Rail Passenger Selective
Screening Summit
MTI Report S- 09- 01
MTI Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit MTI Report S- 09- 01 October 2009
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MTI REPORT S- 09- 01
RAIL PASSENGER SELECTIVE SCREENING
SUMMIT
October 2009
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October 2009
MTI S- 09- 01
This publication is an edited transcript of the Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit, which was
co- sponsored by MTI and the American Public Transportation Association ( APTA) in Chicago, Illinois on June
18, 2009, during APTA’s annual Rail Conference.
The workshop was moderated by Brian Michael Jenkins, director, Mineta Transportation Institute's National
Transportation Security Center of Excellence ( NTSCOE). Speakers included Bruce R. Butterworth, co- author,
Selective Screening of Rail Passengers; Greg Hull, president, American Public Transportation Association
( APTA); Paul MacMillan, chief of police, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Transit Police
Department; Ron Masciana, deputy chief, Metropolitan Transit Authority ( MTA), New York; Jesus Ojeda,
security coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail Authority; Ed Phillips, operations deputy, Office of
Security, Amtrak; and John P. Sammon, assistant administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management,
Transportation Security Administration ( TSA).
Passenger security; Rail
transit; Rail transit facilities;
Security; Terrorism
104
CA- MTI- 09- 2891
Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit
by Mineta Transportation Institute
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Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192- 0219
Tel ( 408) 924- 7560
Fax ( 408) 924- 7565
email: mti@ mti. sjsu. edu
www. transweb. sjsu. edu
Copyright © 2009
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Mineta Transportation Institute would like to thank the following individuals and their
agencies for offering their expertise as presenters at the Rail Passenger Selective
Screening Summit, which was held in Chicago, Illinois on June 17, 2009.
• Bruce R. Butterworth, co- author, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers
• Greg Hull, president, American Public Transportation Association ( APTA)
• Brian Michael Jenkins, director, Mineta Transportation Institute’s National
Transportation Security Center of Excellence ( NTSCOE)
• Paul MacMillan, chief of police, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Transit
Police Department
• Ron Masciana, deputy chief, Metropolitan Transit Authority ( MTA), New York
• Jesus Ojeda, security coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail Authority
• Ed Phillips, operations deputy, Office of Security, Amtrak
• John P. Sammon, assistant administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management,
Transportation Security Administration ( TSA)
• Dave Schlesinger, course manager, Transportation Safety Institute
This special rail security summit, which was co- sponsored by MTI and APTA, was
organized and produced by MTI’s Director of Communications and Special Projects,
Donna Maurillo.
Other MTI staff instrumental in making this edited transcript available include Student
Publications Assistant Sahil Rahimi and Student Webmaster and Technical Assistant
Ruchi Arya.
Transcription services were provided by Meg Dastrup at Word Power Plus, with editing
and publication production services by Catherine Frazier.
Mineta Transportation Institute
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS AND BRUCE BUTTERWORTH: RAIL PASSENGER
SELECTIVE SCREENING 5
PANEL SESSION, PART ONE: PAUL MACMILLAN, RON MASCIANA AND ED
PHILLIPS 41
KEYNOTE SPEAKER JOHN P. SAMMON 57
PANEL SESSION, PART TWO: DAVE SCHLESINGER AND JESUS OJEDA 59
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 75
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 83
SPEAKER BIOS 85
ii Table of Contents
Mineta Transportation Institute
Mineta Transportation Institute
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Brian Jenkins Speaks to One of the Participants at the APTA Rail
Passenger Selective Screening Summit 40
2. Participants at the APTA Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit 56
3. John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network
Management 57
4. Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail
Authority, and Dave Schlesinger, Course Manager, Transportion Safety
Institute 66
iv List of Figures
Mineta Transportation Institute
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
1
FOREWORD
There is no doubt that the events of 9/ 11 forever changed the way transportation
professionals implement security measures not only at airports, but also in
heavily- trafficked ( and difficult to secure) rail and subway stations, bus terminals, and
within the vehicles themselves.
A great deal of expertise has gone into studying and predicting terrorist behavior in
surface transportation. I am proud that the Mineta Transportation Institute ( MTI) has
been on the leading edge of this research, long before 9/ 11, with a symposium on
terrorism in surface transportation. This was hosted at San José State University ( SJSU)
in 1996. Further, MTI published Brian Michael Jenkins’ report, Protecting Surface
Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities, in December 1997. A few
weeks after 9/ 11, MTI mobilized and hosted a National Transportation Security Summit
on October 30, 2001 in Washington DC. That same month, MTI also released the third in
a series of publications examining best security practices in surface
transportation— Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious
Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices by Brian Jenkins and Larry
Gersten.
In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security named MTI as a National Transportation
Security Center of Excellence ( NTSCOE), with noted counterterrorism expert Brian
Michael Jenkins at the helm as director. With this transportation security function, MTI
will provide research support in developing new technologies, tools and advanced
methods to defend, protect, and increase the resilience of the United States’ multimodal
transportation infrastructure. In the coming months, MTI’s NTSCOE will contribute to the
study of counterterrorism measures with updated publications and case studies.
This publication is an edited transcript of the Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Summit, which was co- sponsored by MTI and the American Public Transportation
Association in Chicago, Illinois on June 18, 2009, during APTA’s annual Rail Conference.
I would like to thank the principal presenters at this event, including Brian Jenkins, Bruce
Butterworth, and John Sammon. Panelists Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana, Jesus Ojeda,
Ed Phillips and Dave Schlesinger provided a great deal of information to the workshop
attendees. And indeed, the workshop attendees themselves added much to the
dialogue.
Thanks also to Greg Hull and APTA for their ongoing support.
Finally, I offer my congratulations to MTI’s Director of Communications and ITT, Donna
Maurillo, for making this Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit such a successful
teaching and learning event.
Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director, MTI
2 Foreword
Mineta Transportation Institute
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 1993 and 9/ 11 attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center forever changed the
way transportation professionals in the United States implement security measures, not
only in airports, but also for all surface transportation modalities, including bus and
railway stations, and also the vehicles themselves, all of which are prime targets for
terrorism. Further attacks on rail systems in Madrid, London and Mumbai, among
others, have provided researchers with plenty of raw data for study.
This e- publication is an edited record of a special Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Summit which was held on June 17, 2009 as part of the American Public Transportation
Association’s annual rail conference, which was held in Chicago, Illinois, and
co- sponsored by the Mineta Transportation Institute and APTA. The interactive workshop
brought together experts in the transportation security industry and security practitioners
who are “ out in the trenches” providing rail security for systems of various sizes and
varieties, from light rail to heavy commuter rail to Amtrak.
The event’s principal presenters were Brian Michael Jenkins, director of the National
Transportation Center of Excellence at MTI, and Bruce Butterworth, co- author of the MTI
publication, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers. The pair is in the process of
updating their previous publications on terrorism and creating a searchable database
which will contain a chronology of attacks on surface transportation systems.
Other presenters included Paul MacMillan, chief of police, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority Police Department; Ron Masciana, deputy chief, Metropolitan
Transit Authority ( MTA), New York; Ed Phillips, operations deputy, Office of Security,
Amtrak; Dave Schlesinger, course manager, Transportation Safety Institute; and Jesus
Ojeda, security coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail Authority.
Topics of discussion included an overview of security best practices, selective screening
techniques, security staff training, legal issues, funding challenges and establishing
agency policy and procedures.
This publication has had sensitive and identifying material, such as specific agency
names and brand names, removed to ensure agency privacy and security.
4 Executive Summary
Mineta Transportation Institute
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
5
BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS AND BRUCE BUTTERWORTH:
RAIL PASSENGER SELECTIVE SCREENING
GREG HULL
The American Public Transportation Association has had a longstanding relationship
with the Mineta Transportation Institute, and we’ve partnered with MTI in a number of
areas. Certainly, as MTI has taken on a leading role in the areas of security, research and
policies, we have worked closely in those areas as well. Quite often, in fact, as we are
citing information, and even in our testimonies that we give to Congress, it’s work coming
out of MTI that enables us to speak credibly of the status of security and countering
terrorism, particularly in our industry, public transportation. We certainly thank MTI for all
of the good work that they’re engaged in
I had the opportunity to get caught up on some of the projects and publications from MTI
that we can anticipate being made available to us in the coming months, and I'm very
excited to be the recipient of those products.
I’ve worked very closely over the past several years with both Brian Michael Jenkins and
Bruce Butterworth. I have participated in forums and have had the opportunity to join
them in providing support for some of their activities, and I’m sure that what you’re going
to hear today, through the group that’s been brought together, you will come away more
enlightened and better informed in these areas that we’re going to be addressing with
respect to policies on conducting of searches. So, on behalf of APTA, welcome.
BRIAN M. JENKINS
Thank you very much, Greg.
I am Brian Jenkins and I direct the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
( NTSCOE) at the Mineta Transportation Institute. The Mineta Transportation Institute has
been involved in research on surface transportation security since 1996. Since 1991,
MTI has been one of the centers of research sponsored by the Department of
Transportation. In 2007, the Mineta Transportation Institute was selected by the
Department of Homeland Security ( DHS) as one of the centers of excellence. Although
our budget remains tight, this support does allow us to not only continue our work, but to
create jointly- funded projects that bridge DOT and DHS concerns. It certainly has
increased the workflow for the NTSCOE, which is the entity within MTI that addresses
security.
Greg Hull mentioned some of the things that we are working on. Today we are going to
be talking about selective screening: one of the reports that we have scheduled for this
year includes overall trends in attacks on surface- transportation systems. More than ten
years ago, MTI was one of the first organizations to create a chronology of attacks on
surface transportation systems. Now we are going to take that information— what was
essentially a narrative set of entries— and digitize it. We’re in the process of doing that
now, to turn that information into a much more powerful research tool so that we can
examine the trends.
6 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
One of the things that we’ve been specifically asked by the Department of Homeland
Security to do is to provide research support to their counter- IED ( improvised explosive
device). We will be producing a report that is looking at the use of improvised explosive
devices by terrorists against surface transportation targets, but in great detail— looking at
the types of devices, at the placement of devices, trends over time, where in the systems
the greatest casualties occur when these events take place. That report will be coming
out later this year. We also have several case studies coming out. Overall there are
about seven or eight major reports that will be coming out this year.
In addition to the research reports, we have been doing these summits. To me, “ summit”
is a high- fallutin’ term. Greg’s got the right idea— these are workshops and really ought
not to be perceived only as us presenting information to you, because there is as much
experience on your side of the podium as there is on my side. These are very informal
sessions, and we’re going to be inviting comments and discussion as much as we are
presenting the results of our research.
The process of these summits formally began in 2001. There had been earlier
conferences, but right after 9/ 11, then- Secretary of Transportation Norm Mineta said, “ I
want to pull together all the operators of surface transportation systems. W. e need to
bring them up- to- date on terrorist threats, what DOT is going to do about it, and how
we're going to address this.”
