- author of Terrorism and Personal Protection; the co- editor and co- author of Aviation Terrorism and Security; and a co- author of The Fall of South Vietnam. His latest books are Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves and Will Terrorists Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Go Nuclear? He is also the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and published research reports on conflict and crime.
BRUCE ROBERT BUTTERWORTH
Bruce Butterworth is a Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence Research Associate. He has had a distinguished government career working at congressional, senior policy, and operational levels. Between 1975 and 1980, as a professional staff member for the House Government Operations Committee, he ran investigations and hearings on many transportation safety issues, particularly in aviation. He spent 11 years in the Department of Transportation, eight of them in the Office of the Secretary. He managed negotiations on air and maritime services in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT) ( now the World Trade Organization ( WTO)), chaired U. S. delegations to United Nations committees, dealt with transport issues related to border inspections, and was part of the U. S. response to the Lockerbie bombing.
Mr. Butterworth has held two executive posts in aviation security and in both worked closely with Congress as the informal but primary liaison. He was Director of Policy and Planning ( l991– 1995), establishing strategic, long- term, and contingency plans and federal rules. As Director of Operations ( l995– 2000), he was responsible for federal air marshals, hijacking response, and 900 field agents; he worked to improve security and the performance of security measures by U. S. airports in this country and by U. S. airlines worldwide. He ran the Federal Air Administration’s ( FAA’s) Aviation Command Center, successfully managing the resolution of hijackings and security emergencies. He launched a successful program of regulation of dangerous goods and cargo security after the 1995 ValuJet crash, oversaw the conversion of the air marshal program to a full- time program with high standards, was a key player in the response to the ValuJet and TWA 800 accidents, and was a frequent media spokesperson. He has worked closely with Congress, the National Security Council staff, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and authorities of other nations.
He was an Associate Director at the U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum ( 2000– 2003), responsible for security and building operations. He designed and implemented a “ best practice” procedure to deal with mail possibly containing anthrax powder and developed and conducted comprehensive emergency planning and exercises. Between January 2003 and September 2007, he was one of two deputy directors in a 1,300- person Engineering Directorate at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, managing workforce planning, budgeting, and human- capital management for complex robotics space missions, substantially reducing overhead and improving workplace safety there. In addition to having helped the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS) in information sharing, he is a research associate at the Mineta Transportation Institute. He has written a peer- reviewed report on security risks created by highway- borne hazardous materials for the State of California, is updating prior work on selective screening in the rail environment, and is constructing an IED- focused database of surface transport attacks, along with Brian Michael Jenkins.
He co- authored with Mr. Jenkins the following reports published by the Mineta Transportation Institute: Selective Screening of Rail Passengers ( MTI Report 06- 07), Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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February 2007; a supplement to that report, published in January 2010; Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway Borne Hazardous Materials ( MTI Report 09- 03), January 2010; and Implementation and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization Technologies ( MTI Report 09- 04). He also co- authored a study with P. J. Crowley, Senior Fellow and Director of Homeland Security at the Center for American Progress, Keeping Bombs Off Planes: Securing Air Cargo, Aviation’s Soft Underbelly, May 2007. In February 2009, he published with Mr. Jenkins an opinion piece on information sharing entitled “ A Campaign the Secretary Must Win.”
Mr. Butterworth received a Master of Science degree from the London School of Economics in 1974 and a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Pacific in 1972 ( Magna Cum Laude). He was a California State Scholar and a Rotary Foundation Fellow and has received numerous special achievement and performance awards MTI FOUNDER
Hon. Norman Y. Mineta
MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Honorary Co- Chair
Hon. James Oberstar **
Chair
House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
Honorary Co- Chair
Hon. John L. Mica **
Ranking Member
House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
David L. Turney *
Chair/ President/ CEO
Digital Recorders, Inc.
Dallas, TX
William W. Millar ^
Vice Chair/ President
American Public Transportation
Association ( APTA)
Washington, DC
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr. #
Executive Director
Mineta Transportation Institute
San Jose, CA
Ronald Barnes
General Manager
Veolia Transportation/ East
Valley RPTA
Mesa, AZ
Rebecca Brewster
President/ COO
American Transportation
Research Institute
Smyrna, GA
Donald H. Camph
President
California Institute for
Technology Exchange
Los Angeles, CA
Anne P. Canby
President
Surface Transportation
Policy Project
Washington, DC
Jane Chmielinski
President
DMJM Harris
New York, NY
William Dorey
President/ CEO
Granite Construction, Inc.
Watsonville, CA
Mortimer Downey
Chairman
PB Consult Inc.
Washington, DC
Nuria Fernandez
Commissioner
City of Chicago,
Department of Aviation,
Chicago, IL
Steve Heminger
Executive Director
Metropolitan Transportation
Commission
Oakland, CA
Hon. John Horsley #
Executive Director
American Association of State
Highway & Transportation
Officials ( AASHTO)
Washington, DC
Joseph Boardman
President/ CEO
Amtrak
60 Massachusetts Ave., N. E.
Washington, DC 20002
Will Kempton
Director
California Department of
Transportation
Sacramento, CA
Brian Macleod
Senior Vice President
Gillig Corporation
Hayward, CA
Dr. Bruce Magid
Dean
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA
Stephanie Pinson
President/ COO
Gilbert Tweed Associates, Inc.
New York, NY
Hans Rat
Secretary General
Union Internationale des
Transports Publics
Bruxelles, Belgium
Vickie Shaffer
General Manager
Tri- State Transit Authority
Huntington, WV
Paul Toliver #
President
New Age Industries
Seattle, WA
Michael S. Townes #
President/ CEO
Transportation District
Commission of Hampton Roads
Hampton, VA
Edward Wytkind
President
Transportation Trades
Department, AFL- CIO
Washington, DC
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director
Karen E. Philbrick, Ph. D.
Research Director
Peter Haas, Ph. D.
Education Director
Donna Maurillo
Communications Director
Brian Michael Jenkins
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph. D.
National Transportation Finance Center
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph. D.
Urban and Regional Planning
San José State University
Jan Botha, Ph. D.
Civil & Environmental Engineering
San José State University
Katherine Kao Cushing, Ph. D.
Enviromental Science
San José State University
Dave Czerwinski, Ph. D.
Marketing and Decision Science
San José State University
Frances Edwards, Ph. D.
Political Science
San José State University
Taeho Park, Ph. D.
Organization and Management
San José State University
Diana Wu
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library
San José State University
Directors
Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee
** Honorary
* Chair
^ Vice Chair
# Past Chair Funded by U. S. Department of Transportation and California Department of Transportation