MTI was able to put that together within three weeks of 9/ 11. That's because we already
had five or six years of research under our belts. That enabled us to respond quickly.
Since then, these symposiums have become regular features of our work. They are
workshops, and we use them to introduce new research and elicit views through
discussions, which, in turn, we incorporate not only in a report on the meeting itself, but
bring back into the final report as we write that. So you are all actually enlisted in a
peer- review process as we go along. We're not going to be handing out a report today,
but we are going to make the edited proceedings available.
We'll start off today with a discussion of our recent research on selective screening. Then
we have assembled a five- member panel. We actually have about a century and a half of
transportation security experience on the panel itself. I'll introduce the members of that
panel after the break.
Then at lunch, John Sammon from TSA will be joining us to say a few words. After lunch,
we'll continue the discussion for as long as we want to. We're scheduled to break up at
three.
I’m going to introduce what we’ve done at MTI and talk about some of the broad issues
of selective screening, and some of the issues of implementation. Then I’m going to turn
things over to Bruce, who will describe some of the components of these selective
screening systems, and then I’m going to come back and talk about some of the
operations, some of the lessons learned, and then we’ll take a break and come back with
our panel.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 7
The subject of selective screening is a little bit like plutonium. It’s a security measure that
doesn’t go down easy, and as you all understand, there’s a lot of sensitivity about this
particular issue. Several years ago, MTI took on the task of looking at the issue of
selective screening, and in 2007, produced a report ( Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce
Butterworth, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers, MTI Report 06- 07) based on
research conducted in 2006. I’ll be talking about the background and implementation
decisions. Bruce Butterworth will then talk about components. Then I'll conclude with
lessons learned, best practices, and some issues for discussion.
I want to bring to your attention another report that was put out by Stephan A. Parker
through the TCRP ( Transit Cooperative Research Program). Public Transportations
Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. It is an excellent
report that also deals with screening and is a guide for policy and decision- making.
TCRP has an array of products and reports which are valuable, and a monthly status
report of what is ongoing and what is about to come out. I have got copies here available
for people who want it.
In our 2007 MTI report, Bruce and I asked what we thought were the key questions at the
time. Clearly, 100 percent passenger screening for surface transportation simply wasn’t
realistic. Applying the commercial aviation model wasn’t going to work here, for a variety
of reasons— volume of passengers, the number of screeners that would be required if
screening were increased, the number of boardings of people that would have to be
screened. The cost would be enormous. Waiting in line 15 minutes or in some cases, 30
minutes, to board a plane to fly across the country is acceptable. If you’re going to take a
25- minute subway ride, waiting 15 or 20 minutes in a security line is not acceptable. So
the question was, “ If 100 percent screening is not going to work, do selective searches
work? Is it an option?”
June 18, 2009 1
Review of Selective Passenger
Screening in Mass Transit:
Preliminary Observations
Mineta Transportation Institute
National Transportation Security
Center
8 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
If only some passengers are to be screened where there is no specific intelligence, then
what selection methods or combination of selection methods, under different conditions,
might be appropriate? How do you do the selection process?
We also wanted to take a look at technology in our 2007 report, what was available at the
time, what was on the drawing boards, what was on the horizon, in terms of availability of
technology that would affect passenger screening. And we wanted to ask, “ What would
be the ingredients of what we’d call a good selection program?
We concluded that 100 percent screening was not an option; but certainly, there were
circumstances where selective screening would, and did, make sense.
For example, there might be a situation where there would be an alert, or where an
attack had occurred on a system, and we were worried about copycats or other
components of the original attack that we weren’t yet aware of.
Therefore, among the security measures that could be rapidly implemented or increased,
selective screening offered a flexible response. When we talk about selective screening,
we have to talk about it in terms of risk reduction, not the prevention of all attacks.
With commercial aviation security, you’re really talking about prevention— you’re going
for 100 percent prevention. When we talk about selective screening, we're not talking
about absolute prevention. We're talking about deterrence. We’re talking about
complicating the task of the bad guys, talking about moving them away from some of
their preferred targets to some less- lucrative targets. We are talking about risk reduction.
June 18, 2009 4
2007 MTI Report
• In February 2007, MTI published report based on
research initiated in January 2006.
• Public report entitled: “ Selective Screening of Rail
Passengers”
• Report addressed key questions:
1. If 100 percent screening is not possible, do selective searches
make sense?
2. If only some passengers are screened, where there is no
specific intelligence, what should be the appropriate selection
process?
3. What combinations of selection methods are appropriate under
different conditions?
4. What role can current and future technology play in passenger
screening?
5. What are the characteristics of a good screening program
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 9
There is historical support for risk reduction. One of the case studies that we did years
ago of the IRA bombing campaign showed just that. This was good campaign to study; it
ran 25 years, therefore it gives us lots of data so that we can see how terrorists
responded to things. They were going after very lucrative targets like Victoria Station and
other locations in the heart of London.
As the authorities began to implement security measures, the IRA attacks began to focus
on the stations in the suburbs, and as the authorities spread those security measures
further out, the IRA was ultimately reduced to carrying out attacks on signal boxes and
remote stations. The measures didn’t end the terrorism campaign, but it did reduce the
risk by reducing their return on investment in terms of casualties. Now that changed in a
different environment when terrorists went to suicide bombers, but at least it raised the
threshold, indicating that a particular regime of security works unless somebody is willing
to commit suicide.
Overall, we were able to say that selective searches can contribute to deterrence. They
oblige the terrorists to take greater risks. Screening complicates their planning.
Screening may force terrorists to use smaller quantities of explosives. They may divert to
less lucrative targets.
JOHN MC PARTLAND
If you were to try to do something like that in the state of California, the first thing that’s
going to jump up is, “ What's the criteria you’re using for that random selection?” and
“ You're profiling me and my friends.”
June 18, 2009 5
2007 Report Conclusions
• Screening 100 percent of urban mass transit passengers
is not a realistic security option, but that…
• Terrorism alerts on transportation targets may dictate
that security measures be rapidly increased, and that
selective screening offers a flexible response.
• The goal of any security measure is risk reduction, not
the prevention of all attacks.
• Selective searches can contribute to deterrence, oblige
terrorists to take greater risks, complicate their planning,
force them to use smaller quantities of explosives, and
divert them to less lucrative targets.
• Full technological solutions are years away.
10 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
BRIAN JENKINS
You bet. And we will come to that, but that indeed is the tricky part— How do you do the
selection?
We’ve looked— are there any technological silver bullets out there? No, not really. I mean
there is some interesting technology and there are some good things being done by DHS
Science and Technology, but we don’t have a silver bullet yet.
Selective screening runs directly contrary to an American preference for security that is
non- intrusive, passive and that is egalitarian. We want to see everybody treated exactly
the same way.
And that’s the tricky part. Clearly, one of the challenges is that you do have to reduce the
inevitable allegations of discrimination and profiling based upon race or ethnicity. To
answer your question directly, there are three bases for selecting someone for screening.
One is a truly mathematically random selection. That is, a police chief at the beginning of
the day says, “ It’s going to be every seventh or every thirteenth passenger.” It's
numerically generated. Some of the departments do it in different ways, and Bruce will
get into these different ways of assuring randomness. But it’s mathematically driven.
Some agencies actually have little random number generators.
A second criterion is some aspect of observed behavior or clothing. In other words, it
would be legitimate to say, “ We’re not simply going to inspect every seventh person.
We’re going to inspect every seventh person that is carrying a parcel, backpack, suitcase
or bag of a certain size.” You can use those two in combination.
A third criterion— which is a rare one— would be if you have specific intelligence that tells
you that should be looking for a specific person or group. Clearly, race or ethnicity would
not only be inappropriate, given our society. It would also be poor security. If you ask me,
June 18, 2009 6
Report Conclusions ( con’t)
• Selective searches run against Americans’ preference for security that
is passive and egalitarian, and therefore must be carefully planned
and closely managed to reduce the inevitable allegations of
discrimination and profiling based upon race or ethnicity.
• A good selection process must be
– Planned in advance
– Based on clear policies and procedures
– Combine random selection, behavioral profiling, and threat information
– Maximize unpredictability
– Allow for expansion, redeployment, and reduction
– Maximize interaction with riders, but not in a way that is perceived as
harassment.
• Vigorous public information programs must accompany the
introduction of any new security measure that directly engages riders,
to alley potential public concerns.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 11
and I’ve been involved in research on terrorism for a number of years— what does a
terrorist look like? I would be hard- pressed to tell you.
The youngest terrorist that I know about that carried out a successful suicide bombing,
killing the prime minister of India, was 12 years old. The oldest was 73. Males and
females have carried out attacks. In our diverse society, it would be stupid to have a
security system based upon a profile. Bruce will come back to this.
A good selection process must be planned in advance. This is not something you do ad
hoc, but you have to have very clear policies and procedures. You can combine selection
methods. You can combine random selection with behavioral profiling and specific threat
information. You want to maximize the unpredictability of it, and you want something that
you can expand, move around, or reduce, depending on the situation. So you want a
very flexible platform for this thing. You want something that maximizes interaction,
because frequently, it's not just the inspection— it’s the interaction that accompanies it.
You have to have a vigorous public information program to explain to people what you
are doing and to allay some of the inevitable suspicions. These are going to vary in
different parts of the country.
In 2008, we were asked by the Department of Homeland Security if we would update our
2006 study. Several years had passed since we did the study. We wanted to see what
lessons had been learned from the systems that were in place and operating. We also
were curious about those specific decisions where operators or authorities said, “ We’re
not going to implement this.”
We did some interviews over the telephone. We also did go out and observe some of the
inspection programs in Penn Station, in New Jersey, and Washington. We wanted to
identify the components of each search program, those issues with regard to legal
June 18, 2009 7
DHS Requests Update
• 2008: DHS asked MTI as a COE to update study
• Task:
– Review all selective screening programs in mass transit systems
implemented as a continuing or temporary measure
– Draft supplement for DHS review and for dissemination to industry
leaders
– NOTE: MTI also took the initiative to interview transit agencies that had
decided not to implement such a program
• Team:
– Brian Michael Jenkins, PI
– Bruce R. Butterworth, Research Associate
– Larry N. Gerston, Research Associate
12 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
authority, selection process, the inspection process. When there is a “ hit,” how do they
resolve it? How do they handle public information. What are some of the dilemmas?
What we’re talking about is search, examination, of a person or an article through
questioning or a search. Screening can either be passive, that is, with TV or observation,
June 18, 2009 8
Scope and Methodology
• Interviews conducted telephonically or in person: 10
• All passenger inspection programs observed: 5
• Approach:
– Identify common and unusual components of programs. For example:
• How legal authority and constraints are dealt with
• How passengers are selected
• What is inspected, and how
• How “ hits” are resolved
• How public information is handled
• How deterrence and community policing are maximized
– Identify the factors that influenced transit agencies to implement
programs.
– Identify dilemmas facing all agencies.
– Identify best practices and lessons learned.
• Guarantee: Program specifics safeguarded
June 18, 2009 10
Purpose Today
• Our observations are preliminary.
• Today, we want to
– Present observations to transit operators
– Provoke a discussion
– Elicit reactions and corrections
• We also have a view: We want to make
selective screening a more viable option.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 13
but that's different from an inspection or search. Selective means something less than a
hundred percent, and how do you get to that?
We’re going to talk about our preliminary observations but we want to provoke
discussion, elicit your reactions, and, as a result, we want to ask, “ What really makes a
program more viable? What works here?”
June 18, 2009 1
Observations on Factors
Influencing Decisions to
Implement
June 18, 2009 12
Factors Influencing Implementation
Screening Decision
• Legal Authority:
– Initially agencies were unsure they could prevail in court. Now
they know they can.
– There are sustainable models as guides.
• Resources:
– Perceived costs
– Limited Federal assistance
• Perceptions of threat and difficulty of implementation:
– Agencies near a bigger transit target believe they are less likely
to be attacked.
– Agencies that operate light rail systems with large bus fleets face
more implementation challenges.
14 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
One of the big issues at the outset for some of the systems that were introducing these
programs early on, like Boston and New York, was legality. What’s the legal basis for
this? This is obviously going to be challenged in a court. Is it going to hold up? What
does this have to do with regard to the Fourth Amendment? That is a key issue. It has, by
the way, held up in a federal court, but that doesn’t end the argument. There are still
going to be challenges to this in state courts and, probably future challenges in federal
courts.
Some of the issues involve resources— how much does it cost to run these programs?
How much manpower has to be deployed in this? There’s only limited federal assistance,
both in terms of the amount and the time. What happens if the federal money runs out?
The reality we face is that I suspect— this is just a personal view, it’s not a research
result— that because of the country’s financial difficulties, the DHS budget is going to be
under enormous pressure over the next several years.
Perceptions of threat differ throughout the country. In New York, the perception of threat
is very high. In Washington, it’s high. You move west, and it is not so high. In California,
there is a tendency to say, “ Terrorism is that thing they deal with back there on the other
coast. That’s not our particular problem.”
If you’re a smaller operator you might say, “ They’re gonna attack those guys over there,
not us. I’m Valley Transit Authority, and the big target in the neighborhood is BART, not
me.” In some cases, the physical layout doesn’t lend itself to screening, or makes
screening more difficult. If you have big open- air systems. It’s harder to run inspection
programs.
Public support varies greatly throughout the country. It varies from time to time. This is
constantly, constantly shifting.
June 18, 2009 13
Implementation Decisions ( con’t)
• Public Support:
– Without credible threats or actual attacks in the U. S., popular support
is determined locally.
– Community leaders ( and transit leadership) weigh perceived security
benefits against concerns for civil liberties ( Cost may be secondary).
• Support or opposition can come from different places:
– A board chairman or board member/ s ( each board member can have a
unique constituency)
– A Police Commissioner
– A Mayor or a Governor
– Congress
• Prompting events can include:
– Success of another transit agency
– Mass transit attacks overseas
– Special event ( Olympics, inauguration, national convention)
– Red Team assessment and congressional intervention
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 15
Community leaders and transit leadership are part of the equation In some cases, the
boards that govern these systems are local politicians or are appointed by local
politicians. These systems aren’t free of politics and that becomes a huge factor. Support
or opposition can come from different directions. You may have a board chairman or
board members who have specific constituencies. Or you may have a particularly
vigorous police commissioner who slams his fist down and wants something. You may
have a supporting governor or mayor. You also have congressional involvement in this.
And then you have the events themselves. If you are talking about implementation in the
immediate wake of the subway bombings in London, there is greater receptivity. As we
get somewhat distant from those events, receptivity goes down.
Now could we find any kind of pattern in this? We really couldn’t. We've got a couple of
locations with a history of very strong civil liberties advocates, and yet those were the
systems that moved out first with screening.
The reason we have a panel here is our original agreement with all of the operators we
spoke with is that no systems are identified in the report. We simply took the information
and reconfigured it in terms of legal issues, inspection process issues, and so on. We
weren’t trying to do it by system. But we do have on the panel representatives from a
variety of systems who have programs in place and they can provide a front- line
perspective.
Those not implementing said, “ We're going to emphasize passive surveillance.” They
may have emergency authority to implement, providing there is a specific threat. I'm
going to be candid about this. Sometimes selective screening is is a bit of a dodge by the
June 18, 2009 14
Implementation Decisions ( con’t)
• There is no pre- determining pattern:
– 2 Locations with history of strong liberties advocates at or near
the 9/ 11 attacks moved out first.
– But one location – Washington DC – did not, even for the 2009
inauguration.
– One East Coast location that implemented first for a special
event had to wait for daily implementation for changed political
landscape.
– One West Coast location – Los Angeles – implemented a
program.
– View in one Mountain state was that public and leadership would
support selecting passenger screening
16 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
board, which says to the chief, “ We're not going to tell you to do this, but if you decide
that there's a threat, and do it, okay; but it's on your head.
Now, for those implementing selective screening, maintaining that public and political
support is a key factor, not just for political reasons, but for the general reasons that you
do have to ensure that civil liberties are protected and racial profiling is guarded against.
With that brief background, let me turn it over to Bruce, who will go into some more
specific components of the program.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Thanks, Brian. I'm going to try and go a bit into warp speed here as to time, because
there are some challenges at the end that I think will provoke a lot of discussion. I do
want to say here one thing. I want to thank the transit authorities that interviewed with us.
I was watching some of the facial recognitions that you could tell where your quotations
were buried, but not with your names.
The cooperation has been really good. So this is a look at the various components,
looking for what’s common, and where there’s a variation. The first thing is there's legal
authority and sources of help. I think Brian has already said this. Some of these
authorities moved up very fast. There’s been police commissioners that said something
like, “ Damn the torpedoes. I’m going to do it and we'll prevail.” And they did.
Others that were able to follow, the later ones all had good models to work with. Still
others today that I interview still seem to be uncertain that they would survive a legal
challenge. I’m not sure that’s actually accurate. That’s certainly their perception. I don’t
know if it’s actually accurate, or they have other reasons for hesitating.
June 18, 2009 15
Implementation Decisions ( con’t)
• For those not implementing:
– Passive surveillance is emphasized
– Emergency authority to implement explicitly or
implicitly provided if there is a specific threat
• For those implementing:
– Maintaining public and high level support
remain key.
– Civil liberties must be protected and racial
profiling guarded against.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 17
I want to throw in another thing. The TRB ( Transportation Research Board) guidance on
legal cases— I think it was Jocelyn Waite’s 2005 report— was quoted very often and it’s
really helpful. “ The Case for Searches on Public Transportation,” TRB Legal Research
Digest, No. 22, October, 2005. Our study also is quoted.
June 18, 2009 16
Components of Selective
Passenger Screening Programs
Common themes and variations
June 18, 2009 17
Legal Authority and Sources of
Help
• A few agencies initiated programs and then prevailed in
key legal cases: New York and Boston.
• Others followed once precedent had been set
• Some still uncertain that they would survive legal
challenge or have other reasons for hesitating
• TRB Guidance on legal foundations useful
• MTI study provided encouragement and model for some
18 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
The first thing you’ve got to have is policies and general orders. Again, in the same way I
was just describing, some of the authorities that we talked to literally built the airplane
while flying it. One of them said that we got the materials, put the thing together on the
weekend and made the policy up as we did it. Others later then had mature policies to
build from.
I’m going to call out one that is particularly good. I think Boston will not mind me saying
this, because their particular general order is very well written, very well organized, and
has been providing good guidance for others. Typically, this is what these orders will lay
out.
And, you know, the scope of the inspection is really important— what its purpose is, the
authority of the officers, how the passengers are selected to make sure that it’s not racial
profiling and is sustainable in court, and the controls placed on it, and also the fact that
it’s voluntary.
Legal integrity was a term that came up quite often. By that, I think we mean that the
transit authority is concerned that with whatever decision that was made, whether it’s an
attorney general, or the case, their inspection process stays within the bounds of that. So
you want to make sure that they stay on literally the right side of the law. That ends up
being mostly about how you select passengers.
Two variations here: some are centrally controlled. The chief chooses the particular
number or set of numbers that the local supervisor implements; or there are others
where the local officer that's supervising the inspection point has the ability to change.
Here are the different ways that passengers are counted: Passengers with any bag,
passengers with airline- type bags, the sequence differed. In some cases, it was every
seventh, every eighth, and every tenth, regardless of who was being inspected. In some,
June 18, 2009 18
Policies and General Orders
• Some pioneers “ built the plane while flying it”
• Over time, Policies and General Orders were built on
experiences of others, and have matured.
• Typically, these documents specify:
– Authority of transit police
– Purpose, scope and method of inspection
– Method of passenger selection
– Voluntary nature of inspection
– Controls ( including supervision and documentation) to ensure
inspections follow policies and procedures.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 19
the count was restarted when a passenger was inspected; others, the count continued.
So it was continuous in ones that were interrupted. Agencies allowed officers’ discretion,
when there was probable cause or suspicious behavior, to do questions and arrests.
They all also allowed, in one form or another, the local supervisor to alter the inspection
sequence for line management. For those transit agencies that haven’t done this, I think
this is one of the things that needs to be understood, that there’s flexibility to make sure
that the line doesn’t gum up and actually create a target in and of itself. I saw that
demonstrated in several places we’ve looked at.
All of the agencies had a manual count but one— I was going to cite that later as a best
practice— which uses a computer- generated random count. I’m going to make this
example up. It’s the second, it’s the fourth, it’s the eleventh, the thirteenth, the
eighteenth, the nineteenth, the thirtieth passenger, and that sequence changes each day,
so it becomes impossible to predict from one day to another.
The screening is voluntary, but once it starts, once that officer grabs the bag, we found it
common that it has to be continued. You can’t back out. You can back out before, and
there are signs that allow you to do it. If you haven’t paid your fare, you can back out
before. But once it starts, it’s got to be finished. That’s the standard that we saw.
Signage is really important. For one, it designated how far the signs are, how many have
to be there. I think there was a court order or an AG decision that said, “ It’s got to be X
type. It’s got to be a certain distance.” I’m going to point out when there was a good best
practice. Everyone has a web site, so Amtrak has a very good video on their boarding
system that tells the passengers what's going to be happening. You can go and see that
any time you want.
If there is a refusal to go through screening, and Brian and I both saw this, the
consequences differ. In a large station, the passenger can leave, but can board the train
in another place, so you wonder what’s the value in that. We’re going to get into that
June 18, 2009 19
How is Legal Integrity Maintained when
Selecting Passengers?
• A primary concern for all is maintaining legal “ integrity”
by avoiding discrimination and racial profiling, and
inspections conducted out of procedure.
• Methods used to determine random selection of
passengers differed:
– Some are centrally controlled with only one or two options for
supervisors, based on passenger flow
– Some provide local supervisors with more discretion within
specified boundaries
20 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
later. Smaller stations, the transit authorities say you have to leave the station entirely.
You’ll have to go somewhere else. The last one, you can figure out what transit agency
this is because it’s an actual ticket. You know, you can’t board the train. You get a refund,
but you can board another one.
June 18, 2009 20
Legal Integrity ( con’t)
– All use a count of passengers, but count differs. Variations
include:
• All passengers
• All passengers with any bag
• All passenger with airline- type carry- on bags.
– Sequence differs. Variations include:
• A continuous count
• A count that restarts with each inspection
– All allowed officers discretion to:
• Question passengers displaying suspicious behavior
• Make arrest upon reasonable suspicion or exigent circumstances
• Reduce frequency for line management.
– All but one used a manual count ( one in every X passengers);
one used a random count generated by computer each day.
June 18, 2009 21
Voluntary Screening and
the Consequences of Refusal
• All agency programs make baggage inspection voluntary. But once
inspection starts, it must be completed.
• All agencies have signage. For at least one, signage is a
particularly important part of the program, often posted a
designated number of feet away.
• Agencies also post policies on their websites ( AMTRAK runs a
video in the boarding area).
• Consequence of refusals differs:
– Passenger must leave but can board elsewhere in station
– Passenger must leave the station
– Passenger cannot board the train but can get a refund and re- board
another train
• Passengers who are ordered to leave transit property and refuse
can be arrested.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 21
Passengers that refuse can go out on their own, but if they refuse to leave, and they're
ordered to leave, they can be questioned and possibly arrested if they resist.
Almost all of the refusals are benign. They were people that have strong views about
personal liberties. They don’t want their bags searched. The officer knows it. It’s really
clear. It’s not a security issue. You know, they’re handled well. They’re turned around and
say, “ Well, then, fine. You can go, but you have to leave the station.” It’s done very well.
Far more significant are the people evading or avoiding screening, and that most often
means contraband. One of the agencies I was at said, “ When they run, they’ve got
drugs, you know? Or they’ve got an illegal weapon.” Or it could be terrorist surveillance.
Where there is evasion or avoidance, the officers who are trained properly in behavioral
observation can and do question the passengers to determine if additional action is
needed. Very often, there’s no action needed, but they’ll file a report, which will go into
the local system, and we’ll talk about that later also.
Every single transit agency we talked to said the people that object the most to screening
are people that are older white males, because I think they say if you were alive at
Woodstock, and you can remember the ' 60s, then you object. “ Security is someone
else's problem, you know? It’s not me you should be looking at. You should be looking at
that dark guy over there.”
Let’s turn to ocumentation and the range of documentation kept. Everyone takes, keeps
documentation; some people audit.
Let’s go to intelligence and information.
Now this is a sensitive issue because everyone’s trying hard to do intelligence- sharing
and information- sharing, and it never can get exactly right, but this is, in general, what we
heard, When you detail a transit officer to the JTTF ( Joint Terrorism Task Force), or the
June 18, 2009 22
Voluntary Screening ( con’t)
• Nearly all screening refusals are benign -- based in strong views of
personal rights. ( Passenger behavior usually confirms absence of
threat)
• More significant are those who evade or avoid screening.
– Most often indicates contraband
– Could also indicate terrorist surveillance, trial run, or operation.
• When there is evasion or avoidance, officers can and do question
passengers and then further determine if additional action is
needed. ( Suspicious Activity Reports can be and are filed)
• Common Observation: Older white males have strongest objections
to screening.
22 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
local fusion or diffusion center, you get good results. When you create a trusted
relationship with a state or federal agency, you get good results and high praises.
Paul Lennon, Mass Transit Division, got a lot of good kudos for the kinds of liaison
they’re performing with the transit agencies, both TSA and FTA. Tony Tisdale and also
Sonya Carter were repeatedly mentioned as people that are from the transit agencies,
know how transit works, and know how to work with the agencies. In my personal
experience with FA security, if we hired people from inside the industry, they were
tougher on the industry than we were, because they knew what was going on. They also
knew how to help.
The issues that were expressed, and this is just classic, is when the IC ( intelligence
community) produces something, it wasn't particularly timely. This was a classic quote:
“ The gentleman is here.” It’s that “ CNN tells us more.” This is something I’ve seen in
information sharing, there is an overload phase, we’re in right now. We’re getting
duplicative reporting, getting flooded by email, and there’s no siphon that says what’s
real or not. So you tune it out, and that’s what we found from DHS, TSA, and some of the
supported activities. I know that’s being worked on now and it's a difficult problem.
Standard inspection team: I’ll point out the fact that usually there’s a K- 9 team in the
area, and there’s plain- clothes officers watching.
Professionalism is important— it’s strongly mentioned. You know, being customer- friendly
and professional goes together. They do that with training and supervision. The ones we
saw really showed a high familiarity with the environment, and they have a sixth sense
about what’s there and what’s out of order, you know? The crazy guy that’s living in the
station? You know him, right? He’s not a threat. He might even tell you some information
that you need to know. A new person would look at the guy and say, “ He’s got a huge,
baggy coat. We need to search him.” But if you know the guy that’s been there for a long
time knows, “ No. That's just Joe.” We saw a lot of that.
June 18, 2009 23
What Role does Documentation Play?
• All agencies keep some documentation.
– Some agencies keep more extensive records on gender and apparent
race of those inspected.
– Some agencies keep less detailed records.
• All agencies document passenger complaints.
• Most agencies document positive “ hits”.
• Some agencies review inspection records to ensure inspection is
random and cannot be predicted.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 23
There is a service mentality. You talk to people; you get to know them. It’s a good thing.
They help the line. Attention to detail in the inspection.
A couple of the agencies did very good on the actual inspection and associated training.
I used to do watch inspections at airports, and one of the agencies did what I would call a
June 18, 2009 24
Intelligence and Information
• Opinions varied, but generally:
• Highest value given to
– Transit officers located at JTTFs and Fusion Centers
– Trusted relationships established with other State and local police
and sometimes with federal agencies
– Personal interaction with TSA’s Mass Transit Division leadership
and individual government staff from TSA and FTA, who received
high praise.
• Issues expressed with
– Timeliness of information from the Intelligence Community
– Controls on information: “ CNN tells us more.”
– Overload: Volume of sometimes duplicative information
June 18, 2009 25
Inspection team composition
• While there are variations, the typical
inspection consists of:
– One supervisor
– One selecting officer
– Two inspecting officers
– At least one canine team in the area
– Plainclothes officers in the area observing
passengers
24 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
model ETD ( Explosive Trace Detection) inside and outside bag search that would have
worked really well, and probably better than most TSA screeners.
Also, they all understand that they’re being observed. This is a stage; this is a show. I
don’t mean a show in a bad sense of the word. The public is watching us and it gives
them confidence; but the other guys are watching.
It’s a mistake to say that this is just deterrence, we just go through the motion.
Professional watchers look and they know the difference, and someone who knows what
they're searching and how to look for it. They’re going to look at that.
The 9/ 11 hijackers scoped out the aviation system. They knew what the weaknesses
were. So you can't just say, “ Deterrence. Let's just put a bunch of dogs out there,”
because we actually have to really have the people trained and know what they’re doing.
What’s searched? Not passengers— it’s bags. Size counts. The size of the bag could be
small. I think these are some of the reasons. For others, it may actually call out only
passengers with the larger, carry- on bags, but it’s more fitting for the threats and
destruction we’ve seen in Madrid and London, which is closer to 15 to 20 pound bags.
Interestingly, one of the agencies that focused on airline bags maintained the integrity of
the count by handing out a card to someone that didn't have a bag, saying, “ Had you had
a bag, you would have been inspected.” That’s an interesting kind of compromise. I
maintain the count if I only inspect people with bags, it's a good compromise.
June 18, 2009 26
How is Professionalism Maintained?
• All agencies strongly emphasize customer- friendly and professional
demeanor, and reinforce that with training and supervision.
• All supervisors and officers observed seemed to combine:
– Familiarity with environment ( they see what is out of order)
– Customer service mentality ( they are friendly and courteous)
– Helpful line management
– Attention to detail
• One or two agencies seem particularly focused on inspection
techniques and associated training.
• All understand that they are observed not only by the public but also
by terrorists conducting surveillance.
• Detection and deterrence are mutually supportive.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 25
DAVE SCHLESINGER
Just to ask a quick question. I’m just real curious about the comment that “ we only
search bags.” Is that something that’s been prevalent across all agencies?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
That we talk to, yes. This is a sensitive area.
What are they inspected for? It's a narrow focus on the things that terrorists could use. In
general orders, they say the bags can be opened and manipulated. Some look for any
size of explosives. Some look for a larger amount. We’re going to talk about that as an
issue later. It’s a limited search. You know, reading material. He’s not supposed to read it.
And although the searches are specifically are not designed to detect contraband, if it’s
detected incidental to the search, it can, and has, led to an arrest, and those arrests have
been sustained in court, at least in one jurisdiction I talked to. So if you find drugs
incidental, or you find something else, you can take action. But the focus of the
inspection is not on drugs.
How are the bags opened? Here are the range of practices, with different sequences. All
but one searched only outside of the bag with a trace detector as the primary inspection
team. Minimizes the hand search, the intrusion.
In those cases, the bags were opened where there was a hit. Now it’s important to know
what a “ hit” is— we’re not talking about gun hits, but ETD hits. You can have a various set
of alarms from different reasons. I’m going to get to that later. These are the kinds of
things we found, and it’s really a combination of three things— questions to the
June 18, 2009 29
How Are Bags Inspected and When
Are They Opened?
• There are a range of practices, from hand search, to
canine search, to Explosive Trace Detectors ( ETD’s).
• All specify an inspection sequence. Sequence of ETD,
canine and hand- search may vary.
• All but one searched only outside of the bag with ETD
as primary inspection, minimizing hand- search to avoid
personal intrusion.
• In these cases, bags only opened when there is an
ETD “ hit”.
26 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
passenger: Do you have heart medication? Have you been working on a range? Are you
a police officer? Military officer? In the mining industry? Black powder. Do you have black
powder or C4 or TNT on you? That would set the alert off. Then, physical inspection of
the bag. And finally, watching the reaction of the passenger.
If the passenger is sitting there saying, “ Fine. Go ahead.” Then the officer knows. You
can see it. They know right away there’s no issue here. If the passenger starts to get
nervous, you’ve got a problem, a different reaction.
I think I mentioned the agency that did both inside and outside of the bag. By interesting
contrast, one of the agencies planned to use only manual search in order to reduce the
time. So that gives you an interesting contrast. Technology traces what’s used. There are
times when older units are not so good; newer units, better. The reaction of the
passenger is positive, curious, or, as Brian would imitate, bored or whatever.
The trace units can be set to detect drugs, but actually, they are set for explosives, which
is appropriate for the scope of the search.
JOHN MCPARTLAND
Can you back that up one, please?
“ The passenger reaction seems positive or curious or bored?”
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yeah. People that have been through it before or in airlines know boredom, or know that
this is a normal thing. So their reaction could be curious: “ They’ve got this technology.
June 18, 2009 30
Inspecting and Opening Bags ( con’t)
• ETD “ hits” resolved by combination of:
– Questions to determine a benign positive alarm:
• Black powder or other explosive ( military, police, mining)
• Nitroglycerine ( heart medication)
• Certain make- up
– Physical inspection
– Observation of passenger reaction
• One agency routinely performed careful ETD and hand
search on inside of bag.
• By contrast, one agency planned to use only manual
search to speed inspection.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 27
They’re swabbing it. What is that thing?” Or positive: “ I like this. You’re screening. You’re
not opening my bag.”
There are true positives that are benign. The ones I was talking about before is what I
call those. This is the military/ police officer one. There are probably others. There are
false positives or other positives that, when they detect chemical compounds related to
June 18, 2009 31
What Technology is Used?
• ETD only technology routinely utilized
• Time involved is only 10 to 15 seconds
• Older units are larger and less mobile; newer models
lighter, more mobile
• Passenger reaction seems positive, or curious, or
bored
• Some units can detect drugs and explosives; but
settings always on explosives
June 18, 2009 32
Technology used ( con’t)
• ETD’s can give “ true” or “ false” positives that are almost
always benign
– “ true” when they detect explosives or elements of explosives
used legitimately;
– “ false” when they detect chemical compound related to
explosives.
• As detection technology eliminates known “ false”
positives, manufacturing may create new ones
• One model at one inspection point that was observed
gave false positives if sample became saturated.
• But on rare occasions – both in and outside of screening
– hits have detected persons of interest.
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Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
explosives. There’s kind of a race here as technology detection eliminates some of the
known false positives, for example, those coming from makeup or Magic Markers. As the
detection technology eliminates those false positives, manufacturing processed are
going to keep bringing more of them, so there's always going to be a need to take a hit
and ask, “ What have I got here?” Not jump to the conclusion that you’ve got a problem.
Pass that information around the transit community, too.
It’s also important to avoid saturation of the samples in quality control. I saw that at one
point. You’ve got to watch that one, because that can give you hits all the time, and really,
the machine isn’t operating properly. On rare occasions— this is the jewel in the crown,
this is what this is all about— both inside and outside screen, hits have detected persons
of interest as defined by the GATO ( Global Air Traffic Operations). We did confirm that.
Doggies. They’re common, and they do both detection and deterrence. One agency
almost completely relies on them. Almost all of them place a K- 9 team near the screen
operation, which is important. They also are trace detectors. They can be used to screen
the outside or the inside of the bag. They also can generate benign hits, though, for false
positives, like Magic Markers.
There is a special dog program that TSA started, but I’m not sure has been actively
pushing, and that’s that at Auburn University. They’ve been training dogs to detect
explosive amounts present in the vapor wakes left by multiple people. Our understanding
is that when these were trialed and tested, they performed very well in blind testing, not
double- blind testing. There is a film we could show you, they’re positioned as people go
past, multiple people combined. They appear to be very well trained, and, with good
quality control, they can detect very, very faint amounts of explosives. Passenger
reaction is very positive. Reaction by terrorists, we think, is they have a high respect for
dogs. Whether it’s valid or not, we know that they do.
June 18, 2009 33
What Role do Canines play?
• Common in agency programs
• Provide both detection and deterrence ( even when not actively
searching)
• One agency relies almost exclusively on canines
• Nearly all place a canine team near any screening operation;
– for some this is a 100% requirement
– for others it is as often as possible
• Canines can be used to screen the outside and inside of bags – they
are “ trace detectors” and also generate benign “ hits”
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 29
By the way, dogs can not work and not tell you, but dogs can really work, and it all
depends on the quality control and the handling. The key thing here is that these dogs
can detect, can essentially screen, more than one person at a time. That's the beauty of
it.
June 18, 2009 34
Vapor- Wake Detection Canine
Teams
• Canines have also recently been trained by Auburn
University to detect explosives in the vapor wakes left by
people as an additional duty.
– Positioned as people go past, canines sniff vapor wakes to
determine presence of explosives.
– Appear to be a formidable deterrent
– Appear to be an effective way of passively screening multiple
passengers, not just those going through inspection
– Reaction by most passengers is positive; reaction by those
hiding something probably different
June 18, 2009 35
Are Passengers Screened?
• While passengers are not searched unless there is probable cause,
passengers ARE in fact passively screened in two ways
– Officers trained in behavior observation, including uniformed and
plainclothes, observe all passengers entering screening.
– One agency used communication between highly trained plainclothes
officers in the boarding areas with those conducting the screening
process.
– In some agencies, canines trained for vapor wake detection are
deployed ( two agencies have canines trained by Auburn)
• All agencies train their uniformed and plainclothes officers in
different types of behavioral observation training. Some take a
particularly aggressive approach.
30 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Are passengers screened? Well, they’re searched, but they are screened in two ways. I
think this is the key part of this whole program. It's not the inspection. It’s the opportunity
to observe behavior, particularly those “ gaming” during inspection. If the officer is trained
in behavioral observation, it’s very good. Observe all the passengers. In one agency,
they had plain- clothes people at the boarding areas using sophisticated communications
that indicate to the screening supervisor, “ I’ve got somebody I want you to particularly
look at.” In three agencies, you had K- 9s in a vertical wave detection. If you put the
behavioral observation together, and you put the K- 9s together, and you really work them
as a team, you're essentially looking at every person coming through, whether they're
being inspected or not. You're looking particularly at the people that should give you the
most interest- those that are trying to evade the inspection.
JOHN MCPARTLAND
Are there standard courses in that?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yes. They’re called BASS/ PATRIOT Terrorist Awareness Recognition and Reaction.
Patriot’s the latest version, but they’re always being improved, and NTI, National Transit
Institute, has some excellent, excellent stuff for transit employees. Highly recommended,
both their modules and their films. I’ve looked at their training film. It’s really good.
Here’s the training. Any one of the people here can give you information on where to go.
Again, the focus of the observation is on those evading, not those going through it, and
that third point is what I’m trying to say. That’s the value. It’s not the inspection. The
June 18, 2009 36
Are Passengers Screened? ( Con’t)
• All agencies train their regular employees in a shortened
version of the same training, based on the NTI transit
employee training
• The focus of these observations is more on those
evading inspection than on those willingly going through
it.
• In short, all agencies understand that the value of the
passenger inspection is not the inspection, but:
– deterrent value of the inspection for those observing it
– the behavior it evokes on the part of those avoiding inspection
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 31
inspection is almost a prompting event. It prompts behavior and it’s the behavior you’re
watching. That’s the value of the program.
That’s not going to be understood by civil liberties advocates. It’s not going to be
understood by the public; and my suggestion is that we don’t try and explain it. They’re
going to start asking questions like, “ Are you trailing the people once they leave?” But I
think, for the transit community, considering this, they need to understand that it's not
catching people with bombs in the bags. It's watching people evade and watching the
inspection process that gives the value to it.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
I wanted to ask you a question about the behavior. You said that you prompt people to be
stopped, and you look at their behavior, if they get nervous, they are very likely to be
watched, but do you have any data to indicate the Al Qaida- like terrorist who probably
has religious fervor and doesn't care about dying, would he also act in a nervous way?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yeah. The BASS/ PATROIT programs are based on lots of detailed studies of what even
a trained terrorist will still show.
BRIAN JENKINS
In 1999, an Al Qaida- linked terrorist coming from Canada, tried to cross the Canadian
border on his way to the Los Angeles Airport. He was stopped by a customs agent on the
border. There were a number of things going on through the custom agent’s
head— number one, why is he taking this peculiar route to get to his location, because it's
not the usual route. That’s a little bit unusual. So this experienced customs agent asks
him a couple of questions, just the interaction tells the agent there’s something not quite
right about this individual. The route’s not right. The answer isn’t quite right, and so she
simply says, “ Would you step out of the car, sir?”, at which point he bolts out of the car.
He’s tackled. They open the trunk of the car. It’s loaded with explosives. This man is now
doing 35 years. The plan was to bring a bomb to Los Angeles.
There are ample examples even of terrorists arousing suspicion in the course of their
mission. Here’s a concrete example, and it’s been public: Mohammed Atta, the leader of
the 9/ 11 hijacking team. The fellow who checked him in at the airport worked on the
airport counter for 26 years and his perception was, “ There's something wrong here. This
is absolutely wrong.” Unfortunately he didn’t do anything more with that information.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
The other thing is that the training teaches you to look for physical behaviors that are
very difficult for people to control. You know, the pulsing of the neck, the redness of the
neck, is something that is very hard for people to actually really pretend to be normal
when they’re about to blow themselves up. It's not a natural act. I suppose it can be
done, but it’s not. When you’re actually being watched by trained people, they have a
32 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
good chance, especially if they’ve been in that station for years and years and years, and
they know what’s normal.
RON MASCIANA
It's a good question, but it’s not a new question. And we have to go back to how law
enforcement deals with a crime, and interaction with those who we feel may have
committed a crime. You’re going to see physiological effects on somebody that you stop
for a burglary or a robbery, and all we’re adding, even BASS, those elements of instinct
that we see and experience, and put it in context to the terrorist world.
The question here is that we’ve set up screening outside. Because of the tendency of
people to get really upset with their civil liberties, that since we do the screening of
everybody going into the board meetings now, if somebody decides that they really want
to see how much junk they can stir up, all they’ve got to do is say that: a) I’m being
profiled, and b) I’m this, that, and everything else. Are there any of these agencies that
are doing periodic or random screening? Do they have it set up so that they have
surveillance cameras in order to protect both the rights of the public as well as the rights
of the agency, in the event that some person turns it into a political issue?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I tell you what. There are going to be people here, I know, who have those systems. It’s
both cameras and documentation stuff.
BRIAN JENKINS
We are going to deal with that in the panel. A short answer, you should use of cameras in
conjunction with screening, and particularly where you are expecting confrontation, that
is, expecting someone to create an incident, cameras aren’t a bad idea.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I’m going to try and get through this, so I can turn this back over to Brian. The questions
have been really good, though. Thank you.
Picture- taking: We have a range that goes all the way from one agency which, upon
learning its inspections were on YouTube, reached out to the guy and say, “ Let’s help
make sure you understand what you’ve got.” Perfectly legitimate. Others had an absolute
policy, no pictures of any screening taken that’s on transit property. Absolutely none. One
system we talked to said even passengers taking pictures of trains is not allowed.
Though now they all do allow officers to go up and question people that are taking
pictures to make sure that the motives are benign.
Deterrence is important. These are the ways in which it’s maximized. I thought this was
very good. You’ve got major stations, but you’ve got small stations. You’ve got peak
hours, and off- peak hours. Passenger selection can be varied through the system or by
inspection posts. I haven’t mentioned before, and Brian is going to mention later, at least
in one system, the inspection supervisor is allowed to say, “ All right. In addition to once
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 33
every seven, I’m going to choose every seventh person carrying a bag over their right
shoulder.” I mean that becomes very difficult to predict if you’re watching.
They all have public information. The “ see- something/ say- something” programs that are
common are very good.
June 18, 2009 37
How is Public Information
Controlled?
• All agencies post some information on their
websites.
• Some undertook an aggressive and continuing
media campaign.
• Others knew media would come to them.
• All have assigned personnel to answer
questions and prepared Q’s and A’s.
June 18, 2009 38
Different Responses to
Picture- Taking
• There are marked differences in the response to a passenger taking
pictures of inspection operations or even any part of transit property.
– One agency, upon learning that its inspections were on U- Tube,
assisted the person to increase public knowledge that inspections were
taking place.
– Others had an absolute policy of no pictures being taken of any
screening operation, with eviction from property and possible arrest
being the consequence.
– Some even had a policy of no pictures taken anywhere in the system,
even by passengers, and even of normal train activity.
– Most had a policy of allowing police officers to question those taking
pictures to ensure that their intentions were benign.
34 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Then you’ve got community policing. It’s quite impressive. They have heavily armed guys
with dogs go through trains and stations. People say, “ Why? This is really serious. Long
guns, etc.” And also the K- 9s, even when they’re not visibly searching, no one really
knows that they’re not. They can just be wandering around, taking a rest, but people
think that they’re searching. So it’s an added benefit there.
There were some creative practices. Computer- generated sequence each day I thought
was a really good one.
Community policing is brilliant, for all these guys around the panel will tell you, in many
ways, it’s just an extension of good, solid community policing in the station, where you’re
interacting with passengers and the vendors, even to the homeless where it’s legal for
them to stay. I just mentioned New York. There’s a large vagrant population. They get to
know them. They watch. They’ll tell them when there’s crime. They’re additional eyes.
Outside the station, one was particularly great, going to all the businesses at some of the
transit entrances, and saying, “ Look. This is our program. Here it is in your language. If
you see a crime, if you see something that's odd or off, tell us.” And all of this encourages
information, deterrents, and support for the program. To me, I think the most important
thing is it increases the chance that police officers know when something is in place and
out of place, which is both a rational and a matter of emotional intelligence.
I’m going to skip quality control. All I’ll say is that only one system used Red Team
Testing. We had a range from agencies that had very detailed contingency plans for
doing more intensive screening at different threat levels to ones that had very little.
As for the benefits for the transit agencies— they’ve received an increase in deterrence.
They’ve received an increase in public confidence and assurance. The reaction from the
public toward the people and agencies that put this in place, I think they will tell you is
overwhelmingly positive, or it’s certainly acceptable. Once you get past the original, you
know, “ What is this?” it’s either a ho- hum or it’s a good thing.
I want to leave with this, because this is so important. Two agencies detailed cases
where suspicious persons and operations had been detected and confirmed.
And that leads me to the final thought— you know the old bear joke, right? There’s two
guys that are running from a grizzly bear. One turns to the other and says, “ Why should
we run? A grizzly bear can run 35 miles an hour. We can only run 15.” And the guy says,
“ I’m not trying to outrun the grizzly bear. I’m trying to outrun you.”
Back to Brian.
BRIAN JENKINS
Let me just underscore a couple of things here, and then we’ll take a quick break before
the panelists convene. Behavioral observation training is an area on the move. It is
improving. We don’t have an X- ray for a man’s soul, nor do we have individuals that can
be so well trained that they can look at an individual and know what’s inside their heads.
However, we are learning that there are some basic indicators that may provide an
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 35
additional set of clues. That’s about as good as it gets in that area. That training is very
valuable.
We keep mentioning training here. One of the presentations on the panel deals with
training. It is an important ingredient of these programs.
Underscoring another point that Bruce made, while our focus is on the inspection, on the
selective screening, this is not a standalone measure. Screening is one component of an
June 18, 2009 45
Best Practices
June 18, 2009 46
1. Behavioral Observation Training
– All agencies provide to officers and an abbreviated
version to paid staff
– Some aggressively update training and keep it fresh
– Because the “ eyes” of staff and officers see more
than those being inspected, and can differentiate
between the normal ( including the bizarre) and the
abnormal or suspicious, this appears to be a wise
investment.
– Some agencies have apparently detected possible
terrorist surveillance.
36 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
array of measures, including use of TV cameras, physical patrols and other measures.
Bruce mentioned a very interesting one, where one of the agencies went to the local
businesses around the entrances and enlisted them in information gathering. That was
an interesting way of expanding screening security efforts.
June 18, 2009 47
2. Community Policing Inside and Outside
• All agencies encourage officers and staff to interact with passengers
during inspections and at other times.
• This increases information and improves officer and staff “ gut” sense
of what is normal and what is out of place – which is invaluable.
• But one agency went further and:
– Went to all businesses ( and local police) near each transit stop
– Reached out to different ethnic communities in different languages
– Explained the program and asked to be kept informed of suspicious
activity – criminal or otherwise
– Left flyers
– Regularly re- freshed contacts
• Results:
– Increases information flow and extends “ eyes and ears”
– Extends deterrence
– Increases public support in key communities ( including Islamic community
June 18, 2009 48
3. Unpredictability: Keep ‘ em Guessing
• All agencies choose stations and times for inspection randomly. But…
– One agency utilized computer- generated, daily- altered random number for
passenger selection.
– One agency allowed inspection supervisor to select passengers based on
carefully chosen other factors difficult to predict that stay clear of ethnic
profiling.
– One agency searched cars and areas around stations based on color of
vehicle or number on license plates.
– One agency picked stations based on tips and left luggage, or based on
some physical configuration ( e. g., position of stairs).
• The selection methods that are impossible to predict by analysis or observation
are a best practice.
• Racial profiling IS a predictable selection method, and should be avoided not
only for legal and ethical reasons, but for security reasons as well.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 37
In my view, and we can talk about this more during the panel presentations, there are
three reasons for randomness. One is it ought not to be predictable to the bad guys.
Having said that, I don’t really see terrorists who would make a serious investment in
constructing a bomb coming up to an inspection point and saying, “ I think I’m not the
seventh guy. I’m going to try to go through.” I think their reaction is going to be, “ Here’s
an inspection point. I don’t know what the hell the count is. I’m going somewhere else.”
And that’s really the reaction you want. So, yes, it should be unpredictable, but I don't
see terrorists trying to beat the numbers. This is not roulette.
The second reason for the randomness is for the protection— the legitimate protection of
civil liberties, so that we are not doing things wrong.
The third reason really for what are being pushed in a direction of randomness is that I
think the inspectors themselves, in some cases, might get a little too confident about
their ability to make choices, and those choices may be the right or wrong choices. While
these are in many cases experienced officers, you really don't want to put your entire
trust on an individual inspector, or somebody making that call. You want to yank them
back in the direction of randomness. So it has three purposes.
Plain- clothes and physical inspection: Plain- clothes officers are part of the search. They
really get to watch a lot of things that are going on, and as Bruce and I’ve mentioned,
they really know these stations. They know their neighborhoods, they know their
territories.
I’m a Californian, when I come to New York, I get on the subway, and somebody’s telling
me that, “ We’re looking for aberrant behavior.” I think I’m in the zoo here! And yet,
walking across the station with a couple of the officers, they walk right up to this guy, and
say, “ John, you know, you’re not supposed to be in here. We told you. You’ve got to
leave.” That’s the kind of intimate neighborhood knowledge local police have.
June 18, 2009 49
( 4) Plainclothes Officers
• All use plainclothes officers to detect suspicious behavior, including
those avoiding inspection.
• Experienced officers know the environment; they know what is
ordinary, and when someone needs to be questioned.
• Selective screening prompts behavior; observing it provides the
main benefit.
• All agencies appear to collect and file SARS.
• One agency, however,
– Gave month- long counter- surveillance training to officers
– Placed them in boarding areas and on trains
– Enabled them to communicate remotely with screening supervisor
38 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
It would be nice if we had technology that could enable us to do bulk detection. We don’t
have that yet, but dogs are doing some pretty interesting things here.
Other best practices: The idea of details of transit police with the fusion centers and
JTTFs, I think that makes sense. They’re part of the overall effort here. Inspections
June 18, 2009 50
( 5) Vapor Wake Detection Canines
• All agencies have canines, but normal application is to screen cars, bags,
parcels, sometimes assist bomb technicians, and provide deterrence.
• Auburn has trained canines to screen vapor wakes of people.
• Some agencies have Auburn- trained canines
• When trained, qualified, and carefully and regularly tested in their working
environment, vapor- wake detection dogs can provide significant detection and
deterrence benefits for all those boarding or going through an inspection point.
• Even when not actively searching, they provide deterrence.
• Respected by terrorists, they are liked by passengers.
• Given the difficulty of creating stand- off passive detection, vapor- wake
detection dogs should be further utilized, but also regularly re- qualified by TSA
and agencies, using realistic testing methods.
• TSA and other agency involvement is crucial
June 18, 2009 51
( 6) Shows of Force
• Heavily armed officers arriving en mass at stations or
moving through trains add deterrence.
• Joint Operations with other police departments and
agencies:
– Increase deterrence
– Increase HQ and field level partnership and planning
– Identify need for cross- training and decisions on procedures to
be followed
– Create foundation for mutual assistance for special events and
emergencies ( Transit police assisted WMATA during
inauguration)
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening 39
performed by diverse officers is another defense against racial or ethnic profiling. That’s
important. Again, a creative use of plain- clothes performing surveillance and deterrence
even on their way to the inspection positions, and communicating with one another, that
is good.
The last one here, I wouldn't have said this years ago. Airport screeners, when they were
run by private contractors, were a disaster. But now that we actually have a stable TSA
screening force, we have people gaining a lot of frontline experience, and TSA is
beginning to capture really good experience. I think there can be some transfer of
knowledge and best practices.
GREG HULL
If I could, one of the points that was made on best practices, and it goes back to a slide
you had on intelligence and information. Just for the folks that are here, so that you’re
aware, where the major agencies are invited to the JTTF, which is a tremendous
resource, there’s a lot of others who don't have that resource, and so we look to other
systems. What we have agreed to do, and we confirmed this at a meeting we had with
our federal partners, our mass- transit sector coordinating council. It's our policy- level
interface look at that particular area of DHS.
We’ve agreed to pull together a working group to look at the whole issue of information
sharing, and this is not relative to JTTF, but in these other modes, we do have a
public- transit ISAP, an information- sharing analysis center. How do we combine that into
the most effective system possible?
June 18, 2009 52
Other Best Practices
7) Detailing transit police to JTTFs and Fusion Centers and building
good relationships with LE agencies is essential.
8) Inspections performed by diverse officers help counter fears of
“ racial profiling”.
9) Smaller, portable trace units appear to provide advantages.
10) One agency’s General Order has been viewed and adopted by
others.
11) One agency placed officers along its system and had them perform
surveillance and deterrence on their way to inspection position.
12) Collaboration with TSA airport screeners can bring additional skills.
40 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
BRIAN JENKINS
Thanks for bringing us up- to- date on the issue of information- sharing. There is a
difference, by the way, between intelligence- sharing and information- sharing, and we get
hung up; the feds every now and again get hung up around intelligence- sharing.
For the operators— the people running the systems, running the security for the
systems— for the most part don’t need the sensitive intelligence. When bombs go off in
Mumbai or London, you don’t need to know who did it, and how do we know that? That’s
an intelligence question. What you really need to know is, “ What did they do and now
how did they do it, and, therefore, what do I need to do, to protect our system fast?” And
that’s information. We don’t have to classify that. We don’t need top secret clearances to
know that. That’s something that has to move out really fast.
And here’s a case where the NYPD has been ahead of the feds in getting that
information out faster. Operating systems need to know that within a couple of hours.
Figure 1 Brian Jenkins Speaks to One of the Participants at the APTA Rail
Passenger Selective Screening Summit
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
41
PANEL SESSION, PART ONE:
PAUL MACMILLAN, RON MASCIANA AND ED PHILLIPS
BRIAN JENKINS
Let’s get started again. We haven’t imposed a specific presentation requirement, but
each one of our panelists represents an operating system, or, in one case, a training
function. While Bruce and I have talked about these in conceptual terms, they will be
able to talk to you in terms of dealing with these issues in real life.
Some of these issues they will address were brought to us during the course of research.
We don’t always know what the right answers are. One interesting question that came up
was regarding the issue of “ should passenger selection and bag- based searches be
limited to larger bags? Both larger and smaller bags? Should it be strictly person
regardless of what they're carrying?”
Do the officers on the scene have sufficient latitude within a random- dictated system to
respond to something that they really do think is suspicious? How do we do that, and at
the same time, maintain the integrity of the randomness?
Bruce touched upon this point detection versus deterrence. This is primarily a deterrent
measure. I mean, quite honestly, if an inspection point finds a terrorist standing in front of
the table with a bomb, we've just found the dumbest terrorist in the world. So this is
primarily about deterrence; but, having said that, it's still a detection system.
June 18, 2009 55
Five Dilemmas for Discussion
1. SHOULD PASSENGER SELECTION AND BAG SEARCHES BE
LIMITED TO LARGER BAGS?
2. DO OFFICERS HAVE SUFFICIENT LATITUDE TO SEARCH
THOSE THEY VIEW MORE LIKELY TO BE CARRYING A
BOMB?
3. HOW CAN MORE RANDOMNESS BE ENTERED INTO THE
PASSENGER COUNT AND RETAIN LEGAL INTEGRITY
4. HOW MUCH SHOULD A DETERRENCE- BASED PROGRAM
FOCUS ON DETECTION?
5. HOW MUCH ACCESS HOUDL BE GIVEN TO THOSE SEEKING
TO RECORD THE INSPECTION THEMSELVES?
42 Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
And then a number of other questions came up about the public. People are curious
about this. Their interest is not necessarily hostile. In some cases, they ask “ I want to
come up. Learn more about it. I want to take pictures of it.” As Bruce mentioned, there
June 18, 2009 58
Some Opportunities for Discussion
1. Voluntary Search may be better than
mandatory search
2. When there is selective passenger
baggage inspection, behavioral
observation and highly- trained vapor-wake
detection canines can screen all
passengers and their bags by
June 18, 2009 59
Opportunities for Discussion ( con’t)
3. Suspicious Activity Reporting:
– National SAR initiative is improving national data
reporting, analysis, and dissemination
• Local legacy systems can perform regional and national
searches of SAR data
• Data includes indicators, responses, results
• Examples of State and local police now participating:
Miami- Dade, NYSIC, Virginia Fusion Center
• Data involves trains and buses
• Terrorist and criminal cases have been opened
– Transit agency PDs could create a national SAR
“ shared space” dedicated to transit indicators and
responses ( e. g., e. g., left luggage, suspicious
picture taking)
– Program is growing. Consider participating.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips 43
are different reactions in different systems as to how that should be handled. These are
just some thoughts that came up in the course of our research.
Let me introduce our first speaker. Paul MacMillan is chief of police for the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Department in Boston. He
has been with the MBTA for 26 years, has come up through the ranks and is now in
charge. Boston itself is one of the oldest systems in the United States. It is also the
fifth- largest system in the United States, and it was one of first to implement a screening
system. So MacMillan brings a terrific experience to this particular issue. Paul?
PAUL MACMILLAN
Thank you, Brian. Thank you, Bruce. To the extent that Bruce has not outed me, I will
continue to out myself here shortly. Many of those things that you saw up there will
become self- evident as I go through a presentation. I’m going to show this video from
YouTube. It is the video in question that Bruce talked about, and I’m going to show it first,
for a couple of reasons. One, just to see popular expectations in Massachusetts.
So what we said was, “ You can film for educational or sight- seeing purposes and stuff,
but if you're filming, regardless of who you are, we have a right to stop you and ask you
what you're doing and why you’re filming.”
In the video here, you’ll see that this individual came down to film, and they mentioned
we have a plain- clothes person observing the security inspection, and he saw this
person filming, and then he engaged him, and there's a term we use, and it’s a police
term. It’s called FIO. It's just a police term and I'll use it— FIO. It’s field interview and
observation. But we take the information down and talk to the individual.
So I’m going to lead off with this ( video plays). This is from YouTube; and a very good
description of a program, by the way. Very accurate! It's not a very good quality video,
but you get the point.
So this gentleman is part of a group and I got a letter from him. I called him and and he
refused to answer my phone call. He left his phone number and his email account, and I
tried to write to him, to engage him, and he wouldn’t write back. He sent the letter to the
governor and they referred it to me to answer him.
And then another woman— they were all tied in together— wrote to the governor, and we
had to write back on what grounds we have to do these things. So it’s not a particularly
large group.
Just a little bit about the MBTA. It is the fifth- largest system in the country, carrying 1.2
million a day. We are multi- modal and use light rail, commuter rail, bus, heavy rail, and
ferry services We started screening back during the Democratic National Convention
( DNC). The Arab- American Anti- Discrimination Committee along with others took us to
court, and we won that case, though on very specific grounds. Because of the DNC, and
because at that time we were only selecting everybody who was going to the event on
the train, taking them off and searching them, the court allowed it. The decision was
silent on the random inspections we're doing now; yet we haven’t yet been challenged.
But the New York case dealt with that.
After a period of time, after the DNC, we stopped doing the inspections. And then, after
a period of time, and after the New York case was settled and New York became the
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Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
trend setter, we started inspections back up again in October of 2006, and we’ve done
about 1,100 to date. We do a number of them per day, four or five days a week. As the
YouTube slide indicates, we are supported by Homeland Security money for most of
them, but not all of them. The funding from DHS says you can use this money to
supplement a program you're already running. We were already running a program, so
we're using that money just to do more of them.
There are three officers, one sergeant and an Explosive Detection Unit ( EDU) member
who has a bomb dog, and we have a plain- clothes officer that observes it. We do post
these signs that were in the video, and we've screened 84,000 passengers. In the back
there, by the way, is our policy and the card we hand out. I’m going to get into the
sequential thing in a minute. Whether they have a bag or a carryon or not, that number
comes up, and we hand them a card that says, “ Had you been carrying an item, you
would have been screened.” And they’re allowed to just go on their way. So it keeps the
sequential number going.
Inspections take place outside the fare gates. The signs you saw are there. The
inspection sequence is random, with frequencies raised according to the threat. We
haven’t had a raised threat yet.
We are the only agency that uses the computerized random- numbering system.
Let’s say a refusal takes place—” I don’t want to be screened.” We respond, “ Thank you.
You can’t ride the T at this station today. You need to go somewhere else.” Now that
person can walk five blocks and get on the T. Referring to Brian’s point, this is a
disruption of whatever was going to happen; maybe we pick up on that. Of if they’re
doing some re- planning, they may realize they just don’t know where we're going to be,
which is why we use a random inspection sequence and choose stations randomly.
Within that context, stations are picked based on volume and also based on the patterns
that have been used in past bombings.
Again, the inspection takes about 12 seconds— realistically maybe they take a little bit
more. I think the guy on YouTube said it was about 20 seconds— I assume that he
thought he must have observed it. But it’s not an inconvenience. We swab the outside
of the package, put it through the explosive trace detection equipment that I’ll show here
in a minute, and then it goes through. It’s a quick reading and then the passenger is on
his or her way. It’s not intrusive at all.
Our screenings differ from others that open bags, which are “ searches.” We’re very
careful to say these are “ inspections.” They’re not searches. People write in and say,
“ You illegally searched me.” We did not. We swabbed the outside of your bag, we did not
search your bag; we did not search your purse.
We have a protocol. If you get a hit, ask simple clearance questions. You know, we ask
the obvious questions—” Is this your bag?” We ask them for some ID if it comes up.
A lot of these problems we had early on with the explosive trace detection equipment we
have since solved with the manufacturer. They’ve done some fine tuning of the
machines, and we’re not getting the number of positive readings that they had before, for
example, for lawn or garden fertilizer, or skin care products. Skin cream was a big hit for
a while. If that happens, we ask a typical baggage clearance question: “ Has anyone else
placed anything in this bag?”
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips 45
That will trigger an FIO. We’ll get his or her information and document that. We document
everybody we check by race and sex, so that we can look at the random numbers to
make sure that there is not some pattern that develops in the random system that
predicts who it is we’re checking, or that there is some kind of bias in the system. It
obviously isn’t there. We haven't seen it, but we do record all of that.
After the past threat, where the intelligence community developed information that
terrorists were going to attack certain critical infrastructures, we incorporated what we
call “ critical infrastructure inspections.” We have several critical infrastructures in Boston.
We talked about a lot of measures, but we never implemented any of them.
But what we’re going to do if that threat becomes real— an elevated threat, or a specific
threat about our critical infrastructure— is that we’re going to implement more aggressive
searches. We haven’t done it yet, as the threat level hasn’t been raised. It’s going to be
interesting to see if we ever have to conduct these more intensive critical infrastructure
inspections.
We use explosive trace detection equipment. They're set up for it. While they can be set
up to detect drugs we don’t use them for that. That’s specifically in the policy. We do not
test for drugs. There are civil liberties claims that, “ They're really checking for drugs.
That’s what they’re doing.” We do not. The machine is not calibrated for drugs
whatsoever. And we’re looking to get some more machines. The explosive trace
detection equipment we have now is portable but are not as portable as we would like.
There’s the machine. We take it out every day, set up at a station, and we do have
readings from it. They come from all sorts of things.
We’ve got 119 investigatory readings from these. There was one positive hit for
explosives, from a guy who built model rockets. He verified that was the case— I believe
we went to his house. We asked him to show us his information, and that he did build
model rockets. Voluntarily, he took us to his house and showed us that that’s what he
does for a living, so that’s the only hit involving explosives that we had to actually
investigate.
The other hits were cleared with the questions for nitro or hand sanitizers and the like.
This is what I led off with. This guy was filming these. And we let him. It’s transparent.
We said, “ Go ahead and film them.” The terrorists know what they’re getting into. But
they just don’t know when it’s going to happen. So to the extent that people know about
it, yeah, okay. But where it’s going to happen is a different story. But the policy is public.
It’s transparent.
Some advocates get upset, fearing that we’ve somehow done something, strip- searched
them before they can get on the MBTA. They don’t have the same objection in getting on
an airplane or getting into Fenway Park, where they get searched and their bag gets
dumped. For some reason, when they get on the MBTA, they feel that they can’t be
inspected.
Thank you very much. Again, thank you to the Mineta Institute and APTA. The policies
are on the back table. Feel free to take one.
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Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you very much, Chief MacMillan. One point that you made, which I want to
emphasize here, is the issue about doing additional things, or expanding the program if
the threat level goes up. One of the utilities of having a plan in place is having a tested
platform for expansion if necessary. One of the dangerous ways of doing it is to wait for a
higher threat level and then try to design the airplane, build the airplane, and fly the
airplane all at the same time. That gets you into legal trouble. It creates procedural
problems. It doesn't work well.
You might say, “ Well, the threat is low right now,” but the idea of having in place a policy,
a platform, a logical approach, some trained people, so that if, heaven forbid, something
were to happen on the system, or a high threat level, we could say, “ Well, we’ve got
something here. We’ve got measures, and we can expand this, and we can just as easily
bring it down when the threat is lower.”
Next, we have with us Deputy Chief Ron Masciana from the MTA in New York. Ron has
been with MTA for 25 years, and has a long career in counter- terrorism. MTA is the
biggest system in the world, or close to it. It's a very complex system with trains, buses,
commuter trains, bridges, tunnels, all kinds of interesting things. Having had to deal with
the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in ' 93 and on 9/ 11, plus the subsequent
plots that have been uncovered, MTA is really on the front lines, and so they have
implemented a program, and Ron's going to talk to us about that right now.
RON MASCIANA
MTA’s programs are very much similar to what Chief MacMillan provided regarding the
randomness and selection. When we talk about “ selective” and “ random,” we’re talking
about a combination of two processes to provide some level of risk reduction.
What I did want to do this morning briefly is to go over the court case, because think
that's important for not only liability issues, but usually general managers and CEOs
have a fear. They have a fear that when we implement a policy that may affect the public,
that we’ll get the result that we did when the New York Civil Liberties Union filed their
complaint on August 12, 2005. That was based upon the July 22 implementation of the
random screening by NYPD. Of course, we in the MTA followed suit six days after the
complaint was filed, because we were going to respond to the threat.
In my 26 years of experience, I never had to deal with the legal issues, as long as you’re
working in a very clean environment after the fact, because you can’t risk the lives of
human beings based upon what legal issues may arise. But let me just get into the court
case for a moment.
There were two complaints. One was what we call “ unreasonable searches.” Keep in
mind that term “ unreasonable.” Prior to terrorism, there have been what we called
exceptions to the search rule in New York— vehicle search exceptions, as some of you
may be aware of. There are exceptions when we stop someone. You can do what we call
“ frisk.” You stop and frisk or you can frisk individuals if you feel that they have a weapon
on them. And so you can therefore conduct a search. So that’s an exception.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips 47
There’s an exception to the search rule for exigencies. Let’s say you’re standing by a
door and you hear noises in an apartment. Then you hear screaming. You don’t need a
warrant.
So what I’m trying to get to is that the court has recognized that there are certain
circumstances and, in this case, they call it “ special needs” to the search provisions.
The second complaint dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment, and that deals with due
process and equal protection under law. In essence, to what Mr. Jenkins said earlier, that
means treating everybody equally; it means that no state should enact or implement a
law that treats their citizens without due process or the equivalent.
There were thirteen witnesses: Eight complainants and five for the defense. There were
two days of testimony on October 31 and November 1. The real issue was that people
felt afraid of the police during the inspections. It wasn't the searches, because two of the
four witnesses that testified that they were searched admitted to the fact that they were
searched at hospitals, at government buildings. They were searched at airports. So it
wasn’t the search and it wasn’t so much what was being conducted. It was who was
conducting the searches.
I don’t know about you folks, but I go to Disney World once every two years. And if you
got to Disney World today, not only is your bag searched, as it would be at any major
stadium that you go to, but they use biometrics. So, in the case of the NYC lawsuit who
does it, not what is being done, is what was being questioned.
Three of the witnesses that testified had a very extensive background in
counter- terrorism. Commissioner Michael A. Sheehan from NYPD who, at that time, was
their counter- terrorism czar, had been an advisor to Clinton, and he had served 35 years
in the military. Also Mike Cohen, who was an advisor to two of the presidents and was
also in the State Department. We had Richard Clarke from Good Harbor Consulting, who
was in the military, and is a very well- known advisor to four presidents.
The basic element of the testimony was that screening was a valuable deterrent, and
that's really what's important here, because it's going to be to deter, it’s going to be to
displace, it’s going to be to disrupt their operations. You want to stop or interrupt the
planning.
The court looked at the level of risk and found it to be real. The court also looked at
certain criteria, but let me explain the criteria, because it's very important to understand
what the court viewed. First, there was notice to the public: very important.
And what was raised earlier, the “ see- something/ say- something” campaign. I like to call it
not community policing, but rather “ passenger policing.” Our community in the
transportation world, they hit the same train car. They hit the same stations. They hit the
same parking lots. They speak with the same people, and they get off at the same spots.
It’s what our cops do. We deploy our cops at the same stations, on the same trains,
because we want them to be ingrained with the community. So why aren’t we taking a
methodology that includes passenger policing? And believe it or not, the more you get
your community involved with you, the more they support what you're going to do, and
the only objection in court came from the New York City civil libertarians.
The second thing is that the search be delimited and not be overly intrusive. They’re
swabbed. But we do open the bags. I do want to see what's inside. In response to
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Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
question number one, it’s not only large packages. Even though our history may tell us
that a bomb at a certain time, whether it be in Mumbai or London or Spain, is at a certain
weight, why take the chances? Let me tell you something. If a one- or two- pound bomb,
regardless of what it is, is activated by a suicide bomber— which, by the way, they’re not
going to stop in the transit station— shutting down the system is going to have a
traumatic effect. The larger device will cause much more casualties, much more
damage, and it will have much more destruction of service. But if the terrorists go after
the psyche, then that’s what you’ve got to be careful of.
Getting back to the original point, we do search inside the package as well as swabbing
the outside. We do use trace detectors. They’re portable. And we turn the machine
setting “ off” for drugs. We are not looking for drugs. Our protocols, like yours, are similar.
Don’t go into wallets. Don’t go into purses. And don’t be reading anybody’s material. It’s
that simple. That’s the reason why we have supervision, to ensure that what Mr.
Butterworth talks about in the MTI report takes place. If you haven’t read it, I strongly
urge you to read it if you’re going to implement such a program in your organization, it’s
an excellent guiding document. Certainly if you take what they wrote and published in
February ' 07, and then compare it with the court case, you just have no idea how close
you were to what the requirements of what the courts indicated. It's phenomenal. You
should be proud of the work that you have done.
Screenings and searches are conducted in the open. It’s not behind a screen, as Chief
MacMillan indicated. It's right there.
It's supervised; it’s random. We record the number in the sergeant’s and in the cop’s
memo books, and then record it at the base. Please, do me a favor. Unless there’s some
set of circumstances that changes it, keep the number the same. It doesn’t have to be
the same for every day. It just has to be the same for the time period that you’re going to
be looking at right now. Because if you change it—
PAUL MACMILLAN
Can I just interject there?
We don’t authorize them to change it. When we went to the random sequential and
computer- generated number, we don't allow anyone to change it. It’s fraught with, “ Why
did you change it?” Did you see somebody that you thought, “ Oh, okay. Let me change it.
One, two, three, four, five. Okay. Now we can get to that person.” So we don’t allow it.
Now if the threat level were to change during the operation, we’d shoot out another
randomized number that would get more people screened. Sorry, Ron.
RON MASCIANA
That's important stuff.
HEATHER
I have a question about that. What's there to back you up on that? How do you prove
documentation.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips 49
PAUL MACMILLAN
One of the officers uses a hand clicker. Then they record it down on a sheet that said,
“ Number eight was selected. There you go.” And he sends it to hand clicker. That’s the
documentation, plus the supervisor there, plus the sheet they fill out.
RON MASCIANA
In the court case, Judge Berman had noted five cases of special need, where sometimes
the governmental interest, rules for public safety, outweigh the privacy interests of an
individual. Keep in mind, unreasonable searches are for an individual wrongdoing, and
this involves a much more broader scope. Let me just read a comment.
“ The government’s need to discover such conditions or to prevent their implementation is
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion of privacy without any measure of
individualized wrongdoing.”
The court case, if you’re interested, is on the web site. I happen to have a copy with me.
It’s a special need, but you have to keep in mind that what we do in baggage screening,
whether it's random or selective, is that all our officers are trained in PATRIOT. If you
don’t use a combination of the two, you’re making a mistake. Don’t rely on one more than
on the other. You can’t say that you’re going to prevent terrorism by just doing random
screening or re- training your officers in selective screening. If you’re going to tell me
today— and I’ve been a police officer for 26 years, and I’ve been using criteria to look for
people who committed crimes—“ Well, just do this by number,” you’re going against the
grain of what we’re taught. You’re going against our instincts. You’re going against our
experience. You’re going against our knowle